Eighth Army: El Alamein To The River Sangro [Illustrated Edition]

Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein KG GCB DSO PC

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781782898399
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

[Illustrated with 16 highly detailed maps of the actions]Field Marshal Montgomery commanded the Eighth Army from 13th August 1942 until the 31st December 1943, and the 21st Army Group from 1st January 1944 until the German surrender on the 5th May, 1945. Whilst in command of the British Army of the Rhine, in occupation of Germany, shortly after the end of the Second World War Montgomery set out to record the exploits and victories of the troops under his command.Both this volume and its companion volume, Normandy to the Rhine, are superb examples of military history as presented by one of the greatest generals to command victorious armies in the field. The texts are taken from his personal war diaries and are distinguished by his incisive style. The whole strategy and course of these two campaigns are presented to the reader with great clarity and accuracy.El Alamein to the River Sangro is as he himself writes '... an authoritative account of the activities of the Eighth Army in the days of its greatest, successes'. El Alamein was the turning point in the war: from that momentous battle the tide against Germany turned. During the time the Eighth Army was commanded by Monty it lost not a single action, and when Monty was transferred to Europe in December 1943, Winston Churchill wrote to him: 'The immortal march of the Eighth Army from the gates of Cairo along the African shore, through Sicily, has now carried its ever victorious soldiers far into Italy towards the gates of Rome. The scene changes and vastly expands. A great task accomplished gives place to a greater, in which the same unfailing spirit will win for all true men a full and glorious reward.'

PART I—THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AFRICA FROM EL ALAMEIN, 13 AUGUST 1942, TO THE END IN TUNISIA, 12 MAY 1943

CHAPTER ONE—The Situation in the Eighth Army in August 1942

AT the close of the Axis summer offensive, the battle front in the Western Desert was finally stabilized on a line running approximately north and south from the sea at Tel el Eisa to Qaret el Himeimat: a 35 mile front about 60 miles west of Alexandria.

The Eighth Army defensive positions, known as the El Alamein Line, were constructed astride the gap between the sea and the Qattara Depression, blocking the gateway to the Nile Delta. The original line had been laid out in 1941.

Facing our defences the Axis forces, nominally under Italian command but in fact controlled by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, comprised five equivalent German divisions and nine Italian divisions. The German Panzer Army Africa included the German Africa Corps (15 and 21 Panzer Divisions), 90 Light and 164 Infantry Divisions and the Ramcke brigade of parachutists. The Italians were organized in three corps (10, 20 and 21) and included two armoured divisions—Ariete and Littorio.

The Eighth Army front was held by XIII and XXX Corps. The Army disposed six divisions and certain independent armoured and infantry brigades. It was an Imperial force in the truest sense, for it included 9 Australian Division, 5 (later replaced by 4) Indian Division, 2 New Zealand Division, 1 South African Division, and 7 Armoured and 50 Infantry Divisions. There were also Greek and French contingents.

The reverses suffered during the summer of 1942 had left the Eighth Army, in the words of Mr. Churchill, ‘brave but baffled.’ The troops knew that they were worthy of greater things, and indeed the divisions comprised some very fine fighting material. But they had lost confidence in their higher leadership, they lacked a sound battle technique, and they were deficient of equipment and weapons comparable to those of the Germans. It was clear that Rommel was preparing further attacks, and the morale and determination of our troops was undermined by plans for further withdrawals. The ‘atmosphere’ was wrong.

Such were my impressions when I arrived in the Western Desert and assumed command of the Eighth Army on 13 August 1942.

My mandate was to destroy the Axis forces in North Africa, and it was immediately apparent that the first step necessary was the initiation of a period of reorganization, re-equipment and training. While this was being done, I would have to defeat any attempt by the enemy to break through the Alamein defences, and ensure a firm front behind which a striking force could be prepared for the offensive. On my journey from England, I had decided that the Eighth Army required a reserve corps, well equipped and highly trained. This corps ( consisting primarily of armoured divisions) would be trained as the spearhead in our offensives, and would never be used to hold static fronts. The Germans had a reserve formation of this kind—the German Africa Corps—based on two crack Panzer divisions. Our lack of a similar formation in the past had meant that we had never been properly balanced. ‘Balance’ on the battlefield implies the disposal of available forces in such a way that it is never necessary to react to the enemy’s thrusts and moves; a balanced army proceeds relentlessly with its plans in spite of what the enemy may do.

I decided, therefore, that the formation, equipping and training of a reserve corps, strong in armour, must begin at once: as a matter of priority.

