1 Social Forces and Political Dynamics in Modern Iran
Revolutions emerge from the past; their foundations are laid in history.1 The Islamic Revolution in 1978â1979 in Iran was no exception. One can search into the more esoteric roots, going back to the birth of the Shiâism in the fourteenth century, given the revivalist essence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiniâs doctrine. Yet the manifold factors that went into the making of the Islamic Revolution are primarily a product of, and require an understanding of, latter-day Iranian society and the dynamics that the clash of traditional and modernist forces unleashed to shape that monumental event. In the final analysis, the Islamic Revolution was a product of those dynamics. This introductory chapter aims to address that need while offering a panoramic view of the main post-war occurrences that provided the backdrop to the years of crisis.
At the onset of the twentieth century, the crown and the ruling elite still held all the instruments of power while the clergy held unrivaled sway over the masses. A third social group, the intelligentsia, comprised of secular modernists, social democrats and the radical left, had just emerged and was soon in a position to challenge the establishment. Foreign influence in different shapes and forms was yet another factor: Anglo-Russian rivalries, wartime alliances, Britainâs often pernicious prying into internal Iranian affairs, the Soviet post-war gaze over northern provinces of Iran and, finally, the Cold War context, which brought an implacable American influence during the final decades of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlaviâs rule.
Beginning with the Constitutional Movement (1905â1909), virtually every landmark event in Iran resulted from the interplay of the above three internal socio-political groups meshed with foreign input. Alliance between two against the third invariably defeated the latter. During the Constitutional Movement, the clergy and the intelligentsia worked in harmony, to the detriment of the reigning monarch, who was compelled to accept significant limitations to his absolute power imposed by the (1906â1907) constitution. In 1924, the three principal Shii divines underwrote Premier Reza Khanâs bid for dynasty change, leading to the advent of the Pahlavi dynasty.2 The all-powerful Reza Khan had initially planned to replace the Qajar dynasty with a secular republic along the lines of Kemal Ataturkâs Turkish model. That was anathema to âulamaâ, who made a display of their rabble-rousing prowess to bring Reza Khan to see reason.3 In the late 1940s and early 1950s the liberal-nationalist movement championed by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq benefitted from a tactical alliance with a high-profile activist cleric, Ayatollah Seyyed Abolqassem Kashani, whose mixed bag of followers included a terrorist group called âFadaâian Eslamâ. Mosaddeq âs road to power was paved by the latter group through the assassination of the incumbent prime ministerâand Mosaddeq âs principal adversaryâAli Razmara.4 In 1953, a different coalition, this time between the crown and the clergy, resulted in the downfall of Mosaddeq.
The victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 did not escape the shifting pattern of alliances among social groups in as much as the clergy-led grand anti-Shah coalition in 1978 encompassed the full spectrum of intelligentsia on the left and in the center, which included the intellectual and literary community. Without the fully fledged participation of these groups, the uprising in 1978 would have been crushed.
Another point of historical relevanceâignored by historiansâneeds elucidation. Much of the political commotions in Iran in the years prior to the revolution were rooted in the eclectic character of Iranâs 1906â1907 fundamental law in as much as it was an incongruous blend of the 1831 Belgian constitution with clerical exigencies. It was the outcome of a grand bargain struck precisely among secular modernists, the clerical estate and the ruling elite. Secular democrats obtained an elected assembly known by its short name, Majles, with wide legislative and supervisory powers. The âShia hierocracyâ earned a prerogative to ensure that Majles legislation would not infringe Islamic law.5 This came with a ringing endorsement of the Shii faith as the official religion of the country, which the sovereign was duty-bound to protect.6 The crownâs absolute powers were curtailed, but significant prerogatives were retained (Articles 35 to 57 of the constitution). They notably included the function of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Article 50).
In later years ambiguities in the formulation of the crownâs prerogatives would lend themselves to contrasting interpretations, with troubling ramifications through much of the post-war history of Iran. The French word âinviolable,â included in the 1831 Belgian constitution, was translated in article 44 as âmaghamâe mobara az masâouliat,â a classic case of double entendre which could mean the absence of real executive responsibility or alternatively denote an exalted authority with well-defined prerogatives but not accountable to parliament. The conflicting interpretations caused an irreparable rift between the Shah and Mosaddeq in 1952 and became an impediment to later reconciliation attempts in the post-Mosaddeq era. A whole generation of Iranian literati grew up in the belief that the prerogatives accorded by the constitution to the Shah were nominal and inoperative.
In practice, Iranâs Magna Carta as forged by the constitutionalists was never respected. As early as 1911, the Regent Nasser-Al-Molk felt compelled to evince deputies by force and exiled the more recalcitrant among them to rule in the next three years by decree.7 The power of veto granted to clerics in Article 2 of the 1907 supplement was also trampled on by the advent of the First World War and long periods of legislative interregnum followed by the drive to secularization under Reza Shah (1926â1941), which rendered that provision inoperative. The Pahlavi monarchs rode roughshod over the Majles and ignored much of the other constitutional provisions. Even Mosaddeq , who in the public consciousness personifies constitutional rule, moved to curtail the powers of the Majles by obtaining special legislative powers known as ekhtiaârat and ended up dissolving the upper house and the Majles in two separate strokes.
2 Events and Protagonists in Post-war Iran
In February 1921 a military coup dâĂ©tatâencouraged by local British military and diplomatic agents without the knowledge or approval of Londonâushered in a new era in Iran.8 The coupâs military leader, Reza Khan Mirpanj, swiftly trashed political rivals and engineered his own accession to the throne to found the Pahlavi dynasty. His roughly 20 years as strongman and king transformed Iran from an archaic near-failed state into a country with the rudiments of modern statehood. He laid the foundations for a modern army, a universal system of schooling and modern judiciary; he dramatically improved the status of women and built the first fully fledged modern university as well as roads, hospitals, factories and more; but along the way he also quashed liberties, subdued the Majles, humiliated the clergy and abused his power for self-enrichment. His reign came to an abrupt end after the Anglo-Russian wartime allies invaded Iran in August 1941, giving a pretext for the presence of a sizable number of German technicians in the country accused by the invaders to be the German fifth column. In actual fact Britain sought to secure the British-run oil installations, of immense strategic value, in the south of Iran and run a secure a supply route from Persian Gulf to the Caspian to feed Russiaâs war efforts.
The political system that replaced Reza Shahâs autocracy had all the trappings of a parliamentary democracy but was closer to an oligarchy. The eruption of liberties spawned a full spectrum of political parties as well as a plethora of newspapers and tabloids.
Prompted by the Soviet Embassy in Tehran , the Tudeh party (âthe party of massesâ) was founded in 1941 from the wreckage of the ephemeral âCommunist Party of Iran,â formed in Anzali in 1920.9 Its founders were the remnants of a group of 53 leftist intellectuals imprisoned under Reza Shah using a law he had enacted that proscribed the communist ideology. The Tudeh party, which shunned the communist label, soon became a major political force, falteringly present on the political scene to the time of the Revolution and beyond.
On a different terrain, steps were taken in 1943 to roll back Reza Shahâs secularization measures, which restored ulama to the social standing they enjoyed prior to his advent.10 The revival ...