PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany

Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, Steven Schäller

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9783319674940
• eBook ISBN:
  9783319674957
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Offers a revised and updated version of the German book PEGIDA: Entwicklung, Zusammensetzung und Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung by the same authors

Brings together scientific surveys of PEGIDA-participants with literature on German politics

Considers the impact of the development of PEGIDA on German politics and culture

 

 

© The Author(s) 2018

Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold and Steven SchällerPEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in GermanyNew Perspectives in German Political Studieshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7_1

Begin Abstract

1. The Development of PEGIDA: From a Movement of the Outraged to a Protest Ritual

Hans Vorländer¹ , Maik Herold¹ and Steven Schäller¹

(1)

TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany

End Abstract

The Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) represented something unprecedented in the Federal Republic of Germany. Never before had there been a right-wing protest movement that could mobilise on a massive scale and bring thousands or even tens of thousands of supporters onto the street. Hence, PEGIDA’s demonstrations and rallies quickly attracted attention well beyond Germany and Europe. The origin and main location of the protest movement was Dresden , the state capital of the Bundesland Saxony. It was from here, starting in October 2014, that every week the same pictures went around the world, of a flag-waving and banner-holding crowd, which cleverly presented itself against a baroque backdrop.

Every Monday evening the same ritual could be observed. In a relaxed, even festival-like, yet partly tense atmosphere, thousands of people streamed into the historic centre of town. These were mainly groups of men, many middle-aged, but also married couples, young people, pensioners, as well as numerous people who appeared to belong to the hooligan or neo-Nazi scene. Influenced by the speakers the atmosphere quickly heated up. Slogans like “We are the people” (Wir sind das Volk), “Lying press ” (Lügenpresse) or “Merkel must go” (Merkel muss weg) rang out through the night. Remarks which were xenophobic, nationalist and critical of the elites could be heard, and journalists on the sidelines were insulted, which made their coverage even more critical. This image presented to the outside world led to the conclusion that PEGIDA was a narrow-minded, blatantly Islamophobic and xenophobic mob, publicly displaying its diffuse fears. And yet its initiators and supporters always denied that they hated foreigners and Islam . In fact, they thought of themselves as the avant-garde among the citizens, who had the courage to take justified criticisms generally shared by the population to the streets as a public protest. With this in mind, the slogan of the freedom movement from 1989, “We are the people” (Wir sind das Volk) was also adopted. PEGIDA believed itself to be the core of a collective German and European movement of the outraged, the new “enraged citizens” (Wutbürger).

The development of the protests was marked by highs and lows. Their rapid rise in winter 2014/2015 was followed by a progressive erosion of support, so that in July 2015 it seemed that PEGIDA had already come to an end. Then, the refugee crisis ¹ of late summer 2015 provided the impetus for a veritable resurrection of the demonstrations, alongside which a noticeable radicalisation began. One could subsequently observe a brutalisation of the political discourse on the streets and on social media, in which the lines between rhetorical and physical violence threatened to become blurred. Since 2016 the new right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has achieved, at times, spectacular electoral success in elections in a number of German states, whereas the number of participants at PEGIDA events soon declined. The right-wing populist protest, it seemed, had now found its way into parliament via the AfD , whereas on the streets it had stagnated and become an increasingly weary protest ritual. Accompanied by further public quarrels among the organisers, PEGIDA’s slow decline into insignificance began.

1.1 Emergence and First Successes

What presented itself in autumn 2015 as an anti-immigration movement with international ambitions had started a year earlier as a small, like-minded group of friends and acquaintances. In a Facebook group not visible to the public, established on 11.10.2014, views were exchanged about one’s dissatisfaction with the political course of the country. The group’s initiator, the trained chef and self-employed advertising entrepreneur Lutz Bachmann ,² later justified the establishment of this group as a result of a demonstration by supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which had recently taken place in Dresden , along with the latest reports of ethnically and religiously motivated conflicts between foreigners in German cities.³ As a matter of fact, the incidents mentioned were in the context of developments which had led to a broad political debate, not only in the traditional media, but also on social media.

