The worldwide decline in linguistic diversity has attracted the attention of linguists and caused concern even amongst a section of the wider public for at least the last two decades (Nettle and Romaine 2000; Crystal 2000). Since then, language revitalisation studies have generated planning measures, documentation, educational material and, more generally, made efforts to give endangered linguistic communities a voice. Nonetheless, the most negative predictions cannot be altered yet because, in the words of Fishman (2001a), ‘it is hard to save a threatened language’. Indeed, complex and far-reaching issues such as ideological environments, the particularities of local linguistic ecologies and the question of the empowerment of local communities require further investigation.
Engaging with local speakers in order to understand their practices, beliefs and hopes is a priority on the research agenda. From individual case studies on the ground, trends can be identified and comparisons are made, sometimes with limits. What links all communities affected by the symptoms of language endangerment is the presence of a Big Brother (Fishman 2001a), that is to say the more or less close contact with a more powerful language spoken by an elite. In France, the latter has impacted on historically and ethnically varied communities. Recently, debates about the alarming level of endangerment of France’s territorial languages have emphasised the necessity to act urgently to support the languages traditionally spoken in various regions of mainland France and its overseas territories.
It is important to observe at the outset that non-territorial languages (such as Dialectal Arabic, Berber, Yiddish and others) also feature in discussions of language policy towards the langues de France; however, the work presented here focuses on the languages that have a long-established linguistic and cultural tradition rooted in the French territory (Walter 2012). Immigrant languages are excluded from this volume, not because they would not bring another crucial element of analysis for the progress (or indeed lack of progress) of inclusive language policies in France, but because the focus is on the political incorporation of and respect (or indeed lack of respect) for the linguistic diversity already present within the French borders at the time of the establishment and through successive versions of the French Republic, of its system and operating values.1
This volume sets out to define the issues at stake when dealing with language revitalisation in France in the twenty-first century. It seeks to understand the obstacles facing language revitalisation in a post-industrial society such as France, which joins together a defence of traditions and a love for avant-gardism, a drive towards protectionism and an openness to the world, a pride in defending human rights and an oversight or neglect of minority needs. This project has arisen from the observation that even though dynamics are evolving and society is changing, French language policies reveal a tendency to ‘change by doing the same’. Stemming from a conference at the University of Leicester in September 2015, this volume draws on the research of experts to investigate the present-day situation of a range of regional languages,2 and evaluates the particularities of the French situation as regards the challenges and the opportunities faced by its diverse regional linguistic communities.
As an introductory step into this multi-faceted topic, the socio-political and ideological background of French language policies needs to be addressed. This introduction will, therefore, examine the history of language policies in France and will explore the two seemingly contradictory and somewhat successive movements of implementing long-lasting pro-monolingual policies and fostering support for regional languages. It will also explain how this sometimes-tricky balancing act can be observed on the ground through the four main sections of this volume.
1.1 Deeply Rooted Linguistic Nationalism
It is a well-researched and an undisputed point that language, identity and nation have been construed in an interlinked system exclusive of diversity in the French context (Rickard 1989; Ager 1996; Judge 2002a, b; Wright 2000). Judge (2007: 21) explains that since the Revolution ‘French became—and remains—one of the most important symbols of the new nation -state defined as an indivisible community […]’. Ingrained in the French citizen’s perception of the French language and of the role of regional languages are values which originate from a political drive towards territorial unity. While language centralisation certainly climaxed as a result of Revolutionary ideals, it predates 1789 (Cole and Harguindéguy 2014: 29). As Marrani (2013: 128) argues, the myth of unity surpasses political regimes: ‘The language, and the ways in which the paradigm of unity operates, appear to play a fundamental role in the French state, regardless of the system of government, except perhaps in the scale of the violence used in its reinforcement. It is a matter that transcends the Monarchy and the Republic’. Despite the timeless aspect of linguistic nationalism in France, its link to Republican values and to the constitution is certainly very strong and deeply rooted.
1.1.1 Republican Values and the French Language
The French political system has its constitution at its core: it lies within its frame of reference and works as the ‘bible’ of a ‘laïque’ (secular) Republic. New treaties and laws need to abide by and operate within the limits of the constitution. To help maintain this order, the conseil constitutionnel monitors the decisions of the executive and legislative powers. This has led to a cumbersome and multi-layered system in which implementing changes is extremely slow.
The French nation has experienced different regimes since the Revolution, with five Republics and two Empires. Modern political stability has come about with the evolution of the distribution of executive, legislative and judiciary powers. During the 2017 election campaigns, both Marine Le Pen, from the far right Front National, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, from the far left La France Insoumise, championed the idea of the creation of a 6th Republic. Hence, the Republic can be perceived as capable of adapting, of being renewed in order to respond to the will of its people. A sort of Republic 2.0 is something that politicians can envisage, but what is striking is that it does not impact on linguistic affairs and on the role of the French language, which appears to be unchallengeable. The symbolism around the national language has been a constant parameter in the formation and functioning of the Republic. Le Pen and Mélenchon are both strong defenders of the unity and supremacy of the French language, which acts as a beacon of stability. Stronger than presidents, monarchs or emperors, the symbolism of the French language has been impossible to overthrow.
The unity of France as conceptualised in the motto ‘une et indivisible’ has affected the view of the French language, also seen as one and indivisible, and with a supposedly early standardisation (Trotter 2006: 366).3 All French citizens are declared free and equal in rights before the law without distinction ‘of origin, race or religion’. Yet not of language. The anchoring of Republican values in the French language, and culture more generally, seems to offer some stability, perhaps reassurance, to citizens and institutions. At least, this is the belief that has been passed on from generation to generation, and from Republic to Republic.
In order to understand the deeply rooted links between identity, language and Republicanism, which affect numerous decisions made about language policies in France, one needs to observe the omnipresence of references to the Republic in the political world, including, for instance, in the names of political parties, from all areas of the political spectrum (e.g. the recently renamed Les Républicains, formerly the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, and Macron’s recently coined La République en Marche!). Another example is the declaration of the former president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who regretted in 2015 not saying he ‘wanted to defend the values of the Republic’ in the 2009 debate about national identity (Mihaely 2015). It is very clear that he fused the notion of national identity with Republican values. As Laborde states (2008: 3), ‘Republicanism is the dominant language of modern politics in France’. The pervasiveness of the symbol of the Republic, which is present in all aspects of political and, by extension, social life, including the intrinsic role of the national language, is a point that regional language planners and supporters have attempted to tackle. The dissociation of language, identity and Republic is a major obstacle which can be surpassed if the French language is viewed as a mere instrument that facilitated Revolutionary ideals.
The principle of national unity originates in the Revolutionary goal that aimed to create an egalitarian society, ridding France of the feudal system. Naturally, the relations of power between groups did not disappear with the abolishment of the monarchy, as some groups maintained a sense of superiority in their intellect and morals. The perceived disparity between an Enlightened, righteous and educated centre and the obscure, backwards and morally devious provinces was one reason for the desire of politicians and moralists like the Abbot Grégoire to bring all regions into line, philosophically and linguistically, with the centre of influence that was Paris (Walter 1988; de Certeau et al. 2002). The disparaging judgement of regional languages occurred as one effect of a movem...