Transnational Environmental Policy
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Transnational Environmental Policy

Reiner Grundmann

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Transnational Environmental Policy

Reiner Grundmann

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About This Book

Transnational Environmental Policy analyses a surprising success story in the field of international environmental policy making: the threat to the ozone layer posed by industrial chemicals, and how it has been averted. The book also raises the more general question about the problem-solving capacities of industrialised countries and the world society as a whole. Reiner Grundmann investigates the regulations which have been put in place at an international level, and how the process evolved over twenty years in the US and Germany.

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Publisher
Routledge
Year
2002
ISBN
9781134592234

1 Social science and global environmental problems

Every year in the autumn there are fresh news reports on the ozone hole over the Antarctic. There is an almost ritual quality to the coverage, since the script always seems to be the same: in comparison with the preceding year, the hole in the ozone layer has grown or the ozone levels have reached new record lows. Obviously, only negative records are set in this area. The lay public is given the impression that too little is being done in the face of this catastrophic development. In actuality, the international community has already agreed upon measures that could solve the problem. According to the experts, however, it will be several more decades before the seasonally appearing ozone hole over the South Pole disappears (WMO 1994). This is due above all to the longevity of the ozonedestroying substances, which remain in the atmosphere for a long period after their release. Thus far the facts—paradoxical as they may seem at first—are simple: although the ozone layer initially continues to deteriorate, in the long term the measures are assumed to be successful. The matter becomes more complicated, however, if we want to understand how it became possible to arrive at binding controls in the first place.
This case study analyses a surprising success story in the field of international environmental policy making. It investigates the regulations that have been put in place at the international level and how the process evolved over twenty years in the USA and Germany. This raises the more general question about problemsolving capacities of industrialised countries. Is the international community in a position to tackle global environmental threats? Under which conditions is transnational governance without government possible? (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).1
Global ecological problems are newcomers to politics and a new research topic in the social sciences. To be sure, the 1960s saw international agreements to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and back in the nineteenth century cholera and yellow fever have been the object of such attempts (Cooper 1989). Also in the 1960s, the first alarming reports about environmental problems were published. But it was not until the 1970s, with the publication of the reports of the Club of Rome, the establishment of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the publication of Global 2000 and the Brundtland Report (World Commission 1987, making the term ‘sustainable development’ current) that these issues were established on the political agenda on a permanent basis. Since then, many problems have been thematised, ranging from the civil application of nuclear energy to genetic engineering and to global warming. To date, more than 170 multilateral agreements on the environment have been reached (UNEP 1993). Social scientists have also become aware of the problem. The exponential growth in literature testifies to this (among many: Beck 1992; Beck et al. 1995; Breitmeier 1996; Dickens 1996; Dryzek 1997; Gehring 1994; Haas et al. 1993; Irwin 1995; MacNaghten and Urry 1998; Martell 1994; Murphy 1997; Norgaard 1994; Redclift and Benton 1994; Redclift and Woodgate 1996; Shiva 1989; Yearley 1996; Young 1994; Young and Osherenko 1993). However, it should be noted that interest from social science has been highly selective: ‘Sociologists and anthropologists have concentrated on working scientists, whereas the few political scientists and policy analysts interested in science have focused on politicians’ (Hart and Victor 1993:643). Therefore, the challenge is to combine approaches from different social science backgrounds. I shall develop an institutionalist approach that incorporates insights from different areas of political science and sociology.

