Emergency

Crisis on the Flight Deck

Stanley Stewart

• Publisher: Airlife
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781847974129
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Aviation
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Emergency is a collection of true stories about events where disaster seems imminent. Yet each situation is concluded without loss of life thanks to the skill of the pilots and their crews, whose bravery and resourcefulness have earned them well-deserved commendations. Written by a British Airways First Officer, Stanley Stewart, who has spoken at first hand with the pilots and crews involved in all the incidents recorded here, the book offers a unique insight into what really happened: not the passengers eye-view, which in many cases is already documented, but the view from the flight deck of the aircraft itself.

Chapter 1

Forced Entry

On 11 September 2001, the world of aviation changed for ever. In the years before the events of that day, when the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York were attacked, the aviation and security industries were justifiably proud of their record in preventing the unlawful seizure of aircraft. Although lapses had occurred and forced entry to flight decks had been recorded, the efforts of the security industry in denying terrorists access to aircraft and in preventing weapons from getting aboard, and the determination of individual states to prosecute and punish culprits, seemed to be paying dividends. Unknown to aviation at the time, however, the industry had been lulled into a false sense of security and, on that fateful day in September, everything changed.

On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen individuals, all of whom were bent on suicide, simultaneously seized four aircraft. To the horror of the world and the total dismay of the aviation and security industries, the Twin Towers in Manhattan were destroyed, the Pentagon in Washington DC was badly damaged and 3,000 people lost their lives. It was a monumental crime against humanity and an aviation tragedy of unprecedented proportions.

In the decade before 11 September, hijackings were rare, as not only did the crime seem to be out of vogue, but also havens for hijackers had diminished considerably as Third World governments had become less tolerant of such behaviour. Security at airports had been tightened extensively and metal detectors, the searching and X-raying of hand and hold baggage, and the identifying of individual suitcases had all helped to improve safety, not only with regard to hijackings, but to bomb scares as well. The authorities also seemed much more able to cope with terrorists and the risk of imprisonment for such criminals was high. On occasions, culprits were even slain. The action of authorities and the implementation of security measures appeared to be effective but, at the time, no one imagined that any group of perpetrators would be prepared to commit mass suicide and cause death and destruction on such a massive scale.

Prior to 11 September, individual countries, and even airlines within the same country, did not conform to a unified approach to security but adopted various attitudes in combating terrorism in the air. In the United States, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forbade passengers’ visits to the flight deck during flight for all airlines. The cockpit door was locked at all times and on some flights armed sky marshals were carried. In some other countries, crews were themselves encouraged to physically resist hijacking attempts.

The laws of most European nations, and procedures on their airlines, permitted a more relaxed attitude to flight deck access. It was believed, not unreasonably, that determined terrorists armed with anything from a knife to a small firearm could easily overpower an unarmed crew by force, and that the line of least resistance was the safest approach for passengers. Hijackings, in fact, although sometimes bloody and violent, had rarely resulted in an aircraft accident and experience had shown that once overpowered, crews complying with terrorists’ instructions could best maintain safety. The locked door policy and the barring of passengers to the cockpit in the air on US aircraft had never been a totally effective deterrent in stopping forced entry to the flight deck or in preventing the unlawful seizure of an aircraft by determined assailants, as evidenced by the events of 11 September. In addition, in the pre-11 September era, it was not unusual for terrorists to threaten to attack passengers if the flight crew refused to unlock the cockpit door. It was a very callous captain indeed who could listen to passengers being injured, or even killed, outside the door while continuing to deny access to the flight deck, especially since the evidence indicated that the line of least resistance was the safest. The evidence also indicated that once terrorists seized control the likely outcome was damage being caused only to the aircraft and that, in almost all cases, most, if not all, passengers would eventually be freed. Since 11 September, of course, the restricting of access to the flight deck has become of paramount importance and every effort is being made to prevent forced entry by the installation of secure cockpit doors.