The New Defensive Policy At Alamein

My immediate concern was to ensure that the Alamein Line was securely held. Realizing that the Army might have to withstand a renewed Axis offensive in the immediate future, I ordered at once a new defensive policy.

All existing instructions and plans for further withdrawals were cancelled, and I made it clear that there would be no withdrawal from the Alamein Line; if Rommel attacked, we would fight him where we stood. This change of policy necessitated major alterations in our defences, in particular to give them additional depth, and stocks of ammunition, water and rations had to be increased in the forward areas. These matters were rapidly put in hand. My initial tour of the battle zone convinced me of the vital importance of the Alam Halfa ridge, which I found virtually undefended. It will be seen from the map that this ridge was several miles in rear of the Alamein Line; it commanded a wide area of desert country, and was essentially one of the keys to the whole defensive system. If the enemy penetrated the Alamein defences in the southern sectors, his subsequent progress would depend on securing this ridge. If it remained in our hands, it would serve either as a base from which to block the enemy’s progress to the north towards Ruweisat ridge (the backbone of our defences in the central sector) or alternatively to cut the axis of any hostile thrust attempting to strike east or north-east towards the Nile. I considered a whole division was required to garrison this ridge as a lay-back position, and asked at once for 44 Division to be sent up to me from the Delta, where it had recently arrived from England.

I ordered that divisions should be concentrated and fought as such; this ended the employment of brigade groups, Jock Columns, and the tactical methods which caused divisions to be split up, but to which recourse had been made in the past because of shortage of troops. As part of this policy, I made it clear that armour and artillery develop their maximum effectiveness when employed in mass, and instructions to implement their use in this way were issued.

When I took over command, the Army and Air Headquarters were widely separated, and lacked that close personal relationship which is so essential. I therefore moved my Headquarters to a site adjacent to Air Headquarters, where commanders and staffs could plan and work together as one team.

Lastly, I found a number of higher commanders were tired and in great need of a rest, and I initiated certain changes in order to bring fresh minds to bear on the problem in front of us.

Having established a firm defensive policy, I turned to detailed consideration of the reorganization of the Army, and the formation of the reserve corps—which was to be X Corps. During the last weeks of August preparations to this end began to take shape. The reaction within the Eighth Army to the measures I have described was most enthusiastic. The morale of the troops was in the ascendant and their confidence was becoming re-established.

This was the situation when, towards the end of August, it became clear that Rommel intended to attack during the coming full moon.

CHAPTER TWO—The Battle of Alam Halfa, 31 August 1942

ON 29 August, Rommel announced to his troops that in two or three days they would be in Alexandria, and issued a special order of the day in which he proclaimed that the forthcoming attack would accomplish the ‘final annihilation of the enemy.’

His attacks began just after midnight 30/31 August with three simultaneous thrusts. The most northerly attempt was easily repulsed by the Australians and was no more than a raid. In the centre a heavier holding attack, which had lost direction, hit the right of 5 Indian Division, and achieved some initial success. The enemy was ejected from the Ruweisat ridge only after a strong counter attack had been put in at first light on 31 August.

The main thrust was made in the south: between the left flank of the New Zealand Division and Himeimat. Here Rommel employed both 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions, 90 Light Division and 20 Italian Corps which included Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions. By 1000 hours 31 August strong tank columns had penetrated our minefields, and were moving eastwards between Gaballa and the Ragil Depression. Further north 90 Light Division had some difficulty in crossing the minefields and did not reach Deir el Muhafid until the evening; between the German wings three Italian divisions were operating but, of these, during the whole engagement the Trieste Division alone succeeded in penetrating the mine belts. Our mobile troops of 7 Armoured Division watching the southern flank were forced back in face of this onslaught and, in accordance with their orders, avoided becoming pinned to the ground. 4 Light Armoured Brigade withdrew on Gaballa, and from that area mounted harassing attacks against the flank of the enemy penetration. Further north, 7 Motor Brigade was similarly employed.

My main preoccupation during 31 August was to determine exactly the direction of the enemy thrust line. I hoped that he would move in a tight wheel to the north towards Alam Halfa, and not wide towards El Hammam. Our deception measures had been directed towards that end. During the late afternoon, the enemy armour began to move north-east, in fact directly towards the area for which the Eighth Army layout was designed. A strong wind was blowing and the Royal Air Force was unable to hinder the advance owing to the dust. By about 1700 hours enemy tanks made contact with 22 Armoured Brigade which was in position to the south of the Alam Halfa ridge. 22 Armoured Brigade met this attack on ground of its own choosing, and the enemy was driven off with heavy casualties.

