Arms Control in the 21st Century

Oliver Meier, Christopher Daase, Oliver Meier, Christopher Daase

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136287619
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Freedom
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume evaluates the impact of coercive arms control efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century.

A new paradigm in arms control is gradually replacing the idea that mutually agreed restrictions on armaments can improve international security. Thus, Hedley Bull's classic definition of arms control as the "cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in military affairs" needs to be amended by a new notion of coercive arms control as the set of non-cooperative and non-reciprocal measures to restrict the weapons or military capabilities of certain states.

This volume addresses the topic of how this ongoing paradigmatic shift will affect the effectiveness of arms control as a conflict management instrument.While some argue that new instruments can complement and strengthen traditional, multilateral and inclusive arms control regimes, others maintain that conflicts and contradictions between coercive and cooperative arms control regimes will severely limit their effectiveness. This volume provides a forum for academics and practitioners from around the globe to discuss these developments in depth and to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of these new instruments of arms control.

This book will be of much interest to students of arms control, global governance, foreign policy and IR/Security Studies in general.

Part I
Introduction

1 Introduction

Christopher Daase and Oliver Meier

This book proposes that a paradigm shift is underway in arms control after the end of the Cold War. Paradigm shifts occur if “one conceptual world view is replaced by another” (Kuhn 1970: 10). In the case of arms control and non-proliferation, the old idea, that mutually agreed upon restrictions of armaments can improve international and national security, is gradually replaced by the new opinion that coercion rather than cooperation can do the job.

A few years ago, Jeffrey Larsen defined arms control as a cooperative endeavour between conflicting parties. He stated that arms control approaches “presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their military programs” (Larsen 2002: 1). But the new paradigm relies on coercion rather than cooperation, on suspicion rather than trust, inequality rather than reciprocity. Kennedy Graham describes this shift as a doctrinal move from Cold War deterrence to post-Cold War “compellence” (Graham 2006: 40), and Rebecca Johnson has analyzed the transformation from non-proliferation as a regime-building exercise, to counter-proliferation as a policing operation (Johnson 2006: 75). Thus, Hedley Bull’s classic definition of arms control as the “cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in military affairs” (Bull 1976: 22) needs to be amended by a new notion of coercive arms control as the set of non-cooperative and non-reciprocal measures to restrict the weapons of certain states or classes of states. This volume addresses the topic of how this ongoing paradigmatic shift will affect the effectiveness of arms control as a conflict management instrument.

Coercion in international politics

Coercive diplomacy has often been regarded as an alternative to war (George 1991). As such, it is especially attractive to international organizations, such as the United Nations, that prefer to uphold collective security and enforce decisions with a minimum of force and violence. But peace enforcement is a strange concept, seemingly a contradiction in terms. It is the use of non-peaceful means to achieve peace. The idea can be traced back not only to the UN Charter, but to the Covenant of the League of Nations. This is because one of the most important questions of collective security is how to achieve compliance with generally agreed provisions, norms, and rules, and what to do with non-compliant actors. The League could not give a viable answer to this question. It was powerless when states, such as Italy, Japan, and Germany, violated their obligations, because no mechanisms existed to enforce the agreements. The United Nations, by contrast, has several tools at its disposal that it can use to compel a state’s compliance with UN decisions and norms. These tools include economic sanctions, the threat of military force, and the actual use of the latter. Insofar as these tools are used to compel states to agree on and to comply with legally correct and legitimate UN decisions and provisions, they are referred to as peace enforcement measures.

But the situation is more complicated where no such legally correct and politically legitimate justification exists and when states apply coercive instruments without an explicit UN mandate. In these cases, it is difficult to speak of peace enforcement, since this implies a certain legal authority. Nevertheless, such actions occur regularly when states try to coerce a desired action from other states through more or less violent means (see, for example, Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Leng 1993).

Generally speaking, coercion is the political use of a power inequality. But power is not always used openly and blatantly. Instead, coercion often comes in the form of limited threats, where a threat is a conditional promise to do harm. In the international system, where there is no central authority to enforce international rules and norms, individual states are tempted to use coercive means of self-help when the techniques of peaceful settlement are perceived as insufficient. For these reasons, the use of threat and punishment, i.e., coercion, is a common feature of international relations.

Coercive diplomacy is a much more limited and circumscribed concept. Alexander George describes coercive diplomacy as a strategy that policy-makers employ in the hope of securing a peaceful resolution to a serious dispute. In this sense, coercive diplomacy is an alternative to war. George argues: “The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand made to an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand” (George 1991: 4).

Two definitional difficulties arise from this: first, to distinguish between coercive diplomacy and blackmail; second, to differentiate coercive diplomacy from deterrence. George limits his definition of coercive diplomacy to the “defensive use of threats” (George 1991: 5). For example, the USA demanded that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait in 1990 or risk a US military intervention. But coercive threats can also be employed aggressively to compel an adversary to give up something of value without resistance. George labels such behaviour “blackmail,” implying that it lacks legitimacy. This is a normative distinction, which might become difficult to uphold when a certain threat is seen as legitimate by one side and illegitimate by the other. Therefore, the distinction could be misleading. Coercive diplomacy can be employed to serve good and bad intentions, and its legitimacy should not be assumed, but can rather be seen as an independent variable of its success.

