PART I
Brokered Empire
Roman, remember by your strength to rule
Earthās peoplesāfor your arts are to be these:
To pacify, to impose the rule of law,
To spare the conquered, battle down the proud.
Virgil, Aeneid 6.851ā853 (Fitzgerald 190)
The city of Rome has never been an important center of tradeā¦. Perhaps no major city in Western history has had so little commercial and economic importance as has ancient, medieval, and modern Rome.
William 1. Davisson and James E. Harper (175)
From the time Rome became an imperial city until today she has been a parasite-city, living on gifts, rents, taxes, tribute. That does not make Rome any less a city, only a different kind of city from Genoa.
Sir Moses 1. Finley (12S)
Rome attempted, not merely to cope with the large quantities of people it had brought together, but to give to its otherwise degraded mass culture an appropriate urban guise, reflecting imperial magnificence. To investigate this contribution one must fortify oneself for an ordeal: to enjoy it, one must keep oneās eyes open, but learn to close oneās nose to the stench, oneās ears to the screams of anguish and terror, oneās gullet to the retching of oneās own stomach. Above all, one must keep oneās heart on ice and check any impulse to tenderness and pity, with a truly Roman stolidity. All the magnitudes will be stretched in Rome: not least the magnitude of debasement and evil.
Lewis Mumford (214)
1
Then and Now
The voices that speak to us from antiquity are overwhelmingly those of the cultured few, the elites. The modern voices that carry on their tale are overwhelmingly those of white, middle-class, European and North American males. These men can, and do, laud imperialistic, authoritarian slave societies. The scholarship of antiquity is often removed from the real world, hygienically free of value judgements. Of the value judgements, that is, of the voiceless masses, the 95% who knew how āthe other halfā lived in antiquity.
The peasants form no part of the literate world on which most reconstructions of ancient history focus. Indeed, the peasantsāthe paganiādid not even form part of the lowly Christian (town dwellerās) world. They are almost lost to historical view, because of their illiteracy and localism.
Thomas F. Carney (xiv, 231 note 123)
The first century of the common era is obscured from our contemporary view by three giant filters. The past is recorded almost exclusively in the voices of elites and males, in the viewpoints of the wealthy and the powerful, in the visions of the literate and the educated. That already constricted report is available sometimes through the deliberate decision of later dominations but also through the vagaries of chance and luck, fate and accident. Either way, further constrictions. And our present looks back to the past, to that already doubly filtered past, dependent, of course, on where oneās present is located, but, let us say in individualistic, democratic, urban, middle-class America, often with ethnocentric presumptions it is not even aware of projecting.
Some demographic statistics from the past may serve, therefore, not as proofs about anything but as warnings about everything. Bruce Malina speaks of classes and masses. āThe preindustrial city contained no more than ten percent of the entire population under its direct and immediate control. And of this ten percent that constituted the preindustrial urban population, perhaps less than two percent belonged to the elite or high classā (1981:72). Thomas Carney writes of death and taxes. On death: āWe are used to a society in which very few infants are lost at birth or prior to weaning. Death, happily, tends to be remote from our experience, if we are below 30. People do not start dying in any numbers until their late fifties or, generally, their sixties or later. In preindustrial society, however, probably a third of the live births were dead before they reached the age of six. By sixteen something like 60% of these live births would have died, 75% by twenty-six, and 90% by forty-six. Very fewā3% maybeāreached their sixtiesā (88). On taxes: āIn general, resources extracted from the tax base were mostly redistributed to the men of the apparatusāwho mostly invested their official gains in large estates. Taxation was generally regressiveā¦. At best they protected the tax base; they rarely developed itāmore often, indeed, they eroded itā¦. They took a larger share, in fact, than did the elites in more primitive societies before them, or in industrial societies after themā (341).
How, then, is it even possible for us to imagine the face of a Mediterranean Jewish peasant through those triple filters and across the gulf of those millennia? Three major sources help at least somewhat to counter those three filters just mentioned. First, on the macrocosmic level, there are anthropological or sociological studies and models, especially those using trans-temporal and cross-cultural disciplines. Next, on the mesocosmic and more local level, there are archaeological digs and discoveries. Finally, on the microcosmic level, there are papyrus documents and archives, documentary texts predominantly from Egypt in which ordinary peasants have preserved an individual voice and a personal presence normally denied them by their illiteracy and their poverty.
