A Praxis of Nothingness in Education

On Heidegger and Wittgenstein

Håvard Åsvoll

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000548587
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Didattica
• Subtopic: Ricerca nella didattica

This book puts forward a "theory of Nothing" and shows how a praxis of "Nothing" can offer new possibilities for educational research and practice. Taking inspiration from Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's philosophy and with regards to phenomenology and language, the book indicates how nothing can be a condition for an educational technology.

The book translates the complex philosophical thinking of Heidegger and Wittgenstein into the realm of education studies, drawing on their perspectives to contribute to an understanding of how nothingness comes into being and how this relates to education. Arguing that nothingness addresses new possibilities for understanding and how we perceive the world and our place in it, the book theorises different aspects that can be included in a theory of Nothing; including indeterminateness, embodiment and how the inexpressible can be made expressible. The book presents vignettes and examples of educational practice and explores how nothing can show up in educational research, theory and practice.

Outlining a unique conceptualisation of nothingness in education, the book will be of great interest to academics, researchers and post-graduate students in the field of educational philosophy and educational theory.

Part 1 Introduction and theorising nothing

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003222231-2

As a beginning, both L. Wittgenstein and M. Heidegger say something essential with regard to this book:

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings.

(Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 7)

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]…. Thus … Where Enframing holds sway, the regulating and securing of standing in reserve marks all. They no longer even allow their own fundamental characteristic of revealing to appear.

(Heidegger, 1977, p. 17 and 26)

This book is about the relationship between technology and the theory of nothing in educational practice. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein is used to examine and articulate this relationship. The aforementioned quotes indicate that educational participants (including researchers) should use technology (the standing reserve) not only as an instrument at hand but also as a “way of revealing”. And Wittgenstein’s thinking through architecture gives abstract thought a concrete quality that renders possibilities more visible or, in Heideggerian terms, shows the potential of nothing as the groundless ground of possibilities.¹

In other words, technology and the theory of nothing can be something that we are embedded in and use as a kind of praxis of the possible through everyday experiences, in educational practice and in educational contexts. Here, technology should be understood in a broad sense and as a dominant framework for educational practice. This means that the term encompasses control tools, structural frameworks, popular organisational methods, teaching, (theories of) learning and a delivery logic that ultimately rests on a kind of (theoretical) understanding of knowledge. Technology consists of tools and artefacts that are efficient and ready for use and that can be mobilised and used with the least possible friction by school principals, teachers, pupils, politicians, researchers and institutions. Key terms in this context are learning outcomes, quality assurance, implementation, production (i.e. credits, publication points), control, evaluation, behavioural change, competence (goals), educational quality, etc. This technology is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that is manifested at several different levels of educational practice, including (1) individual propositions (i.e. new self-understanding and new possible worlds), (2) reflective constructs (some theory, for instance relating to learning, didactics/teaching), (3) regional understandings/ontologies of different kinds of beings (art, law, economics, sociology, psychology), (4) the overall understanding of being that gives unity to an epoch, in modernity termed technology (das Gestell) and, finally, (5) the formal conditions (phenomenological) for the understanding of being whatsoever.

Building on the claim that, left unchallenged, technology represents an attempt to shut down Nothing and freedom in educational practice (including educational research), Heidegger and Wittgenstein together offer an alternative route through their philosophy of lost-your-way or Nothing (Not-being-at-home). In lost-your-way as a theory of nothing, there is always room for questions such as “Where am I going? Where is my home? How can you become what you are?”² since being is approached ontologically, emphasising (new) ways of being rather than final truth (veritas) and fixed ways of doing things. According to the theory of nothing and in line with the intention behind this book, every educational participant has the capacity to resist, confront and make personal meaning out of technology. As such, emphasis is placed on “here and now” situations, being(-there) and the indeterminate understanding that is in play in educational practice, rather than on seeking consensus and a laundry list of competences and best practice as a necessary outcome.

The importance of performance and praxis is key here, in a technology (theory)-nothing (praxis) perspective. For instance, researchers learn to conduct advanced research by engaging in research, not by reading about it or attending courses about how research can be conducted. More is required to become a good concert pianist than just notes; being and performing in a stage setting require the pianist to master skills that have become second nature. A teacher does not become a good teacher just by knowing everything about didactic theory; the practice of teaching is also about being alert in unpredictable learning situations where he or she can draw on previous experiences. A professional football coach must know more than just how to analyse play and have a theoretical knowledge of football; giving feedback in coaching situations that suddenly arise is about the capability of being intuitively attentive to certain aspects of the training. These four situations can be said to be characterised by a certain professional practice, where theoretical/technological knowledge is only necessary to the extent that it is part of the performance and praxis.³

One particularly important factor in this context is not just how acquired experience and technology/knowledge are performed and applied in situations that require action, but also how the practitioner (the teacher, principal, pupil, student, researcher) creates a new understanding and knowledge that rests on nothing. It is about creating or not creating experiences and a new self-understanding when faced with routine praxis, situations requiring action and unexpected events. New (nothing) experiences that either do not necessarily “fit” already established theoretical/technological knowledge bases, or that are (temporarily) inaccessible for theorisation/articulation, can nonetheless be decisive in an educational practice.

