Globalizing Resistance against War

Tiina Seppälä

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136330803
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The political revival of the anti-war movement after 9/11 launched a controversial debate on global resistance. Through detailed study of the anti-war movement in Britain, this book critically evaluates the theoretical debate from the perspective of 'critical theory in political practice'.

This book presents new arguments and theoretical framework to consider globalized resistance to war. In an attempt to develop the theoretical debate further, this book analyses two strands of current thought; liberal cosmopolitanism which considers the movement a consensual force of opposition against war in the form of global civil society, and radical poststructuralism which speaks of the Multitude's 'war against war'.. Including detailed empirical case study of four anti-war organizations; the Stop the War Coalition, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Globalise Resistance and War Resisters' International, the author illustrates the limitations of the abstract nature of current theorizing and highlights the need for theory to be more engaged with political practice. While revealing tensions and conflicts within the new anti-war movement, the study not only underlines the need to critically analyse the dominant theoretical discourses but also suggests that the movement would benefit from a more open discussion about the complex relationship between unity and diversity.

Globalizing Resistance against War is invaluable reading for students and scholars of International Sociology, International Relations, War and Peace Studies, International Theory and Political Theory.

1 Introduction

Global War, Global Resistance?

On 15 February 2003, less than five weeks before the US launch of the military attack on Iraq, there was a chain of anti-war demonstrations taking place simultaneously across the world. The massive spectacle of anti-war demonstrations, orchestrated internationally to oppose the Iraq War, was a clear manifestation that the anti-war movement had experienced a political revival. The demonstrations gathered over ten million people in the streets of major cities in Europe, the United States, Asia and the Middle East. In the following three months, similar demonstrations were organized around the globe. It has been estimated that around thirty million people participated in these.

Activism on such a scale took many by surprise, because the anti-war movement had lived rather a quiet life since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, there had been some opposition to the first Gulf War, and later on to the wars in the Balkans, but nothing to measure up to the kind of opposition that had now formed to resist the US military invasion of Iraq. The movement experienced its political revival in a very specific political situation, that of the early twenty-first century, which was strongly characterized and shaped by the foreign policy of the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The anti-war movement both reflected and inspired more opposition, not only to the war, but also US hegemony in more general terms. For many activists, the ‘Global War on Terror’, and especially the Iraq War, illustrated a new kind of oil-driven imperialism by the United States that should be fiercely opposed. It was maintained that the declaration of a ‘global war’ required a global response – resistance, too, was to be globalized.

Struggling intensely against one of the most controversial wars of our times, the new anti-war movement certainly provided an interesting context for the idea of ‘global resistance’. It was not, however, a concept invented by the anti-war movement or in the context of the Iraq War. It was a slogan used and made popular first by the anti-capitalist movement, also known as the anti- or alter-globalization movement, which had advocated a political strategy of global resistance in its struggle against neo-liberal globalization, global capitalism and corporate power since the mid-1990s. The movement brought together a broad array of organizations and groups from all over the world to protest in Seattle in 1999 against the World Trade Organization (WTO), and on many different occasions thereafter under the umbrella of the World Social Forum (WSF). During the first years of the new millennium, the imperative to ‘globalize resistance’ surfaced in many social movements, which started to use the slogan in their own political campaigning. It also became popular in the academic literature dealing with social movements.

Although the internationally coordinated anti-war demonstrations did resemble the form of protests introduced by the anti-capitalist movement, in the academic literature these two movements have often been bundled together without taking seriously into account the important differences between them. Analyses that tend to see the anti-war movement as a characteristically transnational movement often fail to recognize that the primary targets of resistance and forms of political organization for the anti-war movement are quite different from those which characterize the anti-capitalist movement. (Gillan et al. 2008: 103, 112–13, 119)

There is a second important difference that has not been often reflected upon in the academic literature. While advocating a strategy of global resistance, the alter-globalization movement has become well known for arguing that it seeks no power. In contrast, in the context of the anti-war movement the discourse of global resistance was soon accompanied by that of global power. It originated from the often-cited piece ‘New Power in the Streets’, published in the New York Times two days after the demonstrations in February 2003. The article was highly optimistic about the political significance of the new movement. It argued that demonstrations taking place all over the world proved that there are ‘two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion’ (New York Times 2003). Later, the phrase ‘world’s second superpower’ was used increasingly often when referring to the anti-war movement. Many scholars argued that it must be regarded as a noteworthy challenger to the global hegemony of the United States due to its ‘soft power’ and its ability to influence public opinion on a world scale (e.g., Chomsky 2003; Kahn and Kellner 2004; Cortright 2007). The movement was represented as a global political counterforce to the United States while it also was suggested that its power should be conceptualized in globalized terms.

