1
OMENS
May Day
Not only must every opportunity to attack be resolutely seized, but it would also be a grave error to depart from the principles which have been hammered into U-boat crews so hard and so frequently: âget to your position ahead just as quickly as you can, launch your attack just as soon as you can, exploit your opportunities at once and as fully as you can.â
THE U-515 WAS ON HER THIRD operational patrol since the longrange Type IXC boat emerged from the yards of Deutsche Werft at Hamburg-Finkenwerder and Werner Henke raised the national flag and his Commanderâs pennant above her conning tower at the Indienststellung, or formal commissioning, on 21 February 1942. After six months of workup and tactical exercises, she had made her maiden war patrol, and Henkeâs first as a Kommandant, on 12 August-14 October 1942 off Trinidad and Tobago in the southeast Caribbean, netting ten Allied ships sunk, for a total of 52,807 GRT; a not-inconsiderable tally for a single cruise, even given the fact that Henke was operating against mostly independently routed ships in a weakly defended area. It was a score outdone by only a handful of German boats during the war, and matched by only one U.S. Navy submarine in the Pacific (U.S.S. Tang in June-July 1944).1
The U-515âs second cruise, on 7 November 1942â6 January 1943, off Gibraltar and the Azores, resulted in only two sinkings, but one vessel was a Royal Navy destroyer depot ship, H.M.S. Hecla (10,850 tons), and the other a passenger liner-troopship, Ceramic (18,713 GRT). The loss of life from the two ships had been dreadful: 279 lost from 847 ranks and ratings on the former; all but one of 656 on the latter. By 30 April 1943, U-515âs third patrol, begun on 21 February, was already one of the longest of the war, and due to grow longer still. Operating off first the Azores and then Dakar in Senegal, on the bulge of West Africa, U-515âs third cruise, like the second, had been mostly a run of bad luck, with only two merchant trophies of 10,657 GRT to show for sixty-nine days of steamingâa poor individual tonnage rate per sea-day of 154 GRT.
The first sinking had come on the evening of 4 March while U-515 was northwest of the Azores. On a calm sea with little wind and good visibility, Henke sighted a large freighter proceeding independently at 15 knots on a course of 050° (degrees). He advanced on the surface toward the target. What happened next he described in his war diary (Kriegstagebuch, hereafter KTB):
Double fan launch [FĂ€cher] from [torpedo] Tubes II and IV. [Torpedo] speed 14 knots, range [to target] 1,200 meters. [Targetâs] bows on right, bearing 80 degrees, [torpedo] depth 5 meters, running times 37 and 38 seconds. Two hits amidship and forward [but] the steamer doesnât sink. Coup de grace [Fangschuss] from [stern] Tube VI, depth [set to run below the keel of the target] 9 meters, [torpedo warhead equipped] with Pi 2 [Pistole-2: a detonator designed to be activated by the magnetic field of a shipâs steel keel], running time 36 seconds. Hit toward the stern, in the engine roomâa powerful explosion. The steamer sinks slowly on an even keel, transmits wireless signal. [Another] coup de grace, this time from Tube I. Depth 10 [meters] with Pi 2, running time 25 seconds. Hit forwardâgreat explosion. Ship goes down after about 10 minutes. Itâs the California Star at 8,300 GRT, [which was sailing] from New Zealand to England with butter, cheese, lard, and meat. The Second Officer was taken prisoner. The Captain and First Officer probably went down with their ship.2
The California Star, which carried general cargo as well as food, was a motor ship of British registry. Fifty of her seventy-four men on board were killed, fatally wounded, or drowned. The sinking took place at latitude and longitude coordinates 42°32'N, 37°20'W. On 21 March and 1 April U-515 rendezvoused with two returning boats, U-106 (Kptlt. Hermann Rasch) and U-67 (Kptlt. GĂŒnther MĂŒller-Stockheim), to take on fuel, provisions, and spare parts. Henkeâs second success on this patrol came thirty-six days after the first, on 9 April, at night, while steaming off Dakar. This victim, the French motor ship Bamako, was a smallish 2,357 GRT, slightly overestimated by Henke:
Advanced on a freighter of 3,500 GRT. Double fan launch from [stern] Tubes V and VI. [Targetâs] speed 8.5 knots. [Torpedo] depths set to 3 and 4 meters. [Targetâs] bows on right bearing 80 degrees. Range 800 meters. [Torpedo] running times 60 and 61 seconds. Hits fore and aft. Ship capsizes and sinks very quickly.3
Twenty of the shipâs thirty-seven crew and passengers went to watery graves at position 14°57'N, 17°15'W.
