This book takes a detailed look at four major financial crises—the twin crises of the South Sea Bubble in Britain and the Mississippi Bubble in France in 1720; the Great Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression; and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9. It traces the evolution and causes of the crises by reference to a theory of support-bargaining and money-bargaining, set out in earlier work, but reintroduced here with specific reference to financial crises. Two early chapters focus on theoretical issues. The work of prominent theorists, including John Law and J. M. Keynes, is evaluated.
A fundamental problem of neoclassical theory is its failure to accommodate time disparities, and consequent credit requirements, in economic transactions. This has necessitated theoretical separation of a ‘real economy’ from financial markets. The separation renders neoclassical economists blind to financial services, and hence to the dynamics of financial crises. In support-bargaining and money-bargaining, the ‘real economy’ and financial services are seamlessly linked.
The book shows how the theory of support-bargaining and money-bargaining provides a clear and consistent explanation of the incidence of financial crises. Since financial crises are not exceptional events, the wider aim of the book is to convince social scientists that, in explaining financial crises, the theory of support-bargaining and money-bargaining provides also a superior explanation of the functioning of economies and societies in quieter times. It will appeal particularly to those many economists who find the prevalent neoclassical model of economic transactions inconsistent with the observable functioning of economies.