The Nuclear Ban Treaty

A Transformational Reframing of the Global Nuclear Order

Ramesh Thakur, Ramesh Thakur

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000516937
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Traités

The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order.

Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book's contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists.

A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.

PART I

Origins, nature, impact

DOI: 10.4324/9781003227502-2

1

The Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW¹

Alexander Kmentt

DOI: 10.4324/9781003227502-3

At the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, states parties agreed by consensus to express their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.”² In the following years, non-nuclear weapons state’ (non-NWS) and civil society representatives focused increasingly on the humanitarian impact and the risks associated with nuclear weapons. This focus of activities – later referred to as the Humanitarian Initiative – was done primarily through several international conferences where new research on the humanitarian consequences and nuclear risks aspects was presented, as well as joint cross-regional statements highlighting the concern about these aspects. The latest iteration of the initiative’s joint statement in 2015 has been subscribed to by 159 states. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) builds on the Humanitarian Initiative. It was adopted by 122 states in 2017 and entered into legal force on 22 January 2021. This chapter outlines the rationale of the Humanitarian Initiative which underpins the TPNW and responds to the counter-narratives and critiques against the TPNW presented by NWS and nuclear-umbrella states.

The humanitarian TPNW rationale

The Humanitarian Initiative and the resulting TPNW challenge the parameters of the nuclear weapons discourse. Reframing this discourse around the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons was effective because it countered the NWS narrative on the security, responsibility and legitimacy of the nuclear status quo. This reframing formed the basis of the Humanitarian Initiative, the Humanitarian Pledge, underpinned the TPNW negotiations and is reiterated in the TPNW’s preamble.

The perspective on the global humanitarian consequences, across a wide range of sectors, and the lack of response capability to the human suffering, placed the nuclear weapons issue firmly in a human security context. The Humanitarian Initiative promoted a globalist and comprehensive view of security, in juxtaposition to the “state-centred” security arguments of NWS, who stress that nuclear weapons are essential for their and their allies’ security. It asserted that states relying on nuclear deterrence defend a narrower and self-serving, but ultimately short-sighted, perspective of security, which comes at the expense of the security of all.

From the human security perspective ensues the question of responsibility. Can the threat of not only mutually assured destruction between adversaries but also the risk of inflicting global catastrophic humanitarian consequences, possibly threatening all humankind, be considered a responsible policy? Conversely, if nuclear-armed states are apparently trapped in a vicious circle, justifying their own need to have nuclear weapons with the possession of nuclear weapons by other nuclear-armed states, what is then the responsibility of non-NWS? The human security arguments about humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons thus lead to an appeal to the sense of responsibility of all states and to a call for action to strengthen the normative framework of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The focus on the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons questions the “normalisation” of nuclear deterrence in the security policy discourse of NWS. It demands a reassessment of what constitutes responsible behaviour. This focus raises pertinent questions on the legitimacy of the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The humanitarian arguments reinforced the reasoning that it is the responsibility and in the legitimate security interest of non-NWS to take matters into their own hands, given the unwillingness or inability of NWS to take more credible steps towards nuclear disarmament. Rather than continue to merely demand disarmament progress from NWS, a prohibition of nuclear weapons emerged as the one concrete action that non-NWS were able to effect themselves.

The counter-narrative

In relation to the TPNW, a number of counter-narratives have been and continue to be presented by NWS and nuclear-umbrella states. Closer analysis shows that the broad range of procedural and substantive criticisms of the TPNW are relatively easy to counter, do not stand up to scrutiny and/or cannot be substantiated. Rather, they are the expressions of a politically motivated counter-narrative from those states who object to the Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW, because of the challenge they present to the nuclear status quo and a particular interpretation of what the NPT represents in terms of obligations and commitments.

Deflection

The NWS have shown very limited engagement on the actual issue of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, at no stage going further than a general acknowledgement that these consequences exist and to affirm their resolve to prevent them from materialising. The NWS have not provided answers or commented in any detail on the key Humanitarian Initiative conclusions, arguably owing to a lack of valid counterarguments. Such a conversation would inevitably entail admitting that the impact of nuclear weapons explosions affects not only one’s own and the adversary’s populations, but also the populations of innocent bystander states. It would reveal a willingness to accept these effects on third states and, indeed, on all of humanity, as a “necessary collateral” to maintaining a nuclear deterrence-based notion of security and stability. Whenever the humanitarian consequences and risks were raised, the response of the NWS – and of the nuclear-umbrella states – was to deflect and criticise a possible ban treaty instead.

Distraction and division

At best [the TPNW] is a distraction (…). At worst, it will deepen political divisions.³

Given the severity of the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons for the entire planet, the “distraction” argument is, per se, highly problematic. Moreover, it is hard to argue that the TPNW distracts from the implementation of other disarmament steps because such steps are not being taken by the NWS. The TPNW is supposed to instil more urgency into the currently non-existent nuclear disarmament and facilitate a focus on precisely those necessary steps not implemented.