The wages of war were not only bottoms and cargoesâa reminder, if one were needed by affronted humanity, that the fragile tissue of men was no equal to the violent and deadly instruments that roamed the spring Atlantic seeking whom they might devour. In that connection, it bears mention that if there has been a general fault with histories of the Atlantic war it has been their tendency to concentrate on the uniformed fighting services of sea and air, while giving scant notice to the civilian British, American, and other Allied merchant seamen who experienced the most danger of U-boat attack at sea and suffered by far the most human casualties.4
A summary of wartime losses in the British Merchant Navy makes the point: about 185,000 merchant seamen served aboard freighters, tankers, and motor ships, of whom 32,952, or 17 percent, lost their lives. That was a higher casualty rate than the 9.3 percent suffered during the war by the Royal Navy, the 9 percent by the Royal Air Force, and the 6 percent by the British Army. To the merchant seamen casualties must be added losses suffered by Royal Navy and Army Royal Regiment of Maritime Artillery gunners who served aboard most merchant vessels and were colloquially called D.E.M.S. ratings, after Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships.
Henkeâs U-boat was a Type IXC Atlantikboot, an improved version of two earlier submarine models, IXB and IXA, which had been built in the late 1930s and 1940 to specifications close to those of a World War I boat, Uâ81. The IX series had been envisioned originally as command and control boats, in which tactical group (âpackâ) leaders could direct operations at sea (an idea abandoned in late 1940); also as reconnaissance and mine-laying boats; and, finally, as long-range high-seas attack boats. In the last capacity, Types IXB and IXC boats had conducted immensely successful torpedo operations against Allied shipping as far distant as the United States East Coast, the Caribbean Basin, and the coast of West Africa.
Because of their large displacement (1,120 tons, surfaced) and wide, flat upper deck, the Type IX boats received the sobriquet Seekuh (sea cow), after aquatic herbivorous mammals like the manatee. The IXC was 76.8 meters (254 feet) in lengthâabout 21 feet longer than todayâs Boeing jumbo jet 747â400âand 6.8 meters (22ÂŒ, ft.) across the beam. Surfaced keel depth was 4.7 meters (15Âœ. ft.). Its fuel bunkers, or tanks, had a capacity of 208 tons, allowing for a surface, as against submerged, range of 11,000 nautical miles at an economy speed of 12 knots. (The prior Type IXB, a series produced in fewer numbers, had a smaller fuel capacity by 43 tons and a surface range of 8,700 nautical miles.) Propelled on the surface by two 2,200-horsepower diesel engines (ninecylinder, four-cycle, supercharged, salt water-cooled) manufactured by Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-NĂŒrnberg AG (MAN), the IXC was capable of 18.3 knots maximum speed (one knot was one nautical mile per hour, about 1.15 statute miles per hour); and it was on the surface, which surprises many modern readers, that U-boats of this period did most of their travel and fighting: The submerged attack by periscope was an exception rather than the rule. In truth, because it could not operate continually under water, the 1943 U-boat was a submersible rather than a genuine submarine. It launched its torpedoes in the manner of a motor torpedo boat, and dived only to avoid enemy ships and planes, to find relief from rough weather, or to make an occasional submerged attack in daylight. Submerged, it could make 7.3 knots maximum (except that in U-515âs case, top speed tested out at 7.46), which greatly reduced its maneuverability and effectiveness, particularly in convoy battles.5
Underwater propulsion was provided by twin electric dynamotors (E-Maschinen), manufactured by Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG, each rated at 500 horsepower. Power was supplied by sixty tons of storage battery arrays distributed under the interior deck plates. Even at economy speed of four knots, a submerged boat would exhaust its battery power after 64 nautical miles (one nautical mile was about 1.15 statute miles). By clutching a diesel to a dynamotor, which served as a generator, the batteries could be recharged, but that lengthy procedure required that the boat surface. Another kind of power transfer was supplied by compressed air, the product of either diesel-driven Junkers air compressors or an electric compressor that the crew employed for blowing water from the ballast, or diving, tanks when the boat surfaced; for starting the diesels; and for launching torpedoes from their tubes. Like the storage batteries, the compressed air tanks were âtopped upâ each time the boat surfaced.
