Color-Blind

Ellis Cose

• Publisher: HarperCollins e-books
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9780061936111
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Afroamerikanische Studien

"A book this country desperately needs, one with genuine healing potential." — New York Times Book Review

From the author of The Rage of a Privileged Class, a provocative, in-depth analysis of the state of race in America; a work that not only explores the racial transformation of this nation, but offers a creative and viable ten-step blueprint for the development of a race-neutral society

Is a truly race-neutral society possible? Can the United States wipe the slate clean and surmount the racism of its past? Or is color blindness just another name for denial? In this penetrating and provocative book, Ellis Cose probes the depths of the American mind and exposes the contradictions, fears, hopes and illusions embedded in our complicated perceptions of race. Cose trains his practiced eye on the murky waters of race in America and looks at the acute differences, even hostility, in our perceptions of race exposed by the O. J. Simpson trial, not to mention the controversial content of The Bell Curve.Looking beyond the platitudes and pronouncements that tend to distort reality rather than illuminate it, Cose offers a visionary analysis of the steps we must take if we are serious about finding a true resolution to the thorny problem of race in America.

CHAPTER 1

Can a new race surmount old prejudices?

Americans are accustomed to infinite shades of ebony, but the South African journalist Mzimkulu Malunga found the notion hilarious. So he named one celebrity after another—Tina Turner, Vanessa Williams, Mariah Carey—tickled at the thought that anyone might consider them all black. The impromptu racial-identity game soon had the small group in Soweto in stitches. It seemed an appropriately absurd end to an evening spent, for the most part, in more serious conversation in a country whose governing principle once had been: “Tell me your race, and I’ll tell you your place.” As his guests finished a dinner of beer, beans, beef, and a grits-like delicacy called pap, Malunga, business editor of The Sowetan, finally shrugged as if to say: Race is a strange and flexible concept, with an endless capacity to confound.

That evening took me back to an encounter, some years earlier, on a bus several miles outside Caracas, Venezuela. Upon learning I was from the United States, the dark-skinned woman beside me had peppered me with questions. Did I find Venezuelans to be prejudiced? Was there racism in the United States? Were Canadians less biased than their neighbors to the south? Finally, she focused on her son, seated directly in front of us. He was the color of caramel and about seven years old. His father, she told me, was “white,” and the son, despite his dusky appearance and faintly African features, had decided that he was white, too. At first, the idea struck me as ridiculous, but, by and by, I found myself thinking, “Why the hell not?” By any logical calculus, he was probably more “white” than “black” (not that, in most of Latin America, he would be considered either). And from the perspective of a child who was old enough to know that whiteness means status but too young to realize how whiteness is defined, wanting to be white was just as natural as wanting to be a quarterback instead of a cheerleader. I wondered, however, if the boy had been American, whether he would have thought he had the option to choose his color. For most of us, race is simply accepted as a given and on faith, no more subject to questioning than the reality of our existence.

Even before the civil rights movement erupted and Jim Crow died, racial definitions in the United States were somewhat different from those in South Africa (and Latin America), and specific policies varied as well. But these countries shared the conceit that the concept of race was reasonably precise and that it told us something important. In fact, those assumptions never really made sense.

Earlier in this century, for instance, Italians, Jews, and Rumanians were widely considered to be of different (and inferior) racial stock compared to the English, Germans, and Swedes. Just a few decades later, those groups were fully accepted into the community of whites. In an essay entitled, “How Did Jews Become White Folks?” Karen Brodkin Sacks asked, “Did Jews and other Euroethnics become white because they became middle class? That is, did money whiten? Or did being incorporated in an expanded version of whiteness open up the economic doors to middle-class status?” The answer, she concluded, is both. The question, nonetheless, illustrates the absurdity of the premise that racial classifications are fixed.

That supposition, at long last, is under serious challenge—from intellectuals who doubt that the concept of race has much meaning; from immigrants who have a different and more elastic view of racial classifications; and, perhaps most interestingly, from those who refuse to consider themselves members of any currently accepted racial category but refer to themselves as multiracial and demand the recognition of a new melded race.

Success in that endeavor, some advocates believe, would be a huge step in the direction of a color-blind society, for by embracing those who are multiracial, the United States would be recognizing, if only implicitly, that the ugly racial lines etched in the nation’s soul will, sooner or later, disappear. Alternatively, goes the argument, the nation’s failure to recognize formally the existence of multiracial Americans would be a tragedy, not only for mixed-race people but for American society, and would perhaps be a fatal blow to the dream of racial harmony and egalitarianism.

