The Falaise Pocket. World War II Allied Encirclement Of The German Armies.

Failure Or Success Of The Allied Leadership And Planning?

Major Braden DeLauder

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782897927
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

By Aug. 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early Aug., Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the 'Ultra' intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket.
To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of Aug., Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket.
I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn't Eisenhower get involved?
The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket's gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

United States Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The Papers of General Omar N. Bradley

The Hansen Diary (Aide to Bradley)

The War Diary of William Sylvan (Aide to General Hodges)

Oral Interview with Pete Quesada (Commander, Ninth Tactical Air Command)

Oral Interview with General Dempsey (Commander, Second British Army)

Oral Interview with Lord Tedder (Chief of Staff, Air Ministry)

Oral Interview with Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham (Montgomery’s Tactical Air Force Commander)

The War Department Observers Board. Report 208, Aug. 31, 1944, NHI.

“Visit to Falaise Pocket.” Col. C. H. Price, President of Observers Board

Modern Military Branch, National Archives Records Administration, Washington D.C.

The Operational Records of the First U.S. Army. Record Group 94, Box 2017. “1st Army G-2 Operations Reports.” First Army After Action Report The Operational Records of the Third U.S. Army. Record Group 94, Box 1823. “G-2 Operations Diary.”

United States Air Force Historical Support Office, Bolling AFB

Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties: XIX Tactical Air Command’s First Month of Operations in Support of Third US Army in France

Secondary Sources

Alanbrooke, Viscount. War Diaries: 1939-1945. Edited by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman. University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1957.

Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers. Touchstone, Simon & Schuster Inc., NY, 1997

Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the West. The Normandy Campaign 1944-45. Charles Scribner’s Sons, NY, 1980.

Blumenson, Martin. The Battle of the Generals. The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket—The Campaign that should have won World War II. William Morrow and Company, NY, 1993.

Blumenson, Martin. United States Army In World War II The European Theater of Operations Breakout and Pursuit. Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC, 1989.

Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier’s Story. Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, NY, 1951.

Bradley, Omar N. and Blair, Clay. A General’s Life. Simon and Schuster, NY, 1983.

Breuer, William B. The Death of a Nazi Army. Scarborough House, Briarcliff, NY, 1985.

Carafano, James Jay. After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout. Lynne Rienner Publish...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Illustrations
• Preface
• The General Situation
• Analysis
• Conclusion
• Bibliography