Allied Wartime Diplomacy

A Pattern In Poland

Edward J Rozek

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780429714269
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

Originally published in 1959, this volume is a symposium from Official Government documents, Mikolajczyk's private files and other Polish sources is an indictment of Soviet policy towards Poland and of the Western Allies' leniency towards Stalin.

1Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy

DOI: 10.4324/9780429044434-1

The study of the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy is one of the most perplexing riddles for those who seek to explain its long-range objectives. As will be shown, its ultimate goal is the elimination of what the Soviets call the capitalistic world and the establishment of Soviet world domination in its place. But, since their aim requires the destruction of those fundamental values in Western society which assert the dignity of man and challenge the arbitrary powers of society and the state, what is at stake is not so much the issue of "capitalism" as the survival of Western civilization itself. If this civilization is to survive such a systematic long-range offensive from the communists, it needs to supplement its inherent strength with an endeavor to understand the nature of this implacable threat and to find counter measures which can effectively match and check Soviet actions.

The Soviets were among the first to realize the inadequacy of Marx's Utopian assumptions that capitalism could not survive the inevitable victory of the "proletariat." They became convinced that the downfall of capitalism required more than the automatic operation of Marx's historical materialism, and they therefore applied themselves to the task of building an effective machine to help accelerate this downfall.

In the earlier stages of the development of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks had no clear conception of the state policy needed to help bring about the communist goal which was "historically inevitable." But, as time went by, the ever-present aim of their activities (the destruction of their opponents and world supremacy) came to be more vividly defined and the methods to achieve that goal perfected. They believed that their ideology embodied the purpose of all collective efforts, that, in fact, the ideology was a statement of such purposes. It was, they held, the ultimate justification for the existence of both the Soviet individual and his community.

The greatest immediate tasks which they set themselves were to train efficient revolutionaries, to create a strong party, and to set up a powerful state. These were to be stepping stones towards the achievement of the distant goal.

In the beginnings of the Soviet State, its leaders hoped that a series of revolutions would bring about the downfall of the international capitalist system. But soon bitter experience convinced the rulers in the Kremlin that revolutionary forces abroad were not powerful enough to do this and that they would have to be supplemented by the activities of the Soviet State if world communism was to be promoted in the future. A series of unplanned events led Stalin to assign to the Soviet Union the same role in the constellation of states which Marx assigned to the working class in an individual capitalist society. This meant that the burden of weakening and destroying the non-communist states would rest on the shoulders of the Soviet State. Since the strength of the Soviet Union was not yet sufficient to achieve that objective (let alone the greater objective of victorious world communism) through direct use of military force, it was only logical that the task of waging political and economic warfare against capitalism should be entrusted to Soviet foreign policy and its strategic diplomacy.

The Soviets' aim is to achieve not so much world communism as the destruction of capitalism, which is expected to be achieved by a skillful application of strategy and tactics.

The duty of tactics is primarily as follows: While guided by the indications of strategy and drawing on the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the workers of all countries, it must be determined by the forms and methods of fighting that are most closely in accord with the concrete situation of the struggle at the given moment.¹

Since the original Marxist theory did not prescribe the exact tactical measures to be taken for the execution of strategic goals, the self-appointed disciples of Marx in each generation are therefore "free" to determine the methods for executing the "will of history" by exempting it from the yoke of inevitability.

The choice of tactics was, however, determined by empirical necessity as understood by the actors of the drama. Finally, tactics would merge into strategy. All of this, in practice, amounts to extreme opportunism or expediency successfully developed in the field of diplomacy and revolutionary policies. In each case, Marxian assumptions and prescriptions are invoked to give justification, motivation, and "grace" to the actions taken. Since all these rationalizations are performed in the name of the Marxian goal which still lies in the distant and indefinite future, and since no proof to the contrary can be derived from an unfulfilled future, a judgment of Soviet acts in terms of their allegiance to communism strongly tends to confirm the practical adequacy of their strategy. The success of their foreign policy testifies to this. The destruction of capitalism seems to be closer to, not further from, realization than it was prior to World War II.

Every other system that does not conform to communism is considered to be an enemy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets constantly emphasize the conviction that the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by a hostile world. This argument, in turn, serves as a justification for the strong, coercive measures used to force people to greater sacrifices. Theoretically, these sacrifices were for "defensive" purposes, but in practice they became a prerequisite for the attainment of the ultimate goal in a strategically chosen time. Whether this goal is attained by "defensive" or "offensive" measures is a matter of complete indifference to the Soviets. An absence of "forces hostile" to the Soviet Union would make it extremely difficult to justify and explain to the people of the U.S.S.R. the totalitarian internal policies inherent in such a system. An enemy, imaginary or real, is essential for the Kremlin's expansionist policies, for it is on this scapegoat that the Kremlin relies to divert and channel the inevitable hostilities of its population.

As early as 1925 Stalin identified the United States as the chief imperialistic nation in the world.

The predominant financial exploiter of the world, and, therefore, the most influential creditor, is the United States. Britain is no more than the Chief Assistant of that Country.²

The Soviets maintain that European capitalists, in order to obtain new markets for their surplus products and increase their profits to repay their debts to the United States were forced to plot the conquest of the U.S.S.R., and, in order to do this, were driven to exploit their domestic proletariats. By these actions they tried to suppress the growth of the revolutionary movement against this American-caused exploitation.