Simultaneously, there was extensive reporting about the successes of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq , as well as about the targeted killings shown by the group in videos, which led to a debate about possible German support for Kurdish Peshmerga militias (Leithäuser and Bickel 01.09.2014). Subsequently, on 10.10.2014, also in Dresden , a demonstration did in fact occur in which the participants advocated arms shipments to the PKK , which is banned in Germany.⁴ At the same time, already in autumn 2014, the housing of refugees was being discussed at a local level. The authorities had revealed plans to establish new accommodation for asylum seekers . According to those plans, in the Dresden area, for instance, around 2000 places were to be provided. In many affected communities resistance quickly emerged, which was voiced in local discussion rounds, local media and social networks and was frequently consolidated in protest initiatives. The target of the criticism was, above all, a seemingly authoritarian style of administration, the lack of involvement of the local population and the lack of a strategy for the housing and integration of asylum seekers (Baumann-Hartwig et al. 26.11.2014; Wolf and Llanque 08.08.2014).⁵

Against the backdrop of this mix of developments in global politics, national debates and local conflict situations in the population, a decision was made in Lutz Bachmann’s Facebook group to take their outrage to the streets in a protest event. By choosing the label “Patriotic Europeans” the aim was to create the image of a middle-class initiative.⁶ Even the first public call for a demonstration in Dresden’s city centre, which the PEGIDA organisers distributed among their friends and acquaintances on Facebook , was heeded by around 300 to 350 people on 20.10.2014. In the following weeks the number of participants then rose exponentially. As it turned out, the threat scenarios that were then under discussion and captured in the name “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident” acted as an emotional catalyst for a fast and successful mobilisation of thousands of supporters (Fig. 1.1).⁷

Fig. 1.1

Numbers of participants at PEGIDA and NoPEGIDA events in Dresden (October 2014–October 2016)

In the wake of these successes, offshoots of the Dresden PEGIDA initiative were soon also established in other large German cities. As early as mid-November 2014 a group in Würzburg took to the streets. In December Kassel , Bonn , Munich and Düsseldorf followed, and in early 2015 Hanover , Leipzig , Kiel , Saarbrücken , Braunschweig and further cities joined. In addition to the offshoots throughout Germany, eventually even international groups emerged, which adopted the same general thrust as the Dresden movement, some even taking the name PEGIDA, for example in Great Britain , Spain , Austria , Poland , the Netherlands and even Australia (see Fig. 1.2).⁸ However, it was mainly in Dresden that PEGIDA was successful. There the Patriotic Europeans achieved rapid growth until mid-January and on 12.01.2015 ultimately reached the peak of their mobilisation with approximately 25,000 demonstrators.

Fig. 1.2

One of the many offshoots, PEGIDA UK , with its spokesperson Tommy Robinson giving a speech at a rally in Birmingham on 6.2.2016. Image credit: Guy Corbishley/Alamy Stock Photo

One week later all PEGIDA-related events in Dresden were cancelled at short notice, because the security authorities had detected a “concrete threat”, a planned attack against a member of PEGIDA’s organisational team.⁹ Sunday, 25.01.2015, was the last time the high level of the previous weeks was close to being achieved with approximately 17,500 participants. After internal conflicts and a first split ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. The Development of PEGIDA: From a Movement of the Outraged to a Protest Ritual
• 2. Dealing with PEGIDA: Between Demarcation and Dialogue
• 3. PEGIDA in the Context of German Right-wing Populism
• 4. The PEGIDA Demonstrators: Characteristics and Motivations
• 5. Right-wing Populist Attitudes at PEGIDA: Findings and Interpretations
• 6. Right-Wing Populism in Germany: Classification and Explanation
• 7. PEGIDA as Part of Right-Wing Populism in Germany and Europe
• Back Matter