Government Responses to Crisis

Stefanie Haeffele, Virgil Henry Storr, Stefanie Haeffele, Virgil Henry Storr

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783030393083
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030393090
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

When crises occur, citizens, media and policymakers alike expect government to respond and to take a leading role in recovery. Given the scale and scope of crises, whether natural (such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes), manmade (such as conflict and economic downturns), or often a combination of the two, governments are often seen as being in the best position to identify the problems, understand the circumstances, and direct action. They are also likely to be the entities that have adequate resources to devote to such large-scale efforts. Yet, governments are not spared from the effects of crises. They are composed of individuals who are impacted by disasters and face many of the same challenges in identifying needs, prioritizing action, and adjusting to changing circumstances. It is by no surprise that governments are also often scrutinized during and after crises. How, then, do we understand the capability of and proper role for governments to respond to crisis and to drive recovery?

This edited volume—comprised of chapters by accomplished scholars and seasoned practitioners in disaster and crises studies and management, spanning multiple disciplines including sociology, economics, and public administration—examines the roles, expectations, and capabilities of government responses to crises. It gives an overview of the literature, provides lessons learned from both research and experience on the ground during crises, and puts forth a framework for understanding crisis management and subsequent policy implications. It will be of use to any scholars, students, practitioners or policymakers interested in learning from and better preparing for crises and responding when they do occur. 

© The Author(s) 2020

S. Haeffele, V. H. Storr (eds.)Government Responses to CrisisMercatus Studies in Political and Social Economyhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39309-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Stefanie Haeffele¹ and Virgil Henry Storr^{1, 2}

(1)

F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

(2)

Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

Stefanie Haeffele (Corresponding author)

Email: [email protected]

Virgil Henry Storr

End Abstract

1.1 Introduction

Crises can disrupt lives and devastate communities. Think of the personal crises that regularly plague individuals, like illnesses and unemployment, and challenge families, like the death of a relative or the dissolution of a marriage. Think of crises like severe economic downturns, hyperinflation, debt crises, earthquakes, fires, war, political unrest, riots, and health epidemics that can destroy communities. These crises can be natural (such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods), man-made (such as conflict and economic recessions), or, more often than not, a combination of the two (such as the compounding effect of the levees breaking after Hurricane Katrina and the increasing frequency and ferocity of storms due to climate change). While it is certainly the case that wealthier individuals and more developed communities are often better able to respond to crises (see Kahn 2005), every community is vulnerable to crises. Individuals and communities will, thus, thrive or flounder, prosper or struggle, succeed or fail depending in part on whether or not they respond effectively to crises.

Effectively responding to crises, however, can be extremely difficult. In the case of community-level crises, local residents, business owners, and government officials are often directly affected and can experience physical damage and injury as well as mental and emotional distress. Further, in an ever-interconnected world, crises in one geographical location can affect individuals and communities across the globe by affecting their family, friends, and colleagues, by resulting in migration, or by disrupting communication networks and trade routes. And, while everyone in a community may be affected by crises, as noted above, individuals and groups that are marginalized—such as racial and ethnic minorities, women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and the poor—are less likely to be able to prepare for and rebound from disaster (see, for instance, Hewitt 1997; Morrow 1999; Cutter et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2004; Bourque et al. 2007; Phillips et al. 2009; Enarson 2012; Thomas et al. 2013; Peek et al. 2018; Veenema 2018).

Consider, for instance, Hurricane Sandy, which caused considerable damage along the northeast coast of the United States in 2012. The storm caused 73 deaths in the United States, damaged or destroyed over 37,000 primary residences, and resulted in $60 billion in damages.¹ Or, consider, Hurricane Maria, which caused over $90 billion dollars in damages in Puerto Rico, displaced around a hundred thousand residents, and resulted in almost 3000 deaths (although some estimates place the death toll much higher).² Recovering from disasters of this scale and scope can be a daunting challenge for disaster survivors. The costs associated with rebuilding after a major disaster can be extremely high. Moreover, the benefits of rebuilding rather than relocating are necessarily uncertain. Indeed, rebuilding only makes sense if others in the community plan to rebuild and the community is likely to rebound. In this scenario, the rational move for disaster survivors is to wait and see what others do before committing to a particular recovery strategy. Storr et al. (2015) and others have described post-disaster recovery as a collective action problem because rebuilding in the wake of a disaster is only rational if other key community members also rebuild.

Effectively responding to a community-wide crisis, like a hurricane, war, or a prolonged economic recession, means finding ways to overcome these collective action problems that complicate response and recovery. Still, we see individuals and communities rebounding from crises all the time. How do individuals and communities effectively respond to and bounce back after crises? Arguably, effectively responding to crises often requires that affected individuals have, borrow, or attract the requisite resources and that they cooperate and coordinate their activities with one another.

Often individuals and communities rely on bottom-up strategies to respond to crises. Local entrepreneurs provide needed goods and services, community members leverage their social networks, and community leaders drive and coordinate recovery efforts and in the aftermath of crises (Storr et al. 2015). These bottom-up efforts can be critical to individuals and communities as they rebound. But, there are concerns regarding whether or not these bottom-up efforts will ever be adequate responses to crises. Given the scale, scope, and complexities of crises as well as the adverse impact on socially vulnerable populations, it is unsurprising that citizens, media, and policymakers alike turn to governments to take a leading role in response, recovery, and even mitigation and preparedness efforts. Indeed, the public seems to call for increased government intervention and demand higher performance by government organizations after crises (see Kapucu and Van Wart 2006; Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2010a).

This volume examines and advances the literature on governmental responses to crises, describes the lessons learned from past research, and discusses the proper roles, responsibilities, and expectations for government action after crises.

1.2 Understanding the Role of Government in Crisis Response and Recovery Efforts

Large-scale crises—such as hurricanes , famine, war, and severe economic downturns—can cause deaths, injury, and displacement of the population; destroy infrastructure and crops; induce electricity and communication network outages; and lead to shortages in food, gasoline, medicine, and other essential goods. This destruction and displacement can result in tremendous uncertainty for crisis survivors, who must assess how to respond. People may lose their jobs and homes. Additionally, essential services (e.g. education, health care, and welfare programs) may be suspended. Rebounding from crises means either deciding to start fresh somewhere else or deciding to rebuild and reopen damaged or destroyed homes, businesses, and schools. Rebuilding requires not only access to resources but also an understanding that others will do the same so that there are customers to serve, employees to hire, children to educate, and a community to belong. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for instance, many residents, journalists, scholars, and politicians worried that New Orleans would never fully recover and that its unique social and cultural impact would become extinct. Similar worries could be said of nations long suffering from civil wars or economic crises, such as Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Somalia. And, these challenges impact not only the residents of these communities but their political leaders as well.

Bottom-up responses to crises can often be effective because local actors often have the requisite knowledge needed to properly assess the specific challenges that must be overcome and the incentives to identify the solutions that best meet the needs of crises survivors. Storr et al. (2015), for instance, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Rules of the Game and Post-Disaster Rebuilding and Recovery
• 3. Government as Gardener: Cultivating the Environment for Private Sector Natural Disaster Response
• 4. The Role of the Local Emergency Manager in a Centralized System of Disaster Management
• 5. Recognizing Vulnerability and Capacity: Federal Initiatives Focused on Children and Youth Across the Disaster Lifecycle
• 6. The Political Economy of Foreign Intervention
• 7. When Is Top-Down State-Building Appropriate?
• 8. The European Migrant Crisis: A Case Study in Failure of Governmental and Supra-governmental Responses
• Back Matter