Anatomies
The beginning of our journey takes us far back in time. The setting is the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, in the decades between the sixth and fifth century BC, when the outline began to form of what would later be called, in a way as suggestive as it was overstated, the âGreek miracleâ: an age of great innovations, when features took shape that would leave their mark on the whole of the ancient West.
As far as is known, reflection on equality first began to crystallize in relation to one of the most significant events of this period: the birth of the polis; that is, of the city as a politically organized body that we would call sovereignâthough the ancients themselves had no such concept.
In the new communities, whose independent existence often stemmed from the crumbling of vaster territorial entities, in Greece and along the coasts of Ionia colonized by the Greeks, the experience of complete political autonomy led the inhabitants to form very close ties among themselves. Reciprocal and equal, these bonds were not just between the old aristocracies, but also included people of humbler stockâpeasants, artisans, shopkeepers, traders, seafarersâand prompted a distribution of government tasks that involved the whole community, rather than just being concentrated in tight-knit oligarchies or in the hands of a monarch.
The poleis regenerated from this new sociality quickly became the context for a peculiar management of power, which was soon called âdemocracyââa word that Aeschylus, in The Suppliants, written in Athens probably around 460 BC, already showed that he knew, working deftly around the terms forming it: demos and kratosâpeople and power, combined in a previously unimaginable short circuit.1
In the newly refashioned cities there was plenty of discussion (and writing too): more complex modes of social organization and of the division of labor freed up, albeit for just a few, time and resources to devote to activities that we would describe as intellectual. People began to publicly ask questions about themselves, the value of their choices, the characteristics of the societies that were developing, the mysterious regularity of nature, and the hidden meaning of life and of the world. They debated the exact significance of the peculiar symmetry between citizens induced by democratic politics, and what the limits were of this condition.
Parity within the bounds of oneâs own circle had already long been common among various aristocratic groups at the timeâas is clearly shown, for example, in Homerâs poetry. But something different was emerging now: the democracy taking root in centers along the coasts of the Aegean was at once the presupposition and the result of a leveling not limited to a narrow circle of important families but extending to the whole social fabric of the city. It is in this framework that we come across an announcement that has reached us mutilated and decontextualized but which, due to the essentiality of its content, has been part of European and Western history ever since: in a certain sense, the point of origin of the path we are trying to reconstruct.
Expressed in it, probably in highly assertive and polemical termsâwhether for the first time exactly we do not know, but undoubtedly in an already very definite and complete wayâwas a radical idea, that of equality as a ânaturalâ feature of the human; and some decisive implications of this discovery were clearly set forth:
We know them and we respect them [perhaps: âour customs, our lawsâ: the integrations to render this incipit are conjectural and controversial]; but those of people who live far away we neither know nor do we respect them. Thus in this regard we have become barbarians towards each other, since, in nature at least, we are all fitted similarly by nature in all regards to be both barbarians and Greeks. It is possible to observe what is necessary by nature for all human beings and what they possess in relation to their needs in conformity with <the same> needs, and in all this none of us can be defined as either b<arbaria>n or Greek. For we all breathe into the air through our mouth and nose; <we laugh when we are happy in our mind> or we weep when we are grieved; we take in sounds by our hearing, and we see by means of light with our eyes; we do work with our hands and we walk with our feet.2
It is possible, as has been suggested, that these words were paradoxical or even provocative, and that their author was not exactly a friend of democracy, whose limitations and incompleteness he wished to denounce.3 But no attempt to piece together a background can extinguish the objective force of this thought, presented with the impact of a drastic pronouncement open to all âhuman beings.â4 The boundaries of citizenship in the new poleis were breached in a single blow; the declaration went further even than the whole sum of their inhabitants, to include nothing less than the entire human species.
Writing in this fashion, around 430 BC, in a work consisting of various books and probably entitled On Truth, was a man devoted to âphilosophizing,â as Pericles, the great Athenian politician, put it in those same years. His name was Antiphon, and his words have survived in a fragment known to us through two of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri.
Antiphon lived in Athensâat the height of the democratic experienceâand his master had probably been Anaxagoras, who came from Clazomenae on the coast of Asia Minor: a man of learning versed in the doctrines of the Ionic physics that had accompanied the establishment of popular governments on the Asian side of the Mediterranean.
