1.2 Migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons: clarification
Integral to the history of societies is migration and human mobilities. And this narrative evidently resonates in the way in which societies across Africa have been formed. Embedded in the histories of the plurality of cultures across Nigeria is the diversity of movement from within and outside the continent.
Pre-colonially for instance, the narrative of mobilities was conditioned upon âtrade, trade routes, markets, religions, diplomacy, wars, conquests and slave tradeâ.4 For instance, the founding figure of the Borgu royal lineages â which spanned parts of the north-west region of Nigeria and the northern parts of Benin â was said to have originally migrated from Persia (pre-Islamic Iran).5 This founding figure (Kisra) derived his name from âthe term KisrÄ, which is used in classical Arabic sources as the title of the Sasanian rulers of pre-Islamic Iran.â6 A cursory look at the histories of other notable empires and kingdoms including the Ibibio Kingdom, the Kanem-Bornu empire, the Nri Kingdom, the Oyo empire and the Kwararafa Kingdom reflect the centrality of mobilities to the socio-cultural formation and emergence of the Nigerian state.7
Movements during the colonial epoch were mostly linked to colonial capital given the emergence of export-oriented plantations. As such, in this period, labour migration was a prevalent feature. Aworawo observes, for instance, that from âthe mid-1930s, Nigerians came to dominate the labor that sustained Equatorial Guineaâs cocoa and coffee plantationâ.8 Sundiata observes that by the year 1941 âthere were 10,000 Nigerians already on Bioko. This number increased throughout the decade. In 1954â1955 a very conservative estimate of the total number of Nigerian migrants on the island was âabout 15,800ââ.9 However, by the mid-1960s, Nigerians comprised about 85,000 of 100,000 people on the island, âtwo-thirds of these Nigerians were Igbo-, Ibibio-, and Efik-speakingâ.10 At least three factors drove this narrative. According to Sundiata ârecruiters were generously paid by Spanish officials and employers. Second, there was pressure to pay taxes to the British colonial administration in Nigeria. And third, there was demographic pressureâ.11 But this was not solely the reality in Nigeria. Across various parts of the continent, there were seasonal movements to farms, mines and plantations with and across borders, that were sometimes strictly induced by the colonial administration.
With the attainment of political independence and the emergence of colonial nation-states, the narrative on movements began to shift towards the consolidation of national identities as constructed in national immigration policies and programs. With the retention of the Berlin borders, the post-colonial state redefined patterns of movement along the lines of national belonging. And this significantly shaped the socio-economic narrative, in some instances resulting in toxic exclusions and the negative labelling of those who did not belong to the legally constructed notion of citizenship and nationality. According to Peil, the âachievement of independence, provided several countries with an opportunity to get rid of âstrangersâ in their midstâ.12 For instance, Peil observes that âGhana deported some Nigerians in 1954, and some Voltaics [BurkinabĂ©s] in 1961, because âtheir presence was not conducive to the public goodââ.13 The undulations in national economic development were also in certain instances, conflated with the presence of non-nationals. And this resulted in cases of mass expulsions, for instance, of non-nationals including Ghanaians from Nigerians in the 1980s.14 According to Aluko,15
The parlous state of the economy had also contributed to the expulsion order. As a result of the combination of mismanagement, inefficiency, and unparalleled official corruption, and the glut in oil world market, the economy that was relatively buoyant throughout most of the seventies slumped by early 1981. Instead of the real growth rate of 7.2 per cent envisaged under the Four Year Development Plan 1981â5 there was only a growth rate of 2 per cent in 1981, and this fell below 1 per cent in 1982. The balance of payments surplus of the country that stood at âŠ2,402.6 billion in 1980 turned to a deficit of âŠ1,500 million in 1982. The foreign reserves of the country that amounted to âŠ5,648.2 million in December 1980 had fallen to about âŠ780 million at the end of 1982. The public debt that stood at âŠ9,922.3 million in 1980 had risen to âŠ12 billion at the end of 1982.
The austerity measures that were introduced in April 1982 had done little to improve the economy. Inflation in 1982 reached a record level of over 25 per cent. Unemployment (including graduate unemployment) had reached an alarming proportion of nearly 20 per cent of the work force. And more unemployment was daily being created by manufacturing and construction companies who could not easily import raw materials and spare parts, because of the austerity measures of the Shagari government. Given all these factors, then, expelling the illegal aliens must have been tempting if partly as a scape-goat measure for the failures of the government and partly as a popular move to create jobs for thousands of Nigerians in an election year. Alhaji Ali Baba said on 25 January 1983 that one of the reasons for the expulsion order was to create job opportunities for Nigerians.
The post-colonial preservation of the in-group and out-group narratives on identities with evident colonial links shaped the laws and policies of newly independent states from the early periods of independence. Over the last decades, national governance of migration and mobilities has been orchestrated through prisms of national security and in some instances, criminal justice.16 However, these approaches are mostly a consequence of negative binaries and systemic crisis of reception and mobilities management.
The existence of uneven patterns of laws and practices on migration and mobilities across the continent has led to an increasing call for effective governance at various levels that addresses the causes of movement (specifically in contexts where these are negative), protect various categories of persons (along the spectrum of voluntary to forcibly moved populations) and reinforce the continental drive towards unification. In developing solutions, it is useful to underscore the fact that the causes for migration and mobilities are not monolithic and this suggests an inherent complexity.
The patterns of migration and mobilities evidently reinforce the fact that there are several reasons why people move. While many of the movements in pre-colonial times were directed towards seizing on new opportunities, there were movements brought about by inter-tribal conflicts such as in the conquest of lands and territories. Moreover, there was the trans-Atlantic slave trade in which an estimated â12.5 million people were forced out of Africaâ.17 As earlier observed, during the colonial era, labour-oriented mobilities were a significant feature. Though there were also forced movements due to inter-tribal wars, uprisings against colonial administrations and clashes. In post-colonial Africa, voluntary and involuntary dimensions of mobilities have also emerged linked to a plethora of factors including labour, conflict, socio-economic opportunities, education, and in more recent years, disasters linked to climate change. In the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa), it is observed that18
The root causes of migration in Africa are numerous and inter-related. The push-pull framework provides insight into this complex web of factors. Lack of socio-economic opportunities and the rule of law, poor governance, patronage and corruption, political instability, conflict, terrorism and civil strife are major push factors. Pull factors include the real or perceived opportunities for a better life, higher income, improved security, and superior education and health care in countries of destination. The push-pull dynamic is intensified by a number of other factors that facilitate migration. These include the lower costs of migration; improved communication, especially social media and the internet; greater information availability; and the need to join relatives, families and friends. The movement of people â voluntary or forced, legal or undocumented, within or across borders â is a complex process that affects policy making in a wide range of areas.
And along the verse spectrum of causes of migration and mobilities, normative frameworks have also defined categories and structured governance. In this context, the use of the word âmigrationâ or the term âmigrantsâ is often employed with respect to populations moving voluntarily. While such movements may be internal, much of the emphasis of migration governance from global and regional perspectives relates to the international dimension of these forms of movement. Within this context, movements may be regular or irregular. The spectrum of regular movements is often defined with reference to immigration laws and policies. Within this context are a broad group, based on national normative systems, which may include migrant workers, students, permanent or temporary residents and other categories of persons whose presence in a country are through the regular pathways provided within normative frameworks at national, bilateral or multilateral levels. In...