Aleutian Campaign In World War II: A Strategic Perspective

Major John A. Polhamus

• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Year: 2015
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781786250674
• Index: History

This work is a detailed historical study of the Second World War's little known Aleutian Campaign in the North Pacific, commonly referred to as the "Forgotten War." After describing the events that transpired in the North Pacific throughout the war, this work focuses on the strategic reasons why the United States and Japan decided to dedicate critical and limited resources to a secondary effort in the North Pacific. The strategies are compared to determine which country dedicated a higher percentage of available manpower and resources to the region and which country gained an advantage from their respective propaganda efforts. Despite the United States' tactical and operational victories in the North Pacific, the Japanese benefited at the strategic level. Secondary theaters of operations, like the Aleutians during World War II, produced many lessons that were applied to other theaters during the war and remain relevant today in the Global War on Terrorism.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

A soldier stood at the Pearly Gate;

His face was wan and old.

He gently asked the man of fate

Admission to the fold.

“What have you done,” Saint Peter asked,

“To gain admission here?”

“I’ve been in the Aleutians

For nigh unto a year.”

Then the gates swung open sharply

As Saint Peter tolled the bell.

“Come in,” said he, “and take a harp.

“You’ve had your share of hell.”{1}

Warrant Officer Boswell Boomhower

The Aleutian Campaign in the Pacific Theater of Operations in World War II is not a well-known or much publicized campaign. This fifteen month-long struggle is often referred to as the “Forgotten War.” It is, however, the only campaign that included ground combat on American soil in the Western Hemisphere in World War II. Why was it necessary for Japan and the United States to fight in such a remote, inhospitable, and desolate part of the world? What was the strategic significance of the Aleutians in World War II as viewed from the Japanese and American perspective?

The Aleutian chain consists of approximately 120 islands stretched over a 1,000 miles from the Alaska Peninsula on the eastern most portion to Attu Island in the west, 90 miles from the Russian province of Kamchatka. Dutch Harbor on the island of Unalaska provides a relatively good anchorage for the Navy 610 miles east of Kiska Island. This naval base is 2,000 miles from both Honolulu and San Francisco. The Aleutian chain is only 750 miles from the northernmost of the Japanese Kurile Islands. Figure 1 depicts the Aleutians in relation to the entire Pacific Theater.

All the Aleutian Islands were formed by volcanoes and they are uniformly rocky and barren. There are no trees to speak of on the islands and very little brush cover the many precipitous mountains. The lowlands are covered with muskeg or tundra up to three feet thick. This spongy growth makes maneuvering, by foot or vehicle, very difficult. At sea, navigation is hazardous due to the submerged rock formations and jagged shorelines. Aviation operations are often hampered by a wind sheer phenomenon known as a “williwaw” which produces sudden gale force wind squalls. In 1943, weather conditions became progressively worse toward the western end of the Aleutian chain as rain and fog were the norm. On Attu, for example, five to six days a week were likely to be rainy and there was rarely more than ten clear days annually.

By April 1942, after a series of Japanese military victories, Japan’s military leadership was debating its future objectives. The Imperial Army commanders favored a southern push into the south pacific which would potentially lead to the invasion of Australia. The naval strategy, following the leadership of Pearl Harbor’s mastermind Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, sought to complete the destruction of the U.S. Navy by destroying its remaining aircraft carriers. On 18 April 1942, just over four months after the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor, Colonel James “Jimmy” Doolittle led a successful attack on Tokyo by flying sixteen land-based B-25 “Mitchell” medium bombers off the deck of the USS Hornet. The symbolic raid on Tokyo produced little physical damage but sent tremors through Japan’s leadership and struck at the nation’s morale. Unsure of where the attack originated, many Japanese incorrectly surmised that the only place that could support a land-based B-25 attack was from the western Aleutians; it wasn’t until after the war that Japan conclusively learned the true nature of the Doolittle raid.{2} Until the raid, Japanese defenses consisted of a picket line of vessels positioned 800 miles from the home islands in order to provide early warning. With a breech of their defensive buffer zone, the Japanese Imperial High Command expressed an interest in expanding the zone and preventing future attacks by capturing the Aleutians.

