This book is a contribution to African philosophy. Like any tradition of philosophy, African philosophy covers a broad range of themes insofar as it deals with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics. The focus of this book will be in the domain of African moral philosophy. Here, we will discuss the confluence of two central concepts in [African ] moral philosophy. The primary concept will be the moral category of personhood in African philosophy.¹ The second important concept will be the universal value of dignity.² The idea of personhood embodies an African value system for assessing human lives that are morally excellent or virtuous (Gyekye 1992; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1996). To judge someone [to be] a person, in the moral sense, amounts to appreciating the quality of their moral deportment or character insofar as it exudes virtue or excellence (Ikuenobe 2006a, b; Molefe 2018a; Oyowe 2014).

The concept of dignity refers to the intrinsic worth associated with some entity in virtue of possessing certain ontological features (Donnelly 2015; Ilesanmi 2001; Waldrow 2012). Dignity marks something, in virtue of possessing certain ontological features or capacities, as having a superlative rank (Metz 2012a; Waldrow 2012). Different theories of dignity differ in terms of the ontological feature or features they specify to account for it, be they spiritual (the soul, the image of God, vitality) or natural (rationality, autonomy, basic capabilities, the capacity for love, empathy or care ) (Metz 2012a; Nussbaum 2008).

The aim of this book is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to contribute to the discourse on personhood and dignity. It will do so by articulating a theory of dignity inherent in the discourse on personhood in African philosophy. In other words, it will articulate an African conception of dignity by drawing on the axiological resource of personhood. The insight here is that there is a moral-theoretical connection between the idea of personhood and dignity in African philosophy. Secondly, the aim will be to apply the novel personhood-based conception of dignity to the discourse of bioethics, thus contributing to the emerging field of African bioethics (Tangwa 1996; Murove 2005; Behrens 2013a). The idea here is: the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy embodies its own conception of moral status [dignity], which is useful to the discourse of African bioethics.

The above aim—to contribute to African bioethics through a personhood-based theory of dignity—is informed by the centrality of the concept of dignity in the discourse of bioethics (see Behrens 2013a; Christiano 2008; Formosa and Mackenzie 2014). In fact, Daniel Sulmasy (2008: 484) informs us that the idea of “dignity has important implications for addressing a variety of issues in bioethics”. For another, Adam Schulman (2008: 4) avers—“the concept of human dignity … has an important role to play in bioethics, both now and especially in future”. I believe that the idea of personhood as initially advocated by leading thinkers such as Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 2004), Kwame Gyekye (1992, 1997, 2010) and Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2009), among others, embodies a robust and under-explored view of dignity, which I aim to unfold in this book.³ I believe that this view of dignity will offer us an interesting African perspective on bioethical themes such as abortion and euthanasia. Put differently, this book is one attempt to realise the vision that Kevin Behrens (2013a: 32), one of the leading scholars of African environmental ethics and bioethics, expresses it in this fashion—

One way is for African bioethicists to begin to apply indigenous African philosophy, thought and values to ethical issues. This project is important (i) to restore dignity; (ii) because a bioethics grounded in indigenous ideas is more likely to be accepted by Africans; and (iii) because such ideas can enrich bioethical discourse.

In the light of Behrens’ call, the aim of this book is to single out the indigenous axiological concept of personhood (or, more precisely, a conception of dignity inherent in it) and apply it to the bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia, thus contributing to African bioethics. I think that this project is important for the very reasons provided by Behrens, above. Firstly, this project is important for restoring the dignity of African people, so that their forms of life—their cultures—should be one of the crucial considerations in how we handle pressing practical ethical issues (see Murove 2005). Secondly, African people are most likely to embrace ethical systems that are in tune with plausible interpretations of African thought and values. Finally, reflecting on moral issues in terms of local intellectual and moral resources will contribute to global bioethics discourse by adding to the diversity of bioethical thought (Chuwa 2014). This is important for cross-cultural learning and dialogue, and it provides a platform for the evaluation of our diverse philosophical views.

Another reason that informs why this project is important and relevant in African philosophy is that it speaks to the blind-spot or lacuna regarding the idea of personhood. The literature focusing on the discourse on personhood has tended to overlook the possibility that the idea of personhood can embody its own conception of moral status and dignity. This blind-spot in the literature is best exemplified in the writings of Behrens (2013b) and Oyowe (2018). The possibility that the idea of personhood entails its own conception of dignity is implicit in the works of scholars like Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Kwame Gyekye (1992), Mogobe Ramose (2009), but it has not been given the philosophical exposition and justification it deserves. As a result, the possible moral-theoretical contribution the idea of personhood qua dignity can make to bioethical, environmental and political philosophy has escaped the attention of the literature.⁴ This book is important because it will speak to this deficiency in the literature, by directing us to how the idea of personhood can contribute to bioethical discourses.

In this chapter, I provide the reader with a bird’s eye view of this book. I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by clarifying the concepts of personhood that are crucial to this project and their relation to the idea of moral status (dignity) in the literature in African philosophy. The ultimate burden of this section is to suggest how the African idea of personhood embodies its own conception of dignity. Secondly, I give the reader a sense of the status of the aforementioned bioethical themes—abortion and euthanasia—in the tradition of African philosophy. Finally, I discuss the chapters that will constitute the remainder of the book. Immediately below, I discuss the concepts of personhood central to this project.