In January 2021, the US Navy and naval and air forces from Australia, India, Japan and Canada took part in the multilateral anti-submarine warfare exercise Sea Dragon 2021, in what some would quickly label a âQuad plus 1â event.1 Meanwhile, analysts in South Korea have begun discussing whether that country should play a larger role in Quad activities, or whether remaining aloof from the Quad could impact the countyâs relations with the United States.2 Two days after the completion of the Sea Dragon exercise, while speaking at an online forum hosted by the US Institute for Peace, President Bidenâs National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, noted that the US was open to the possibility of working with and expanding upon the Quad, saying:
We really want to carry forward and build on that [Quad] format, that mechanism, which we see as fundamental, a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific.
In response to these events, Chinese officials have, to date been relatively muted. When asked about the possibility that the United States sought to strengthen the Quad, Peopleâs Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying simply stated âwe hope that cooperation between relevant countries is open, inclusive, and winâwinâ, and is âa positive force for good, and not an attempt to target specific countriesâ.3
Huaâs tone appeared to echo that of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who famously argued in 2018 that the Quad was a âheadline grabbing ideaâ that âwould soon dissipateâ. Others, however, such as Luo Zhaohui, Chinaâs Deputy Foreign Minister for Asian Affairs, have been less sanguine. Speaking at a Foreign Ministry seminar in September 2020, Luo described the Quad as an âanti-China front lineâ. He also referred to the Quad as âthe âmini-NATOââ, thus connecting the Quadâs rise to one of Beijingâs older, longstanding concerns.4
Since its re-emergence in 2017, the Quad has been a subject of both debate and speculation. How does China perceive cooperation among Quad countries, or even among the Quad and an additional grouping some have labelled as âQuad Plusâ arrangements? This article examines how the Quad is being viewed from China, and how Chinese academics and government- and military-affiliated analysts view its potential impact on Chinese interests in the region.
With its origins in the response to the December 2004 SumatraâAndaman earthquake, Quad country representatives would meet for the first time in May 2007, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila.5 That September, navies from the four Quad countries, as well as participants from the Singapore Navy, would participate in the Malabar naval exercise, held 350 km southwest of the Andaman Islands.6
This increased cooperation would not go unnoticed in Beijing. Following the Manila meetings, China issued formal diplomatic protests to each of the Quad countries.7 When asked about the 2007 five-nation Malabar exercise, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu noted that China calls upon âall countries to establish a new security concept and carry out dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and mutual benefitâ.8 Meanwhile, Beijing sought to convince Canberra and New Delhi that an assertive Quad arrangement could jeopardise their economic relations with the Peopleâs Republic of China (PRC).
While Beijing was successful in slowing Quad cooperation, in 2007â2008, Chinaâs re-evaluation of the balance of power in Asia following the 2008 financial crisis helped bring the Quad back into play.9 Following the crisis, Chinese leaders saw an opportunity to modify Deng Xiaopingâs traditional axiom of âkeeping a low profile and biding oneâs timeâ and instead pursue the countryâs overseas interests more aggressively.10 Indeed, in the decade since, one can see this assertive posture in a range of activities, including the establishment of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, island building in the South China Sea, and continued border disputes with India.
Economically, Chinese domestic growth slowed during this time as the economy grew and matured, with GDP growth declining from more than 14 per cent in 2007 to less than 7 per cent in 2017, while demands for imported energy continued to grow.11 In part, this demand for new sources of growth helped spur Chinaâs outward economic expansion in the form of overseas investment projects, culminating in Chinaâs massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), President Xi Jinpingâs flagship policy designed to leverage Chinese lending, investment and technical expertise to integrate China more closely with the rest of the world, primarily through infrastructure development.12 As Chinaâs reliance on overseas energy imports and overseas investments grew, the Peopleâs Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the PLA Navy (PLAN), was given responsibility for protecting these interests. This subsequently expanded the PLANâs presence in the Indian Ocean beyond its traditional counter-piracy operations, to include submarine patrols and the establishment of the PLAâs first overseas base in Djibouti.13
This reassessment of the international situation post-financial crisis, and corresponding shift toward a more assertive PRC foreign policy, served to rekindle interest in cooperation among the four Quad member-states. In the United States, this was made evident in the Trump Administrationâs 2017 National Security Strategy, which noted the desire to âseek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia and Indiaâ.14 While not naming the Quad specifically, Australiaâs 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper notes that it pledges to âbuild on the growing strategic collaboration between Australia, India and Japanâ.15
The re-emergence of the Quad was witnessed in November 2017, as senior officials from all four countries met again in Manila ahead of that yearâs ASEAN summit.16 Between 2017 and 2019, Quad member representatives would meet again in Singapore in June and November 2018, and New York and Bangkok in September and November 2019. In March, the four countries met in an expanded âQuad Plusâ virtual session at the vice-ministerial level, involving South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam.17In November 2020, Australia once again joined India, Japan and the United States in the Malabar naval exercise after a 13-year hiatus.18
In February 2021, foreign ministers from all four Quad countries held a virtual meeting for the first time under the Biden Administration. According to the US State Departmentâs official press, the US emphasised cooperation on COVID-19 response and recovery, as well as combating climate change.19 Meanwhile, Japanese readouts emphasised the âchallenges to the existing international orderâ,20 while Australia noted the need to ârespect[ing] and uphold[ing] international rules and obligationsâ,21 and India emphasised the groupâs âcommitment to upholding a rules-based international order, underpinned by respect for territorial integrity and sovereigntyâ.22
Publicly, official PRC government statements were not as strident following the Quadâs ârevivalâ in 2017 as they were in 2007 (China did not, for example, demarche all four countries as it did in 2007). However, Beijing certainly took notice, often seeking to link India and other Quad membersâ activities directly to US policies. When asked about the Quad meetings in Manila, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that âthese visions and proposals [in the Indo-Pacific] should be open and inclusive and conducive to enhancing winâwin cooperation. Politicised and exclusionary ones [i.e. the Quad] should be avoidedâ.23 When asked about Malabar 2017, Geng provided similar comments, noting, âWe hope such relations and cooperation are not targeted at a third party and are conducive to regional peace and stabilityâ.24 When asked about the Quad at the March press conference for the first session of the 2018 National Peopleâs Congress, Wang Yi noted:
It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas. They are like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon will dissipate. Contrary to the claim made by some academics and media outlets that the âIndo-Pacific strategyâ aims to contain China, the four countriesâ official position is that it targets no one. I hope they mean what they say and their action will match their rhetoric.25
Chinese media coverage, however, was more strident. Writing in the Global Times immediately following the 2017 Manila meetings, Ling Shengli of the China Foreign Affairs University argued that âinterference [in the South China Sea] by the US, Japan, Australia and other nations ⊠cannot be left unnoticedâ and was adding tensions to an otherwise peaceful environment in the South China Sea.26 The overseas edition of the Peopleâs Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, raised the question âShould the United States, Australia, Japan...