The strengthening of flight deck doors and the policy of keeping them securely locked in flight is now a key feature in preventing any repetition of the 11 September atrocity. The design of the new secure doors varies slightly, but they are mostly Kevlar armoured and are locked by a crossbar locking device of which the main component is a 19 mm (0.75 in) steel bar that can withstand a 680 kg (1,500 lb) force. The door itself must also be able to withstand the ramming force of a fully laden food trolley weighing 136 kg (300 lb). Almost any security system can eventually be defeated by a determined attacker, of course, but the resistance of the door is designed to give the flight crew time to land, or to adopt other procedures such as violent movement of the controls to throw the attackers off balance, or depressurising the cabin to render the assailants unconscious. The doors, however, are not designed to contain the impact of a bomb, as it is assumed that an explosive device large enough to blow any secure barrier would probably destroy the aircraft anyway. The door and bulkhead are also only ballistic resistant and not bullet proof, as heightened security at airports is expected to prevent firearms being boarded, as it did on 11 September.

The Israelis lead the world in aviation security, and access to the flight decks on El Al, for example, is via two reinforced doors with a sterile area between. The arrangement prevents an attacker rushing the cockpit when one of the doors is open, and the system is being studied for longer-term security solutions. In the meantime, the programme is continuing with a single secure door system and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires completion on US aircraft by April 2003. The retrofit is a daunting task and, as other nations follow suit, the number of commercial aircraft involved could be as many as 10,000 worldwide, with the estimated cost being $2 billion.

The installation of secure cockpit doors, however, creates as many safety problems as it solves security requirements. To begin with, crew co-operation in an emergency is vital, and a firmly locked door between flight and cabin crews does nothing for crew communications. A further problem is the occurrence of a sudden depressurisation. A locked door forming a secure barrier system could create dangerous loads on the structure if unequal pressures resulted on either side of the door and bulkhead. Secure cockpit doors are, therefore, provided with hinged panels and vents arranged to be opened by quick-release latches, triggered by a pressure rate sensor, if an explosive decompression occurs. The integral strength of the door, however, is maintained with the latches in place and anti-jam panels are also fitted to allow trapped flight crew to escape from the cockpit in the event of an accident. The doors can be opened from the outside by the operation of locks via numeric keypads that can be overridden by the pilots, and some door systems can also be locked and unlocked remotely from the cockpit centre-pedestal.

Another feature being introduced to improve security in the air is a video camera surveillance system for monitoring cabin activity, whereby the behaviour of passengers can be viewed from a display on the flight deck. The use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) is widespread in the security industry at large, of course, and has now become as important an issue as secure cockpit doors for security in the air. There is little doubt it will become a mandatory aviation item. Surveillance equipment produced to date includes systems with a minimum of four cameras, effective for both day and night use, and a touchscreen monitor on the flight deck that can display up to four video images. Also integral to the system is a crew alert wireless pager that can be activated by a flight attendant pressing a ‘panic button’ to silently alert the pilots of an emergency in the cabin. The locations of the four cameras are two displaying different views outside the flight deck door, one above and one just aft in the ceiling, giving sight of a 2.4 m (8 ft) approach area to the cockpit, a third in the forward galley and a fourth at the front of the cabin looking rearwards down the aisle. Unlocking of the flight deck door from the outside using the numeric pads produces an aural and visual warning that alerts the pilots to check the identity of the intruder on the cockpit monitor.

Air marshals have been in use in the US for some time although their numbers have been small and their duties restricted mostly to international flights where the risk factor was considered high. Elsewhere there has been a reluctance to employ sky marshals but, on airlines such as El Al, their use has been extensive. Attitudes changed after 11 September, especially in the United States, and sky marshals are now carried on flights as deemed necessary, and are required to be on board all flights operating into and out of Washington National Airport, owing to its proximity to so many US government buildings. In the event of a confrontation with attackers, any shooting in flight, fortunately, will not pose the same risks as previously. Sky marshals’ weapons will not be loaded with standard ammunition, but will fire a compressed, powdered metal bullet that will disintegrate on impact with a hard surface such as the fuselage. It will, however, still penetrate soft skin.

