Chapter 1
The Campaign of the Allies
At about 3:00 p.m. on Friday, October 19, 1781, a large British army commanded by Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis marched forth from heavily damaged works at Yorktown, Virginia, and formally surrendered to a combined French and American force under the supreme command of General George Washington. Pleading illness, the British general did not personally accompany his troops. A short distance away across the York River, a similar ceremony marked the capitulation of the British-held garrison at Gloucester Point.
The solemn pageantry of that autumn day bore significant implications. The impact of the victory of the Allied armies over Cornwallis represented the culmination of good fortune and a coordinated military-naval strategy that permitted the final tactical success. In its broader sense, Yorktown signified the ultimate accomplishment of American arms during the long and arduous revolutionary struggle, and virtually assured Great Britainâs recognition of independence for her former colonies.
Victory at Yorktown revitalized American morale and afforded a striking contrast to the harrowing times experienced by Washingtonâs army scarcely a year earlier. By mid-1780, American battlefield defeats had become common occurrences and raised serious doubts about the survival of the new nation. Grievous military setbacks in the South and Major General Benedict Arnoldâs treason in September 1780 had dealt a severe psychological blow to the Patriot cause.1
Problems organizing and maintaining an effective army had proved especially vexatious for Washington. While the timely arrival in July 1780 of almost 6,000 French regulars under General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau, had greatly augmented Washingtonâs dwindling force, by late that year enlistments in the Continental Army had declined substantially. This occurred primarily because of difficulties in paying and provisioning the troops, and because of competition from the various states, which offered more lucrative inducements for enlistment in their militias. In mid-1778, Continental Army strength stood at nearly 17,000 men; just two years later, the patriots could field only some 8,000 effectives, a force supplemented by numerous provincial units.
By that time, however, a major army reorganization was underway with special consideration being given to the problems of subsistence, supply, and payment of troops. The fortunes of the American Army were decidedly on the rise when the calendar turned to 1781, despite some short-lived mutinies within the ranks and the fact that recruiting for the Continental force continued to decline during the new yearâs early months (the period from January to May produced only 2,574 enlistees).2
The strengthening American army was confronted with a shift in British strategyâparticularly as it affected the Southern colonies. By 1780, inactivity in the North made a concerted British effort in the South more tenable than ever before. General Henry Clinton, the commander of the British forces in North America, had long harbored designs against the South, including Virginia.
The son of a prominent admiral whose brother was the Earl of Lincoln, Henry Clinton was born in Newfoundland, Canada, in 1738. He spent his early years in New York, where his father served as Royal Governor from 1741-1751. He returned to England as a young teen and was commissioned into the British Army. He distinguished himself in battle in Germany in 1760 during the Seven Yearsâ War. Eventually elevated to the rank of colonel, Clinton served as an aide-de-camp to Prince Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick. Clinton seemed destined for prominent public service and his star was clearly in the ascendant. He was appointed groom of the bedchamber for the Duke of Gloucester (the Kingâs brother) and attended the Duke of Newcastle, who saw to it that the young Clinton was elected to Parliament. Although surrounded by a royal web of relationships and obviously well liked, financial woes dogged Clinton. Unlike so many of his social class, he wed for love rather than money, taking Harriet Carter as his bride in early 1767. The marriage did nothing to improve his financial condition but did produce five children. Clintonâs life changed thereafter, though not for the better. Just five years after their marriage, Harriet died. He felt her loss keenly and may have suffered a depression as a result of her passing. Barely able to function, he did not take his seat in Parliament. He retired from public life, his star nearly extinguished.
Sir Henry Clinton
National Park Service Colonial National Historical Park Yorktown Collection
By the time the American Revolution began, Clinton was back in service and promoted to major general. In 1775, he was ordered to join the young effort in North America. When General Thomas Gage was recalled after the disastrous Bunker Hill outing, Clinton was elevated to second-in-command under Sir William Howe. His solid performance at the Battle of Long Island in 1776 eventually led to a knighthood the following year, but by this time Clinton was exhibiting disagreeable personality traits that did not endear him to his subordinates or to Howe. His quick temper and often child-like insistence on having his way alienated his fellow officers and did not instill faith in his abilities as a leader of men. As the Revolution entered its middle phase, Clinton adopted a mantle of excessive caution and obvious self-doubt that contrasted poorly with his highly visible performance during the warâs early months.
As early as 1779, Clinton hoped to establish at least one base in the Chesapeake Bay from which he could command the region and also launch a drive against Pennsylvania. A British raid in the area in 1779 succeeded in temporarily arousing Loyalist sentiment, and Clinton, headquartered in New York City, hoped to capitalize on the situation. British civil and military leaders believed that by paralyzing Virginia, the colonies would be severed and more easily defeated.3 Armed with a plan for subduing and ending the vexing rebellion, the British home government looked to Clintonâs army and the superior British Navy for its successful execution.
Contrary to popular accounts, Clinton and his chief subordinate, General Cornwallis, did not hold opposing views on the question of taking Virginia. Whatever differences they may have held concerned degree and procedure. Both men realized Virginiaâs potential contribution to a British victory, but Clinton adhered to a conservative philosophy as the best means of reducing the state. Further, his position at New York seemed under threat of imminent attack early in 1781, and he was reluctant to divert his energies. At the same time, Clinton probably envisioned greater consequences from controlling the Chesapeake than did Cornwallis, for his initial raiding policy had been designed to control Virginiaâs waterways and establish a base in the Chesapeake vicinity.4 To Cornwallis, however, such matters were fleeting and incidental. He advocated a more aggressive means of controlling Virginia, and argued that it should become the major theater for British offensive operations.5 On the question of ultimate control over the province, Clinton and Cornwallis were in essential agreement.
Their relationship was complicated, however, because Cornwallis had managed to interest Colonial Secretary Lord George Germain in his views and had pressed for immediate military attention in the South. Germainâs intrusion into the matter offended Clinton, although his own negativism and lack of imaginative policy doubtless figured into Londonâs growing alignment with Cornwallisâs aggressive views. The issue drove a wedge between the two men which, compounded by geographical separation and communication problems, practically ensured misunderstandings and a breakdown in cooperation.6 Despite the gulf between them, however, Clinton had complete confidence in his junior officerâs military judgment. This fact, coupled with Clintonâs own passivity and preoccupation with defensive arrangements, influenced the final shift of British strategy from the Northern colonies to those in the South.7
That Clinton did not share Cornwallisâs immediate enthusiasm for the control of Virginia is certain. By 1781, his own interest for prosecuting the war in the South lay in recruiting to the Kingâs cause the sizable Loyalist population in the Carolinas, Maryland, Delaware, and southeastern Pennsylvania.8 Clintonâs Southern strategy was only partially successful. After a month-long siege by Clinton and Cornwallis, Charleston, South Carolina, succumbed to the British on May 12, 1780. In June, Clinton proclaimed the state once again under British control, a premature exclamation at best. Clintonâs subsequent strategy was to secure South Carolina while rallying the Loyalists of that province in order to further solidify his gains.9
Left largely to his own designs after Clinton departed for New York, Cornwallis proposed to invade North Carolina and make that state a protective barrier for the conquered provinces below it. Clinton, albeit reluctantly, agreed to this course. He also agreed to launch a campaign in the Chesapeake to distract American forces in Virginia and keep them from joining a move to reconquer the southernmost colonies.10
Initially, the British plan appeared a success. On August 16, 1780, Cornwallis defeated the Americans under Major General Horatio Gates in one of the most decisive routs of the war at Camden, South Carolina. The victory scattered and demoralized the enemy. As far as the British were concerned, the stunning victory spelled an end to major conflict in the Deep South. Cornwallis was now free to turn his attention northward.
Such a view proved illusory. British hopes for an easy theater victory were shattered with the sudden American success at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on October 7, 1780. The battle helped rejuvenate American morale and the determination to fight on. Shortly thereafter, Major General Nathanael Greene replaced the defeated Gates as the American commander in the South. Greene revitalized the army and improved its training, supply situation, and morale. Within a short time, he restored the army to fighting condition. Greeneâs fresh army stood directly in the path of British success in the South. In a move that surprised many, the Americans went on the offensive and launched a series of harassing attacks against Cornwallisâs army. Anticipating the wane of Tory support in the wake of the debacle at Kings Mountain, Cornwallis was left to fend for himself.11 Harassed by state militia, he prudently retreated to Winnsboro, South Carolina, to await reinforcements from Clinton.
In order to assist his subordinate, Clinton diverted 2,500 men scheduled to establish a base in Virginia to support Cornwallis. With these reinforcements, Cornwallis moved out again to invade North Carolina and confront Greene.12 To impede the Americans, Cornwallis divided his command into three wings. One was sent to Camden to temporarily divert Greeneâs attention. Another was dispatched under his cavalry corps commander, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, to seek out Brigadier General Daniel Morganâs army in the Carolina back coun...