An Ionic inspirationâthe intellectual environment between Miletus and Abderaâshines through in Antiphonâs text: the naturalism supported by the empirical observation of reality typical of early Greek science, which had yielded the conceptions of Thales, Anaximander, and Leucippus, and would run through to Democritus. A universe that is now almost lost to us (something can be intuited through Lucretius), due to the drastic selection made in late antiquity when saving classical textsâa choice dominated by the Christian canon, which, by no longer transcribing works deemed incompatible with the new religion, effectively consigned them to oblivionâlike those of the early Ionic scholars, too imbued with materialism. Their analytic force can be almost only detected in an indirect way, through the screen of Platonic and Aristotelean writings that would intercept and readapt their memory. But unfortunately, here too we are conditioned by a thick filter erected by the two philosophers, who forced the richness and originality of that tradition into the categories of the metaphysical and spiritualistic turn that distinguished Greek thought from Plato onward (we shall see an example shortly).
To push his reasoning to its most extreme consequences, Antiphon evoked an alterity well known to fifth-century Athenian culture, constitutive of the Greek certitude of their own superiority: we, the Greeks, on the one hand, and the barbarians on the other. A contrast based on a primary negation, a path of self-recognition determined above all by exclusion, in opposition to the other: not slaves, not women, not peoples unable to speak a Greek dialect.
Instead, Antiphon stripped those differences of meaning, erasing them completely, and in so doing reached the horizon of an absolute inclusion: the space of the universally equal (the philosopher did not mention women, but he probably included slaves in his formulation, though whether here or in another text we cannot say, as we shall see more clearly further onâthey must also have fallen within the scope of the equality he imagined). Every identification obtained solely through opposition was superseded at a stroke, to the point of including within the same field also what appeared at first sight to be completely extraneous to it: the barbarian, or the slave, recognized as being perfectly equal.
Any distinction constructed on the basis of social conventions, however deep rooted, was cancelled out by the evidence of a more important uniformity, founded on objective recognition of fundamental characteristics shared by all human beings, distinguished by the same anatomy and the same functioning of the body. Such uniformity had to come first, becauseâand this was the real heart of Antiphonâs reasoning, implicit but crystal clearâeverything belonging to the world that we would call social-historical should be relatedâand to a certain extent subordinatedâto the natural-biological datum. The corporeality of bare existence was elevated in this way to the measure of every human relation. Not just the common functions of survival (breathing), but also those enabling sociality and community life (seeing, moving, working, laughing, crying), performed by means of the same anatomical base (the mouth, nostrils, feet, eyes, hands), make humans entirely similar; and from this Antiphon derived consequences that could connect nature and society, observation of reality and the correct formation of the rules that should guide all dealings between human beings.
The affirmation, as formulated, had the effect of bringing lifeâgrasped in its barest essentialityâdirectly into politics (the declaration inevitably had political implications), projecting the materiality and functionality of bodies not only onto the social profile of the polis, but even onto relations between different peoples commonly perceived as opposites. And life was brought in not as an inert object over which to exercise an omnipotent commandâthe unquestionable authority of the law, of nomosâbut rather as the unbreakable foundation of collective action: an intent that, with time, would become the genetic feature of all democratic radicalism.
In Antiphonâs interpretation, the experience of politicsâwhatever the philosopherâs actual position within itâwas evoked and, as it were, placed between parentheses, while it was the discovery of the natural character of equality that was placed in the foreground. As if, to truly comprehend its import, it was necessary to give that idea a completely external grounding with respect to the constitution of the polis. To conceive it as evidence of a nature pushed beyond itself and interpreted as norm and as destinyâan attitude also known to Greek thought irrespective of this particular vision. And it was the conquest of a prepolitical horizon that made it possible to arrive at that otherwise precluded universality which, once achieved, had a socially and culturally explosive significance.
The boundaries of nature, in fact, did not coincide with those of the polis. The discovery of equality held true also and indeed above all outside the city; it could go beyond the specifically political sphere to include the whole species, precisely because the affirmation was not the outcome of an achievement within a particular community, but reflected a natural input, a kind of primary self-recognition of the human as such.
What weight and value Antiphon really gave to the proclamation of this boundless unity is not known. It is likely that he himself thought it wise not to exaggerate its significance, sterilizing its practical and political meaning, reduced to a declaration of principle, perhaps even with paradoxical overtones, and without any immediate consequences for the established order of an entire civilization.
The fact remains, however, that it is impossible to erase the effect of destabilizing relativity that the affirmationâwhatever its intentionâended up radiating. A whole system of persuasions was called into question and oscillated dangerously, observed with the estranged gaze of someone judging it in the light of another truth.