The second definitional clarification concerns the difference between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. We can define deterrence as a conditional threat to retaliate or punish, to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action in the future. Coercive diplomacy, by contrast, is a response to an encroachment already undertaken. It threatens retaliation or punishment if the action is not stopped or even reversed. This is not a clear-cut distinction, however, since coercion can also have a deterrent effect. Sometimes, it is difficult to assess whether an action is a “fait accompli” or still underway. The idea of dissuasion, i.e., the notion that other nations can be discouraged from engaging in an arms race when faced with overwhelming military superiority, exemplifies this problem. Nevertheless, it is a useful distinction if only to highlight the fact that coercive diplomacy is more ambitious and arguably more difficult to achieve than deterrence. The point that it is more difficult to induce somebody to do something than to dissuade him from doing was stressed by Thomas Schelling in his early writings on deterrence theory, in which he distinguished between deterrence and compellence (Schelling 1960).

Why should compellence or coercive diplomacy be an attractive strategy for states and international organizations? If coercive diplomacy worked, it would be an efficient way to achieve political objectives. Compared to the alternative of war, there would be no bloodshed and few political and economic costs are involved. In addition, the risk of escalation could also be kept low. But it is exactly this oversimplification that often leads governments to apply coercive diplomacy without considering its side-effects, unintended consequences, and long-term implications. According to George, policy-makers who are willing to apply coercive measures against adversaries have to make four decisions: (1) they must determine what to demand from the opponent; (2) they must decide how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; (3) they must determine what kind of punishment to threaten in response to non-compliance; and (4) they must decide what kind of positive inducement to offer for acceptance of the demand. A fifth dimension is related to the legitimacy of coercive measures.

The focus of the analysis here is on the political aspects of coercion, although the same arguments apply to military application of coercive arms control as well. As the contributions to this book show, the application of military force as part of a coercive arms control approach, for example through interdiction, preemptive or preventive strikes, is generally more problematic than the application of coercive diplomacy.

The first question – what to demand – is central. Political demands can be limited or comprehensive, modest or radical. Compare, for example, the limited and modest US demand made of Iraq in 1991 to pull out of Kuwait with the more comprehensive and radical one to disarm and to change the regime in 2003. The central question is: how much of a threat, or a threat in combination with a positive inducement, is necessary to persuade an opponent to comply? The scope or severity of the demand is crucial. The more significant the demand, the greater the opponent’s reluctance to comply, and consequently, the more severe the threat necessary to achieve compliance. Put simply: the magnitude of the demand affects the motivation of both sides, the coercer and the coerced, and, therefore, the balance of motivation between the adversaries.

The magnitude of the demand is one thing; the clarity with which it is communicated is another. Demands can be very precise or left largely unspecified. To minimize the danger of misperception and miscalculation, it is important to clearly communicate the demand. Communication is not only a matter of words, but also of actions. Action can reinforce words or compensate for weak words, but sometimes actions contradict words. In such situations, misperception is likely. Successful coercive diplomacy, George argues, requires consistent communication and action.

The second question concerns how to signal urgency. The most effective method is to set a short, clear time-limit for compliance, for example: “Pull out of Kuwait by 15 January, or else we will attack militarily.” Such classic ultimatums put maximum pressure on the target state, but at the same time increase the stakes for the coercing state as well. If the target state does not back down, the coercing state has to carry out the initial threat. Otherwise, it would become apparent that the threat was a bluff, damaging the credibility and reputation of the threatening state. Thus, an ultimatum is a time limit that restricts policy options for both the coerced and the coercing state. Policy-makers sometimes use ultimatums to limit their choices voluntarily and to increase domestic support for (military) action. Since reputation and resolve are highly valued in foreign policy, governments can argue that not carrying out a promise to intervene would harm a country’s international standing and reduce its influence. The United States used this argument during the diplomatic manoeuvring leading up to the intervention in Iraq in 2003, and even extended it to the United Nations by arguing that the Security Council would become “irrelevant,” should it not mandate a US-led military inter vention in Iraq.

The least urgent form of coercive diplomacy is to pose a demand without any time limit attached. George calls this strategy the “try-and-see approach.” This approach has characterized the policy of Western powers towards the Iranian nuclear program, particularly in the early stages of the confrontation. In general, this approach is more symbolic and can be used to signal disagreement or to induce other reluctant states to support stronger coercive measures. If the sense of urgency is increased over time, George refers to it as the “gradual turning of the screw.”