On March 10, 1939 in his report to the Central Committee of the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin maintained that the United States tried to turn the Axis against the Soviet Union.³ After the end of World War II, Stalin accused Churchill and the United States of setting up an anti-Soviet bloc.⁴ He conveniently forgot the coups d'état in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the war in Greece, the violation of the Yalta obligations to hold free elections in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. It was after consideration and analysis of these aggressions and violations that the West was led to take appropriate measures for its protection. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been and is considered as the main opponent of communism because of her strength and because of her successful resistance to Soviet expansion since 1947.

Yet, while branding Western leaders as aggressive, Stalin distinguished the "people" as a separate entity and expressed his deep friendship for the latter, no doubt hoping to drive a wedge between the people and their elected rulers. The whole phenomenon illustrates a fundamental concept in the strategy of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviets supplemented the theory of class war with the notion of the "inevitability" of the war of nations, and the Soviets decided to put the main emphasis on the war of states and subordinate class war to the strategy of international war. To be successful, that is, to emerge victorious from the struggle of states for power, for world domination, is thus the ultimate aim of the Soviet version of Marxism, and belief in its fulfillment is the chief basis for their allegiance to it. Thus, in this war of states, the Soviet State will play a decisive role and represent the culminating stage of a whole process of historical development.

From an analysis of Bolshevik behavior from 1917 to the present, one cannot escape the conclusion that the temporary departures from ultimate Marxian objectives were only "detours" of varying length and significance, but that in the end, they joined the general pattern of striving to achieve the prescribed goal: the expansion of the Soviet power over the ruins of capitalism. At no time, however, did they forget that the interest of the Soviet State will serve as a means to their ultimate aim.

If the interest of the Soviet State were an end in itself, there have been many occasions when the Soviets could have profited more by establishing lasting and friendly relations than by provoking hostilities.

Throughout the existence of their State, the Soviets have remained consistent in their verbal profession of Marxist ideals and in their acceptance of a Marxist interpretation of politics, vigorously justifying their opportunism and their flexibility of tactics to achieve the final goal. The successors of Stalin have adhered to this pattern no less than he.

In the ultimate analysis, the meaning of Soviet foreign policy can be understood only in terms of their belief in the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the advent of Soviet victory. Every effort is made to keep that assumption alive and to achieve its realization. The belief in the incompatibility of these two systems and the inevitability of Western defeat generates the psychological strength necessary for the vigilance of the Soviet bloc and the predatory tendency to take every advantage of Western mistakes or complacency.

Knowing that the Western Powers are fundamentally interested in global peace and that in order to preserve it they would be willing to satisfy (at least partly) Soviet demands in a specific area of the world, the Bolsheviks resolved to attain their goal piecemeal. By posing as a formidable opponent, by making excessive demands at almost regular intervals, by generating pressures engendering the fear of war, and by extracting concessions profitable only to themselves, the Soviets managed to seize objective after objective from their adversaries. Skillful use of these techniques combined with other more organic factors increased the political and military stature of the Soviet Union from a position of insignificance in 1917 to one of great power in 1957.

Given the dual role of the Soviet Union as a headquarters of world communism and as a major military power, the strategy and tactics of the latter in dealing with other states are their most effective means of advancing the aims of the former. The successes of their foreign policy can be largely explained by the mobility with which they switch back and forth between the revolutionary tactics of foreign infiltration and the traditional diplomatic and military pressures of Machiavellian power politics.

As the history of the Soviet Union makes clear, the social, economic, and political disruptions which follow in the wake of war provide the Soviet Union with the most favorable opportunities to practice their versatile arts of paralyzing resistance and seizing control wherever they can by whatsoever means they can find.

The Second World War again gave them a highly favorable opportunity to use the resources of their diplomacy, their followers abroad, the Red Army, and the secret police towards consolidating their power at home and vastly extending their influence abroad.

Western appreciation for the outstanding contribution of the Soviet armed forces made to defeat German power provided the Soviets with an opportunity to secure the political fruits of war for themselves and, by the same token, to deny these to the West.

In the scheme of Soviet war and post-war objectives was their determination to establish control over Eastern Europe. To do this, the Soviets felt bound to conquer Poland. The following pages will attempt to document exactly how this was achieved.

Notes

• ¹Strategy and Tactics of the Proletarian Revolution, New York, International Publishers, 1936, pp. 28-29.
• ²Joseph Stalin, Leninism, New York, International Publishers, 1928, p. 359.
• ³Leninism, Selected Writings, New York, International Publishers, 1945, pp. 438-442.
• ⁴Information Bulletin, Washington, Embassy of the US.S.R., March 19, 1946, Vol. VI, p. 225.

2Historical Background of Soviet-Polish Relations

From 1917 to September 1939

DOI: 10.4324/9780429044434-2

1. The Setting

Although we have no detailed individual case study which would illustrate all the principles involved in the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy, a study of the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland between the years 1939 and 1947 may serve as a partial illustration of these principles. This is so because Soviet-Polish relations in that period reflected the relationships which existed between the Soviet Union and the two major Western Powers, namely, Great Britain and the United States; thus Soviet-Polish relations are to be understood within the broader framework of Soviet foreign policy specifically, and allied wartime dip...