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Introduction to Human Factors for Organisational Psychologists
Mark W. Wiggins
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eBook - ePub
Introduction to Human Factors for Organisational Psychologists
Mark W. Wiggins
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About This Book
This text introduces industrial and organisational psychologists to the discipline of human factors. It also provides a range of tools necessary for the application of human factors strategies and techniques in practice. The text is intended to respond to the growing demand for organisational psychologists to assist in the development and evaluation of initiatives that are intended to optimise the relationship between workers and the operational environments with which they engage.
The book
• Contains practical strategies and examples that are intended to guide readers
• Combines human factors and organisational psychological concepts in a single volume
• Covers context-related examples that illustrate the application of human factors tools and principles
• Presents an integrated approach to human factors from an organisational psychological perspective
The text begins by discussing the application of human factors in organisations, together with notions of risk and uncertainty. Frameworks for human factors are considered, including error-based and system safety approaches. It explores the links between individual differences and human factors, and it covers group processes and the impact on team performance, including the role of leadership and followership. The book also presents a range of tools and techniques that can be applied by organisational psychologists to acquire human factors-related information and develop an understanding of the situation or factors that may explain human behaviour.
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Part ISetting the Scene
1An Introduction to Human Factors
DOI: 10.1201/9781003229858-2
1.1Introduction to Human Factors
The term ‘human factors’ describes a discipline the aim of which is to seek understanding and an optimisation of the relationship between human behaviour and the environment (Salvendy, 1997). It brings together a number of complementary areas of investigation including psychology, engineering, education, and ergonomics. The goal is to provide a holistic approach to problem-solving that deals with a range of potential issues and ultimately yields solutions that optimise human and system performance.
The interest in human factors has tended to parallel developments in technology. More accurately, it is often a failure in relation to the use of new technology that emphasises the importance of an understanding of the role of human behaviour. For example, the introduction of electric motor vehicles has resulted in a number of pedestrian collisions where pedestrians failed to hear oncoming vehicles (Wogalter, Lim, & Nyeste, 2014). Similarly, the introduction of self-drive motor vehicles has highlighted the difficulty that drivers are likely to face in monitoring the behaviour of automated systems over extended periods (Banks & Stanton, 2016).
This tendency towards a ‘reactive’ approach to the management of deficiencies in the relationship between human performance and technology reflects a broader conflict in the design of human–machine systems where there is often a tension between delivering a product quickly and cost-effectively, and delivering a product that can be assured is safe, efficient, and functional. There are a number of examples where the pressure to production has occurred at the expense of rigorous testing of the potential outcomes, from the use of thalidomide as a sleeping pill for pregnant mothers, to the use of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) as an insecticide, and the use of asbestos as a building product (Swetonic, 1993). In each case, these products were associated with unacceptable and often fatal outcomes that would likely have been revealed had they been subjected to rigorous testing prior to their introduction to the marketplace.
Despite the potential for unsatisfactory outcomes, the difficulty associated with product development lies in determining the depth and extent of preliminary testing necessary to establish what might be regarded as a reasonable outcome. Erring on the side of caution may result in a product where the costs exceed its value to the market. Conversely, the failure to test a product sufficiently may result in legal liability for any damages resulting from the product. Therefore, a balance must be struck between the requirement for an extensive and rigorous testing regime, and the necessity for a cost-effective and timely outcome.
In some cases, the potential for imperfect outcomes may be underestimated, thereby resulting in a failure far worse than might have been anticipated during the process of design. For example, the Grand National horse race in 1993 was described as a ‘complete debacle’ following a failure associated with the starting tape (Wilson, 1995). The 70-metre-long tape failed to rise at a consistent rate, so that some of the jockeys were caught, while others thought that the race had begun. Some of the horses had run at least 4½ miles before officials could stop the race.
Despite the fact that there were no injuries or fatalities associated with the failure, the 1993 Grand National race illustrates how the success or failure of an entire system can often depend on a relatively innocuous component. Consequently, it is important to consider, during preliminary testing, the relationship between various products and the systems with which they will eventually interact.
The perceived importance of preliminary testing differs for different products and systems. For example, failing to establish the usability of a computer game may simply result in the user becoming frustrated. However, failing to establish the usability of a computer system involved in the management of a nuclear power plant might have far more significant consequences. Therefore, the relative impact of the consequences of a failure ought to figure significantly during the preliminary testing phase of a product or system.
1.2 Human Factors and Organisational Psychology
Psychology is most appropriately regarded as a component-discipline within the broader study of human factors. Within psychology, organisational psychology is the specialist field that offers the greatest synergies with human factors, since it is an applied psychology that draws together research outcomes in learning, individual differences, applied cognition, perception, and mental health (Byrne, Hayes, McPhail, Hakel, Cortina, & McHenry, 2014). This intersection of fields of psychology corresponds and contributes to the three primary interventions that are available in optimising the relationship between humans and their environment. These three interventions are:
- Aspects of the human operator that may be altered to meet the demands associated with a particular task and may include additional training and/or selection strategies;
- Aspects of the environment that may be altered to meet the particular needs of the human operator and may include redesigning instruments, procedures, checklists, and controls so that errors, and/or the consequences of errors, are minimised; or
- A combination of both strategies.