In 1992, in Bethesda, Maryland, several hundred multiracialists came together for the “first national gathering of the multiracial community,” as described by Bijan Gilanshah, in the December 1993 issue of the journal Law and Inequality. The “Loving Conference” was named in honor of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Loving v. Virginia, which outlawed antimiscegenation statutes in 1967. But the meeting was not simply a celebration of the right to reproduce across racial lines; it would mark—or so its organizers hoped—the public launching of a new and potent political movement.

At stake, in Gilanshah’s eyes, was nothing less than the prevention of “cultural genocide.” Instead of leaving mixed-race people in a vulnerable and nebulous state of official nowhereness, the government, he thought, was obliged to give them full recognition “as a distinct, powerful social unit with idiosyncratic cultural, social and legal interests.” Much the same point was made by Charles Byrd, who organized a rally at the Washington Mall in July 1996 to allow mixed-raced Americans, like himself, an opportunity to collectively and “proudly affirm a self-determined identity” while attempting to persuade the federal government to sanction the multiracial category.

Multiracial people with a heritage that is, to some degree, black have a special interest in how mixed-race people are to be defined. “In physical as well as cultural terms every Negro is a little bit colored and a little bit white,” observed Martin Luther King, Jr. in Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? Yet it is only the “colored” part that has generally been acknowledged. Unlike Americans of other races, blacks have largely been defined by the so-called one-drop rule: the presumption that even a small percentage of black ancestry effectively cancels out any other racial stock. It is a rule that some biracial people believe compels them either to deny a big part of who they are or to explain constantly to a rigid, “monoracial” world why they reject a patently illogical designation. Why, they ask, should they renounce the ancestry of a nonblack parent or grandparent? What’s the point, they ask, in forcing people into narrow boxes that cannot possibly accommodate America’s growing racial diversity?—particularly when the black box is fundamentally different from the others, carries the full baggage of slavery, and defies all common sense. As Lawrence Hirschfeld, author of Race in the Making, observed: “The absurdity of the biological reading of the one-drop rule is obvious…. How reasonable is it to say that a white woman can give birth to a Black baby, but a Black woman can’t give birth to a white baby?”

Lise Funderburg, author of Black, White, Other, which profiles several children of black-white interracial unions, extracted the following comment from one of the persons she interviewed: “A lot of Blacks get upset if they ask you exactly what you are and you come back and say, ‘Biracial.’ One response is, ‘What? Are you too good to identify with Blacks?’ I say, ‘It’s not that I’m too good at all, but I’m composed of two different races and I choose to value each of those.’ It’s not as though I’m going to write off my mother’s race for the convenience of pleasing somebody else’s view of what I should or should not be doing.” The one-drop rule, however, demands that biracial children do just that. As novelist Gish Jen noted in an essay in the New York Times Magazine, “a mulatto is not a kind of white person, but a kind of black person.” Yet there is nothing in biology—indeed, nothing in science at all—that says “black” should trump “white” when it comes to assigning racial categories.

The argument against such an illogical racial-classification scheme ultimately takes you down one of two roads: rejection of the idea of race altogether or acceptance of the possibility of an endless proliferation of new races. In recent years, the debate has focused on the census for the year 2000—specifically on an edict known as “Statistical Policy Directive Number 15.” That directive, conjured up by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the late 1970s, sets out the minimum categories that governmental agencies can use when collecting racial and ethnic data. It provides for four racial clusters (white, black, Asian and Pacific Islander, and American Indian and Alaska Native) and one distinct ethnic group (Hispanic). If someone doesn’t quite fit, they are squeezed into the pigeonhole that “most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community.” If that doesn’t work, they can always be lumped into “other.”

These particular groups are not arbitrary. They reflect OMB’s best attempt to capture the American consensus on race. They also reflect the needs of an array of governmental agencies that enforce civil rights laws, run American Indian programs, fight poverty, and calculate health and other statistics—agencies, in short, that need to know something about America’s racial makeup to do their jobs. The problem is that America’s racial composition is quite different now from the way it was in the 1970s. It is less “monoracial,” less black and white, more intermarried, and a hell of a lot more confusing.

