Unipolarity and World Politics

Birthe Hansen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781136835384
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This new book offers a coherent model of a unipolar world order.

Unipolarity is usually described either as a 'brief moment' or as something historically insignificant. However, we have already seen nearly twenty years of virtual unipolarity and this period has been of great significance for world politics.

Two issues have been crucial since the end of the Cold War: How to theorize the distinctiveness and exceptional character of a unipolar international system? And what is it like to conduct state business in a unipolar world? Until now, a comprehensive model for unipolarity has been lacking. This volume provides a theoretical framework for analysis of the current world order and identifies the patterns of outcomes and systematic variations to be expected. Terrorism and attempts by small states to achieve a nuclear capability are not new phenomena or exclusive to the current world order, but in the case of unipolarity these have become attached to the fear of marginalization and the struggle against a powerful centre without the possibility of allying with an alternative superpower.

Supplying a coherent theoretical model for unipolarity, which can provide explanations of trends and patterns in the turbulent post-Cold War era, this book will be of interest to students of IR theory, international security and foreign policy.

1 What is unipolarity?

Two issues have been crucial since the end of the Cold War, and they are the focus of this book:

1. How to theorize the distinctiveness and exceptional character of a unipolar international system; and
2. What is it like to conduct state business in a unipolar world?

Currently, the United States has a preponderance of power, but still faces hindrances when acting internationally. Many trends compete with the oldfashioned realist notion of the state as the decisive actor. The world has become globalized, sub-state actors are gaining terrain, most people no longer fear war between great powers or nuclear apocalypse, and many new theories and ways of conceiving theories have been put forward. Thus, it is easy to accept the end of ‘grand theories’ in International Relations (IR) and instead resort to conducting concrete analyses of lesser problems.

One could think of many reasons not to write a book on unipolarity in the realist tradition. Yet there are reasons. There is a need to address how unipolarity contributes to explaining a time in history in which ‘low politics’ prevails, but in which there is also room for reforms both internationally and within states.

Grand theories such as neorealism provide general frameworks for explanation and understanding. A specific model for unipolarity explains why we currently witness many small – rather than large – conflicts; why the only superpower both attracts and repels; and what the other states’ room for manoeuvre is like. General theory thus becomes the prerequisite and background for concrete analyses.

States are still the important actors. They are still defended by their populations, and as Bob Holton wrote, they are still deeply wanted among groups of people who do not have a state (Holton 1998). Moreover, security problems still exist, even though the focus is on a different type of security than was the case during the Cold War and in the absence of wars between great powers. This was demonstrated in 9/11, in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime and in Afghanistan. Some of these conflicts become subject to intervention, while others develop as in the Sudan or Rwanda. A model for unipolarity is important in order to understand why a new type of conflict prevails and why some of these conflicts are subject to intervention.

Furthermore, democratization has boomed since the end of the Cold War. Many new democracies have surfaced, and the United States has given priority to democracy internationally since 9/11. The model for unipolarity tells us why democratization has become an international issue and why competing political projects are struggling, as well as why the ‘world order’ plays a bigger role than has previously been the case.

In a way, unipolarity also tells us why more and different theoretical approaches have emerged and why conventional approaches – as here – are being transformed or softened. The new world order, with only one superpower, is unique and demands special treatment, in both an academic and political–strategic sense.

This is the reason for Unipolarity and World Politics. It has been written within the neorealist tradition, but the model for unipolarity is accommodated according to the relations of strength. Below, the point of departure is the neorealist theory according to Kenneth Waltz (1979), which is later expanded with a greater emphasis on the world order.

Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealist theory, was strongly inspired by theories about the market. In his main work, Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979), he warned against confusing structural dynamics with those of the unit level (i.e. what motivates specific states), using an analogy of confusing notions of the market with those of firms.

Following the Waltzian analogy, however, just like a monopoly situation, unipolarity represents a distinct version of polarity. The analogy should not be carried too far, but even though unipolarity still represents a version of international systems and monopoly represents a market, specific dynamics should be attributed to the two rare phenomena.

Within Waltz’s systemic universe, units may be arranged in different ways. If they are anarchically arranged, this structural arrangement will select their behaviour. More specifically, variations in patterns of behaviour are affected by the numbers of great powers. One of the basic assumptions is that the states seek security; that is, survival as a minimum and, if possible, the improvement of their international position. They also do so in the case of unipolarity. In this case, however, there is only one great power. This affects the alignment options, the risk of great power warfare and the transparency of the system. It also leaves the other states with only one option in terms of great power relations. This has implications for their mutual relationship, their position vis-à-vis the great power, and their general search for security.