As exaggerated as the above-mentioned interpretations may first sound, especially for political realists, they become less surprising when viewed in the light of the current state of theorization in International Relations (IR) (see e.g. Amoore 2005). As David Chandler (2009a: 1) points out, in the currently dominant theories it is now commonly maintained that ‘politics, power and resistance make themselves felt at the global level rather than primarily at the level of nation states – the traditional subjects of international relations’. In short, the global is viewed ‘as the key site for power, policy and resistance’ (ibid.: 3). For Chandler (2009b: 532), this uniformity represents ‘Global Ideology’, that is, the globalization of political discourse. In his critical analysis, he does not argue that politics, power and resistance merely operate at local or national levels but aims at ‘conceptually unpacking what is meant when we talk about global politics, power and resistance’ (ibid.: 530, 532). What is called ‘a more subjectivist or constructivist approach’ does not take it for granted that the globalization of politics is ‘a secondary political effect of primary social and economic transformations’, but enables critical evaluation of how the global is actually being constructed (ibid.: 532).

Chandler criticizes especially IR, where analyzing global interactions is now considered more relevant than state-level interaction in the international system – the traditional focus of the discipline. When the starting assumption is that the world has become increasingly globalized, the view that politics, too, is and should be, taking place primarily at the global level becomes more or less inevitable. (Chandler 2009b: 533) If the globalization of politics is understood ‘as a response to processes of social and economic change’, ‘the shift towards the global’ becomes essentialized or reified (Chandler 2009a: 5).

Rather than the shift from national to global conceptions of politics, power and resistance being a question for investigation, it has been understood as natural or inevitable, as a process driven by forces external to us and out of our control.

(Chandler 2009a: 5)

Chandler’s critical analysis is very interesting as well as important from the perspective of this book, because it succeeds in revealing the essentialized nature of the globalized conceptualizations of politics, power and resistance found in the currently dominant theoretical discourses. This in turn helps to explain why political strategies of resistance and the power of the new anti-war movement have been conceptualized in highly globalized and idealistic terms. Although the political significance of the movement should not be downplayed – nor its increasingly transnational character denied – it must be admitted that some of the interpretations are way out of proportion. Transnational elements of the new movement have been emphasized to such an extent that, as Gillan et al. (2008: 103) point out, transnationalism is considered its ‘defining feature’. Yet many empirical studies have already shown that in practical terms the movement is not as globally oriented as many wish to believe when it comes to, for example, the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in mobilization. International demonstrations have illustrated the movement’s ability ‘to act on the world stage’, but in terms of concrete political action it has yet remained ‘predominantly affixed to place and to the political context of the nation’ (ibid.: 102, 113, 128).

Moreover, the fact that the Iraq War still continues, eight years after the proclaimed birth of the world’s second superpower, indicates that there has not been too much critical discussion about the movement’s power and effectiveness, that is, how and with what criteria it should be evaluated.¹ Surprisingly few scholars have reflected on whether it is even realistic to expect that a social movement such as the anti-war movement could influence world politics to an extent that wars could be prevented or stopped on the spot. Quite the contrary, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that many of the most optimistic as well as globalized interpretations made in regard to the existing anti-war movement can be easily challenged, some theorists have expressed even more optimistic and globalized views in regard to future resistance against war.

A particularly interesting development has been the way in which social movements and other non-state actors are conceptualized as an answer to war in recent theoretical debate. This debate has clearly been dominated by two theoretical discourses, which can be labeled the liberal cosmopolitan approach and the radical poststructuralist approach, and whose adherents belong to the category of ‘academic globalists’. A third perspective, the state-centric approach, can be considered their critique. Academic globalists have argued that resisting war and/or transforming the war system must take place from below, which requires transnational political engagement in global advocacy networks transcending the boundaries of nation states. Liberal cosmopolitans suggest that ‘global civil society’ can become an important challenger of state power, contesting the status quo from below (e.g., Beck 2000; Nye 2004a; Castells 2008) and resisting war (e.g., Kaldor 2003a). Radical poststructuralists argue that the ‘global state of war’ can be challenged by the oppressed people of the world, who together form a Multitude which would wage a ‘war against war’ (Hardt and Negri 2004).

Both approaches can be criticized on many grounds. From the perspective of concrete political practice, they seem very abstract and future-oriented, even utopian, in that they talk about global struggles and global political subjects that do not yet exist. As a key representative of the state-centric approach, David Chandler (2009b: 537) points out, ‘these struggles remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress are intimated but are yet to fully develop’. There is no collective political subject that could ‘give content’ to the global struggle anticipated by theorists which means that theorizing actually ‘becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency’ (ibid.: 535, 537). Provocatively, Chandler (2009b: 537) goes on to argue that ‘politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement’.

Despite these problems, it must be admitted that there is something very interesting going on, since many political theorists invite us to take a closer look at the anti-war movement as an integral part of either global civil society or the Multitude. Obviously, the debate has been taken far beyond the current movement when speculating on the possibility of establishing a global collective political subject dedicated to resistance against war. This does not mean that the present anti-war movement should or even could be totally left out of the debate. Although the movement is not conceived as being the forthcoming global collective political subject as such, it is difficult, almost impossible, to imagine a global collective dedicated to resistance against war that would exclude the already existing anti-war movement.

Yet the present anti-war movement seems to be essentially ignored by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists. In fantasizing about global struggles, global strategies of resistance, and even a global collective political subject, they are not engaging empirically with the current anti-war movement but ‘jumping’ directly into the future. Their suggestions and visions seem to be based on what they assume about the movement or what they want it to become in the future. Taking place as it does on such a highly abstract and future-oriented level, the debate invites four critical questions.

