A Seat at the Table

New Zealand and the United Nations Security Council 2015–2016

Graham Hassall, Negar Partow

• Publisher: Massey University Press
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780995135499
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This fascinating look at global politics follows New Zealand's fourth term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, from 2015 to 2016. Its engrossing chapters by key players, from the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Murray McCully to the two-term New Zealand President of the Security Council Gerard van Bohemen, offer real insights into the Council's day-to-day workings. This book examines New Zealand's efforts to improve Council processes, and asks: Given the dominance of the P5—the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom—is there a role on the Security Council for smaller nations? And can they effect meaningful change for those suffering in war-torn and corrupt countries?

PART 1: THE CAMPAIGN

1. Why seek a seat on the UN Security Council?

Murray McCully

2. The campaign: An impossible journey?

Simon Draper

3. Lifting engagement with Africa

James Kember

4. The New York perspective

Jim McLay

Murray McCully addresses the Security Council during New Zealand’s first term as President in July 2015. MFAT

1. Why seek a seat on the UN Security Council?

Murray McCully

New Zealand’s campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2015–16 term was initiated by the Clark Government. Its endorsement by the John Key-led National Government was not automatic. It was the subject of some discussion and debate.

The decision to proceed was not a reflection of a wholly positive view of the UN and its various off-shoots. It would be difficult to refute the assertions of its many critics that the UN is inefficient, ineffective, ponderous and often hypocritical. New Zealand’s engagement with the UN is not a ringing endorsement of that body’s performance; rather, it is the result of a completely pragmatic decision that multilateralism is in New Zealand’s interest.

The alternative to multilateralism is a world in which the big guys always win and the small guys always lose. And that would be very bad news for a small country like ours. It is in New Zealand’s interest to support good bodies of international rules and good institutions to promote them. Nowhere is this more true than in relation to the UN Security Council — the most important UN body, charged with maintaining international peace and security. And if that body was not performing to an acceptable standard, surely our goal should be to bring about some necessary improvements? We should seek to use a short two-year term on the Council to improve the manner in which it discharged its responsibilities, and to highlight the structural and cultural changes that might improve its operations for the future.

It was on this basis that I recommended to the prime minister that the government should endorse the campaign for UNSC membership and make it a foreign policy priority. It was on this basis that we campaigned to become one of two Western Europe and Others Group members of the Council for the 2015–16 term.

We sought no additional funding for our Security Council campaign — it was funded entirely from within a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) baseline, which had already been reduced by 4 per cent in response to the global financial crisis. But we mounted an energetic campaign built around ministerial and special-envoy visits, vigorous use of our diplomatic footprint and consistent messaging. There is no substitute to calling directly on counterparts and asking for their vote.

Our messages were simple. If elected we would be good listeners and fair-minded decision-makers. We would try to do what was right rather than what was popular. We would work to provide a voice at the Council for the smaller states that are so often ignored, and would take a particular interest, given our role in the Pacific, in issues affecting small island developing states (SIDS). And we would work to reform the Council and improve its culture.

Receiving the votes of three-quarters of the UN membership on the first ballot was a very good outcome. Even better, it was my clear impression that our support was even stronger towards the end of our term — a consequence of New Zealand making good on its campaign commitments.

We were seen as a strong champion of the interests of SIDS — a group of over 40 UN members that often struggle to be heard. We tried to ensure that the Council faced up to difficult issues when many of the permanent Council members found this inconvenient. We challenged the privileges of the permanent members, including the exercise of the veto. And when we had to choose between our integrity and our friends, we chose the former.

Our term on the Security Council was good for New Zealand’s reputation, but it also brought a significant additional benefit: it made us, at least for a while, much more international in our focus. For a nation that is so dependent on international trade, New Zealand is a very insular country in which foreign policy issues attract limited public debate and lamentably poor media coverage. We underestimate both the importance of international affairs to our own fortunes and the strength of New Zealand’s voice when we choose to employ it. Campaigning for, and then serving on, the Security Council provided a useful reminder of both these important messages.

