Myles Burnyeat (2001, 1) describes Metaphysics Zeta as the Mount Everest of ancient philosophy. Marc Cohen calls it āthat tar babyā. Both descriptions are apt. Z challenges its reader. Once a reader accepts its challenge, he or she tends to get stuck in its details. What promises to be an illuminating reading of one critical text ends up apparently at odds with another. Investigating one promising interpretation leads one to see that there are bases for alternative interpretations. Once stuck, one finds that the tar baby wonāt let one go, and one canāt let it go. Having been stuck for more years than I want to admit, I offer the following attempt to find a route up this Mount Everest.
When trying to understand Z, naĆÆve optimism can lead one to think that one can provide an interpretation of it that would convince everyone else about how it should be understood. However, grappling with it year after year makes one realize that one will be pleased if one can offer a somewhat fresh reading that others might find illuminating. What follows attempts to do that.
Before engaging in the attempt, I should mention two considerations that have influenced it.
The first stems from the question of the compatibility of Zās account of substance with that of the Categories, which takes individual living organisms to be paradigm examples of substances that are basic constituents.1 However, the use to which Aristotle elsewhere puts matter and form creates tensions for this view. A reconsideration of substance is in order and Z seems to undertake it. Z.3 rules out matter as a basic constituent, even if the details of its being ruled out arenāt entirely clear. The status of form is a different story. Recently, commentators have reached a fairly broad consensus that Z departs from the Categories view of substance, endorsing substantial forms as basic constituents. Their main disagreement is over whether these are universal or particular forms.
Two things led me to wonder whether this is the right way to understand Z. First, I have not been particularly impressed with reasons drawn from works other than Z for thinking that Aristotle is committed to substantial forms as basic constituents. Because of this, I have wondered why Aristotle would have ended up accepting such a view in Z. Second, an important part of Z is anti-Platonic, but the move to substantial forms as basic constituents is a move in the direction of Plato.
Neither of these considerations is sufficient to warrant expecting Z to take individual composites of matter and form to be basic constituents, and so espouse a view compatible with that of the Categories. Z has its own arguments, and they could commit Aristotle to substantial forms as basic constituents. Furthermore, if Z ends up taking substantial forms to be basic constituents, this need not move Aristotle all the way to anything like Platoās theory of Forms. The only forms Aristotle would need to take to be basic constituents would be substantial forms at the level of species. The theory of Forms takes other universals to be basic constituents. Still, these considerations led me to approach Z with the question, āCan Z be understood to allow or endorse individual composites as basic constituents?ā A reader should be aware of this.
The second influence stems from an apparent inconsistency at the heart of Z. Z.6 argues that basic constituents are the same as their essences, and it seems natural to take this to mean that basic constituents are identical with their essences. Essences then are basic constituents. Z.4, 10ā11, and 15 provide grounds to think that these essences are universal forms. Yet, Z.13 seems to argue that no universal is a basic constituent. Aristotle, thus, seems faced with an inconsistency. Furthermore, this inconsistency seems obvious enough that it is hard to see how Aristotle could have been unaware of it. Yet, he shows no sign of acknowledging it. This suggests that this inconsistency is only apparent; so, there should be a way of understanding one or more of the theses that generate it that would make it disappear.2
In investigating ways in which this inconsistency might be removed, I became intrigued by a suggestion of Marc Cohen (1978) that Z.6 doesnāt argue that basic constituents are identical with their essences. Rather they stand in a weaker sameness relation to their essences according to which individual composites are the same as their universal essences. Cohenās argument for this view rested on how well it fits an overall understanding of Z. But after looking at the details of Z.6ās arguments, I became convinced that his suggestion was right. Furthermore, both individual composites and substantial forms are the same as their essences in this way. So, Z.6 allows each of them to be a candidate for basic constituents. Understanding Z.6 in this way also provides a promising way of removing the apparent inconsistency at the heart of Z.
Again, this isnāt decisive when it comes to what Z allows or endorses as basic constituents. My investigation of Z.6ās arguments was, in large part, confined to what was said in Z.6. Passages in other parts of Z could still warrant revising my conclusion. Indeed, they could commit Aristotle to take substantial forms to be basic constituents. Or they could raise an aporia about basic constituents that would need to be resolved by resources outside of Z (as
Code (1984) and Kosman (1984) suggest). Nevertheless, my investigation of Z.6 led me to approach other parts of Z with the question āDoes it commit Aristotle to take substantial forms to be basic constituents, or should it be understood to leave open or endorse individual composites as basic constituents?ā. Again, this is something a reader should be aware of.
Of course, approaching Z with these questions doesnāt mean that Z will answer them affirmatively. Texts say what they say whether one likes it or not. Nevertheless, understanding how I have approached various parts of Z can help a reader better understand what follows, even if he or she doesnāt agree with some of the conclusions I reach.
What emerges from this approach is a kind of coherence argument for an overall interpretation of Z. The final interpretation of any part of Z is based in part on how well it coheres with other parts, and the overall interpretation of Z one should accept is the one that coheres best with what is said throughout Z.
I recognize that approaching Z in this way presupposes that Z tells a single, consistent story. Failing to find such a consistent story could lead one to abandon it but accepting it seems to be the default position one should accept when approaching a thinker of Aristotleās caliber.
Given the difficulty Z presents to those who try to understand it, what I think makes one interpretation of it preferable to others will be the way it fits the details of central and critical parts of Z. There is not sufficient space in what follows to offer a careful investigation of the details of all of the parts of Z. What follows discusses the details of the parts I have found important for understanding Z. If that focus inspires a reader to look more carefully at parts I have ignored or dealt with cursorily, so much the better. Further investigation of them should either fit with what I say or provide grounds for revising or rejecting it. Only a naĆÆve optimist who would think he has said the last word about this difficult and important text.
Space and time constraints have led me to ignore or deal only cursorily with some of the most recent literature on Z. I hope the authors of these works will forgive this oversight.
References
- Burnyeat, Myles (2001), A Map of āMetaphysicsā Zeta (Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications).
- Code, Alan (1984), āThe Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics vii,ā Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 10, 1ā20.Crossref
- Cohen, S. Marc (1978), āIndividual and Essence in Aristotleās Metaphysics,ā Paideia, Supplementary Aristotle Issue, 75ā85.
- Kosman, Aryeh (1984), āSubstance, being, and energeia,ā Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 121ā149.
- Lesher, James (1971), āAristotle on Form, Substance, and Universals: A Dilemma,ā Phronesis, 16, 169ā178.Crossref
Footnotes
1
In Chap. 2, we shall see that Aristotle uses the notion of substance (ousia) in more than one way. Here, it will be enough to note its use to pick out the basic or fundamental constituents of the world, things that in a certain way everything else depends on.
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2
For one explanation of why Aristotle would nevertheless be caught up in this inconsistency, see Lesher (1971).
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