Authoritarian Power And State Formation In Ba`thist Syria

Army, Party, And Peasant

Raymond A Hinnebusch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780429722097
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The social and economic forces that worked together to bring the Ba'thist party to power in 1963: the failure of traditional and liberal leadership, an agrarian crisis, the development of party ideology, the politicization of the army and rural mobilization - are examined in this study. Dr Hinnebusch aims to show how the Ba'th's road to power shaped its ideology and the character of its rule. Attention is then given to the pillars of state power - the army, political organizations and the peasantry. The author concludes that the regime has pursued a dual strategy for maintaining power - placing kin and clientelist networks at the levers of coercive power and building structures based on the mass incorporation of the rural population.

1

Political Theory and the Syrian Ba‘th Case

DOI: 10.4324/9780429042515-1

The Ba‘th Party’s 1963 seizure of power marked a major watershed in modern Syrian history: the collapse of the “old regime” which had inherited power in the first independent Syrian state and its replacement by a counter-elite which set out to forge an entirely new type of state and development strategy. Whether this amounted to a revolution as the Ba‘thists insisted is a matter of controversy. The dominant views hold that it was a mere coup, although there is divergence on the nature of the post-1963 regime. Some hold that the Ba‘th regime amounted to unstable praetorian military rule, others that it coalesced into neo-patrimonial rule by sectarian minorities. Some view the regime as a mere petit bourgeois nationalist reaction to imperialism which quickly evolved into a state bourgeoisie isolated from the masses. All these “schools” share the view that the regime, lacking political institutions capable of incorporating significant support, is narrow based and survives chiefly through repression; the mere creature of sectarian, military, or class elites, it is thought to have little advanced state formation in Syria.

Yet, this view seems strangely at odds with the record. The Ba‘th Party, far from being rootless and ephemeral, has been entrenched as the dominant political force in Syria for decades and, indeed, became the vehicle of a major system transformation. Syria, historically plagued by a weak unstable state, has been ruled since the early sixties by the same party and since 1970 by the same leader, Hafiz al-Asad. Not only durable, this state also appears “stronger” than its predecessors if this is measured by the centralization of power, the expansion of functions, the density of structures, the ability to contain a more mobilized opposition, and growing capabilities as an international actor. This is not readily explained by the dominant views. Each of them undoubtedly captures a different aspect of Ba‘th rule—military, sectarian, class—but to the neglect of other equally crucial dimensions, namely the rural populist roots and the institution-building achievements of the regime.

Authoritarian-Populism

This study will argue that the key concept which gives the most adequate insight into the rise, durability, and nature of the Ba‘th is authoritarian-populism. Authoritarian-populism has been a characteristic feature of the post-colonial world, a particular kind of solution to the challenges facing new states being incorporated as subordinate players in the international state system and dependents of world capitalism. It seeks to establish the authority of a strong state autonomous of the dominant classes and external powers and to launch national economic development aimed at easing dependence and subordinating capitalist forces to populist goals.

Authoritarian-populism is a distinctive subset of authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes typically start out by concentrating decision-making power in the hands of a small elite, often headed by a personalistic, frequently military leader, and rule with the support of the army, through the bureaucracy, and with little tolerance of political pluralism and few mechanisms of accountability; this is true of the populist variant, too. But the establishment of authoritarian power normally has a specific social rationale: such regimes arise out of social conflicts, and, initially at least, take sides in them, excluding and disadvantaging certain social forces to the benefit of others. Authoritarian regimes must thus be distinguished by the particular social interests which shape their ideological orientation. While conservative authoritarianism originates in a bid of the dominant class to block challenges to privilege from below, the populist variant originates in nationalist struggles against imperialism and revolts by middle class or plebeian elements, often from the periphery, against an upper class order. Populist authoritarianism seeks to exclude the old oligarchy from power and challenges dominant interests in the name of nationalism and equality (Huntington 1968:344–396; Almond and Powell 1978:376–381; Malloy 1977). While authoritarian-populist regimes often originate in military coups, to prevail over the powerful interests they challenge, they must mobilize their potential popular constituency. The personal charisma of a populist leader may temporarily bridge the state-society gap but unless routinized in political institutions, this support mobilization is unlikely to be durable. A regime pursuing a populist course against the dominant classes in the name of deprived groups requires a structure able to close the privileged political access of the former and organize the support of the latter: it is therefore likely to adopt some elements of the Leninist single party system, while stopping well short of forging a communist socio-political order. In the Arab world, this has widely resulted in a mixed military-party state which, though authoritarian, is shaped by its populist roots and develops the political organization to incorporate a certain mass base. But such populist regimes have also widely proven vulnerable to transformation in goals and alteration in structure. As they mature, they normally enter a more conservative post-populist phase in which they seek stabilization and accommodation with powerful interests and may abandon limited Leninization for limited liberalization which re-opens political access for the dominant classes.