The Security Council chamber. UN, 764010

2. The campaign: An impossible journey?

Simon Draper

Election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is determined by the UN Charter. Article 18 states:

• Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
• Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council …

Thus, election to the UNSC is — like all elections — ultimately a numbers game. As at October 2014, the number of votes needed to be elected to the UNSC was 129 votes (two-thirds of the 193 UN member states). Not 128 nor 130, but 129.

BACKGROUND¹

New Zealand’s decision to stand for the UNSC, following a recommendation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), was announced by then Prime Minister Rt Hon Helen Clark at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York in September 2004. The early decision to stand — even by UN standards — was to discourage competition and build a secure position for a vote in October 2014.

In March 2008, following a change in their government, Australia declared its intention to run for the UNSC in 2012–14. Internally, this was seen as a complication for New Zealand, as it would mean the informal CANZ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) grouping would be running UNSC candidatures back-to-back from 2010 to 2016, and thus create a perception that New Zealand was ‘greedy’. Short of withdrawing and waiting another decade or two for a possible attempt, there was little New Zealand could do. It did mean, however, that this campaign would not be able to rely on the CANZ ‘brand’ as New Zealand had often deployed in the past, but would be run totally on its own record.

After some debate about the merits and value of proceeding in 2009, the New Zealand National Government, who had withdrawn New Zealand’s Human Rights Council bid in April 2008 to allow the United States bid to go forward, reconfirmed New Zealand’s commitment at the General Assembly that year through Prime Minister Rt Hon John Key. The appointment of the then Hon Jim McLay in 2009 to the position of permanent representative in New York was one of the first visible signals of the government’s intent.

At this point, MFAT, in implementing the process of formal approaches in New York and in capitals, began to establish a UNSC-dedicated database, and adopt a more organised approach to vote-swapping.² MFAT’s United Nations, Human Rights and Commonwealth Division (UNHC) director Dr James Kember focused on a vulnerability for New Zealand, which was the lack of reach into Africa (54 votes), and eventually he was appointed as New Zealand’s ambassador to the African Union in Addis Ababa.

Spain’s entry in 2005, then Turkey’s entry into the race in 2011, coupled with UNSC campaign losses for Canada and Finland, were potential setbacks to New Zealand’s chances, a project that was always a ‘reach’ for a small foreign ministry like New Zealand’s. Spain had large natural constituencies with the European Union (EU) and the Hispanic-speaking world. As a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and as both an OECD (Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation) and G77 (a UN coalition of 135 developing countries) member, Turkey had a natural pool of votes, too. Things did not look good for New Zealand; indeed, the prevailing narrative was that New Zealand would lose against such formidable, well-resourced, well-connected and active competitors.

Soon after arriving in the role of Divisional Manager UNHC in January 2012, it was clear to me that two immediate tasks needed to be completed. The first was agreeing on a simple, clear but authentic message as to why countries should vote for New Zealand. What was our value proposition? And how would we sell it? This was achieved through some relatively quick but intensive brainstorming, with input from our Communications Division. When finalised in March 2012, this became the reference document for what we would say, how we would act, how we would not act, how we would get our message to resonate with different audiences, and finally how we would deliver the message. Referred to simply as the ‘map’, this single A3 page was, I believe, the single most important document in driving the campaign consistently and coherently over 2012–14 until the vote.

At its core was a simple message that New Zealand is ‘fair, practical and constructive’. All of New Zealand’s messaging and actions from March 2012 to October 2014, from New York to Ouagadougou, hung on the central proposition that ‘New Zealand’s record as a fair-minded and practical nation at home means we are committed to working with all member states to find constructive solutions’. While this does not exactly slip off the tongue, it provided enough substance for us to have a consistent message, which could still be adapted for any particular member state(s) with whom we were engaged.

Secondly, the restructure of MFAT through 2012–13, and the decision to run a candidature for the Director-General position of the World Trade Organization (WTO), meant that it was necessary to prosecute an intensive internal campaign within MFAT. In 2012, there was a general ambivalence about the campaign. While the New York embassy post (NYK) was focused on the campaign, it was clear from the failures of Canada and Finland that this needed to be a whole-of-Ministry — indeed whole-of-government — effort, if we were to succeed.