A Friendly Sea in a Hostile Landscape
Three terse judgments, sharp as Mediterranean shadows. āThe Mediterranean,ā in the words of Jane Schneider, āis something of a paradox: a friendly sea surrounded by a hostile landscapeā (3). āAll Mediterranean societies,ā in the words of Julian Pitt-Rivers, āface the sea and their enemiesā and customersāon the far side of itā(1977:ix). āA double constraint,ā in the words of Fernand Braudel, āhas always been at the heart of Mediterranean history: poverty and the uncertainty of the morrowā (1.245). But even to speak of the social and cultural anthropology of the Mediterranean basin demands three steps, each controversial in its possibility and fraught with difficulties in its execution.
The first step proposes a valid pan-Mediterranean construct open to anthropological investigation. John Davis limits this Mediterranean unity exclusively to historical contacts. Early in his book The People of the Mediterranean he describes that unity as, āthose institutions, customs and practices which result from the conversation and commerce of thousands of years, the creation of very different peoples who have come into contact round the mediterranean shoresā (13). That same judgment is reiterated at the bookās conclusion: āover the millennia it has proved impossible for mediterranean people to ignore each other. They have conquered, colonised, converted; they have traded, administered, intermarriedāthe contacts are perpetual and inescapableā (255).
Jeremy Boissevain, in reviewing Davisās book, argues for a more profound unity, that of ecology. āThe Mediterranean is more than just a field of interaction, commerce, and conquest. In spite of his materialist analysis of honour, Davis, in my view, has missed the most obvious materialist parameters that together give the region its distinctive signature: sea, climate, terrain, and mode of productionā¦. These materialist parameters, placed in a comparative historical framework, provide a basis on which various differences and similarities characteristic of mediterranean societies may be usefully comparedā¦. Mediterranean men have done a great deal besides āconverseā and āexchangeāā¦. Men and women around the middle sea have also worked hard to solve similar problems of production under comparable physical conditionsā (Boissevain et al. 83).
David Gilmore, in an invited reply to Davisās book and Boissevainās review, pushes this ecological basis for circum-Mediterranean unity even further by specifying Boissevainās use of Fernand Braudel, who began his huge and magnificent study The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II by devoting three hundred pages to ecology. He claims that Boissevain, āis missing the most important implication of Braudelās work, which is not simply that the Mediterranean is ecologically homogeneous, but rather that this unity derives from the consistent juxtaposition of opposites within nations, the close proximity of rugged topography with fertile riverine basins. It is this intranational contrast between remote, inaccessible mountain peaks and rich agricultural valleys that lies at the heart of mediterranean ecosystems. Throughout the region, one finds independent, egalitarian communities of peasants, tribesmen, or pastoralists in the marginal hills and in the adjacent plains something vastly differentāthe latifundium, the great estate, the commercial farm, heir to the Roman villa ā¦ often worked by day laborers under harsh conditionsā (Boissevain et al. 88).
Writing for the same symposium of invited responses, Thomas Crump adds some other qualifications to the proposed ecological unity of the Mediterranean. āBoissevain is right to refer to the geophysical factors discussed by Braudel [but] he fails to note three critical sociocultural factors which give the area a quite distinctive character. The first, and perhaps the most important, is that almost every region of the Mediterranean has at some time in the pastāgenerally more than 300 years agoābeen very much more important than it is now. ā¦ The second factor is that the general hierarchical structure of Mediterranean societies has always been based on citiesā¦. The third factor is that for more than 2,000 years every mediterranean society of any importance has had the use of a written languageā (Boissevain et al. 86).
It seems, then, that we are dealing with a valid unity-in-diversity called Mediterranean society. But it is built up in interactive layers from geography and ecology, through technology and economics, and on to culture and politics.
The second step is particularly difficult for researchers trained to do specifically located fieldwork. Scholars begin with detailed ethnographies, say, of Andalusian villagers or Greek shepherds or Berber and Bedouin tribes. Next comes the call for comparison, from Davis, and for explanation of what such comparison means, from Boissevain. Analytically comparative social and cultural anthropology within the Mediterranean construct is precisely what the next step demands.
Consider, for example, a specific and indeed fascinating ethnographic case study conducted by Julian Pitt-Rivers between 1949 and 1952 and published as The People of the Sierra in 1954. It is one of the earlier results of the postwar surge in Mediterranean anthropology centered around E. E. Evans-Pritchard at Oxford University. The focal point of his investigation was Grazalema, or AlcalƔ, as he called it to protect the innocent, an Andalusian pueblo in the Sierra de CƔdiz. It is hardly possible to work comparatively with contemporary Grazalema and, say, ancient Nazareth, just because both are Mediterranean hill-villages with a population of about two thousand inhabitants. Before any such trans-temporal comparisons can be attempted, the data from Andalusia or anywhere else has to be analytically compared with other contemporary data to establish modern Mediterranean constants. Only the results of such analysis will have any chance of valid retrojection to the Mediterranean of two thousand years ago. I would note in passing, however, that reading even such isolated and contemporary accounts of traditional societies is an excellent therapeutic against presuming that an ancient Galilean village is like, say, a modern American one, only much smaller, older, and without electrical utilities or electronic toys.