In the following introduction, the argument of the study will be prefigured and located within the relevant traditions of political development theory. It will focus on two problems: (1) the origins and social base which shape the populist orientation of the regime; this will draw on the literature on political instability, popular and peasant movements, military intervention in politics and the formation of political identities in developing countries; and (2) the regime’s power consolidation strategy and outcome; this will rely on Weber’s concepts of authority, functionalist work on institution-building and a critique of conventional authoritarian theory. The discussion will also try to anticipate how the authoritarian-populist interpretation of the Syrian regime can be accommodated to the central but changing roles of sect, army, class, and national struggle in Syrian politics.

Populist Revolt: The Origins of the Authoritarian-Populist State

An authoritarian-populist regime typically originates in a revolt against established elites by relative “outsiders” in the name of subordinate social forces; going well beyond a mere coup from within the establishment, it makes a substantial break with the past, but it also stops far short of mass revolution from below. There are many studies of military intervention and of great revolutions, but little explicit treatment in the literature of this very important intermediate domain of anti-regime revolt.

The intermediate domain itself embraces movements which vary in the level of political mobilization and the extent of change they impose on society. One pole on this continuum could be marked by Huntington’s (1962; 1968:198–208) “reform” or “breakthrough” coup and Trimberger’s (1978) “revolution from above” in which a military coup against the old oligarchy opens the political arena to the middle class and to major social structural reform, but in the absence of major mass mobilization. At the other end is what Walton (1984) calls national revolts, mass uprisings which, being more uneven and less intense than full scale mass revolutions, do not take on the same anti-system dimensions or end in the same radical transformations, but nevertheless have important consequences. Reality can be yet more complex, mixing elements of these cases. Radical coup-makers could stimulate mass mobilization from above; mass forces could infiltrate and capture part of the state apparatus, and then launch a simultaneous coup and mass revolt; rebellion from below could radicalize the officer corps, precipitating a radical coup. Such cases, combining a radical coup and state-led “revolution from above” with aspects of popular revolt from below will be termed “populist revolt” and can be considered a typical road to power of an authoritarian-populist regime. While such a revolt can take place with far less than the massive mobilization of a great revolution, its success requires a wider coalition of forces than a mere faction of the officer corps, small group of urban intellectuals or single primordial group. Some form of anti-oligarchy alliance between a radicalized middle class, including strategic elements of the officer corps, and politicized segments of the peasantry must produce or develop around the populist leadership and this combination depends on a significant incidence of crisis and conflict in a society. This study will argue that the Ba‘th’s rise to power approximates this phenomenon.

But what are the conditions which make possible the combination of radical military coup, expressive of a middle class “breakthrough,” and peasant revolt? Certain generalizations to be found in the literature on these questions have relevance to the Syrian case.

1. Third World revolt almost universally takes place within a context of imperialist domination, dependency, and nationalist reaction to it. National and social crises are interlinked: imperialism may buttress dominant classes but also undermine their traditional legitimacy; and imperialist penetration is a major source of social crisis, typically blocking autonomous national capitalism. National movements need not assume the radical social character of populist revolt; but where the imperialist impact is especially damaging or durable or the nationalist struggle prolonged they are more likely to do so. The intensity of struggle mobilizes ever more plebeian elements and calls forth ever more radical solutions, including the transformation of indigenous society. Leadership, thus, typically passes from the traditional or liberal upper and upper-middle classes into the hands of petit bourgeois radical intellectuals who, lacking a stake in the status quo, view national independence and social transformation as inseparable and the revolutionary mobilization of the masses as a condition of both; this situation may well lead to the radicalization of the officer corps and mobilization of the peasantry. While this reaches its extreme in modern mass revolutions, in the case of populist revolt it takes a lesser but significant form; Syria fits this category.