A success story

This book is about controversies. It is about the claims and counterclaims of scientists, industry, politicians and environmentalists. These controversies had to do with the ozone layer, seen as endangered by some, while others thought that no big threat was looming. In order to contextualise these disputes, let me start with some remarks about the object of controversy.
The ozone layer is located approximately between 10 and 50 kilometres above sea-level and provides protection from certain injurious wavelengths of ultraviolet (UV) sunlight, above all from UV-B. Any reduction of the ozone column leads to an increase in the UV-B radiation reaching the earth. Before chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were seen as possible hazards to the ozone layer, suspicion fell in particular on nuclear explosions and aeroplane exhaust gases. The latter were examined by the Climatic Impact Assessment Program from 1971 to 1973, a US government technology assessment of possible effects of a planned fleet of supersonic aircraft (for example, of the Concorde type). There were fears that the operation of 500 supersonic aircraft could deplete the ozone layer by 22 per cent (Johnston 1971). A later study demonstrated that the risks were considerably lower (CIAP 1973). At about the same time, scientists began to suspect that chlorine from the exhaust of planned space shuttles could have a much greater effect on the ozone layer (Stolarski and Cicerone 1974). As a result, researchers became aware for the first time of the possibility that chlorine poses a potential danger to the ozone layer. In the same year, chlorofluorocarbons were singled out as possible ozone destroyers (Molina and Rowland 1974).
In 1974, scientists advanced the hypothesis that CFCs could damage the ozone layer. By way of increased UV-B radiation, severe environmental and health problems would follow. In the USA, this hypothesis was taken seriously. As a consequence, the Clean Air Act of 1977 introduced a CFC ban in spray-cans. Several other countries followed suit, but not the other large producers of CFCs in Japan or Europe. They pointed to the unknowns of the causal relationships. International negotiations saw two camps opposed to each other: the USA (and few other countries) who proposed strict emission controls for CFCs (despite scientific uncertainty) and the rest of the world. After a protracted negotiation period, a compromise was reached in September 1987 (Montreal Protocol) which envisaged a 50 per cent cut of ozone depleting substances by the year 1999. In the years that followed, this goal was made even more ambitious, resulting in a complete phaseout of these substances in the industrialised countries by 1996 (Benedick 1991; Brack 1996; UNEP 1995). These agreements comprise binding control measures to curb CFC emissions. They are—together with subsequent amendments—an instance of successful international governance. According to the United Nations Environment Program, world production of CFCs has been halved in the period from 1986 to 1992 (UNEP 1995:32).2 This success was unexpected at the time and today still poses problems in terms of theoretical explanation.
The Montreal Protocol is the foremost example of global environmental cooperation. It limits the emissions of major ozone depleting substances, mainly CFCs and halons. International regulations for the protection of the ozone layer seem to have been successful.3 They are even deemed to be a blueprint for other global environmental problems like climate change. One of the architects of the Montreal Protocol, former UNEP director Mostafa Tolba, is not alone in espousing such ‘policy learning’ when he says: ‘The mechanisms we design for the protocol will—very likely—become the blueprint for the institutional apparatus designed to control greenhouse gases and adaptation to climate change’ (cit. in Benedick 1991:7; see also Downie 1995). I shall return to this question in the final chapter.

The theoretical problem

And yet, there is a puzzle. Four characteristics of the case seem to make its success unlikely. First, the successful protection of an environmental asset is unlikely since it has no strong lobby but strong enemies (Schnaiberg et al. 1986). Second, in contradistinction to regulations within the nation-state where the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ sets more favourable conditions for cooperation, regulations in the international arena are bound to take place in the ‘shadow of anarchy’ (Oye 1986). A third puzzle pertains to the character of the good that is at stake. The ozone layer is a common pool resource, not a public good. This distinction may be subtle, yet it has important consequences. A public good can (in principle) be provided by a single actor without the free-riding of others affecting it adversely. In contrast, unilateral action cannot produce or protect a common pool resource, but can harm or destroy it. As a consequence, all potential polluters of the atmosphere must be part of an international agreement to protect the ozone layer (i.e. the ¿-group is large).4 Even more surprising is the successful cooperation if one considers, fourth, that political decisions have had to be taken under uncertainty. This is to say that although expert knowledge is moving to centre stage, it cannot give a clear and unambiguous judgement since we typically have (at least) two opposing expert views on the matter (Adams 1995; Hajer 1995; Jasanoff 1992, 1995; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
All four reasons seem to pose considerable difficulties for international cooperation. Therefore, its success seems quite remarkable. Several approaches have been applied to this case (see Haas 1992b, 1993; Litfin 1994; Maxwell and Weiner 1993; Oye and Maxwell 1994; Rowlands 1995; Sebenius 1992; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). One can distinguish between economic and cognitive explanations. The economic explanation holds that the influence of industry was all decisive to the outcome. Specifically, the American chemical firm Du Pont is said to have gained a technological advantage over its competitors in developing alternative substances. This, it is argued, put the firm in a position to actually favour international regulations of CFCs. The cognitive approach has scientific consensus as the explaining variable. According to this view, expert communities reached a common understanding of causal relationships that could swiftly be transformed into political regulations. However, closer examination reveals that no evidence can be found for the claim that Du Pont had a technological advantage over its competitors. Neither was a scientific understanding of ozone depletion available at the time of the signing of the Montreal Protocol.
The problem has both a national and an international dimension. In the mid- 1970s, political regulations took place on a national level. At the beginning of the 1980s, the process shifted to international level and found its conclusion in international treaties that became binding in the jurisdiction of the signatory countries. On both levels there are serious questions about costs and benefits and the urgency to act. Thus, we have two questions to answer. First, why was there international cooperation? And, second, why was the reaction different with respect to two industrialised countries (Germany and the USA), both heavy producers and consumers of ozone depleting substances? Both countries were chosen because of their crucial role in this controversy. There were other countries who played an important role (like the UK, for example) and it would have been ideal to include these, too. However, there are limits as to what one researcher can do in a given time period.
This chapter falls into three parts. First, I develop the aspects that made this success so unlikely: the representation of diffuse interests, the problem of international cooperation, the problem of public goods and decisions under uncertainty. Then I shall introduce the theoretical approach and finally make some remarks on the method chosen.