At the time of the 1970 census, America had few shades of gray. Whites (at 87.5 percent) and blacks (at 11.1 percent) accounted for more than 98 percent of the total U.S. population. Other racial minorities added up to just over 1 percent. Hispanics, who could be of any race, stood at 4.5 percent. Twenty years later, the nation was spinning from a demographic whirlwind. Newcomers were pouring in from Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Cuba, India, mainland China, and other non-European countries, while Europeans—no longer favored by U.S. immigration laws—had dwindled to a trickle. America, in short, was no longer nearly so black and white. By 1990, whites and blacks stood at roughly 80 percent and 12 percent, respectively, and Hispanics at 9 percent.

Meanwhile, interracial families were forming apace. In 1960, according to the U.S. census, fewer than half of 1 percent of married couples were interracial. By 1990, the number had risen to about 3 percent—the majority comprised of mixtures other than black and white.

After reanalyzing U.S. Bureau of the Census’s survey data for 1985 and 1991), scholars Douglas Besharov and Timothy Sullivan concluded that even black-white marriages were growing faster than had previously been thought. In 1990, they estimated, nearly 10 percent of black grooms married whites brides. Although the sample of the Current Population Survey was too small to allow a good estimate for marriages between black brides and white grooms, Besharov and Sullivan conjectured that their number was also rising rapidly. The children of such unions, they declared (in the July–August 1996 issue of The New Democrat), “may be the best hope for the future of American race relations.”

To multiracialists, America’s approximately 3 million multiracial children are a forceful argument for the recognition of a new race and a new racial reality—and perhaps, as Besharov and Sullivan suggested, even a way out of America’s racial quagmire.

Susan Graham, a white woman married to a black man in Roswell, Georgia, tried to explain the rationale for the new racial category at congressional hearings in 1993. Accompanied by her young son, she related the frustrations of trying to find a comfortable racial niche for biracial children. When she had asked a census official how to identify her two biracial children, the official insulted her. “In cases like these, we always know who the mother is and not always the father,” the official said, in explaining why the child should take the mother’s race. Her experience, Graham pointed out, was far from unique. A multiracial teenager in North Carolina, she said, had been humiliated by a teacher blurting out in class: “You’re so light. Are you sure your mother knows who your father is?” Graham expressed gratitude for a new state policy that had allowed her to identify her five-year-old daughter as “multiracial” when she had enrolled the child in kindergarten. Thanks to Georgia’s legislators, her child “was not made to choose between her parents.” She urged Congress to protect other children from having to make that painful decision.

“I’m not a scholar, attorney, or lawmaker,” Graham continued. “I’m just a mother, a mother who cares about children; and whether I like it or not, I realize that self-esteem is directly tied to accurate racial identity. More and more parents all over our country are instilling new pride in our multiracial children. Can we say we have succeeded if our children leave home only to be denied an equal place in our society?” In closing, she invoked the ever-handy memory of Martin Luther King, Jr.: “I believe Doctor King was speaking thirty years ago for multiracial children too. With your help, their time has finally come.”

Carlos Fernández, president of the Association of Multiethnic Americans, was equally impassioned. Governmental administrators’ refusal to recognize multiracial children, he suggested, could put them in violation of the U.S. Constitution: “When government compels the multiracial, multiethnic family to signify a factually false identity for their child, it invades their fundamental right of privacy.” Fernández made clear, however, that he was primarily concerned not with constitutional issues but with the well-being of multiracial youngsters. The status quo, he intimated, amounted to a form of child abuse. It denied multiracial offspring their “distinctive identity,” damaged their self-esteem, and forced them to “favor one parent over the other.” Meanwhile, it did nothing to protect them from—or even document—the special form of bigotry aimed at people of mixed race.

Julie C. Lythcott-Haimes made a similar argument in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. “The Multiracial person can hardly advocate the superiority or inferiority of one race without touching off a potentially damaging identity struggle within herself,” wrote Lythcott-Haimes. And even if a person’s psyche could put up with such turmoil, Lythcott-Haimes saw no reason why anyone should have to. The one-drop rule is not only absurd, she contended, it is blatantly racist, grounded in the central premise “that ‘Black blood’ is a contaminant while ‘White blood’ is pure.”

