Organisational Change and Time
Time is inherent in the very definition of change and thus it underlies any change process. Yet, the role of time in organisational change management research has often been that of an implicit backdrop considered to be of inferior conceptual importance (Huy, 2001; Noss, 2002; Wiebe, 2010). However, following an increased awareness of the necessity to incorporate time as a focal subject matter in organisational analyses (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001; Roe, Waller, & Clegg, 2009; Shipp & Cole, 2015), change management scholars have also turned their attention to the ontological constitution of time and its potential as a vital component in understanding processes of change in organisations (Huy, 2001; Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001; Purser & Petranker, 2005). A recurrent theme in these discussions concerns the constitution of time as either objective or subjective or, in other words, as clock time or event time (Dawson, 2014; Dawson & Sykes, 2016). Clock time is also conceptualised as quantitative time derived from Newtonian assumptions of time as absolute, exogenous, linear and mechanical (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). Organisation and management studies have often associated clock time with time commodification and assumptions about time as a thing to be controlled and managed (Wiebe, 2010). In contrast, when conceptualised as event time, time is perceived as qualitative â a social construction of interpretive value and context dependent (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). In this view, time does not exist externally to phenomena but is entangled with and unfolds with social events that are defined by organisational members (Adkins, 2009). Time, thus, becomes a product of social practices (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002).
We join this discussion by responding to calls for increased temporal awareness in organisational change studies (Dawson, 2014), that is, an approach defined by an explicit focus on the ways time and temporality are used and conceived by organisational agents, and by a conscious effort to integrate both objective and subjective time in theory development. The latter is reflected in the recognition of how forms of objective time, for example, clocks and calendars, are embedded in organisational change practices and, at the same time, how forms of subjective time, for example, the way agents respond to change, will differ according to the temporal assumptions of these agents (Dawson, 2014).
Inspired by the âpractice turnâ in organisation and management studies (Schatzki, Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001), others have looked to bridge the objectiveâsubjective dualism by approaching time as an enacted phenomenon and examining how time is used to structure social practices (Dawson & Sykes, 2016). A particularly noteworthy contribution is the framework of âtemporal structuringâ outlined by Orlikowski and Yates (2002), where agentsâ engagement in the world is seen to transpire through ongoing production and reproduction of temporal structures that guide and orient their daily practices. In this sense, the framework elucidates how practices simultaneously shape and are shaped by temporal structures, which make time itself both a medium and a product of practices (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). Thus, in this view, time is perceived as an organisational force constituted in and constituting of human action and consciousness (Holt & Johnsen, 2019). By bringing objective and subjective structures dialectically together in practice, the framework bares many resemblances to Bourdieuâs ideas about temporality. However, we believe that an analytical framework based on Bourdieuâs temporal conceptualisation of practice offers more comprehensive explanations of this dialectic and its impact on agentsâ responses to organisational change (Koll, 2020). The concept of hysteresis, particularly, allows us to extend Orlikowski and Yatesâ (2002) notion of temporal structuring by theorising those instances when the routine adjustments between subjective and objective structures are disrupted as well as the consequences of this disruption over time (Bourdieu, 2000; Koll, 2020, 2021). Hence, by operationalising the concept, we shed light on the embodied and embedded temporal dimensions of practice and tie these dimensions to the temporal experiences of agents. Our theoretical framework is explained in the following.
Bourdieu and the Temporalisation of Practice
Inspired by Husserlâs concepts of foresight or protention, Bourdieu sees overall being in fields as temporally constituted (Atkinson, 2018). Foresight is the sense for what can be expected from the future grounded in oneâs experience of the past and, thus, it intersects past, present and future (Bourdieu, 1963). The temporal structuring of consciousness arises through a habitus socialised in the field that allows doxas to develop through a relative stability of that which is considered true, important or valued in a field. Bourdieu sees doxas as sets of taken for granted assumptions â an adherence to the self-evidence of the social world that can be recognised both in institutionalised, that is, objectified discourse about the world and in the practices instituted within it (Bourdieu, 1985). Hence, social life in fields transpires through the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures that continuously maintains doxas and thereby constantly confirms that what we believe and experience as being true and important about the world is true and important (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
The concept of foresight concerns âthe feel for the gameâ and the everyday moves through which agents engage in everyday life and struggles over that which is valued in the field (Atkinson, 2018, p. 4; Jensen Schleiter & Ernst, 2020). It explains their temporal navigation in the field and why some practices are chosen over others at particular points in time â without reflexive consciousness. The latter is important since Bourdieu (1990) emphasised that the actions of agents, rather than being purposeful and pre-planned, are the products of the pre-verbal and embodied feel for the game. In other words, the practices and strategies guided by the feel for the game are products of temporalisation through which agents âtranscend[s]â the immediate present via practical mobilization of...