The representation of diffuse interests

One of the most common obstacles to environmental protection is the asymmetry of costs and benefits. Pollution abatement benefits the majority of the population but confers costs upon the polluters. Based on this observation, it has been argued that although environmental concerns do not have a lobby, they do have strong political enemies (Heidenheimer et al. 1990; Schnaiberg et al. 1986). In order to gain a better understanding of the power of the polluters and the relative weakness of environmental interests, I shall draw upon a typology offered by Wilson (1980). Using two dichotomous dimensions, he classified costs and benefits by whether they are concentrated on a few or spread more widely. This yields four possible cases, to which four types of regulatory policy can be assigned:

  1. Where costs and benefits are broadly spread, a majority policy can be expected; however, this will not always produce successful regulation. For this to come about, the matter must reach the political agenda, and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the proposed measures must be beyond dispute.
  2. If the benefits are broadly spread and the costs concentrated on a small group, we can expect a form of policy regulation dependent on the activities of public interest groups or policy entrepreneurs, representatives or advocates, as there will be a significant incentive among those bearing the costs (who, moreover, are few and therefore easy to organise) to resist the imposition of the measures proposed, but hardly any incentive among the beneficiaries to actively pursue their interests. Environmental and health matters mostly fall into this category
  3. If the benefits are concentrated and the costs are broadly spread, this will very probably result in clientelism, as a few small and easy-to-organise groups will benefit and will thus have a great incentive to organise and mobilise. The costs are so low and so thinly spread that there is little incentive for a (diffuse) opposition to mobilise.
  4. If both the benefits and the costs are concentrated on a few, interest groups will form around their special interests. In this case, subsidies will be paid or other advantages awarded to one small social group at the cost of another small group, and the wider public will have no interest in the outcome of this conflict.
In cases like that under discussion, the problem is that of the representation of diffuse interests (case 2 above), which calls for speakers or representatives. If these are not available, we would expect the well-organised interests to prevail. The representation can be carried out in various ways, such as by individual actors, by public interest groups (environmental pressure groups, citizens’ associations, political parties) or by networks including actors from various organisations and institutions. An individual activist will probably appeal to the public and work at a judicial level. Political entrepreneurs can combine a number of relevant subjects and processes (policy streams, cf. Kingdon 1984). They will often prepare solutions before a problem becomes acute, using windows of opportunity. In addition, organisations and social movements will exert influence on the political decision-making process: environmental groups typically do this by mobilising those affected or through symbolic protests. Networks may also operate in these three dimensions; their chances of success will be greater if they include representatives of various organisations in a position to mobilise extensive resources, alongside individual actors. Networks may therefore provide a coordinating function across society, which may be greater than could be created by power or hierarchy (Mayntz 1993). If, for example, scientists emerge as speakers at the same time as political entrepreneurs take up the question with the support of social movements, there will be an effect of mutual reinforcement.
Governments across the globe realise that they cannot control all the factors that influence the environmental quality within their jurisdiction. Pollutants cross national boundaries easily, a fact that has been dramatically highlighted after the explosion of the nuclear plant at Chernobyl when radioactive clouds meandered over Europe. Effective environmental protection therefore needs international cooperation. Again, the problem of diffuse interest representation surfaces. The representation of diffuse interests at an international level can be carried out in a number of ways: by speakers and activists who enjoy worldwide visibility, by the policies of national states, or by international organisations.

International cooperation

Political scientists or economists not very familiar with this case would probably explain the international cooperation by invoking the mechanism of the prisoners’ dilemma and its solution. In international relations literature, international cooperation is regarded as likely if a limited number of key actors engage in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. A well-known approach assumes that actors in such constellations would be able to reach cooperation if one actor makes the first cooperative move, which is then reciprocated by the others. The shadow of the future provides that the actors continue cooperating through this kind of insurance mechanism (Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987). As neo-institutionalist approaches have pointed out, such iterated prisoner’s dilemmas can lead to institutionalised international regimes.5 Both possibilities have to be excluded as an explanation for the case under consideration, which did not follow the logic of a prisoners’ dilemma. At the beginning of the international negotiations in the 1980s, main parties to a prospective treaty found themselves in a deadlock.6 This situation was transformed when the pro-regulation camp was no longer content with the status quo (which d...

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