No Lack of Courage

Operation Medusa, Afghanistan

Bernd Horn

• Publisher: Dundurn Press
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781459713260
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Zentralasiatische Geschichte

No Lack of Courage is the story of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation Medusa, the largely Canadian action in Afghanistan from 1 to 17 September 2006, to dislodge a heavily entrenched Taliban force in the Pashmul district of Afghanistan's Kandahar Province. At stake, according to senior Afghan politicians and NATO military commanders, was nothing less than the very existence of the reconstituted state of Afghanistan, as well as the NATO alliance itself. In a bitterly fought conflict that lasted more than two weeks, Canadian, Afghan, and Coalition troops defeated the dug-in enemy forces and chased them from the Pashmul area.

In the end, the brunt of the fighting fell on the Canadians, and the operation that saved Afghanistan exacted a great cost. However, the battle also demonstrated that Canada had shed its peacekeeping mythology and was once more ready to commit troops deliberately to combat. Moreover, it revealed yet again that Canadian soldiers have no lack of courage.

CHAPTER ONE:

“Exporting Stability”:
Canada and Afghanistan

THE SKY WAS A clear blue and the leaves were just beginning to change colour. It was another beautiful early fall day in northern Ontario as the commanding officer (CO) of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR), drove into the training area of Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa to do a range reconnaissance for an upcoming exercise. As his vehicle meandered deeper into the heavily forested rolling hills his cellphone erupted, shattering the calm stillness of the vehicle.

“Colonel, you have to come back—something’s happened, I think it’s important that you be here,” was the cryptic message passed to the CO. Trusting the judgment of his highly intelligent and perpetually calm operations officer, the CO told his driver to return to base. Upon arrival, he was able to watch the second commercial airliner plough into the south tower of the World Trade Center. The battalion was the immediate reaction unit for Land Forces Central Area (LFCA) and without delay began preparing for whatever mission would follow. Little did the “Royals” in 1 RCR know that the events unfolding in New York on the tragic morning of 11 September 2001 would lead to the killing fields of Panjwayi five years later, and would cost so many of them their lives.

The brazen attack by terrorists who, armed solely with cheap, 99-cent box cutters, hijacked fully fuelled commercial airliners and used them to strike not only the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York, but also the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. A fourth hijacked jetliner heading for Washington, D.C., slammed into the ground in Pennsylvania, short of its objective due to the bravery of its passengers. In total, almost 3,000 people were killed in the attacks.

Not surprisingly, Washington responded quickly to the 9/11 attacks in order to protect the American homeland and U.S. facilities and installations abroad. The Americans suspected that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network were responsible for the attacks. They realized that they would need to strike their antagonists overseas. On 14 September, the American Congress authorized President George W. Bush to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack on September or harboured such organizations or persons.”¹

The Americans also called on their NATO allies for help. NATO’s North Atlantic Council met on 12 September to discuss the U.S. request to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that defines “an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America” as “an attack against them all,” and thereby requires each ally to “assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary.”² This was the first time that the Article 5 clause had been invoked.

By 2 October the Americans provided their allies with “clear and compelling evidence” that the AQ had, in fact, been behind the 9/11 attacks. Two days later, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that the Alliance would take collective actions to assist the United States. As such, it dispatched an Airborne Early Warning component (an aircrew consisting of 22 Canadians, 55 Germans, and 74 Americans) to assist with the campaign against terror, and it deployed elements of its Standing Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean Sea.³

In accordance with Treaty requirements, NATO also notified the UN that it intended to invoke Article 5 under the framework of the United Nations Charter provision affirming the inherent right of member states to individual and collective defence. However, the UN Security Council had already met to address the 9/11 attacks on 12 September and urged all states to work together “to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the attacks.” In essence, the UN had already given its approval to NATO on 28 September, when they invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which authorized the use of military force.⁴ Then, on 7 October 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom informed the Security Council that they were taking military action in self-defence, specifically that they were undertaking operations to strike at al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist camps and training and military installations in Afghanistan.