“Divisions” on this issue have existed since 1945 but today’s divisions exist because of the loss of credibility in the implementation of NPT Article 6 and not because of initiatives to help remedy this, such as the TPNW. Moreover, the NWS boycotted the humanitarian conferences, the open-ended working group and the treaty negotiations. When NWS do not agree and choose not to engage with a discussion and a process, then – by definition – the discussions and processes, rather than the refusal to engage with them, must be divisive. Moreover, NWS do not like the TPNW because it is divisive, but it is only divisive because they do not like it. The redundancy of this argument is striking.

Inefficacy

(…) it is not realistic to expect that ‘effective’ nuclear disarmament can advance without engaging those States that possess nuclear weapons.⁴

The “inefficacy” counterargument is made by states that possess or rely on nuclear weapons, as a reason for not joining the TPNW. In terms of logic, this connection of cause and effect is circular: states with nuclear weapons are not willing to join the TPNW because, in their view, it will not eliminate a single nuclear weapon. Of course, the TPNW cannot eliminate a single weapon in itself, as long as NWS are not joining. But apart from this point of logic, this argument misses the point that a legally binding non-discriminatory prohibition of nuclear weapons creates the legal basis for their elimination and a practical measure towards this objective. This was the case with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. The pressure and momentum created by the TPNW for progress on nuclear disarmament as well as on non-proliferation, is intended to facilitate reductions of nuclear weapons and establish potential pathways to abandon them, once countries possessing these weapons are ready.

Challenging the legality and the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence might not in itself eliminate nuclear weapons, but has the potential to impact current nuclear weapons-related practices and nuclear deterrence. From the point of view of the Humanitarian Initiative, this is exactly why the TPNW is valid.

The TPNW supporters are also implicitly accused of inadvertently playing into the hands of autocracies at the expense of democratic states because the latter will face more civil society pressure. The TPNW is directed against nuclear weapons as such and not against any states or alliances currently relying on them. Certainly, the public discourse in an open society is, by definition, more vibrant, and sometimes very contested. But this argument has nothing to do with the issue of nuclear weapons or the TPNW; it is a natural function of democratic political systems. It is to be expected, and must indeed be hoped for, that democratic systems will have open societal discussions on the issue of nuclear weapons, including the humanitarian consequences and risks associated with them. Democratic states also have more intense discussions on issues such as human rights and climate change. Progress and change on these and other issues are expected to spring more from democratic debates and decision-making processes, than from closed and autocratic political systems.

The TPNW does not take the “security environment” into account

The threat perceptions of non-NWS, stemming from the concern about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons are not merely a humanitarian perspective but based on equally valid and pertinent security considerations. Contrary to the dominant NWS’ nuclear deterrence views, the non-NWS security perspectives regarding nuclear weapons have been expressed for decades but have not been taken into account adequately, rather than the other way around. While opponents of the TPNW are perfectly entitled to their views on security, they neither own the exclusive right to interpret the NPT nor are they the sole arbiter of whose security perspectives are more valid than others.

Proponents of the TPNW have never disputed the difficult security challenges facing the international community today or argued that nuclear disarmament should be seen in isolation from the global security environment. Nor have they advocated the ban as a panacea for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. All disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts, including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons must inevitably proceed in the face of ongoing security challenges, during times of international crises and some form or another of geopolitical competition. From the perspective of the TPNW, the challenging international security environment, coupled with the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by possessor states, make nuclear disarmament efforts, if anything, even more urgent. The argument that one must wait for a future security environment in which nuclear deterrence is no longer needed as a precondition for nuclear disarmament is disingenuous. There will always be real or perceived security imbalances between states, which, if one follows this line of argument, will provide excuses in perpetuity for not altering the nuclear status quo.

In addition, nuclear disarmament measures, including deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and disarmament verification, are easier and indeed might be possible only when they are based on a strong and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. States are more likely to eliminate a weapon if this weapon is morally unacceptable and legally prohibited, than in a situation where the alleged “virtues” of these weapons continue to be highlighted at every opportunity. For TPNW supporting states, this logic is compelling and firmly based on security considerations.

Finally, NWS and nuclear-umbrella states do not tire of highlighting that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security and have done so in particular to express their opposition to the TPNW. There are, however, many non-NWS who could justifiably claim that their security environment is at least as challenging as the security environment of states “relying” on nuclear weapons. By underscoring the challenging security environment and the necessity to keep relying on nuclear weapons because of it, NWS and nuclear-umbrella states only highlight a striking double standard as regards the concept of security.

The TPNW undermines the NPT

Firstly, the states at the forefront of this process have been among the strongest supporters of the NPT and enjoy an unblemished record of implementation. They are all longstanding promoters of various initiatives in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For example, to accuse Ireland, which is considered to have invented the NPT, or South Africa, which actually disarmed its nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as a non-NWS of undermining the NPT must be considered grossly confrontational. This is exacerbated by the fact that these accusations come primarily from those states whose own lacklustre NPT implementation records were the reason why the Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW process were initiated in the first place. In fact, the negotiations of the TPNW were marked by the utmost care to make the TPNW a new l...