This book represents a concerted attempt to think of the various resonances between the philosophy of Deleuze and concepts in the Buddhist philosophical traditions. Although much scholarship has been devoted to an investigation of Deleuzeâs philosophy in recent years, the question as to how his philosophy might be connected with other forms of thought such as Buddhism remains largely under-researched or peripheral. Deleuze himself has reminded us that it is usually something on the âoutsideâ that forces us to think. It is my contention that Buddhist philosophy can be such an âoutsideâ and that a dialogue between the two can be productive. It is also at once necessary and desirable to engage in this dialogue because Buddhism may not simply be an âoutsideâ but a distant âinsideâ that pulsates with the desire for life against death, for affirmation rather than revenge, for joyful passions rather than sad passions.
The attempt to engage Buddhism as a philosophical âoutsideâ immediately raises a number of methodological problems, chief of which lies in Buddhismâs incredible diversity. Although Buddhism is in popular imaginations represented by the three traditions of TheravÄda, MahÄyÄna and VajrayÄna, in reality it is much more diverse than that. Without a centralized authority, Buddhist traditions are free to follow different teachings and practice a variety of different meditative practices, loosely linked together by no more than a few core principles such as the four noble truths, eightfold paths and wisdom and compassion for all living beings. Its diversity is such that it has become âfashionableâ among some scholars in the last few decades to say that âBuddhismâ is an intellectual abstraction, and that it would be better and more accurate to say that there were many âBuddhisms.â Paul Williams, for instance, noted that âThis diversity prevents, or strongly hinders, generalizations about Buddhism as a whole ⊠what unifying element there is in Buddhism, MahÄyÄna and non-MahÄyÄna, is provided by the monks and their adherence to the monastic ruleâ (Williams 2009, pp. 1â3). On the other hand, while this diversity is a reality in the Buddhist traditions, it can be a formidable challenge for scholars who are interested in studying it or in comparing it with other philosophical systems. Its sheer diversity, due to a lack of central authority like some other religious traditions, can result in a huge catalogue of diverse local practices, doctrines and histories without knowing what Buddhism is. Thus, Rupert Gethin states that it is ânot unreasonableâ to focus on broad patterns within the Buddhist tradition, those that are generally assumed and shared by most Buddhist traditions, and to commit to an âessentialistâ that remains open (Gethin 1998, p. 3). One possible route we might take in response to this debate is in accepting that the answer may lie somewhere in the middleâBuddhism is neither one nor many, but a becoming that aims at wisdom and compassion. Thus, in this book we will examine some of the resonances between Deleuzeâs philosophy and Buddhist philosophy.
Our attempt at a Deleuzian-Buddhist engagement could be seen as the latest addition of what is generally called comparative studies. This interest has been reiterated recently in a book by Jay Garfield called Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy (2015). In this book, Garfield calls for further dialogue between the two traditions because the outcome promises to be âproductiveâ (Garfield 2015, p. 15). Garfieldâs work can be seen as a latest addition to a trajectory of thought which has gained a degree of recognition in some academic institutions. Some of the more notable ones include Freny Mistryâs Nietzsche and Buddhism (1981) which explores the relationship between Nietzscheâs philosophy and various Buddhist philosophical concepts. In addition to this, we also have Graham Parkesâ Heidegger and Asian Thought (1987) which provides a number of notable essays on the relationship between Heideggerâs thought and Buddhist concepts, Parkâs more recent Buddhisms and Deconstructions (2006) and also the intersections between continental philosophy and Buddhist ideas and practices. While these comparative studies have generated some interest they seem to remain peripheral in relation to mainstream academic studies of philosophies and religions, which generally tend towards textual, historiographical and philological studies. It is with the hope of reversing this trend, offering an alternative and promoting a more âproductiveâ dialogue, that this book project is undertaken.
There are currently a number of studies which examine the relationship between Deleuzeâs philosophy and Buddhist thought. We are not alone. Indeed, these by no means constitute a trend, a movement or even a becoming; we have no way of knowing in advance what these amount to. But their molecular beginnings should not prevent us from appreciating the virtuality which they harbour. One such work is Robert Glassâs âThe Tibetan Book of the Dead: Deleuze and the positivity of the Second Lightâ which can be found in the late Mary Brydenâs edited volume Deleuze and Religion (2001). The paper offers us insights into the Buddhist understanding of life and death as it is found in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Philip Goodchildâs âSpeech and Silence in the Mumonkan: An Examination of Use of Language in Light of the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuzeâ (1993) also explores the relationship between Deleuze and Zen in term of their use of language and silence. Simon Sullivanâs paper âA Life between the Finite and Infinite: Remarks on Deleuze, Badiou and Western Buddhismâ (2014) also offers us interesting insights into the development of western Buddhism. More recently, the publication of Deleuze and Asia (2014), an edited volume by Ronald Bogue, Hanping Chiu and Yu-lin Lee in the wake of the First Deleuze in Asia Conference in Tamkang University in Taipei also suggest that this desire for a more âproductiveâ dialogue is gaining momentum. If we have now entered the age of terrorism and ecological collapse, due to humanityâs unrestrained desires in an age of neoliberal dogmatic images of thought, then the necessity for such dialogues becomes all the more apparent and urgent. This volume of essays aims to make a contribution toward such dialogues.