Clearly, the multiracialists have flagged a nettlesome problem. Forcing multiracial children into prefabricated “monoracial” boxes is illogical. It is preposterous—not to mention cruel—to ask any child of mixed race to choose one race (and symbolically one parent) arbitrarily over the other. As Gish Jen, a Chinese American married to a man of Irish descent, acknowledged, there is pain in seeing her child stripped of what he considers to be an essential part of his identity. Yet many Americans insist on seeing multiracial children through monochromatic eyes. Some spiteful schoolmates gave her son a taste of what his future might hold when they taunted him for being “Chinese”—even as he futilely insisted that he was not. Though Jen and her husband originally had hoped their son would “grow up embracing his whole complex ethnic heritage,” they have had to accept a harsher reality and recognize that their son “is considered a kind of Asian person.”

It’s unclear whether the federal government’s official adoption of a multiracial category would lead to broader public acceptance of multiracialism and eventually make things easier for children such as Jen’s son or for families such as Graham’s. It is even less clear what effect a multiracial box would have on statistical analyses of America’s racial stock. “Multiracial,” after all, is not a particularly precise description. It simply means that a person theoretically fits into more than one category. It’s a fancy way, in short, of saying “other.” Consequently, a multiracial designation conceivably could end up being less accurate (in the sense of grouping people together who are deemed to be phenotypically similar) than the groupings we have now, depending on how it is defined and who decides who belongs to it.

Even if a multiracial designation is taken (as many proponents would like) to apply only to those with two parents of recognizably different racial stocks, it’s unclear how useful the descriptor would be. Unless the census spelled out specifically what racial heritages were subsumed by the designation, it would put the offspring of a white person and an American Indian in the same pigeonhole as the child of a black person and a Chinese American or of a black person and a white person. Although the offspring of all the couples would certainly be multiracial, not many Americans would consider them to be of the same race. Many would still consider the black-Asian and black-white children to be black (or perhaps mixed) and the white-American Indian child to be white. The children, in any number of circumstances, would be treated differently, as would be the unions of their parents.

A New York Times poll in 1991 found that 66 percent of whites were opposed to a relative marrying a black person, whereas 45 percent were opposed to a relative marrying a Hispanic or Asian person. (The survey did not attempt to ascertain whether responses would differ depending on whether the prospective Hispanic spouse was black, white, or something else.) Clearly, in the eyes of many of those respondents, all multiracial families are not created equal. And if part of the purpose of such classifications is to permit researchers to determine how various groups are treated, aggregating groups whose only common denominator is that their parents are racially different would not do much to advance that purpose. One is thus faced with the option of creating at least two multiracial categories—one perhaps labeled “multiracial-dark” and the other called “multiracial-light.” But it’s unlikely that anyone would see those categories as an improvement over the current system—least of all those who think that the multiracial category is a form of defense against America’s obsession with rigid racial categories.

And what about those people who don’t care for the multiracial designation? What about the children of black-and-white unions, for instance, who insist on calling themselves black? Providing them with a multiracial box is no guarantee that they will climb into it. And what about the children of “multiracial” parents. If the designation applies only to the first generation, will these children (like many light-skinned “blacks”) become monoracial by the second generation? Or will their children, twenty years from now, be fighting for yet another redefinition of race?—for, perhaps, a new box labeled “old multiracial” as opposed to “new multiracial” or even “part multiracial” (which, of course, raises the question of how much multiracial one has to be to be considered truly multiracial).

And what about Latin Americans? Obviously, many Latinos find the current categories lacking. In the 1990 census, 43 percent of Latinos apparently thought of themselves as neither black, white, American Indian, nor Asian. They were “other.” In fact, of all American residents who put themselves in the “other” category and indicated an ethnicity, the overwhelming majority (86 percent, according to the census bureau) were Hispanic.

A preliminary test of the multiracial option by the Bureau of Labor Statistics provided only a hazy idea of who might check it. When the option was offered to half of the 60,000 households polled in the May 1995 Current Population Survey, it got the biggest response from people in the white, Hispanic, and American Indian-Eskimo-Aleut categories. When Hispanic was offered as a racial (and not just an ethnic) option, the number of Hispanics claiming to be multiracial dropped considerably. Some of the whites who chose to describe themselves as multiracial apparently did so on the basis of belonging to various European ethnic groups. “Multiracial” respondents who did belong to more than one racial grou...