Towards dusk, dust conditions improved and the night bombers took off. Enemy concentrations were pounded throughout the night, and this began a period of intense day and night air action which was a very important factor in our success.

By the morning of 1 September it was clear to me that the enemy axis of advance was directed on the Alam Halfa ridge and thence northwards to the Ruweisat ridge. He was attempting to roll up our line: working from south to north.

Until I was sure of the direction of the main enemy thrust, I had concentrated the bulk of the armour, under Headquarters 10 Armoured Division, to the south of Alam Halfa, where it blocked any attempt to strike north-east and east in order to by-pass our positions and make straight for the Delta. Having established the enemy’s intention I was able to switch the armour to the area between the Alam Halfa ridge, held by 44 Division, and the New Zealand positions in the Alamein Line proper. The ground had been reconnoitred in detail by 10 Armoured Division, and when Rommel renewed his attacks northwards I would be well disposed to inflict heavy losses on his Panzer formations. By the middle of the day, I had nearly 400 tanks in the vital area. At the same time Ruweisat ridge was strengthened by the addition of one brigade, which I withdrew from the front of the South African Division. In order to preserve balance, I brought forward a brigade of 50 Division from Amiriya to the area vacated by 10 Armoured Division south of the Alam Halfa feature.

I was now confident of holding the enemy’s attacks, and of preventing infiltration behind the main defensive position. I began to consider re-grouping: in order to form reserves and to seize the initiative.

During the morning of 1 September, the enemy had renewed his attacks against 22 Armoured Brigade in position. He achieved nothing and, having again suffered considerable casualties, drew off to the south. He returned to the charge during the afternoon: but the whole of 10 Armoured Division was now firmly established in its new positions, and once more the Panzer formations disengaged with heavy losses.

The relentless pounding of enemy concentrations from the air continued throughout the day.

During the afternoon, I ordered planning to begin for a counter stroke which would give us the initiative. I decided to thin out in XXX Corps sector in the north so as to provide reserves, and to order XIII Corps to prepare to close the gap in our minefields through which the enemy attack had come. The operation would be developed southwards from the New Zealand sector, and proceed methodically and by easy stages.

On 2 September the Axis forces proved reluctant to resume the offensive. They were plainly disconcerted by their failure to draw our armour from its prepared positions. No doubt, too, they were finding the administrative situation difficult. 7 Armoured Division had a good day and intensified its harassing operations north and west of Himeimat, while the Desert Air Force continued to cause great damage and confusion to the enemy.

After visiting the Corps Headquarters, I decided that XIII Corps operations to close the minefield gaps would begin on the night 3/4 September. New Zealand Division would be reinforced for the task by two British infantry brigades. Should the enemy show signs of pulling out, all formations would close in and employ ‘jabbing’ tactics. I emphasized the importance of destroying soft-skinned vehicles; the more supply lorries we could knock out the greater would be the strain on Rommel’s administration. The enemy was known to be short of petrol, and a costly but most effective night bomber raid on Tobruk harbour had done much to aggravate the position. Moreover we had made careful plans to ensure that none of our fuel or supplies fell into his hands.

First light reports on 3 September indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from contact and moved south. His main forces seemed to have edged slightly westwards, leaving the area they vacated strewn with derelict vehicles. I issued very precise instructions at this stage, since it was important to resist any temptation to rush into the attack. The standard of training of the Eighth Army formations was such that I was not prepared to loose them headlong into the enemy; moreover my purpose was to restore the line, and to proceed methodically with my own preparations for the big offensive later on. I therefore ordered that there would be no movement westwards from our main fortified positions in the Alamein Line except by patrols and light forces, and that the attacks to close the gap were to proceed vigorously: but methodically and under careful control. The harassing attacks, particularly those directed against enemy mechanical transport, were to continue with the utmost intensity.

On the afternoon of 3 September three large enemy columns were moving west from the minefield area. The operations of 7 Armoured Division on their southern flank were strengthened and the weight of our air attacks was stepped up to its maximum. On the night 3/4 September the New Zealand Division began to attack southw...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• FOREWORD
• MAPS
• INTRODUCTION
• PART I-THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AFRICA FROM EL ALAMEIN, 13 AUGUST 1942, TO THE END IN TUNISIA, 12 MAY 1943
• PART II - THE INVASION AND CAPTURE OF SICILY 10 JULY -17 AUGUST 1943
• PART III - THE INVASION OF THE MAINLAND OF ITALY AND THE ADVANCE TO THE RIVER SANGRO 3 SEPTEMBER-31 DECEMBER 1943