In exterior appearance the IXC had the general form of any other boat or ship. It presented a sharp-edged stem at the bow, a rounded hull, a flat upper deck bisected by a superstructure, in this case a conning tower, and a stern. The outer steel casing visible to the eye, which also enclosed the fuel bunkers and the ballast tanks, made the hull more efficient for surface travel. The heart of the U-boatâs architecture, however, could not be seen: it was the pressure hull, a long, narrow, cylindrical tube constructed of welded high-tensile steel plates 18.5 millimeters thick. This structure, resistant to fifteen atmospheres of water pressure when submerged, enclosed the U-boatâs crew and its engines, motors, compressors, controls, and torpedoes. The normal crew list of a Type IX included four officers and forty-four ratings, but occasionally, on particularly long patrols, the complement would be increased by one or two officers, additional ratings, and perhaps a cameraman-correspondent from the official news service Propaganda-Kompanie or a physician. In those cases, the interior of the boat on departure, already constricted by food stores and reserve torpedoes, would be so cramped as almost to prevent human movement.
While the IX boats had the distinct advantage of long-range war waging, and while they performed well against independently sailing or weakly escorted vessels in distant coastal waters, where, in fact, the IXB sank more tonnage per boat than did any other U-boat type in the war, and individual IX boats became the third through sixth most productive of the war, they were at a marked disadvantage in the heavily escorted transatlantic sea lanes, where Britainâs seaborne trade moved in tight convoy columns protected by Royal Navy close escortsâ destroyers, sloops, frigates, and corvettesâas well as by aircraft, both land-based and, from March 1943, escort carrier-based. The IXs had several particular problems that made them less suitable for convoy operations than another U-boat type that was three times more numerous in the Atlantic at this date, namely, the Type VII.
How well-regarded this latter type was by Dönitz and his boat commanders in convoy operations is evidenced by the fact that prior to and during the war 709 VIIs were manufactured and delivered to the U-Bootwaffe (as against 159 IXAs, IXBs, IXCs, and IXC/405), of which 665 were VIICs or VIIC/415. Produced in greater numbers than any other design in submarine history, the VIIC boat was arguably the best-integrated combat system developed by German engineers prior to the Type XXI, described later. Smaller than the IX, with a lower silhouette, more maneuverable both on the surface and underwater, the whippetlike VII dived faster than the IX, putting 13 meters (42.6 feet) of water above the hull in thirty seconds, while the larger IX required thirty-five seconds at best to do the same. As has been calculated, during that five secondsâ difference an Allied anti-submarine aircraft such as a Consolidated B-24 Liberator could close a target more than a third of a mile on a depth-bomb attack.6 Furthermore, underwater, the VII boats were more stable in maintaining depth and, because of their smaller size, were less easily located by British detection gear.
During March and April 1943 it was observed by BdU (U-Boat Headquarters) that the losses of IX boats to Allied escorts in the Atlantic was proportionately much higher than the losses of VIIs, leading to a decision on 5 May: âType IXC boats leaving French ports are to be detailed to remote western or southern operational areas.â7 The same observation explains why it was such a radical step a month before, on 6 April, for BdU to direct IXs âto proceed to the North Atlantic in order to make up the number of U-boats needed there to intercept convoysâ; and why the commitment of those resources had to be quickly reversed: though making up less than a quarter of the Atlantic force in April, the IXs suffered twice as many losses (8 to 4) as did the VIIs.8 Never enthusiastic about the IXs as a U-boat type, Dönitz had energetically opposed the construction figures that the Naval Staff in Berlin had advanced for them. Nonetheless, during the January-July 1942 offensive off the American coast (chapter 3) he had to have been thankful that he had as many IXs as he did, for the longdistance boats accounted for two-thirds of the merchant traffic sunk in those waters.
Additional stowage was provided by six containers under wood slats between the pressure hull and the upper deck casing, but by 1943 U-boats rarely used them because of the length of time it required the crew to winch a torpedo down the open forward hatch, a period during which the boat was critically vulnerable. Concern was spreading by April 1943 that the Allies possessed new, more powerful depth charges, as evidenced by increased cases of damage to the upper deck containers. Should those containers fracture and fill with water, and should weight thereby suddenly increase to offset the trim, a submerged U-boat could fall fatally out of control. For this reason, as well as for the fact that the now constant danger of air attack had deterred boats from reloading at sea, BdU ordered all boats of whatever type preparing to...