Great power balancing of power is usually considered the basic dynamic in an international self-help system. In the case of unipolarity, however, the balancing dynamic becomes less relevant. However, the states must still relate to one another and care for their security within an anarchical context.

The single option, originating from the presence of only one superpower, encapsulates the unipolar structural pressure and the relationship between the units.

The aim of this book is thus to expand the neorealist theory to encompass a specific theoretical model for unipolarity, as well as investigating the distinctiveness of unipolarity beyond the scope of classic neorealism.

The point of departure consists of Waltz’s classic neorealism, including its emphasis on polarity. Polarity is the structural tenet most likely to vary, and it accounts for the variation in the patterns in an otherwise anarchically organized context. In order to identify what is distinct about unipolarity, it has been necessary to ‘go behind’ what is valid for the structures characterized by the presence of multiple poles (bi-, tri- and multipolarity). This recognizes the importance of polarity and a system’s polarity, but also that the unipolar structure produces different international dynamics compared to the other structural varieties, and that the analysis of unipolarity requires the inclusion of insights from other theoretical approaches.

The main theoretical points are that the great power balancing of power as the main dynamic is replaced by the flocking/free-riding dilemma and that the single superpower’s political project plays a more important role in the case of unipolarity than political projects otherwise do in the case of other polarities/structural varieties. The emphasis on the superpower’s political project requires closer focus on the ‘world order’ than is the norm in the neorealist tradition; the reason for doing so, as argued below, is structurally inferred.

Theoretical challenges

For years, unipolarity was described as a ‘brief moment’ or something that was historically insignificant. Since the Cold War termination in the autumn of 1989, however, more than twenty years of what could be described as unipolarity have already passed. The international events in the course of these years have indeed been of significance in world politics. The post-Cold War era needs explanations, and neorealism approaches fundamental international dynamics and focuses on security conditions. However, the classic neorealist emphasis on the balancing of power needs to be reconsidered in the case of unipolarity.

Particularly, three interrelated problems necessitate the development of a neorealist theoretical model for unipolarity.

First, Kenneth Waltz did not include a model for unipolarity in his main work (Waltz 1979). In order to be the general theory it claims to be, however, neorealism needs such a model. Since 1989 many studies of dimensions of unipolarity have been published. The era has been investigated theoretically and empirically, and many valuable analyses have become available.¹ Still, there is a need for a general theoretical model, and to further develop an otherwise elaborate theory in order to complete its scope and explanatory range.

Second, the post-Cold War era has lasted more than twenty years thus far. This may constitute a brief era in a historical perspective, but the unipolar era is not shorter than that of numerous other international systems – and has not yet come to an end. It would therefore be a serious understatement to label these years merely as a phase of transition or an ‘intermezzo’. Furthermore, the post-Cold War era appears to be one of turbulence comprising international events such as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, the enlargement of NATO, the 2003 War on Iraq, and the continuous integration and enlargement of the European Union (EU). Consequently, disregarding the era’s significance in world politics would be negligent.

Third, ‘unipolarity’ has been regarded merely as a ‘state of transition’. Its expected passing has been attributed to the balance-of-power dynamics inherent in a unipolar distribution of aggregate strength. In line with structural dynamics, the main prediction has been that the single superpower would be counterbalanced by other states, and a new system (most likely a shift to multipolarity) would occur. Rather than a model for unipolarity, this prediction has been based on transferring dynamics from non-­unipolar international systems or by focusing on US superior strength in the analysis of current politics. The missing counterbalance thus requires explanation, and it is important to distinguish between general anarchical dynamics and those originating from unipolarity. Below, it is argued that some international dynamics are comparatively strong in the case of unipolarity and unfold in specific ways: the flocking/free-riding dilemmas prevail over the classic balancing/bandwagoning, and the ‘world order’ has gained particular importance.

In addition to the debates on durability and power balancing, other important questions regarding themes such as the possible benign role of the United States and resistance to the system/world order have been raised. These issues are addressed in the following.

