Critical Conversations in African Philosophy

Asixoxe - Let's Talk

Alena Rettová, Benedetta Lanfranchi, Miriam Pahl, Alena Rettová, Benedetta Lanfranchi, Miriam Pahl

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000488104
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Histoire et théorie de la philosophie

In this edited collection contributors examine key themes, sources and methods in contemporary African Philosophy, building on a wide-ranging understanding of what constitutes African philosophy, and drawing from a variety of both oral and written texts of different genres.

Part one of the volume examines how African philosophy has reacted to burning issues, ranging from contemporary ethical questions on how to integrate technological advancements into human life; to one of philosophy's prime endeavours, which is establishing the conditions of knowledge; to eternal ontological and existential questions on the nature of being, time, memory and death. Part two reflects on the (re)definition of philosophy from an African vantage point and African philosophy's thrust to create its own canon, archive and resources to study African concepts, artefacts, practices and texts from the perspective of intellectual history. The volume aims to make a contribution to the academic debate on African philosophy and philosophy more broadly, challenging orthodox definitions and genres, in favour of a broadening of the discipline's self-understanding and locales.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of African philosophy and comparative philosophy.

Part I

Themes

DOI: 10.4324/9781003172079-2

1 Technology as domination or liberation?

An analysis of the philosophy of technology in relation to African philosophy and development initiatives

Aviv Milgram

DOI: 10.4324/9781003172079-3

Introduction

Surveying development initiatives in the global south, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, one tends to find an explicit focus on the importation of scientific knowledge and the establishment of applicable technologies (see NEPAD 2010–2012 and African Development Bank Group 2013). Whether in the form of medicine, agricultural tools and methods, manufacturing techniques or communication technologies, justifications are provided for such technological imports with reference to their role in improving the overall quality of life and leading to a material liberation ;– that is, to overcoming the constraints of nature in a move towards human progress. Within the branch of philosophy concerned with science and technology, however, a tradition of (mostly) Continental philosophers has argued that technology yields the exact opposite effect on society, namely, that (in a Western context) technology is the prime source of societal ills, responsible for a range of problems including a declining public sphere, deteriorating inter-personal relationships, and a disconnection with nature ;– all of which ultimately lead to a decline in the overall quality of life and to humanity’s loss of autonomy in the face of technological domination (see Habermas 1970; Heidegger 1977; Ellul 1973). Although these contrasting positions can be attributed to the different contexts of the areas involved ;– where technology can help boost developing countries economically, whereas in industrialized countries an excessive reliance on technology has led to a pervasive mechanization ;– the differences also rest on a more fundamental philosophical division, based on divergent viewpoints regarding the neutrality, autonomy and dominance involved in the constitution and use of technology.

Upon outlining both positions ;– namely, the positivist faith in technology and the humanistic critiques thereof ;– this chapter will examine the implications of each standpoint for development policies in sub-Saharan Africa. Looking at Ethiopian modernization efforts as a case study demonstrating the problems accompanying technological optimism, and subsequently identifying several incompatibilities between the philosophical foundations of modern technology and those grounding traditional¹ African thought, particularly at the ontological level and with respect to environmental ethics, the discussion will provide a number of reasons against a wholesale adoption of modern Western technology, but simultaneously acknowledge its benefits. Accordingly, as a recommendation for African development practices but furthermore providing a remedy for the broader problems associated with modern technology, three variations of a synthesis will be presented, associated respectively with three contemporary African philosophers, each targeting the foundational assumptions that ground modern technology and offering an alternate philosophical base for a model of technology that could act more effectively as a tool for liberation. Ultimately, the chapter aims on one level to assess development policies in African countries, while on a deeper level it aspires to explore possibilities for technological reform and improvement, and finally it hopes to open up a fruitful space for future cross-cultural dialogue, particularly in the domain of environmental ethics and contemporary environmental movements.

Liberation

Before engaging with the philosophy of technology and its various conclusions, it is first necessary to attempt to define modern technology ;– a difficult task due to its multiple dimensions, various forms, and many competing characterizations. Modern technology, firstly, is distinguished here from its traditional, universal form as tool, where though the use of technology qua tool is an ancient human feature, essential to human evolution as a method of adapting to new environments, modern technology contrastingly entails a greater degree of resource exploitation and environmental control, reliance on industrialization, and a widespread societal dependence. From a historical perspective, modern technology and science can largely be traced back to Francis Bacon’s foundational philosophy of nature, which places technology at the root of modernization and development, expressed through industrialization and economic growth (Oruka 1997: 246). Technology in this light was optimistically seen as promising progress and human advancement, with “human knowledge and technology [being] continuously charged with acquiring power to subdue nature so as to overcome the miseries of human life” (Oruka 1997: 246). From a technical angle, moreover, modern technology has been characterized as hardware (tools and machines), as rules (software), or as systems (hardware, human skills, and organization), or as a combination of the three, as demonstrated by Val Dusek’s comprehensive definition, namely, that technology is “the application of scientific or other knowledge to practical tasks by ordered systems that involve people and organizations, productive skills, living things, and machines” (Dusek 2006: 35). Most definitions, however, including the way “modern technology” is addressed here, fall within an essentialist understanding, holding that “technology reduces everything to functions and raw materials”, thereby replacing practices that embody human meaning as “efficiency sweeps away all other norms and determines an autonomous process of technological development” (Feenberg 1999: viii).