Deleuzian Remarks on Buddhism
Deleuze wrote exceedingly little about religions, and on Buddhism he wrote even less. Nevertheless, Deleuze made three critical remarks on Buddhism which are indicative of how his understanding of Buddhism underwent development throughout his philosophical career. One of Deleuzeâs first references to Buddhism can be found in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). Here, Buddhism is contrasted with Christianityâwhile Buddhism is a form of âpassive nihilism,â Christianity is a form of âreactive nihilism.â As a form of âpassive nihilism,â Buddhism is seen as being far superior to Christianity because it knows how to deal with nothingness while Christianity has an interest in producing âsad passionsâ and feeding the spirit of revenge (Deleuze 2006, pp. 154â5). Although Deleuze was critical of Christianity, he was not critical of the idea of Christ, for Deleuze follows Nietzsche in making a conceptual distinction between the two (Deleuze 2006). While Christianity was about the spirit of revenge, war and âsad passions,â the figure of Christ was none of this, he represented the coming of âglad tidings,â the absence of sin and all ressentiment. What Christ wanted to reveal was a kingdom of God on earth that is based on the heart. As proof of his doctrine, Christ accepted death and gave up his life for us (Deleuze 2006, p. 155). This Nietzschean Christ has more affinity with the Buddhism than with Christianity as an organized religion, because it reminds us of the Bodhisattva ideal in MahÄyÄna Buddhism, a great being who is possessed of wisdom and who is willing to sacrifice him/herself out of compassion for all sentient beings, rather than a God who is filled with a vengeful spirit. This is why Deleuze would come to say that âChrist was neither Jew nor Christian but Buddhist; nearer the Dalai Lama than the Popeâ (Deleuze 2006, p. 155).
Deleuze also made references to Buddhism in his later collaborative work with Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Deleuze, together with Guattari, brought up the topic of Buddhism while discussing the differences between âwesternâ and âorientalâ bureaucraciesâwestern bureaucracies operate by way of pre-established classes, while oriental bureaucracies work by âchannelingâ classes. Deleuze holds that this calls for a rethinking of the image of the tree in oriental societies. The Buddhaâs âtreeâ is no longer a tree, it is not a signifier for the system of state hierarchy that has come to dominate western societies, but in reality âa rhizomeâ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 20). It is not clear what Deleuze meant when he says that the Buddhaâs âtreeâ is a rhizome as he did not elaborate on it. However, what is at least clear in this passage is that there is a significant development in Deleuzeâs thinking with regard to Buddhismâit is no longer merely a âpassive nihilismâ that is only meaningful by way of its contrast with Christianity. Buddhism has become, at least by the time of A Thousand Plateaus, a ârhizomeâ that is capable of life without dogmatic images of thought.
Deleuze also made references to Buddhism in his final published work with Guattari, What is Philosophy? (1991). Here, Deleuze and Guattari began to draw our attention to the subterranean resonances between western philosophy and Buddhist thought. What is truly fascinating about western logic, they say, is that despite its apparently demonstrative structure, it works in dependence on the virtual which is ultimately that which cannot be demonstrated by propositional statements themselves. Western logic cannot, in the end, demonstrate how it works, it can only show. In this sense, the basis of western logic is not a proposition but a form of silence which makes it much closer to the teachings of Zen Buddhism. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that âlogic is silent, and it is only interesting when it is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agreement with a kind of Zen Buddhismâ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 140). This brief statement by Deleuze and Guattari in their final collaborative work suggests that they were beginning to have an interest in having a more âproductiveâ dialogue with Buddhist thinkers, although this was clearly spelled out or systematically elaborated.
Deleuzeâs three remarks on Buddhism represent a significant development in his thought. By the end of his last collaborative work with Guattari, Buddhism is no longer seen as a âpassive nihilismâ but an ally that western philosophy shares a secret affinity with. If anything, this calls for a rethinking of the divide between religion and philosophy that we have come to accept without questioning. In his famous study of Bergsonâs philosophy, Deleuze noted that it is the mystic who plays the whole of the universe as its âmystical soulâ while philosophers can only consider such a soul âfrom the outsideâ (Deleuze 1988, p. 112). It is not clear what Deleuze was getting at, since the reigning impression among some scholars is that he was opposed to religious and mystical reflections, but it is not improbable to think that Deleuze is here lamenting the limitations of philosophical reflections that proceed with the pretensions of openness when they exclude a priori the contributions that religious and theological systems of thought may make, and have made, toward immanence and resistance. Deleuzeâs brief remarks on Buddhism calls for a rethinking of his thought in relation to religious and theological reflections. This book also aims to contribute to Deleuze scholarship by extending what remains unthought in his work.
Organization of the Book
This book is organized around seven chapters. In Chap. 2,âDeleuze and the Lotus SĆ«tra: Toward an Ethics of Immanence,â I will be examining the resonances between Deleuzeâs philosophy of immanence and the doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus SĆ«tra. Deleuze was known for hunting down transcendence throughout his philosophical career, and for his construction of a philosophy of immanence. The ethical implication of this philosophy is that it does not accept the idea of other-worldly transcendence, but only a positive affirmation of this-worldly immanence. In this regard, there is a strong resonance between Deleuzeâs philosophical project with the idea of Buddha-nature in the Lotus SĆ«tra. This idea rejects the commonly held belief that the aim of Buddhist practice lies in other-worldly transcendence, and affirms the idea that Buddhahood is a state of life that is accessible in the here and now, because all sentient beings already possess a Buddha-nature.
In Chap. 3 âDeleuze, Spinoza and the Question of Reincarnation in the MahÄyÄna Tradition,â Simon Duffy aims to develop a secular foundation for the Buddhist concept of reincarnation, one that is consistent with the different ways in which this concept is understood across a number of Buddhist traditions such as the MahÄyÄna or Madhyamaka tradition as presented in the works of ĆÄntideva and NÄgÄrjuna. In this regard, he is inspired by the Deleuzian-Spinozist account of what it means to be an individual, which provides an alternative metaphysical explanation of reinc...