The fundamental fact of course is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content.
(Lord Eyre Crowe, February 19111)
The relations between Britain and France, at higher military and governmental levels, as well as those between soldiers, have foundations in various parts of the century preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. Following the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815, relations between Britain and France entered a form of stability until the latter years of the nineteenth century, when competition over particular colonial interests caused friction between the two nations. An agreement would eventually be reached over these areas with the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Whilst this agreement laid the foundations for a future military alliance, it was not an agreement to support each other in times of war in itself. In fact, Britain and France had already undertaken such an operation to deal with Russian incursions in the Crimean War and to maintain the balance of power in Europe.
It is this balance of power and the Great Power system itself that must be understood as a preliminary for what followed. Confidence in their place as Great Powers underline many of the actions that both Britain and France took when in positions of strength. The eventual erosion of this confidence at the beginning of the twentieth century in the face of growing German power brought about a series of military agreements that, particularly in the case of Britain, would not have been considered in the decades before. Britain was highly pragmatic in its diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe, and this pragmatism is highlighted by the manner in which it entered the war in 1914. However, the system of alliances and pragmatic agreements that began to criss-cross the Continent would not ordinarily have ensnared Britain.
It was not just the rise of German power that brought about closer relations between Britain and France in the years before 1914. Military difficulties and disasters for both countries undercut their apparent place within the list of Great Powers. British efforts against the Boers in South Africa made the country the object of scorn across Europe, whilst the devastating defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War brought about a collapse in French prestige and political power both at home and abroad. During periods of strength, the Great Power system had acted as a method for Britain and France to test themselves against each other without risking open warfare. Following the drop in perceived power after their respective military setbacks, Britain and France were pulled closer together to prepare for contingencies given the emergence of Germany as a rival.
Britain, France, and the Great Power System
Defining a nation’s Great Power status is notoriously difficult to qualify. If using Benedict Anderson’s theory, whereby a nation is an ‘imagined community’ of participants, then the Great Power system is the further extension of this imagination.2 Great Power status is supposedly self-evident not just internally to individual countries but to the international community as a whole.3 Whilst historians have suggested various units of measure, the most prominent amongst them comprises qualification by military power; though even this criterion is divided up between arguments of whether such power is an internalised ability to defend territory and interests or the ability to wage a successful war against rivals.4 Being a member of the Great Powers had clear benefits to the European nations, principally because it was these select few who administered the system and viewed themselves as ‘the guardians of the Peace of Europe’.5 Beneath the Great Powers existed various grades of lesser state, but it was ‘the strongest second-class states’ that had the greatest cause to resent ‘the existence of this “exclusive club’’’ and therefore greatly to desire access to it. The fear of falling from the top table and becoming a second-class power was often a motivator for the behaviour of the strongest nations of Europe.6 By the self-evident nature of the system, if a nation was not recognised as a Great Power it would be restricted to the periphery of power. In this case, a lack of power represented irrelevance. To be irrelevant in the eyes of the Great Powers was to be unable to impose one’s own views, demands, requirements, and will on the world. The Great Powers did not ask the opinions of lesser states, nor did they feel bound to respect their wishes.
Whilst there is a clear history of attempted brinkmanship and dominance between France and Britain, the primary goal of each nation was the preservation and perpetuation of its own power. Being a Great Power was a largely self-evident pursuit based upon the perception of military strength; an element of restrained belligerence was therefore engineered into the system. To continue to prove Great Power status, it was necessary to utilise the power such status brought. Britain and France had, for centuries, been constant Great Powers with a personal rivalry born out of geography and competing ideological and imperial aims. This rivalry had, for all its ability to vex and frustrate both nations, become comfortable, convenient, and habitual in its own way.7 What better method of testing your own position as a Great Power than by forcing a quarrel with your most familiar rival? Britain and France had, through their respective militaries, come to embody opposing strengths. France (certainly during Napoleonic times) prided itself on being the premier land army in Europe, whilst Britain had the largest navy.8 France concerned itself originally with domination of the Continent, whilst Britain favoured a more global view facilitated by sea power. The ability of one to comprehensively defeat the other rested not so much on their strengths but their opposing weaknesses. A method of evaluating those respective weaknesses exists within the dynamic of Great Power rivalry.
When viewed in this manner, the Fashoda Crisis (which will be examined in further detail below) becomes much easier to understand. France, still recovering from its humiliation by Prussia and riven with internal disputes, took the opportunity to test its own power against that of Britain. However, this also means that incidents like Fashoda should not simply be viewed as an Anglo-French confrontation when, equally, they can be viewed as a test of Great Power status. What complicates this relationship further is that the Great Power system was already beginning to unravel at the end of the nineteenth century through what Kennedy refers to as the ‘crisis of the middle powers’.9 The supposedly second-class powers (and even those Great Powers which were perhaps not immediately or historically viewed as being as strong as France or Britain) had, through methods of industrialisation and economic and political changes, begun to acquire the tools to level the playing field.10 Previously, the cost of being a Great Power had been beyond what most smaller states could ever hope to produce. HMS Victory, for instance, had cost nearly £400,000 over her lifetime; which represented the entire annual budget of some countries.11 Principal amongst these new modern nations which threatened Britain and France, and essentially changed the relationship between the pair, was Prussia/Germany.12 When Germany used its Great Power bellicosity to build up its strength and test its limits, it didn’t so much prey on the weaknesses of its rivals (Britain and France) but instead challenged their strengths through a system of naval construction and army modernisation that took it into spheres which both Britain and France had always considered largely their own. Additionally, Britain and France were no longer as powerful or secure as they had once been. Losing the Franco-Prussian War had been a humiliation for France, and Britain’s difficulty in overcoming the Boers had laid bare its military shortcomings. Furthermore, the Prussian/German state had created its own ideological framework regarding the army in particular as a social institution that cut into the weaknesses of the British and French models and built upon the existing ‘history and traditions’ of militarism which were ‘deeply rooted’ in Germany at the time.13
It is probable that Germany aspired more to the ‘moderate and indeed more legitimate ambition’ of becoming a ‘World Power ( Weltmacht )’ rather than actual world domination, but both Britain and France blocked the path towards this goal to varying degrees.14 Kaiser Wilhelm II’s foreign secretary Bernhard von Bülow declared his desire for Germany to ‘have our own place in the sun’, but there was only so much suitable territory left to claim. Geographically, Germany was penned in amongst European nations, with only a route into the North Sea offering naval expansion. Whilst Germany yearned for...