Other national governments are more sceptical of licensing the use of armed sky marshals and are doubtful of their effectiveness. They also fear the risk of a law-abiding passenger being shot. Marshals will require to be constantly vigilant while remaining incognito, and the task is considered difficult. It is also argued that terrorists who are sufficiently clever to get themselves and weapons past a sophisticated airport security system will be clever enough to deal with any sky marshals on board. Many actions are available to a determined team of terrorists to flush out and identify on-board marshals. Sky marshals could, of course, offer a very useful deterrent against a group of unarmed hijackers. A team of big, powerful terrorists trained in unarmed combat would not need weapons to create havoc on an aircraft. Assistance from marshals would also prove useful in a violent air rage incident or with a violent mentally disturbed person, especially if a large, strong person was involved.

There is also a proposal in the United States to arm pilots, and the American Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) supports the plan. The pilots’ firearms, however, would only ever be considered as a last line of defence. Weapons would only be used in the event of a total failure of the security system, with sky marshals being overwhelmed and attackers smashing through the flight deck door. The ensuing shoot-out might be akin to the gunfight at the OK Corral but would be preferable to a repeat of an 11 September scenario.

Secure flight deck doors, cabin-surveillance cameras and sky marshals are all second-level defence systems that assume a breakdown of security at airports, and the real task is to prevent all undesirable individuals of any kind and weapons of any description getting aboard an aircraft in the first place. Whatever the approach in the air, therefore, the answer lies in strict security precautions at airports.

Sophisticated security arrangements have been in place in Europe for many years. As far back as 1988, the catalyst for the upgrading of airport security systems throughout the continent was the destruction of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland. Clearly, the bomb had been planted at a European airport. A comprehensive security infrastructure emerged in which metal detectors, the X-raying and searching of hand baggage and the identifying and scanning of hold baggage became commonplace. In the United States the X-raying and search of passengers and carry-on baggage were effective, but the reconciliation and X-raying of hold luggage was not a feature on domestic flights. Since 11 September, airport security throughout the world has been upgraded, and police and military personnel at many international airports now assist security staff. Hand luggage is restricted and any sharp objects such as penknives, scissors and nail files are not permitted on board. Even eyelash curlers are prohibited. The terrorists who hijacked flights on 11 September carried on board carpet cutters and were able to inflict serious injury. These small knives had light plastic handles with very sharp blades and were difficult to detect. Now any item that is possible to fashion into a sharp object is banned. The 100 per cent reconciliation of luggage with every passenger and the scanning of all hold baggage before loading is also the ultimate aim

The equipment and procedures required for the detection and prevention of weapons of all kinds being boarded are in place at airports and the screening of passengers themselves is now a priority. Any determined assailant, or potentially violent individual, armed or unarmed, poses a threat, and suspects must be prevented from boarding an aircraft in the first place. One solution is the screening and profiling of passengers. The aim of screening techniques now being introduced, however, is not only to reassure the travelling public by being visible and effective, but also to prevent delays by being as quick and as unobtrusive as possible. Advanced screening systems offer identification of individual passengers by biometric techniques. Sophisticated computers can identify passengers by means, for example, of finger and palm prints, and by iris, voice and face recognition. As a result, passengers can easily be traced and identified from reservation, through check-in to boarding, and the procedure can also be used by immigration and emigration services. Databases maintained by security agencies can also be searched for behavioural characteristics or criminal records, depending on the privacy laws of the country. Even information as simple as an address, travel to certain destinations or the method of ticket payment can target an individual for additional inspection. Clearly some countries are considered suspect and a one-way ticket paid for by cash can raise concern. The small number of travellers considered as possible threats, plus some others selected at random, can be subjected to further security measures. Once again the Israelis lead the world in the profiling process, and at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, for example, passengers are questioned before boarding. Highly trained security officers conduct interviews and can select passengers for additional security checks. Failure to answer questions convincingly and the displaying of stress-related behavioural patterns and body movements can alert staff to a possible suspect. If the security officer is not satisfied, the suspect is cross-examined by a senior officer and their luggage searched. Ultimately, of course, a suspicious individual can be denied boarding. Passenger profiling is known to be effective but, in some countries, certain aspects are in breach of civil rights and the process has to be adapted to conform to national laws.