The MFAT leaders’ meeting in April 2013 — at which Minister McCully articulated the UNSC campaign as New Zealand’s number one foreign policy priority — led to increased buy-in from regional divisions and embassy posts, including outreach by a cadre of special envoys of the prime minister to nearly every country of the world. Despite initial fears that this year of ‘internal’ focus was lost time for campaigning, it did not damage New Zealand’s prospects. Many member states were clear they would not focus on the 2014 WEOG (Western European and Others Group) election until the 2012 WEOG election had been held. This meant, however, that as soon as the 2012 election was completed New Zealand could quickly move with an internal cohesion that may otherwise have been absent.

By 2014 the campaign was seen as a rallying point for MFAT organisational unity, and an opportunity to rediscover and regenerate New Zealand’s vision of itself in the world. It can be argued that by the time of the vote New Zealand had a better sense and connectivity to the global interests and issues of all other 192 UN member states. Key to the campaign was a development of ‘one team’, especially between NYK and UNHC, which traditionally can be a testing relationship. The idea was to use the time difference between the two units so that staff were seamlessly joined up helping and supporting colleagues to prepare material for use in NYK and Wellington, and the wider network. The key was to see the time difference as an advantage, not a disadvantage (as we did for example during the July/August period, during which the northern hemisphere is on summer break, but the southern hemisphere is not).

STRATEGY (WYSIWYG)

In a June 2012 speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA), Minister McCully made clear the parameters under which the New Zealand campaign would operate:

Both the Prime Minister and I laid down two very clear conditions: we would not attempt to buy a seat on the Security Council, either by spending New Zealand taxpayers’ dollars or by changing New Zealand policy positions. It is very important that these conditions should be understood. Because they defy what some commentators and analysts believe to be the accepted wisdom associated with modern Security Council campaigns. That view holds that contested Security Council seats will always fall to the highest bidder of aid dollars, or to the holder of the most flexible positions on the controversial foreign policy issues of the day. Let me be very clear: if the proponents of that view are correct then we will lose our bid for a Security Council seat for 2015–16. We will lose because we, as a small country, do not have the aid resources to be able to campaign effectively on that basis. And even if we did, I, for one, would decline to do so.³

This very useful enunciation of the government’s attitude towards the campaign, which aligned with our internal value position, enabled us to consistently project an ‘authentic’ message. It was a case of WYSIWYG: what you see is what you get. It also informed our decision not to run a negative campaign, and to use the campaign as an opportunity to learn more about the 192 other UN member states. This was our ‘no regrets policy’ — that is, win or lose the UNSC vote, New Zealand’s foreign policy knowledge and skills would be of a higher standard because of the campaign itself. With clear direction from ministers and clarity over our own messaging, key decisions made in terms of our strategy included the following.

Discipline around messaging

As wordsmiths, there was considerable internal angst that our message could be ‘tighter, or richer, or more expansive, or did not resonate with region X or Post Y’. The UNHC/NYK teams were relentless in ensuring that key messages were adhered to. We were aware that our competitors would look for inconsistency or incoherence in our messaging, so we were ruthless in terms of consistency. Nevertheless, we needed to ensure that when responding to the inevitable requests from member states for some sort of assistance, the ‘no’ was conveyed in such a way as not to damage the relationship.

Hearts and minds vote

Each country in the UN had two votes to cast. In order to secure our election, we calculated that existing ‘obligations’ (vote swaps, regional alliances, economic inducements, etc.) would tie up one vote. New Zealand’s objective was to get the other available votes. We wanted to position ourselves to obtain the ‘hearts and minds’ vote, the ‘do the right thing’ vote. This was to some degree considered naïve. Australian Ambassador Richard Butler’s 1996 pronouncement on Australia losing their UNSC campaign — that ‘New York was full of rotten lying bastards [RLB]’⁴ — had influenced opinion in New Zealand that there was little honour in New York. As it turned out, New Zealand’s euphemistically called ‘discount rate’ or ‘RLB factor’ — the difference between those who say they will vote for you and those who actually do — was in single percentage figures. The vast majority of countries kept their word.

People-to-people links

Connected to the ‘hearts and minds’ approach was an acceptance that although it was...