This chapter introduces a new collection of ground-breaking chapters covering the society and politics of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). J&K here refers to the entire erstwhile state, including the parts currently administered by India and Pakistan. Within local political and intellectual arenas, a wide range of academics, journalists, and activists from all regions within the state have joined a renewed discussion on their past, present, and future. It is in recognition of these diverse perspectives that this book brings together writers from both sides of the divided Jammu & Kashmir and its diaspora to provide a comprehensive and much needed inclusive reading of historical and contemporary challenges.

The Ceasefire Line (CfL), which has divided the state, also referred to as the Line of Control (LoC), was a temporary demarcation and most certainly not an official international border. Initiated as an emergency move by the United Nations (UN) to halt a war between neighboring India and Pakistan over the territory, it was drawn without the approval of the citizens of J&K. The international community promised that the temporary bifurcation would be rectified once a referendum took place, and the matter of the state’s sovereignty was resolved. After all, it is unfathomable that such a grave decision be made concerning a country without gaining the consent of its population. Yet in 1971, the UN walked back its support for the people of J&K to decide their own fate.

Instead, a bilateral resolution between India and Pakistan was advocated, which has led to three wars and unquantifiable standoffs and ceasefire violations on J&K’s territory, as well as the exploitation of its resources and thousands of civilian deaths. Furthermore, when Pakistan was unable to stop the Indian government’s illegal revocation of Indian-controlled Kashmir’s autonomous status in August 2019, it became apparent that the bilateral approach had failed. Thus, the decision to divide the state was merely the beginning of an as yet unfinished journey of uncertainty and contestation.

On March 16, 1846, the British, who had colonized India, sold Kashmir and surrounding areas in the Jammu Province¹ to Gulab Singh, the prince of the Dogra (known as the Dogra Raj) for a sum of 7.5 million rupees (Gupta 2012). Gulab Singh had already conquered nearby Ladakh (in 1834) and Baltistan (1839) through various rampages and backhanded deals with local rulers. The sale led to the establishment of the Princely State of Jammu Kashmir and Tibet Ha, which by 1852 also included Gilgit (Brown 1998). J&K was an amalgam of regions and provinces and thus one of the most ethnolinguistically diverse princely states before 1947. Sarila (2005, p. 342) describes:

Nearly the size of France, the state extended from the subcontinental plains to the Pamirs. Three great mountain ranges ran across it east to west, and their spurs north to south cut up the vast area into different segments, so that [it comprised of] people of different cultures, who spoke different languages and professed different faiths.

Today, the erstwhile state comprises five regions, which are further divided into districts shown in Table 1.1. Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh are on the eastern side of the LoC, administered by India; Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit–Baltistan lie to the west, administered by Pakistan (Table 1.1).

To provide an overview of the most prominent communities, Puri (2010) discusses several major ethnolinguistic groups present in the Indian-administered side of the state—Dogra, Kashmiri /Koshur (further distinguishing between Muslims and Hindu Pandits), Gujjar-Bakkarwal, Paharis and Ladakhis. Although the official labels may differ, the populations within AJK and Gilgit–Baltistan also overwhelmingly fall into these broad categories, as exemplified by the major linguistic groups found across the state. Raafi (2015, n.p.) writes, “[It is] estimated that Koshur is spoken by 9.2 Million, Pahari and Gojri by 6.9 Million, Dogri by 3.8 Million, Balti by 1.1 Million, Shina and Burushaski by 0.8 Million and Ladakhi by 0.34 Million, respectively.”

Shakil (2012), however, argues that current figures presented for some of the groups are significantly undercounted due to the lack of consistency with categorization across the dividing line and, in some cases, languages not being recorded at all. The last census to take place before the state’s bifurcation provides details of major language communities and their corresponding geographies presented in Table 1.2.

The Dogra, known primarily due to the Dogra Raj, also include Muslims (Puri 2010) and came from the Dogra belt, which corresponds with the Jammu, Kathua, and Udhampur districts. The Pahari belt cuts across the current LoC and includes Poonch, Rajouri, Kotli, Mirpur, Bagh, Muzaffarabad, and Neelum. Although all Paharis in AJK are Muslims, on the east of the LoC there are also sizable Sikh and Hindu Pahari speaking communities (Maini 2012). Gujjars—primarily comprised of nomadic tribes originating from Rajasthan—live across the state, although there are larger concentrations in some locations (Hussain and Afsana 2019).

The Kashmir Province is predominately made up of Koshur speakers. The overwhelming majority of the population of the province is Muslim, however, there is a high-profile Hindu community known as the Kashmiri Pandits, who formed less than 10% of the Valley population (Wani 2013) before emigrating in 1990 (Mohanty 2018). Gilgit-Baltistan, although majority Muslim, was largely Shia before 1947 and also had significant pockets of other Muslim minority communities (Brown 1998). However, due to demographic shifts through in-migration over the last 72 years, Sunnis have now become just as prominent. The major language communities in Gilgit–Baltistan are Shina, Balti and Burushaki (see Chapter 5 by Mosvi in the present volume).

Historically, Ladakh shared a close cultural affinity with Baltistan (Kreutzmann 2015). However, as in parts of the Jammu Province (namely Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur and Kotli), the CfL blocked long-established routes and relationships. Ladakh is the Buddhist heartland of J&K with the highest concentration of this faith group residing in district Leh (see Chapter 11 by Vasan in the present volume). The Kargil district of Ladakh however has a higher concentration of Shia Muslims than Buddhists.

In addition to the ethnolinguistic, religious, regional, and subregional differences within J&K, there is also further identification with caste or kinship groups (often referred to in the literature as Biraderis. See Chapter 8 by Ishaq in the present volume). Furthermore, several commentators such as Rao (1999), Evans (2008) and Maini (2012) describe a crucial thorn in the side of internal state politics, representation, mobilization, and economic development since the fall of the Dogra Raj period, which essentially led to the Kashmir Valley monopolizing state affairs. Wani (2013, p. 327) illustrates this as he writes:

Initially, Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru agreed to a state constitution granting limited regional aut...