Yamamoto capitalized on Japan’s perceived northern flank vulnerability by devising a comprehensive plan to destroy the American fleet while securing the Aleutians simultaneously. In an attempt to extend Japan’s defensive perimeter in the north and central portion of the Pacific Theater, while at the same time defeating the remnants of the United States Pacific Fleet, Yamamoto devised a plan to capture the Midway Islands. The plan to capture Midway, dubbed “Operation MI,” was approved by the Imperial General Headquarters on 5 May 1942, less than one month before its planned execution. The plan called for the employment of nearly the entire Japanese Combined Fleet consisting of over 100,000 troops and 176 warships.

As a diversionary supporting attack, Yamamoto launched a portion of his fleet to attack the American bases in the Aleutians. The Japanese Northern Area Fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya and consisted of two small aircraft carriers, five cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines and four troop transports.{3} The Northern Area Fleet was responsible for a two phased operation. First, the carriers would launch an early morning surprise attack on the largest U.S. naval base in the Aleutians at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska, followed by an amphibious assault to destroy the American base at Adak.{4} This initial phase of the Aleutian attack was designed to lure the United States Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in order to oppose the attack. The second phase of the Aleutian attack was to occupy Attu and Kiska, two islands on the western end of the Aleutian chain. Once the U.S. fleet was enroute to defend Alaska, Yamamoto planned to unleash his main attack to seize Midway. Since Midway was within land-based bombing range of Hawaii, Yamamoto surmised that the United States would redirect its fleet to prevent the island’s capture. The Japanese fleet, spearheaded by the massive battleship Yamato, would be waiting in ambush to destroy the American fleet, thereby affording the Japanese a favorable negotiating position to end hostilities.

Ever since America’s entry into World War II with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, America was moving frantically to defend her interests in the pacific region including the U.S. territory in Alaska. President Roosevelt authorized the bifurcated defense strategy in the Pacific giving General Douglas MacArthur command of the island hopping offensive in the southwest pacific. The remainder of the Pacific Theater, too include Alaska on the northern rim, fell to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz. Prior to the Battle of Midway, the American military had approximately 45,000 personnel on duty in Alaska with about 13,000 stationed on the Alaskan peninsula or the Aleutian chain itself.{5} Figure 2 is a map depicting the Aleutian archipelago.

As a result of the American code-breaking skills in the intelligence community, the American military was able to decipher the Japanese Midway attack plan to include the Aleutian phase of the operation. To combat the Northern Area Fleet and defend Alaska, Admiral Nimitz created a new task force under the command of Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald which consisted of one-third of the Pacific’s surface fleet. On 25 May 1942, Theobald’s force, designated Task Force 8 and consisting of five cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and six submarines, quietly left Pearl Harbor to take up positions in Alaskan waters and wait for Hosogaya’s arrival.{6} With the remainder of the fleet and in particular the aircraft carriers, Admiral Nimitz was able to turn the table on Yamamoto and to catch him by surprise at Midway resulting in the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers and the prevention of the capture of Midway Island. After the decisive American victory at Midway, Yamamoto ordered his northern fleet, which was enroute back to Japan, to return to the Aleutians and to seize the islands of Attu and Kiska. This unopposed island seizure was Japan’s attempt to salvage their huge lose at Midway. In fact, the Japanese government shielded the Midway defeat from their public and instead, heralded the Aleutian campaign as a decisive victory against the Americans. In contrast, the Americans, who were celebrating their success at Midway took several days to realize that Japanese forces had occupied the western Aleutians.{7}