First, the lack of empirical engagement with the current movement invites the question of the extent to which the globalized interpretations made by academic globalists in regard to the nature of the new anti-war movement and its political strategies can be considered accurate. Second, one might ask whether their globalized normative assumptions and visions are even compatible with the values, beliefs and political premises of the movement. This question directly relates to a third one – whether the kind of global political collective both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are dreaming of can be regarded as a possible, or even desirable, political project from the perspective of the existing movement. Fourth, the lack of empirical engagement with the movement prompts one to ask whether academic globalists are able to provide any practical suggestions on how to organize resistance against war more effectively.

The first question can be considered relevant especially from the perspective of traditional social movement research, which is characterized by its descriptive, usually non-normative methods of analysis. Any critical questions in such terms would address possible errors and shortcomings in existing interpretations, amounting to an assessment of the accuracy of the globalized interpretations made by academic globalists regarding the extent of global elements evident in the new movement and its strategies. This would require empirical analysis of the concrete political practices and processes of the movement, and thereby possibly challenging previous interpretations. Although this perspective is important and will be taken up (but from a different point of view than would be the case in traditional social movement research), the three other questions are more fundamental in the context of this book.

The second and third questions are significant because academic globalists assume that the forthcoming global collective political subject will share their normative ideals. For liberal cosmopolitans, the ideal towards which global civil society should be moving is based on liberal and social democratic values, regarded as international, if not universal – hence, the term ‘cosmopolitan’. Radical poststructuralists accuse liberal cosmopolitans of normative universalism as well as imposing western values and liberal governance on the rest of the world. For them, the ideal towards which the Multitude should lead the world is based on a vision of a communistic, yet diverse and autonomous political collective. Regardless of the character of the normative ideal, the problem remains: both frameworks ‘ground their position on abstract framings of political struggle, rather than on concrete movements or practices’ (Chandler 2009a: 155; see also Mouffe 2005a: 106–7).

This brings us to the fourth problem. If academic globalists were to provide any practical suggestions for the anti-war, or any, movement in regard to how to organize resistance in a more effective way, they should be communicating closely with the existing movement(s). At the moment, this takes place only at a very abstract level. If one considers IR, it is hardly surprising. IR is not the most empirically oriented discipline in the first place, and social movements have not been very popular subjects of research, given the discipline’s primary focus on interactions between nation states within the territorial, state-based international system. Not even the anti-war movement has been a major subject of research within the discipline, although in light of the movement’s fundamental commitment to the questions of war and peace, no other social movement is nearly as significant. Neither is there a more appropriate discipline to provide a proper context for analysis than IR when it comes to the anti-war movement.²

Unless political theorists engage in a dialogue with social movements, they risk rendering their own conceptualizations useless in terms of political practice. In a word, their contributions are likely to remain merely utopian. Moreover, when the theorists are not capitalizing on the experience that social movements have of political practices of resistance, they may totally overlook opportunities to benefit from the ‘knowledge of the field’. Despite being objects of contradicting theorizations and criticisms, social movements are continuously engaged in many sorts of political struggles. Their experiences could offer many insights for developing theories further.

An additional problem is that when social movements are studied empirically, the main focus usually lies on their concrete processes and practices, with ideological factors and the movements’ self-understandings often considered secondary. It is a small mystery why many scholars view empirical studies of the self-understandings of social movements skeptically. As Kevin Gillan (2006: 38–9) explains, it is more common to study the processes and practices – the how-questions – of social movements than the understandings, beliefs and values, that is, the why-questions that underlie them.³ Studying the understandings that guide the political practice of social movements would help to comprehend their processes as well (ibid.). This in turn, I wish to add, would help social scientists and political theorists to offer more reflective and practical suggestions for social movements, which, in fact, should be their main aim – when their work is regarded from the perspective of critical theory.

An intimate link between theory and political practice has always been the basis of critical theory, by definition. As Stephen Leonard (1990: 3) puts it, ‘a critical theory without a practical dimension would be bankrupt on its own terms’. When struggling for emancipation and social change, critical theory needs to have a practical element, because otherwise ‘the promise of a truly emancipatory social theory will remain hopelessly utopian’ (ibid.: xxiv). In his critical analysis, Leonard (1990: xiv–xv) argues that although critical theory has succeeded in its criticism of prevailing disciplinary orthodoxies, in both its modern and postmodern versions it has ‘failed to make clear its own political implications and how it is to be related to concrete political practices’. Thus it has lost its politically engaged and emancipatory forms of critique along with ‘an ever growing preoccupation with what might be called a radical “metacritique” of modernity’, which has made critical theory ‘look more like a form of academic, intellectual introspection’ (ibid.: 6).⁴ It is suggested that partly this derives from the desire of the theorists ‘to avoid seeing critique lose its critical edge by becoming the ideology of any particular social movement’, leading them to define ‘the requirements for emancipation in a way that enabled critique to be autonomous from practice’ (ibid.: 91).

Critical theory is of course a very broad category that includes many d...