2. Social conditions for the rise of a radicalized middle class are typical of many Third World countries, but particularly so in the early stages of modernization when a state leadership rooted in the agrarian bourgeoisie still dominates. Modernization undermines traditional authority, creates a salaried new middle class with rising aspirations, and generates an intelligentsia from which counter-elites may be drawn (Halpern 1963:51–78). If, as is common in cases of delayed dependent development, economic expansion fails to keep pace with social mobilization, and especially if economic growth falters after a period of expansion and expectations are frustrated, a sense of relative deprivation feeds middle class political discontent. As, in these conditions, capitalist development enriches the agrarian-commercial bourgeoisie and exacerbates inequality, conflict over the proper course of development may divide the ruling class and the new middle class (Deutsch 1961; Gurr; Walton 204; Huntington 1968:39–59). Syria in the fifties was a classic case of middle class alienation, a condition which propelled the rise of the Ba‘th.

3. The military is normally elitist and hostile to mass movements but under special conditions army officers may be radicalized. This is most likely: a) where the military establishment is autonomous of the dominant landed class and lacks a strong tradition of corporate elitism, b) where it is recruited from the new middle class or yet lower strata in a society dominated by a traditional elite; military radicalism is most associated with officers of lower middle class background, of a marginal ethnic group, from the hinterland, with personal experience of economic crisis or deprivation and interaction with radical civilian associates, and of younger age. c) where the nation faces exceptional pressure from imperialism or a severe external threat and the military, naturally nationalist, embraces radical reform as the key to national power (Wolpin 9–26, 114–116; Berger 361–398; Halpern 1962; 1963: 251–280; Trimberger; Huntington 1962; 1968:192–237). All these conditions existed in Syria.

4. As Moore (1966) and Huntington (1968:292) argue, the peasantry, the decisive mass force in the outcome of political development in agrarian countries, plays a crucial “swing role:” if peasants are radicalized and mobilized, they provide the shock troops of revolution, but if they remain traditional, they are an anchor of conservative regimes. Between the extremes of peasant revolution and traditional passivity there are, however, many middle cases: peasant revolt or mobilization short of revolution can still affect outcomes and, in particular, may, as part of “populist revolt,” facilitate the emergence of an authoritarian-populist regime. The study will argue that this is so of Syria.

Peasant revolt takes place in a total societal context, but a specifically agrarian crisis provides essential conditions and grievances. This crisis is a function of capitalist penetration of the countryside, making land a commodity, disrupting the village community and issuing in land concentration, tenancy, proletarianization and urban migration. The cash nexus replaces patriarchal or patronage relations. In these conditions, if the landed elite neglects agricultural modernization, while simply extracting a greater surplus from the peasantry, and the growth of population and landlessness generates an intense land hunger, violent landlord-peasant conflict is likely. Small-holders threatened by debt or landlord encroachment may take the lead in peasant mobilization because they possess the necessary independence of landlord control. Share-croppers are likely rebels since this tenure is a zero-sum relation and the landlord dispensable. Peasants threatened with proletarianization have little to lose by anti-system mobilization. A regime which fails to address the agrarian crisis faces, in its peasantry, a permanent reservoir of potential support for system-challenging movements (Russett; Shanin; Wolf; Zagoria; Walton; Paige).

5. Rapid social change and crisis provide conditions for the rise of an anti-system movement, but it takes leadership to translate them into political mobilization. In its early phase, “men of ideas” arise, intellectuals promoting a counter-ideology; critiquing and de-legitimizing the status quo and offering a vision of a better society, they raise the political consciousness of the public. At a later stage the thinkers give way to “men of action” and charismatic leadership may arise to turn ideas into a movement. Militant followers are recruited from the new groups created during, but unsatisfied by, modernization: students and intellectuals, products of the spread of education; the “marginal men” resulting from social atomization—newly-or half-educated persons of modest origins uprooted from traditional communities and insecure, ex-peasants who have recently migrated to the city, the “overeducated” “spiritually underemployed,” white collar employees in dead-end careers. Finally, it takes the party organizers, the technicians of a new political technology, to give broad scale and durability to the movement (Koury). Effective peasant mobilization, in particular, depends on such “outside” leadership which provides the ideology (nationalism, agrarian populism) and organization to break through the local encapsulation of the peasantry and generate broader peasant identifications. Radical intellectuals or “ex-peasant” urban migrants who become students or workers may provide this linkage (Hobsbawm; Walton).

6. The failure of the political system and its legitimacy are important ingredients in populist revolt. Ruling elites which fail to permit evolutionary change and refuse to open existing political institutions to middle class participatory demands are likely to face revolutionary ferment. In the face of radical challenges, they may lose their cohesion and abil...