Canada reacted quickly as its southern neighbour and its European allies mobilized for war. On 9/11 Canada, in accordance with its obligations under the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) treaty, became immediately involved.⁵ Moreover, on 7 October, the day the Americans launched Operation Enduring Freedom, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that Canada, “standing shoulder to shoulder with . . . the American people” would deploy sea, land, and air forces to assist the United States.⁶ The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence affirmed, “in those early days the Committee saw two good reasons for Canada to play a role in Afghanistan. One was supporting our long-time American ally in a time of need. The second was that any initiative that our Government could take to counter international terrorism, as called upon by the United Nations, had merit.”⁷

Shortly after the prime minister’s announcement, the deputy chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) responsible for CF operations, issued his intent for Operation Apollo, the code name given to the CF’s support to the American war on terror. On a national level, the strategic aim was to protect Canada, specifically to prevent future attacks on Canada or its allies by eliminating the threat of terrorism. As a result, the government set a number of national objectives:

a. Focus all elements of national, diplomatic, financial, developmental assistance, economic, military intelligence, and law enforcement in order to neutralize the threat posed by terrorists;

b. build the widest possible international coalition against international terrorism including, in particular, the participation of the Islamic world; and

c. make use of all appropriate means to deter and eliminate the support, harbouring, or cooperation of state and non-state actors of terrorists organizations of terrorist organizations.

To ensure that the overarching objectives were achieved, the government also established a set of immediate military objectives that would be undertaken in cooperation with the U.S. and other coalition partners and countries within the region. Those objectives were articulated as:

a. isolating the Taliban regime from all international support;

b. bringing Osama bin Laden and leaders of al Qaeda organization to justice;

c. eliminating the al Qaeda organization as a continuing terrorist threat;

d. taking the appropriate military, diplomatic, and economic action to force the Taliban to cease all support, harbouring, and cooperation with al Qaeda; and

e. immediately addressing the humanitarian needs of the Afghan population.

Mid-term objectives were also articulated. Once again, working in conjunction with its allies, Canada set the reconstruction of Afghanistan as its mid-term objective priority.

By October the Department of National Defence (DND) had earmarked an initial conventional Canadian contribution. It included:

a. a naval task group of two frigates (HMCS Charlottetown and HMCS Halifax), one destroyer (HMCS Iroquois), one replenishment ship (HMCS Preserver), and five maritime helicopters as of 10 November 2001;

b. one frigate (HMCS Vancouver) (with one maritime helicopter) to augment U.S. Carrier Battle Group (CBG) USS John C. Stennis;

c. an airlift task group (ALTG) comprised of three C-130 Hercules and one C-150 Polaris aircraft;

d. a long-range patrol task group (LRPTG) consisting of two CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft; and

e. a national command element (NCE) located with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

The CDS provided a clear mission for the deploying troops. He affirmed that the “CF will contribute to the elimination of the threat of terrorism as a force in international affairs by contributing [Canadian] Joint Task Force South West Asia (CA JTFSWA) to the commander-in-chief (CINC) CENTCOM in support of the U.S.A. led campaign against terrorism in order to protect Canada and its allies from terrorist attacks and prevent future attacks.” His intent was to support the international campaign through an initial six month commitment of military forces, the role of the CF being further refined as the coalition military campaign plan evolved and matured.⁸

However, the Americans did not wait for the Canadian commitment to be fully mobilized. They utilized special operations forces (SOF), CIA paramilitary forces, and air power to help the Northern Alliance anti-Taliban coalition to quickly cut through the Taliban forces. Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance on 13 November. Priority then shifted to the south, namely the Taliban heartland of Kandahar. Within 63 days of commencing the offensive the Americans and their Afghan allies captured Kandahar.⁹ On 14 November, the day after the fall of Kabul, the UN Security Council once again condemned the Taliban government “for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden.” More importantly, to fill the imminent power vacuum, the UN created a transitional government that would establish a “multi-ethnic and fully representative” government.¹⁰

To achieve that goal talks were held in Bonn, Germany, on 27 November 2001. The Bonn Agreement called for an interim authority to be established in Afghanistan on 22 December 2001. This body was to provide leadership for Afghanistan until a representative government could be elected through free and fair elections. To ensure a smooth transition, and to provide security until Afghan National Security Forces could be established, UNSCR 1386 was tabled on 20 December 2001. The newest resolution called for a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan to develop national security structures, assist in reconstruction, and organize and train future Afghan security forces. It also created the British led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was stationed in Kabul.¹¹ Canada opted not to join the largely European initiative at that time.

Instead, Canada decided to deploy a light infantry BG based on the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), on 1 February 2002, to support American operations in the Kandahar area.¹² Throughout the next six months, in support of the American initiatives to destroy Taliban and al Qaeda forces, members from 3 PPCLI and Canadian SOF conducted combat operations with their American counterparts in the Tergul mountain range in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan, as well as in the Gardēz area. By late July 2002, Canada redeployed these ground forces back home.

However, Canadian ground participation in Afghanistan quickly resumed. On 12 February 2003, Canada’s European allies requested Canadian participation in ISAF. John McCallum, the minister of National Defence (MND) at ...