If we are to objectively assess the effectiveness of each of the allied contingents within Wellington’s army, we must consider two things: firstly, their potential, and secondly, their actual performance in battle, which may exceed their potential, or fall short of it.

Manpower is the most basic requirement for an army and can be raised by volunteers, conscription or a mixture of both. The size of a force, or army, was largely dependent on the size of the pool of military-aged males and the ability of a state to pay for what was an enormously expensive tool. Although a large army may be imposing and capable of achieving many tasks a small army may not, the value of any army cannot be based on raw numbers alone. History has many examples of small, well-equipped, well-trained and highly disciplined armies that have comprehensively defeated much larger, but less well-equipped, less well-trained and poorly disciplined armies, even though they may have been well-motivated and enthusiastic. Although a lack of numbers can be mitigated to a certain extent by strength in other factors we will consider, there is a point when a small army, however professional and effective it is, will be overwhelmed by a numerically superior, but less efficient force. Britain, which had long maintained a small but professional army in preference to a much larger conscript army, had almost inevitably relied on allies providing extra bulk in order to face much larger continental armies. In 1815, unable to field the 150,000 men it was obliged by treaty to provide, Britain subsidised its allies to make up the shortfall, making the other national contingents a vital contribution to the viability of Wellington’s army.

To form an army, manpower needed to be organised into units and formations, to have a command structure and include the basic combat arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery, as well as the supporting arms such as engineers and a transport train. Even in the Napoleonic era, it was an established principle that effective military operations required combined arms cooperation of all three arms – infantry, cavalry and artillery – to become more effective than the sum of the individual parts. A contingent without one or more of these three arms would be forced to rely on allies to provide the shortfall or fight without them, and this risked poor coordination and a drop in effectiveness.

A new force needed to be uniformed, armed and equipped to be able to operate on campaign and in battle. However, in a state which had previously not produced its own arms and equipment, mobilising new means of production could be problematic, especially if funds were low. In 1815, some of the allied contingents relied on the British to a greater or lesser extent to provide the shortfall in uniforms, arms and equipment, without which they may well only have been able to field a smaller, or less effective, force.

A new force needed to be fed and watered and provided with ammunition to fight, with sufficient transport to move the necessary supplies. The failure to have an efficient logistic system could have a huge bearing on the performance of the frontline troops and particularly on their acceptance of a system of discipline. The army that had an effective system of obtaining and transporting vital supplies would often have an advantage over an army which did not. In extremis, food could generally be obtained from the local community, with or without renumeration. However, the same was not true of ammunition and a failure to efficiently replenish stocks could have serious consequences. The difficulties of resupply were increased if there were a variety of different calibres across a polyglot allied army and we shall see how the various mix of muskets and rifles had an impact on the battlefields of 1815.

To compensate for the poor accuracy of muskets of the Napoleonic era it was necessary for men to maintain a tight formation to ensure effective control and maximum concentration of fire. For these units to be able to move efficiently around the battlefield and change formation when conditions demanded, they were regulated by drill. Although the drill regulations inevitably differed from country to country, the basic formations and evolutions were generally similar. However, for those armies with long experience of battle, certain adaptions, and more efficient ways of applying drill, could give an army an appreciable advantage over its adversaries. It was also found that different armies preferred a particular formation that, although it gave them an advantage over one enemy, might not have an advantage over another.

It is insufficient to have a chain of command in an army. Its leaders must be professional, courageous and determined, an example for the other ranks to follow and have trust in. Good leaders add considerably to the morale and capabilities of an army and poor ones will inevitably lead them to defeat. There is an oft-repeated mantra that there is no such thing as bad soldiers, only bad officers.

The need for people to obey orders is a vital requirement of an effective army; without discipline the officers have no control over their men with obvious implications for their performance on the battlefield. However, discipline in good units helps to develop the self-discipline which stops individuals avoiding difficult times and moments and being prepared to fight on when things are not going well. Discipline implies the use of punishment to control behaviour, but a well-disciplined unit generally has high morale and does not require the use of punishment as ...