In a recent article on the current state of Mediterranean anthropology, David Gilmore, presuming the ecological constants, summarizes the other ones that have been suggested within the Mediterranean construct. There are sociocultural constants: āa strong urban orientation; a corresponding disdain for the peasant way of life and for manual labor; sharp social, geographic, and economic stratification; political instability and a history of weak states; āatomisticā community life; rigid sexual segregation; a tendency towards reliance on the smallest possible kinship units (nuclear families and shallow lineages); strong emphasis on shifting ego-centered, noncorporate coalitions; an honor-and-shame syndrome which defines both sexuality and personal reputation ā¦ most villagers share an intense parochialism ā¦ and intervillage rivalries are common ā¦ There is a general gregariousness and interdependence of daily life characteristic of small, densely populated neighborhoods ā¦ [There is] institutionalized hostile nicknamingā¦. The evil eye belief is widespreadā (1982:178ā79). Later he calls that belief, āprobably one of the few true Mediterranean universals. It is also one of the oldest continuous religious constructs in the Mediterranean areaā (1982:198). There are also religious, marital, and political constants: āreligion plays an important institutionalized role in both north and south, as do priests, saints, and holy men ā¦ Dotal marriage [dowry] is practiced in only 4 percent of the worldās cultures, and is limited geographically to eastern Eurasia and the mediterranean basin ā¦ At the micropolitical levelā¦ emphasis on informal personal power rather than formal institutions is reflected in the reliance on patronageā (1982:179).
The third step, then, is to control critically the retrojection of those constants from the modern to the ancient Mediterranean, and, that, to compound the problem, involves moving not only from now to then but from fieldwork among people to library work among texts. It must be said immediately that such forays have usually been conducted from ancient history into modern anthropology rather than in the opposite direction.
John Davis, who seems to have honed his writing style by watching fishmongers fillet fish, castigates his anthropological peers for ignoring history but then savages Pitt-Riversās essay on honor for āhugger-mugger ā¦ impression of potpourriā¦ conceptual confusion which allows historical events, literature of the sort studied by literary critics, and folklore to tend to illustrate whatever real thing the general structure may beā (253) and for āelegant use of historical and literary sources which, in a more methodology-minded age, demands careful and critical analysis of the kinds of reasoning underlying the introduction of wayward materialā (257). But at least Pitt-Rivers was trying to move from now to then and from field to text.
He tried even more formally and deliberately in a later book on the anthropology of Mediterranean sexuality that began once again with the Sierra de CĆ”diz in the early 1950s but ended with Shechem and the text of Genesis 34. His basic intuition on that text is that āthe limits of endogamy and exogamy are debated throughout the length of Genesisā so that its stories ask repeatedly but implicitly, āhow closely related must you be in order to be one people and how other must you be in order to be a spouse? Other sex? Other family? Other lineage? Other tribe? Other nation?ā (1977:154). One answer is given in the earlier nomadic situation of political dependence. In Genesis 12, 20, and 26 the patriarchs are willing to give their wives (as āsistersā) to settled power brokers in exchange for pasture, a āform of sexual hospitality ā¦ amply testified from ethnographies of many nomadic people, who use their women as a means of establishing relations with the sedentary populationā (1977:159). A very different answer is given in their later sedentary situation of political independence. There are two significant transitions in the new answer of Genesis 34. Not only are wives no longer given in sexual hospitality to outsiders, but neither are daughters to be given to them in marriage. And the guardians of this new answer are the new generation, the womanās brothers rather than her father. So Simeon and Levi destroy Shechem and his city rather than allow him to marry Dinah even after all the male citizens accepted circumcision. In Genesis 34:30 Jacob protests against their action, but the brothers get the last word, in 34:31, āShould he treat our sister as a harlot?ā Notice, however, that in 34:28 the sons of Jacob take with them not only all the property of the murdered Shechemites but their wives as well. The politics of sex is exactly the same in Genesis 12, 20, 26, and in 34: superiors take the inferiorsā women but do not give them their own. The difference is that in the former case the patriarchs are inferior, in the latter they are superior.
Pitt-Rivers had mentioned earlier that āthere is however one area of the world which, though it is noted for being traditionally organised in corporate and even kin groups, refuses to exchange women: the Mediterraneanā (1977:120). He is willing, therefore, to generalize from Genesis 34 and suggest that āit records in the cr...