The Belt and Road Initiative

An Old Archetype of a New Development Model

Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9789811525636
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811525643
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is an analysis of the developments associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI) five years after Xi Jinping announced both the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Maritime Silk Road (21MSR). Together, these two dimensions constitute the B&RI, providing the so-called Chinese 'project of the century' with regional, inter-regional and global reach. This book aims at assessing the impact of the B&RI in all these dimensions and levels of influence. This is a current and promising theme, not only in the short and medium terms, but also within a broader timescale, reflecting Chinese strategic thinking itself, since Chinese philosophy and culture are oriented towards long-term and inter-generational perspectives. Likewise, both the title of this publication and the way it has been organized result from the empirical perception that China asserts a conservative attitude towards foreign affairs, redesigned in multiple dimensions, to create a perception of domestic unity and global prestige. In this vein of thought, the B&RI is already influencing and will continue to influence, directly or indirectly, the current economic and political order.

Part IThe Belt and Road Initiative Concept

© The Author(s) 2020

F. J. B. S. Leandro, P. A. B. Duarte (eds.)The Belt and Road Initiativehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_1

Begin Abstract

1. The New Silk Roads: Defining China’s Grand Strategy

Tanguy Struye de Swielande¹ and Dorothée Vandamme^{1, 2}

(1)

Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

(2)

Université de Mons, Mons, Belgium

Tanguy Struye de Swielande (Corresponding author)

Email: [email protected]

Dorothée Vandamme

Email: [email protected]

Keywords

Grand strategyPowerInfluenceStatecraftNarrative

End Abstract

Introduction

The first decade of the twenty-first century was characterized by the advice given by Deng Xiaoping: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”. However, since the economic crisis of 2008, China has become more assertive on the international scene, especially in the economic, military and political fields. The latter has been accompanied by a new, nationalistic form of discourse, which perspired throughout President Xi’s speech to the 19th Congress in October 2017. Indeed, careful analysis shows China’s willingness to assert itself as a powerhouse in the making. Specific excerpts, presenting the country as a future “socialist country, prosperous and powerful”, willing to achieve the “Chinese dream”, being “closer, more assured and more capable than ever to achieve the objective of the great national renaissance”, characterize this tendency. In order to carry out these objectives, Xi Jinping establishes that the military will have to “achieve the modernization of the army and national defence by 2035, and make the army a world-class power by the middle of the century”. Indeed, 2049 will see China celebrate the centenary of its Popular Republic. It is upon this date that its authorities wish to achieve the status of number one on the international scene and realize the “Chinese Dream”, a project put forward by Xi Jinping since ascending as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012.

The chapter analyses China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as Beijing’s grand strategy to assert and legitimize its foreign policy objective of becoming world leader by 2049. In parallel to Chinese rhetoric about BRI being a project that will benefit the international community and which is in line with the current international order, realpolitik factors also inform and drive the project, as China reinforces its exports, increases its spheres of influence, and increasingly sets tomorrow’s norms. In doing so, China projects an image of a country with the objective and power resources of a great power that is ready and willing to take the lead in international affairs. The chapter argues that China mobilizes and operationalizes all the dimensions of power to implement its grand strategy and achieve its aim. Thus, coercion, threats, predatory economics, soft power projection, norms contestation and rules- and institution-building are concealed by social and discursive power of cooperation and connectedness.

A Grand Strategy “with Chinese Characteristics”?

As a Chinese idiom goes, “the real good strategist is the one whose strategy isn’t even noticed, and which we don’t even consider to praise” (Jullien 2015). Despite Beijing’s denial of a grand strategy (both by officials and academia), many factors point to the BRI as being China’s grand strategy. Many researchers doubt or refute the idea that China could have a grand strategy because it appears to be too difficult to decipher and not explicit in speeches and official documents. These are the symptoms of a Western analytic framework where every step of the policy-making process is planned beforehand, and tend to be openly stated. It also results from the reasoning that China is a case sui generis in global affairs, a country which uniqueness prevents us from applying certain conceptual frameworks. Such state of mind is evident when we consider the number of cases that are characterized “with Chinese characteristics”, arguably to make the Chinese case stand out from any other case studies. This mindset restricts our understanding of China. If Chinese politics, whether domestic or external, are so distinct to other countries’, it is doubtful that we can grasp either China’s behaviour or its relation with other international actors. Presumably in fact, all countries are sui generis case studies, therefore constraining scholars into a relativist epistemology which prevents knowledge structuration and understanding of Chinese behaviour.

Our understanding of China’s behaviour is the following: while China can be considered as a distinctive case in many instances, it is also a twenty-first-century state with many similarities to its counterparts. All countries are impacted by their history, and historical narratives are used across the globe to justify foreign policy decisions. State identity is built upon both the history of the state and its interactions with the outside world. Likewise, most countries¹ have a foreign policy objective, ranging from maintaining the status quo of the international order to reforming it to completely overthrowing and replacing it. What is however specific to China is the ability that it has had in developing a long-term, coherent and structured road map to inform and guide its foreign policy. Beijing has shown an exemplary ability to integrate in one coherent frame the mobilization and implementation of its resources, thereby both structuring its world vision and legitimizing its foreign policy for domestic audiences. Layne identifies these two conditions (coherence of world vision and legitimation vis-à-vis domestic population) as necessary for an effective and well-defined grand strategy (in Wang 2006, p. 3). Grand strategy must help build domestic support and bring clarity to external policy by determining the pathways that give the political elite the tools to act according to the state’s values and identity. Grand strategists have a precise understanding of the main interests of the state that they wish to defend, as well as a clear perception of the existing threats and the political, military and economical means at their disposal to defend those interests. In the long run, this means of interpreting allows to (re)define priorities. In the absence of such structuring frame, answers to specific situations risk being incoherent and reactive, while resources allocated to these responses are mainly planned for the short term.

Pointing to the stark difference in Chinese and Western perceptions, François Jullien highlights the specificities of Chinese culture and philosophy and their impact on strategic thinking. Unlike the Western world, which takes part in an established theory–practice relation, China values the situation’s potential: “as soon as the situation reveals itself as not only a frame – or even a context – but an active potential, its relationship with a ‘subject’ thus reconfigures itself” (Jullien 2015). According to Womack, Western thought determines itself by a “transaction logic”, which is characterized by a contractual relationship, and a will to create a win–lose, cost–benefits relation (cited in Pan 2016, p. 306). In other words, Western grand strategies will often be preestablished in well-delineated frames, which proves difficult to get out of—the facts having to match, sometimes forcefully, the conceptualization or modelling. Chinese thinking emphasizes the relationship itself and its mutual benefits by playing on respect in order to obtain a relative advantage in the long run. Taking a long-term approach to relationships, China prefers partnerships to alliances, because “one makes enemies when one makes alliances” (Pan 2016, p. 306). Beijing has no friends or enemies; it has partners. Such an approach implies a “constant implication” and the importance of “discernment”. Moreover, the dimension of reciprocity lies at the core of the aforementioned situation potential (Jullien 2015). This also explains China’s defence of the principle of non-interference, as well as its refusal to take a firm and definitive stand on international affairs (e.g. Syria, Libya…). By refusing to see the world through a binary grid (good-evil, democracy-dictatorship), China conti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Part I. The Belt and Road Initiative Concept
• Part II. The Belt and Road Initiative and the European Union
• Part III. The Belt and Road Initiative and Latin America, North Atlantic, Central Europe and Central Asia
• Back Matter