However, theory should not be developed for the sake of theory alone. The raison d’être of the model is to contribute to the analysis and explanation of international politics. Was it neo-conservatism and arrogant US policy that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Did Libya abandon its WMD programme at the end of 2003 because Colonel Gaddafi had a revelation? Did 9/11 occur because of Western decadence? Or did these incidents and many others like them reflect the dynamics and resulting patterns of a unipolar world order in which the sole superpower is able to act in a comparatively unrestrained manner, weak states are unable to pursue balancing strategies, and terrorism is an inherent feature? Unipolarity and World Politics provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the current world order and identifies the expected patterns of outcomes within the realm of international politics and systematic variations. While particularist or hermeneutic approaches may provide us with solid and comprehensive knowledge about individual incidents, the advantage of systemic–structural theory is its ability to identify and explain recurrent outcomes and systematic patterns.

Furthermore, the structural approach assists us in the task of assessing the incidents. When European and US politicians argue over some issue – as in the autumn of 2007 regarding a possible strengthening of the imposed sanctions against Iran – one could conclude that the political gap between the United States and Europe was huge. The parties wanted different policies. One could also conclude that the parties were very close to each other, however, because the Europeans did not want to support Iran or to counter the general US policy, only to advocate slightly softer sanctions. By means of structural theory, it is possible to delimit the expectations of the parties’ room for manoeuvre. In the case of unipolarity, it seems as though the Europeans have limited wiggle room in regard to challenging US policy (Hansen 2003a; Hansen et al. 2009).

The post-Cold War era thus deserves special interest regarding the theoretical tools for analysis and dealing with the political–strategic challenges. The first task, however, is to define the concept of unipolarity. What is unipolarity? Why does the model include a ‘unipolar world order’? What are the main specifics of unipolarity?

Definition and meaning

Unipolarity is defined as an international system with ‘only one great power in existence’ (Hansen 2000a: 80). Waltz (1979: 131) understands a great power² as a state with a qualitative edge relative to the other states based on the aggregate score on the size of territory, population, economy, military, resource endowment, political stability and political competence.

However, unipolarity is not merely about pinpointing the strongest power in the system. It is also about distinguishing it from other notions of international systems and about the identification of the unipolar dynamics.

According to the Waltzian understanding, an anarchically organized system is characterized by the lack of a monopoly of violence and the specialization of the units. In principle, one could well envisage a system in which a single strong power achieved a monopoly of violence – and the most likely case would be that of a superpower becoming so strong that it transcended its own position. In such a case, the description of the organization of the units as an international system would cease to be an adequate description, and the general dynamics attributed to such a system should no longer be considered operative.

Consequently, dealing with a unipolar system requires the identification of anarchy as the organizing principle and the existence of like units in terms of functional similarity. If so, a unipolar system can be dealt with in ways similar to dealing with multi-, tri- and bipolarity, allowing one to infer hypotheses about the outcomes in the system.

A unipolar international system is similar in those respects, but attributed with a series of specific dynamics distinct from those in other international systems (defined by other polarities). However, the features beyond the basic dynamics of the unipolar system in question may differ. Had the Soviet Union won the Cold War and become the sole superpower, we would have seen a similar unipolar system – but most likely with a different world order. The basic dynamics (which we are searching for in this book) would have been similar, but the content would have differed. We cannot project which world order would have been spread by a victorious Soviet Union: Soviet policy is often associated with the planned economy and socialist regime of the Brezhnev era, but President Gorbachev was promoting democratization and a market-like economy in the later years of the Soviet Union. Still, a Soviet unipolar world order would have differed from other unipolar world orders due to the specific Soviet interests and political values.

The term unipolarity is thus reserved for the international system. Obviously, one could cut out parts of the international system for analytical reasons and attempt to determine their sub-‘polarity’. However, the regional or other subsystemic polarity would be secondary to the systemic polarity. Consequently, it seems useful to use the term exclusively at the systemic level. Obviously, this hardly means that the sub-systemic distribution of capabilities is unimportant or that it does not interact with the systemic distribution. Nor does this imply that we cannot infer hypotheses on the impact of unipolar dynamics on regional issues or the relationship between the single superpower and regional powers. Rather, it merely means that if one polarity shapes the basic dynamics, it deserves the focus rather than several layers of polarity, only one of which creates structural dynamics.

Below, it is argued that the concept of a ‘world order’ is particularly important to a unipolar system. This ‘world order’ is also an analytical concept and differs from the political articulations of what is desirable. Politicians may attempt to articulate their vision, as did President George Bush Sr in 1991 when referring to the emergence of a ‘new world order’.

Here, an international political world order is defined in terms of the polarity set-up and its content in terms of the single superpower’s political project. The current unipolar world order is therefore understood as comprising the US unipolar position plus the US political project.

As argued below, the reason for including the ‘world order’, which does not appear to be a concept that belongs to structural ...