These options for interventions constitute the fundamental principles through which the principles of human factors are applied within the operational environment. More importantly, they reflect the extent to which human factors, as a discipline, targets the performance of an entire system, rather than any individual component of that system. This relationship is captured in a simple conceptual model developed by Edwards (1988) where the interactions between system components can be identified and targeted for subsequent development. Referred to as the SHELL model, it relates the central liveware, or human operator, to four areas: Software (programs, procedures, checklists, etc.); Hardware (aircraft controls, equipment, etc.); the Environment (the surroundings in which the crew member operates); and Liveware (relations with other people). More recent representations have included ‘Organisation’ as another area to be considered as part of a revised SHELLO model (Chang & Wang, 2010). Figure 1.1 illustrates the interrelationship between these components.
Consistent with the broader intention of human factors, the SHELL model is based on the assumption that the failure of a system is the product of a mismatch between two or more components of that system. For example, the failure of a driver to read a signed speed limit correctly may be a product of inattention on the part of the driver (Liveware), the poor design of the sign (Software), and/or the location of the signpost (Hardware). Therefore, any ‘failure’ to respond to the signed speed limit needs to be considered from a number of different perspectives with solutions developed that take into account the interrelationships between these perspectives.
In the case of road traffic speed signs, the impact of inattention could be countered by locating signs in a central position with respect to the direction of travel (e.g. a head-up display) so that the likelihood of observation is maximised (Hardware), and/or the design of the speed sign could be enhanced by co-locating other features, such as intermittent visual or auditory signals (Software) that would draw a driver’s attention. Finally, the importance of speed signs could be highlighted in road safety messages (Liveware), so that drivers are aware of their responsibilities in sustaining their attention during driving. In reality, a combination of strategies, drawing on a range of features, is likely to be most successful, ensuring that the incidence of inadvertent speeding is minimised.
Figure 1.1The SHELLO conceptual model of human factors. (Adapted from Edwards, 1988; Chang and Wang, 2010.)
1.3 A Brief History of Human Factors
Historically, the principle of optimising the relationship between humans and their environment has been an important catalyst for technological development. As new technologies have emerged, these were adapted to render difficult tasks easier or enable tasks that were hitherto considered impossible. For example, the introduction of stirrups enabled riders to better retain their balance and control of the movement of horses at speed. This capability freed the riders’ hands for other activities, enabling cavalry to adopt the role of mobile archers during battles.
As a formal discipline, human factors first emerged in early stages of World War II (Chapanis, 1999) where the swift development of faster and more powerful aircraft resulted in a need for more extensive training for pilots. Combined with the loss of aircraft and pilots due to the inability to cope with these increased demands, the training required was both time-consuming and costly (Meister, 1999).
In response to the problem, twin strategies were developed soon after WWII, and these formed the basis of the contemporary approach to human factors. The first of these strategies was based on the recognition that operating environments were becoming too complex for the average operator to master. In aviation, the controls and displays were neither systematic in their presentation, nor readable under time-constrained conditions. Fitts and Jones (1947) published a seminal study that described the errors made in the interpretation of aircraft instruments. These included difficulties with legibility, illusions, and the misinterpretation of scales. The outcome was a complete reconsideration of the method through which aircraft cockpit instruments were arranged and designed. Importantly, it was the nature of the environment that was altered to meet the needs of the average operator.
The second strategy that underpins contemporary human factors was based on the need to manage the characteristics of the individual to meet the particular needs of the task. The small percentage of pilots who did graduate from flying training were recognised by casual observers as superior both in their ability to operate the aircraft, and in their ability to process large amounts of information in a stressful environment (Meister, 1999). This led to the development of selection strategies that paralleled developments in organisational psychology. In contemporary industrial environments, strategies involving both personnel selection and system design are engaged to optimise the performance of employees.
In understanding behaviour in complex operational settings, one of the first, systematic assessments of human performance was undertaken in the context of aviation using what was referred to as the ‘Cambridge Cockpit’ simulator (Davis, 1948). The equipment was designed to simulate a Spitfire aircraft cockpit and enabled an examination of the effects of fatigue and workload on pilot performance under controlled conditions. Not unexpectedly, severe decrements in skilled performance were reported that were associated with increasing levels of fatigue and workload. Similar results were evident using more advanced simulated environments (Wiener, 1988).
While this preliminary research might have been expected to form a foundation for the future design of human–machine interfaces, many of the principles of design that were developed throughout this early period were not necessarily implemented, even within the aviation industry. The jet-aircraft era that followed World War II, led to a variety of designs, many of which were less than adequate from a human factors perspective. Different manufacturers employed different procedures to operate and interpret aircraft displays and controls, systems were configured differently, and the solution to more complex systems tended to involve the introduction of more complex procedures and checklists, rather than changes to the design of systems. Invariably, this failure to consider poor design in the context of the operating environment only became apparent through aircraft accidents and incidents.
The aviation industry provides a useful case study illustrating the development of human factors as a discipline, as it is a sector that depends on high levels of reliability. Those system failures that do occur are well-reported, and subsequent investigations are particularly thorough, with the outcomes often made available in the public interest. It is also an industry at the forefront of technical innovation, characterised by complex, interdependent components.
In the early years of aviation, technical failures accounted for a significant proportion of aircraft accidents. There was a lack of reliability of engine components, while airframes were constructed of lightweight, fragile materials that were prone to catastrophic failure under the repetitive stresses of flight. However, as aircraft technology became more reliable, particularly in the years following World War II, human error, rather than mechanical failure, became more evident as a key factor associated with aircraft accidents and incidents (Nagel, 1988). In commercial aviation, breakdowns in human performance were highlighted in a number of serious crashes.
In one of the deadliest aircraft accidents in history, a Pan American Boeing 747 and a Royal...