Political scientists generally categorize States into two broad categories: unitary States and federal States. While there are a variety of political regimes and a number of nuances that could be made between these two broad categories, and while there are, in fact, many types of federal States, this basic dichotomy—differentiating between unitary and federal States—is essential to better understanding the subject. From an institutional perspective, unitary States suppose a structure of power that is generally assumed to be more centralized than that of federal States. By contrast, federalism implies a certain diffusion of power (Elazar 1987; Bagchi 2003). That diffusion or separation of power is operated at the level of subunits or subnational units. According to Karmis and Norman (2005), “In the most general sense, federalism is an arrangement in which two or more self-governing communities share the same political space” (p. 6). In other words, federalism supposes an institutional arrangement where two or more governmental units are federated—united—in sharing a national /federal level of government. In a related manner, federalism is not strictly an issue of institutional organization; it is also a political reality that has effects on citizens insofar as it may shape a sense of citizenship and belonging. Again, following Karmis and Norman’s basic definition: “Citizens of federal states (or superstates, as in the case of the European Union) are members of both their subunit (sometimes called a province, canton, land, or, confusingly, a state) and the larger federation as a whole” (p. 6). In a federal State, citizens participate in the politics of their subnational and federal governments; they vote for and are governed by two political entities. A good way to understand federalism and to extend this definition is to approach and identify the logics of the alternative form of State: the unitary State.

In a unitary State, executive and legislative powers—in other words, governments and parliaments—do not need to share their decision-maker power with other subnational units. While unitary States do not have to share their power (with subunits), they have the prerogative to give (and take back) powers and responsibilities to other governmental bodies. For instance, unitary States will often rely on municipal powers or regional governments to oversee or deliver certain policies. France, Italy, and the People’s Republic of China are good case examples of unitary States. In all three of these countries, the central government has given a certain number of decision-making powers to cities, and all of them rely on a very elaborate number of regional administrations to implement central policies. Looking more precisely at cultural policy research , it has been well-documented that France and Italy have also given a lot of cultural power to cities and regions and have decentralized some aspects of their cultural policies; cities and regions in these countries have taken not only a greater role in (cultural) policy implementation , but greater responsibilities in cultural decision-making (Friedberg and Urfalino 1985; Négrier 1997; Zan et al. 2007). In a unitary State, decentralization—handing over power or autonomy to another entity—is a voluntary process. In other words, subnational entities may well exist in political and administrative terms in unitary States—though their existence and relative power are often precarious.

In France, for instance, in 2016, the national government voted to reduce the number of regions in its metropolitan territory, from 22 to 13. This modification was driven by the national government and aimed at creating a more efficient structure for regional service delivery. Many well-known regions that had a long political reality in the post-World War II French administration and that people commonly associated or identified with have been amalgamated by what can easily be described as an ordinary act of government. As a result of this act, for example, two vast territories of western France—the former regions of Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes—have been amalgamated into a single region called Nouvelle-Aquitaine (New Aquitaine). The same thing happened to a number of other regions in France. This example serves to illustrate how these regions—or subnational units—do not share the same level of power and guarantees that those found in a federal State do. This, however, does not mean that there is not a political price to the giving and removing of power to regional units. For instance, citizens of an amalgamated region may find their level of services to be diminished. Some citizens may even lament the fact that the amalgamation made it so that their city was no longer considered a capital of the newly minted region. Others may find that new regions, such as the new Occitanie region, may, in fact, convey a better sense of their local and regional identity than the previous regions did, while others may struggle to find themselves and recognize a sense of belonging and identity in a new mega-region like, for instance, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes. The central government may well pay a political price in the short term for merging its regions—in the ballots, for instance; however, in principle, the reorganization of France’s regions is perfectly within the range and nature of activities that the French (unitary) State is legitimately capable of undertaking. In a unitary State, “regions” and “regional governments” may be created, transformed, or eliminated, and the nature of their activities or power can be increased or decreased by a simple act of the national parliament. Regions in a unitary State do not benefit from the same power and protections as subnational governments found in federations. Unlike federated subnational governments , unitary State regions do not benefit from strong constitutional protections.

By contrast, in a federal States, executive , legislative, and judicial powers are constitutionally defined and distributed. From an institutional perspective, federalism is a form of division of power, where the constitution—the basic and fundamental law sustaining the political system—identifies and defines powers that are specific to the federal government vis-à-vis those that are specific to subnational entities. The vast majority of North American countries have federal States. Notably, Canada, the USA, and Mexico—the three largest North American States—all have federal political systems. Their federal governments and powers—housed in Ottawa, Washington, DC, and Mexico City, respectively—all have to compose with the existence of subnational governments (provinces in Canada, and states in the USA and Mexico) that have their own political space and powers . Subnational units benefit from constitutional protection, and the transformation of the federation—either by addition or removal of one (or more) subnational government(s)—is a very complicated process where subnational governments are actively involved. More importantly, the constitution also protects distinct areas of intervention; it defines, delineates, and protects powers that are specific to federal governments and those that are specific to subnational governments .

According to Lijphart, a “formal federal constitution” that guarantees powers specific to federal government and subnational units is the first and key condition for a federal State (2002: 177). To give an example, when it was crafted, the American Constitution defined powers specific to the federal government. In Article I, Section 8 of the constitution, 18 specific powers are bestowed upon Congress and the federal government, among which the most notable are associated with foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship, the national postal system, and finance—including the ability to establish a national currency. These powers are defined as the specific prerogative of the American federal government and subnational units—in this case, states—cannot intervene or act legitimately in these areas. These powers are constitutionally recognized as belonging to the federal government of the USA. Then, what defines state pow...