The Campaign of Trafalgar — 1805. Vol. II.

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM.

• Publisher: Wagram Press
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781908902467
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia británica

Of the many campaigns in the long history of Britain, naval and otherwise, there have been few more momentous than the campaign in the Mediterranean in 1804-5 culminating in the battle of Trafalgar. They spawned a national hero in the figure of heroic lord Nelson, one-armed and blind in one eye, dying at the moment of his greatest victory over a more numerous enemy. However, the story of the battle, much less the campaign, was more complex than the story of one man, however great. It is this web of sailings, counter-sailings, orders, alliances, courage and genius that Corbett elucidates with his great naval knowledge and lucid text.
Sir Julian Corbett wrote this most important of studies, drawing on not only his comprehensive archive material at the Royal Naval college, but also important sources from French and Spanish sources. He was a prolific author and authority on British warfare, and more particularly the naval aspects, as well as a lecturer in history to the Royal Naval College.
Author — Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM. (1854-1922)
Illustrations – 8 maps and plans.

APPENDIX G

ADDITIONAL NOTES

1. “Nauticus” and Lord Barham, p. 179.

The publication in the Barham Papers (vol. iii. pp. 185 et. Seq..) of the letters of “Nauticus“ throws a new and interesting light on the strategy which Lord Barham adopted in July. It was not till long afterwards that he knew the identity of his pseudonymous correspondent, and was able to express the “estimation “in which he held his communication. The writer proved to be a purser called Nicholas Brown, who for eight years was secretary to Lord Keith, that is from 1799 till his retirement in 1807. Brown's staff experience was therefore rich and varied, and he had had abundant opportunity of becoming familiar with the strategical ideas of Lord Keith and his entourage.

The first of the series is a letter he wrote to Lord Melville in March 1805, after Missiessy's escape. Its purport is to urge that Finisterre is a far better station than Cork for any detachment that can be spared from the Western Squadron for intercepting squadrons breaking out of French ports, or attempting to break in. To support his view he cited the cases of 1793, 1796, and 1799. But whatever the merits of the plan it was impossible to man enough ships to provide such a detachment.

His first letter to Lord Barham was written on May 16, when it was known that Villeneuve had disappeared to the westward. He thought his objective must be in the West Indies, and that, in conjunction with Missiessy's squadron, he would succeed, unless Nelson had followed him at once. But whatever may be the object, he argues “there can be little doubt they will very soon seek their way back in a body.” The proper course therefore was not to follow them with a squadron from hence to intercept them on their return. He calculates their united force at thirty of the line, and proceeds to discuss with much ability their most probable course. In common with the majority of officers he came to the conclusion that the mouth of the Straits is the real danger point. A return to a port in the Bay would be comparatively innocuous, for he judged, as proved to be the truth, that we should always be able to assemble a superior fleet before they were in a condition to take the sea again after their exhausting cruise. If, on the other hand, they proceeded into the Straits, it would be possible for them to seize command of the Mediterranean, and be in a position to deal a disastrous and lasting blow to the British cause. “Should they get to one of the ports on the Atlantic,” he says, “we should have them in some measure in check; but if we fatally find that such a force reaches the Mediterranean the consequences are hardly to be calculated upon.” He foretold that Villeneuve would probably return towards the end of July (as he did). Before his letter was sent off, however, his whole appreciation was upset by the false news which the Wasp had sent in of Villeneuve having doubled back to Cadiz, and he did not deliver it to Barham till the truth was known.

This was on May 31. Ten days later, on hearing of Missiessy's unexpected return to Rochefort alone, he again urged the propriety of holding the Finisterre area instead of that of Cork, and accompanied his proposal with a scheme by which the necessary ships could be manned by increasing the quota of marines to one-fourth of the complement of every ship, and by raising 30,000 seamen and landsmen by parochial ballot. All these recommendations were ignored.

On July 6 the news that Villeneuve had made for Martinique drew from Brown a third appreciation. He deduced that his objective was the Leeward Islands or Jamaica, probably the latter, and unless Nelson was in time to interfere he would be coming back immediately, as he had foretold, but with less than thirt...

Table of contents

• Title page
• CHARTS AND DIAGRAMS
• CHAPTER XVI
• CHAPTER XVII
• CHAPTER XVIII
• CHAPTER XIX
• CHAPTER XX
• CHAPTER XXI
• CHAPTER XXII
• CHAPTER XXIII
• CHAPTER XXIV
• CHAPTER XXV
• CHAPTER XXVI
• APPENDICES
• APPENDIX B
• APPENDIX C
• APPENDIX D
• APPENDIX E
• APPENDIX F
• APPENDIX G