Effective profiling of passengers not only assists in detecting terrorists but can also help to deny boarding to other undesirables such as the potentially violent. The incidence of air rage, for example, is increasing alarmingly. Air rage incidents tend to range from non-violent scuffles between unruly passengers to vicious attacks on crew. One of the worst events aboard a UK aircraft in recent years occurred in October 1998 on an Airtours charter flight from London Gatwick to Malaga in the south of Spain. A passenger, who had been drinking heavily in the terminal, was permitted to board, and it was clear to the crew when he arrived at the aircraft that he was drunk. The captain was informed and the drunken passenger was told to sit at the back of the aircraft and was refused alcohol. The drunk, however, was abusive and disruptive on the journey and the police were asked to meet the aircraft in Malaga. On arrival, whilst waiting for the officers to board, the troublemaker attacked a stewardess with an empty vodka bottle. The drunk smashed the bottle on the left side of the flight attendant’s head and continued to attack her by jabbing the broken bottle into her face, then into her arm and back as she tried to protect herself. The assailant was restrained by passengers but not before the stewardess was left permanently scarred. The violent drunk, who should never have been permitted to board in the first place, was sentenced by a Spanish court to four years in prison.

On occasions, the actions of the emotionally disturbed or mentally ill passenger have also been known to disrupt flights. Such disturbances normally follow similar patterns to those of air rage, and range from the non-violent, but upsetting, to the extremely violent. Events involving the emotionally disturbed and mentally ill frequently occur without warning and often when the unfortunates are travelling alone and the crew have not been informed that a mentally unstable person is on board. Disturbances from air rage and the mentally unstable normally involve violence being restricted to the cabin, with flight attendants in the front line. On the very rare occasion, however, the actions of the emotionally disturbed or mentally ill have involved flight crew and have been extremely violent. As a result of an incident in 1987, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in America ordered all cockpit doors of US aircraft to be locked in flight. An armed male passenger, who turned out to be a disgruntled former employee, intruded into the cockpit of a Pacific Southwest flight over California and shot dead both the captain and the co-pilot. The aircraft crashed, killing all on board. In May 2000, a mentally unbalanced passenger aboard an All Nippon Airways Boeing 747-400 burst on to the flight deck with a knife and fatally stabbed the captain. The assailant was able to carry a knife on board owing to a security loophole, now closed, at Haneda domestic airport in Tokyo. After the incident, airlines in Japan ordered flight deck doors to be locked in flight and banned visits to the cockpit. Although both the above attacks on flight crew had been extremely violent, on each occasion the incidents were considered sufficiently isolated not to warrant responses on an international scale.

Prior to 11 September, no one imagined that the strategy of terrorists would change from hijacking passenger aircraft for bargaining purposes to the seizing of aircraft to use as weapons of mass destruction. Security measures now in place at airports and on board aircraft can prevent a recurrence of such an event and can help deny boarding to all undesirables or, if they do breach the first level of security and board, can contain their destructive actions. The new procedures will also prevent a recurrence of the violent attacks on flight crew such as those that occurred in 1987 and May 2000. Had such measures been in place in December 2000, the system would also have prevented a large, strong, mentally unstable man boarding an aircraft, forcing an entry to the flight deck and causing unbelievable havoc.

Thursday 28 December 2000 was not a typical grey, winter’s day in London, but it was still cold. The wind from the west was brisk and the temperature a chilly 3°C (37°F). Rain and sleety showers had been evident earlier in the day from a partly clouded sky but some sunshine had appeared in the afternoon. A thin sliver of the new moon had risen in the morning and set during the early evening, so by late evening the sky was black. As passengers arrived at London Gatwick’s North Terminal for the late evening departure of British Airways flight BA 2069 to Nairobi, the temperature had dropped to near zero, but the conditions were still dry. Many passengers were leaving London for a winter break in Africa and they may have thought longingly of the weather at their destination, where the temperature in Nairobi that day had been 27°C (81°F).

The British Airways 22:20 departure to Nairobi was one of the last flights of the day to leave the North Terminal. With most aircraft departed, the terminal was quiet and many passengers awaiting the flight mingled in the near empty building close to Departure Gate 54, or in the shops still open in the main concourse. Others more fortunate waited comfortably in the First and Club Class lounges, amongst w...