A further element requiring clarification is the relationship between technology and science, where the former has often historically been conceived as a derivative of the latter ;– applied science ;– where science is construed as “serving the cognitive function of producing true judgments about the nature of reality,” while technology is understood as “the application of scientific knowledge to achieve predetermined practical results” (Mosley 2007). Others argue, however, that contemporary science “is so involved with and dependent upon sophisticated technological instrumentation” that it is more accurate to claim that “technology is prior to science as well as driving science” (Dusek 2006: 23). The two, ultimately, are “inextricably interwoven” (ibid: 23), hence, though technological instruments facilitate scientific research and determine its capacities, it is also the epistemological and ontological assumptions, methods and practices of science that are responsible for the creation and development of modern technology.

Positivist approaches to science (and by association technology) rely on an underlying faith in objectivity, causality and facts, leading to a confidence in science’s ability to advance knowledge reliably, produce an increasingly better understanding of the world and serve the purpose of improving efficiency and the overall quality of human life. There is no philosophical consensus regarding the epistemological processes underlying the acquisition of scientific knowledge and facts, and positions range from inductivist theories such as proposed by Francis Bacon, which maintains that scientific knowledge originates from the observation of individual cases and is then generalized into laws, to logical positivism, entailing a “verification theory of meaning” (Dusek 2006: 7), exemplified by Bertrand Russell’s use of formal, mathematical logic to verify principles. Others, in opposition to the latter, advance a logical empiricism that weakens the verification criteria for knowledge, or go as far as Karl Popper’s falsification method, where the legitimacy of scientific knowledge relies precisely on its falsifiability.

Lying alongside these epistemological assumptions informing a faith in scientific objectivity, furthermore, is a complementary set of ontological and ethical presuppositions regarding humanity and nature, based on an anthropocentric vision of a dualistically divided world. With philosophical roots in Greek dualism, the ontological division between humankind and nature was inaugurated by Socrates and subsequently reinforced with Plato’s division of the human soul from the material world, with humanity’s goal prescribed as being the ability to master the instincts and appetites of nature. Despite Aristotle’s subsequent attempt at reuniting humankind with nature, distinguishing the techne (the domination and artificial transformation of nature) from the empeiria (the immediate experience of nature), the anthropocentric view prevailed, influencing the Renaissance and Enlightenment’s emphases on human dignity (Agazzi 1994: 3–14). The dualistic, anthropocentric position, moreover, corresponds with the Judeo-Christian privileging of humanity over nature, with Genesis sanctioning humanity’s stewardship ;– and thus dominion ;– over nature, animals, and the earth in general. Accordingly, a pervasive “traditional anthropocentrism” (Stenmark 2007: 507) has emerged from the Greek and Judeo-Christian positions, wherein only humans are taken to have moral standing, while nature is understood as holding only instrumental or resource value. It is precisely such an attitude that has had a major influence on transforming the nature of technology from tool to its contemporary variant, with modern science and technology taking shape as a consequence of a shift in its focus, aimed now exclusively on the mastery and control of a value-free nature (Kluxen 1994: 98–106).

Based on a faith in the absolute truth-value of science and based on an enthusiasm for technology’s ability to improve humanity’s control over nature, positivists ;– especially active in the eighteenth and nineteenth century ;– approach technology with great optimism, viewing technology as neutral and as grounding “humanity’s advance toward freedom and happiness” (Feenberg 1999: 2, emphasis mine). Thus, associated with bringing progress and modernization, where “technology’s advance is the advance of the human species” (ibid: 2), the presence of technology, according to this perspective, is equated with material development, and hence beyond the European context it is often adopted with the optimism that it guarantees a liberation from the hardships of life.

Domination

In contrast to the optimistic, positivist views maintaining that technology is a key to human liberation, a group of humanistic, mostly Continental philosophers argue that technology yields the exact opposite effect, namely, that technology is a tool for domination ;– of nature and humans ;– and is principally responsible for the many problems plaguing modern societies.

Substantivist critiques of technology, epitomized in the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul, maintain that technology is not neutral but rather embodies specific values, therefore claiming that “the tools we use shape our way of life in modern societies where technique has become all pervasive”, as “means and ends cannot be separated” and “technological development transforms what it is to be human” (Feenberg 1999: 2). Reminiscent of Max Weber’s concept of the “iron cage”, where societal rationalization simultaneously leads to the freedoms of modernity and an enslavement to its ideals, technology likewise brings greater liberties but at the cost of threatening non-technical, subjective human values. Substantivists, as will be demonstrated below, thus approach technology through an essentialist lens, taking the advancement of technology as an automatic and unilinear process of social domination, which they hold principally responsible for the problems of modern civilization (ibid: 1–3).

Heidegger (1977) addresses modern technology mostly in his later writings, particularly in The Question Concerning Technology, where he identifies modern technology as the defining feature of our epoch, comparable to the centrality of religion in the Middle Ages. For Heidegger, modern technology differs from traditional crafts, where unlike the latter, which “gather” the elements and bring the truth out of their materials, modern technology “enframes” or “de-worlds” its objects, “summoning” nature to submit to its extrinsic demands. Nature in this context becomes a “standing reserve”, seen only as raw materials and a source of resources, as an “objectless” heap of functions, which brings Heide...