For example, even in such a theoretical exercise as writing this book, (self-) insights can pop up that have not been thoroughly thought through and technologically prepared for use but that change meaning in this writing context. It would not be possible to write if I constantly had to reflect on all the rules and technology that are necessary to master the art of writing. Understanding arises at the same time as or just after the performance/recognition of the previous insight. In other words, praxis/performance is not something you can just learn about, but it is also something you can learn and experience through (nothing).

These are (nothing) experiences that often precede our theoretical knowledge and lie behind a technological world that is always ready for use. The theory of nothing is about pre-epistemological and often pre-language elements that challenge our (self-)understanding and way of being. As a point of departure, it is possible to outline six aspects that can be included in a theory of Nothing.⁴

• Indeterminateness – the term horizon⁵ may describe the indeterminate nature and always already potential of nothing, which includes some form of passive compulsion; hence, expressions like “We do not decide our experiences ourselves!? Experiences force themselves on us!” This enforced indeterminateness is further illustrated in a radical way in the statement: “Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 38). It is discussed in projection and letting-go in Chapter 6.
• Personal⁶ – this aspect makes it possible to see the connection between nothingness and personal experience. Experience (erfahrung)⁷ as an unpredictable journey and a hazardous life project may inherit the openness of nothing. The most important thing is that Heidegger (1968) did not seek an understanding or mere knowledge, but a special kind of inner experience of anxiety, which is the feeling of existence as the coming-to-be of newness. It is discussed in Chapter 6.
• Embodiment⁸ – embodied sense of sight.
• Skills-based – skills as the utilisation of tools (hence, the centrality of tools and equipmentality) in Heidegger (Dasein’s everyday relationship to objects) and Wittgenstein (the familiarity of seeing something as something). It is discussed in Chapter 6.
• Intimacy-based – this aspect could shed light on the relationship between dwelling or form of life and not-being-at-home (nothing). It is elaborated in Chapter 6 and discussed in Chapter 7.
• Can break free of the language – here, the crucial point is how the “inexpressible” can be expressible and vice versa. As an apparent double-bind paradox, this is further investigated in Chapter 6, focusing on the difference between showing (Zeigen) itself in the world rather than being sayable. Hence, saying and showing are two modes of nothing. It is discussed in Being-reserved and Being-blank in Chapter 7.

It is a fundamental premise for this book that it assumes that praxis is an important factor. Theoretical knowledge that is abstract, possible to formulate and systematic rests on the practitioner’s praxis (cf. being-in-the-world and form of lives). This means that the meaning and possibilities for understanding that lie in an articulated and systematic theory must be reflected or thrown back into a concrete, action-requiring (skills-based) and unpredictable (intimate) praxis. In other words, it should always be possible at some point to see the abstract (theory) in the context of and interweave it with the concrete (praxis), even though it is far from always given how this should and can be done. My main intention with this book is, therefore, to clarify – to unravel knots and significant links between theory/technology and praxis/nothing. With the help of different theoretical/philosophical and empirical focuses, different aspects and interwoven elements are presented from a theory/technology – praxis (nothing) perspective. In brief, the book is an attempt to highlight the mutual dependence that exists between technology and nothing – an interdependence that is not necessarily characterised by a harmonious balance and a controlling reason, but where the parties contribute to each other’s development and are contentious and unpredictable. In a way, the distinction between theory (technology) and praxis (nothing) is misleading precisely because nothing (Being-there) can be present in both theory and praxis. Theory and praxis can thereby represent two different modes of nothing. The result is that theory/technology is also regarded as a form of praxis, that is praxis is a fundamental process that realises theory and praxis (i.e. skills). The main point, as Heidegger (1962) points out, is that praxis should never be conceived as being directed by or in the service of theory (theoria). Praxis is our concern (Besorgen) with the entities we encounter, and beyond that, it is concern for the Being (and hence Nothing).

Reading Heidegger together with Wittgenstein is encouraged by some intriguing similarities between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s perspectives on seeing the world and the relations human beings enter into with it. It is argued that both Heidegger and Wittgenstein hoped for an existence that would be not only sensitive to the significance of everydayness (both to the things created by man and to those brought forth by nature) but also open to receiving the world as an extraordinary gift that exceeds human comprehension (more on this in Chapter 5). Hence, comparing Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s respective views illuminates them both.

In other words, this is also an attempt to unravel knots in our (linguistic) interaction with the technology (theory)-nothing (praxis) dynamics without succumbing to the tyranny of either theory or praxis. There are many ways of approaching these problems, and Gilbert Ryle (1949), for example, sheds light on a conceptual pitfall in his classic book The Concept of Mind. This means that using an educational technology that rests on a technological and entitative language makes it easy to make a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949), since concepts can obscure that “not merely [has] some performance … been gone through, but also that something has been brought off by the agent going through it” (p. 125).

For example, terms such as learning outcome and (planned) teaching may be confused with learning itself. In other words, used entitatively, concepts merely denote the outcomes of an indeterminate and tentative process, unfolding within, that is being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962) or forms of life (Wittgenstein, 2005). However, for teachers, students and researchers to achieve these outcomes, they must somehow make an effort to achieve them that is not fully captured by the language of technology:

A person’s performance is described as careful or skillful, if in his operations he is ready to detect and correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes, to profit from the examples of others...