The third question policy-makers have to decide if they want to use coercive diplomacy is: “What kind of punishment do we want to threaten, if the adversary continues to defy us?” Again, a wide range of measures exists, for example: political isolation, economic sanctions, or military intervention. What is more, each of these measures can be employed on a limited or a massive scale. Political isolation can mean the symbolic exclusion of politicians from official events, travel bans for officials or the barring of states from international fora and organizations; economic sanctions can be restricted to specific goods or entities or can apply to an entire economy; military force can be used to restore the territorial status quo ante, to seek an unconditional surrender or to topple a government. Threats affect the motivation of both the coercer and coerced since they are usually costly to both. Similar to deterrence, there is a trade-off between credibility and effectiveness. Limited threats might not be strong enough to compel the adversary to back down; severe threats, on the other hand, might not be credible because they also involve high risks for the coercing state.

The fourth question George raises concerns the issue of positive incentives. If we think of coercive diplomacy, we usually think of threats, punishment, and sanctions. But there are also positive sanctions, i.e., incentives or inducements for compliance. Such incentives can have various forms, such as political guarantees (for example, security guarantees for North Korea), side payments, economic or political substitutes, or symbolic measures. George stresses that we should think of coercive diplomacy as a carrot-and-stick strategy, but all too often the “carrot” is forgotten, too small, or it is the wrong type of inducement. To affect the political calculation of the coerced target state, the “carrot” must have some value to it. Here again, credibility is an issue. Like threats, promises can be more or less credible. For example, how credible is a pledge not to attack North Korea after US president George W. Bush has named it part of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002?

Finally, a fifth issue worth studying are the conditions under which coercive diplomacy is perceived as legitimate. This is crucial for the success of coercive measures, yet George circumvents this issue by claiming that all cases of coercive diplomacy are defensive by definition and as such legitimate. Therefore, legitimacy plays no role in his analysis. But coercive measures – even if defensive – may be perceived as more or less legitimate. Crucial factors affecting legitimacy are to what degree they are violating international law and the inclusiveness and transparency of the process for deciding on coercive measures. Assessments of the likelihood of success will also affect perceptions of legitimacy by encouraging domestic and international support for the measures taken – thus reducing opposition, free riding or cheating – or by influencing the image and self-image of both the coercer and the coerced. The economic sanctions against Iraq in the late 1990s arguably lost their effectiveness due to the degree that they were questioned internationally after the Iraqi government portrayed Iraq as a victim and emphasized the human suffering among the civilian population created by the sanctions.

The contributions

The concept of coercive diplomacy seems straightforward in theory. But its application in the practice of arms control and non-proliferation is difficult. This is also the bottom-line of the proceedings of the workshop on “Coercive Arms Control: The Paradigm Shift in Arms Control and Non-proliferation,” jointly organized by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and the Chair of International Relations at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich (LMU) on 24–25 January 2008 in Berlin. The contributions by some of the 45 experts, decision-makers and diplomats that participated in the Berlin meeting form the core of this volume. Generally speaking, participants agreed that the growing significance of coercive measures in arms control is an issue that requires further attention, both from academics and practitioners. The conference showed that we need a better understanding of the conditions under which coercive arms control is effective and what its impact is on traditional arms control regimes. Participants disagreed, however, on the novelty of coercion as an aspect of arms control. Some attendees argued that compellence had always been part and parcel of diplomacy – arms control and otherwise – and that recent developments only indicate a gradual and temporary intensification rather than a paradigmatic shift. More recent initiatives by the Obama administration seem to support this view. But as some contributors to this volume argue, there are also continuities from US presidents Bill Clinton to George W. Bush to Barack Obama that indicate a more general trend towards coercive arms control, especially in the field of nuclear non-proliferation.

The first three chapters deal with general trends in arms control policy. Alyson Bailes explains why and how practices of arms control have changed over time in terms of conceptualization, balance, priorities, and governance tools. She describes the Cold War paradigm of arms control and delineates recent innovations in bilateral and multilateral arms control fora. Alongside forceful coercion, a range of new multilateral, law-based solutions have been developed since the 1990s. For the future of arms control, Bailes argues, it will be necessary to identify strengths and weaknesses of old and new practices and combine them in a more coherent way. Oliver Meier supports this view by critically assessing the effectiveness of what he calls non-cooperative arms control. He examines prime examples, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Meier finds that, generally, the effectiveness of non-cooperative approaches has been exaggerated. However, under certain circumstances, they can extend the reach of non-proliferation norms, improve coordination among states, or help to tighten national controls. Governments should carefully weigh the risks and benefits before supporting such instruments, in particular because their weak institutional structure suggests that some of them may have a short life. The informal structure of many new arms control measures is the focus of Christopher Daase’s contribution on informal arms control. He explains the trend towards tacit cooperation and informal agreements as a rational way to cooperate in situations of high risk and organizational inertia. Informality, he argues, might help to solve cooperation problems but it creates space for blatant power politics and practices that transgress due process and legitimate behaviour, thus undermining cooperation in the long run.

The subsequent four chapters concentrate on the effectiveness and legitimacy of specific instruments of coercive arms control. Martin Malin examines instances in which states have used military force for the purpose of preventing or delaying an adversary’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. On the basis of nine cases in which force was used to attempt to destroy an adversary’s nuclear facilities he shows that attackers encounter numerous obstacles to success, including inadequate intelligence for destroying all key facilities, ...