Now that the Japanese physically controlled a portion of American soil in the Western Hemisphere, they dug in to fortify their positions for the inevitable fight. American military commanders in charge of the defense of Alaska—Rear Admiral Theobald, Commander North Pacific Area under Admiral Nimitz, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Army’s Western Defense Command and his primary subordinate, Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commander of the Alaska Defense Command—all urged for an early offensive aimed at ejecting the Japanese off of Attu and Kiska. After a few weeks, however, Washington and specifically the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, felt there were other strategic priorities and, as a result, reinforcements to the Aleutians were slow to come.{8} For eleven months the Japanese prepared their gains by constructing extensive trench and tunnel networks and working to complete runways on each island. In order to oppose the Japanese on the western tip of the Aleutian chain, the meager American forces, with slowly arriving reinforcements, had to first traverse the length of the chain by constructing a series of bases and airfields among the islands. Adak was occupied on 30 August 1942 and the airfield was amazingly completed less than two weeks later. On 12 January 1943, Amchitka was the next island occupied and, once again, in extremely harsh conditions, a fighter strip was operational in mid-February. The nature of the conflict changed as land-based aircraft were now positioned within one hundred miles of Kiska and capable of providing frequent and steady bombing.

The Aleutian campaign, however, was not limited to just island hopping. The United States Navy and Army Air Corps actively patrolled the waters surrounding the Aleutians in order to gain supremacy and to isolate the Japanese island garrisons. On 26 March 1942, Task Group Mike, an American naval task force under command of Rear Admiral Charles McMorris and consisting of four destroyers and two cruisers, was patrolling west of Attu with orders to intercept any Japanese ships attempting to resupply or reinforce the enemy held islands.{9} Contact was made just before dawn and the ensuing 3 1/2-hour-long battle became the longest and last classic daylight surface naval battle of the war. The Battle of the Komandorskis, named due to the proximity of the Russian islands, was considered an American victory because Task Group Mike was able to force a numerically superior Japanese naval force into withdrawing. As a result, Japan was unable to adequately resupply or reinforce Attu before the upcoming battle.

On 11 May 1943, using land-based aircraft and naval support, the American Army launched an amphibious operation, named Sandcrab, to retake Attu. What was expected to last only three days, took the 15,000 strong American force nearly three weeks to defeat the Japanese island garrison of less than 3,000 troops. With only twenty-nine Japanese soldiers taken prisoner, American forces were introduced to the Japanese spiritual Bushido code of honor, which demanded victory or death; they were amazed by the human sacrifice Japan was willing to endure.{10} A determined enemy and unforgiving weather made the Battle of Attu one of the costliest fights in the Pacific, second only to Iwo Jima, in terms of percentage of casualties versus the number of enemy engaged.

In order to recapture Kiska, where more than twice as many Japanese were stationed, the Allies amassed a force of over 34,000 better trained and better equipped troops, including many Canadians. On 15 August 1943, Operation Cottage commenced to retake Kiska. Unbeknownst to the Allies, the Japanese had secretly evacuated their entire garrison nearly three weeks before. In less than one hour, Japanese surface ships managed to successfully withdraw over 5,000 men from Kiska under the cover of thick fog. This daring operation essentially ended 439 days of hostilities in the Aleutians during World War II. American forces that were once defending the United States’ northern flank, were now threatening Japan’s. With the Japanese no longer occupying portions of the Aleutians, the American military worked quickly to fortify the chain. Consequently, runways were completed on Attu and Kiska and a new 10,000 foot long, heavy-bomber capable runway was constructed on the tiny island of Shemya. For the duration of the war, the Aleutian bases were used as staging areas for a handful of air and sea attacks against Paramushiro and other Japanese Kurile Island bases.

Compared to other campaigns in the Pacific during World War II, there is not a lot written about the “Forgotten War.” Most of the available accounts focus primarily on the operational and tactical nature of the conflict and not the strategic level. Primary source accounts from the campaign’s veterans do an excellent job of depicting the harshness of the terrain and weather at the warfighter level. These recollections are also one sided and heavily biased against their former enemy. Most of the traditional open source accounts of the conflict during the war were stifled by military censorship. In August 1941, in a...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER 2 - THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
• CHAPTER 3 - THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE
• CHAPTER 4 - A STRATEGIC COMPARISON
• CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY