Cartelization in the Automotive Industry and Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions

Johannes Gerhardt

• Publisher: GRIN Verlag
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9783668428638
• Edition: 0
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Industrial Management
• Index: Business

Master's Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1, 3, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, language: English, abstract: Due to the high importance of the automotive industry for the EU and the growing number of discovered automotive supplier cartels in this economic area, the purpose of the master thesis at hand is to analyze and display why cartelization – especially among automotive suppliers in the EU – is observed so frequently. Particularly, it investigates factors that facilitate collusion of car part manufacturers. Furthermore, it focuses on cartelization in procurement auctions as the touch point of automotive manufacturers and suppliers where collusive activities are executed. Hence, it examines the current state of theoretical research on collusive mechanism in auctions and provides implications for further research. Finally, it analyzes approaches to prevent collusion and assesses whether such measures are applicable to the automotive industry. The thesis is structured as follows: After this introduction, chapter two defines the scope of the industry for this paper and provides a broad overview of its different sectors and significant players. In addition, due to their overall importance for the following analysis, procurement and bidding processes in the automotive industry are exhibited upfront. To emphasize the industry's importance for the EU, an outline of the state of this industry sector in the EEA is given. Building on that, chapter three presents a general introduction to cartelization in the automotive industry, followed by a presentation of three representative recent cartel cases in the EU: Car Glass, Automotive Bearings and Parking Heaters. This sets ground for a detailed analysis of the prevailing environment in the automotive industry. First, the analysis examines the manufacturer side including degrees of concentration, dominant strategies and effects of the automotive manufacturers' market power. This is followed by an analysis of the supplier side regarding concentration and barriers to entry. Contingent on the analysis, factors that facilitate collusion in the automotive industry are summarizedTo introduce collusion in auctions, chapter four starts with an outline of the theoretical foundation of auction theory. Based on this, auction formats that foster collusion and stability of cartels are discussed. Furthermore, the most relevant incentive compatible mechanisms are introduced distinguishing between one-shot and repeated auction games.