The International Politics of Democratization
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The International Politics of Democratization

Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Nuno Severiano Teixeira

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eBook - ePub

The International Politics of Democratization

Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Nuno Severiano Teixeira

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About This Book

This book examines the international dimensions of democratization processes, showing the degree to which international actors, ranging from states to non-governmental players, have an influence on what were once thought of as exclusively domestic processes of political change.

The contributors to the volume look at changes in foreign policy resulting from transitions to democracy in a number of countries and regions. Some of the areas covered include:

  • Portugal and Spain in Europe in the 1970s
  • Brazil and Argentina in Latin America from the early 1980s
  • Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s
  • Various countries in the Arab World

The chapters adopt a theoretical and empirical perspective: while the two introductory chapters of the book place a special emphasis on interpretation and quantitative analysis of regime change and the role of international actors in such processes, the remaining chapters examines specific case studies.

The International Politics of Democratization will be of interest to students and researchers of International Relations, Politics and Democracy.

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Publisher
Routledge
Year
2008
ISBN
9781134054350

1 The international politics of democratization from Portugal (1974) to Iraq (2003)

Laurence Whitehead


Introduction

From the “revolution” in Portugal (April 1974) to the “liberation” of Iraq (April 2003), the so-called “third wave” of democratizations has triggered various types of “transition” from authoritarian (or even totalitarian) rule. Over the past thirty years this has affected almost half of the sovereign states recognized by the United Nations (UN). In some countries, a clear-cut episode of regime change separates an old (undemocratic) order from a new (more or less “consolidated”) electoral democracy. In many other cases, the political trajectory has been more erratic and the outcome more ambiguous, but even so what has come to the fore has been the norms and structures of competitive politics within a relatively neutral institutional framework. There remain large regions that have proved resistant to this global tendency (most notably in the Arab world), and there have been a small number of significant reversals (as in Pakistan). In some cases democratization has come about through delicate negotiations between rival domestic political elites, but there are also numerous examples of regime change through rupture, perhaps precipitated by external crises, or even (as in Iraq) imposed through military conquest. The old established democracies remain securely in place but there is quite widespread evidence of growing disenchantment with the way that “really existing” democratic politics works, and in some important countries there have been significant signs of “decay” in the observance of basic democratic norms. Quite a few of the new democracies display substantial levels of citizen disenchantment, and in some cases even institutional dysfunctionality. Whereas the early democratizations of the 1970s all took place in long-established and securely implanted nation states, those of the 1990s were more likely to occur in institutionally fragile nations (perhaps newly created), where basic elements of the underlying political order remained subject to contestation. Overall, then, the record of the past thirty years presents a mixed picture. Democratization has advanced, but initial theories and models of democratic transition have been stretched (and even undermined) by the resulting diversity of paths and outcomes.1
Surveying this thirty-year period, it is evident that individual instances or even regional clusters of democratization cannot be fully understood if studied in isolation from the broader international context and intellectual climate. For example, the tentative nature and uncertain prospects of the early democratizations of the 1970s partly reflected an anxious and indeed somewhat pessimistic outlook for the Western democracies. This was a time of bipolar tension, or international economic difficulties, and of radicalized youth movements. By contrast, the later 1980s were characterized by growing optimism about the prospects of Western victory in the Cold War, together with a more positive economic climate for the corporate sector, and the decline or even eclipse of many radical movements. Whereas democratization was viewed with anxiety in the 1970s (given the fear that it might lurch out of control, or could unleash counter-hegemonic instability, as in Portugal), by the late 1980s the re-democratization of, say, Chile was viewed as a safe way to lock in “pro-market” reformism and to bury disagreeable memories of ideological polarization. Then, during the 1990s, the international climate was one of still further optimism about the prospects for the old Western democracies. There was no longer any Soviet alternative, either military or ideological. Market liberalization could be extended, linked to the promotion of democracy, and lubricated by the “peace dividend” arising from the resolution of world conflicts. In this climate it became possible to regard the extension and indeed universalization of liberal democracy as an almost “natural” state of affairs. Diverse individual processes of transition were all too easily treated as further confirmations of a single ineluctable logic. This led to progressively more ambitious interpretations, as everywhere from Albania to Zimbabwe was assigned a position on a presumably unilinear continuum destined to converge on a pre-determined “end of history.” The implausibility and over-reach of this zeitgeist had become apparent to many well before the end of the 1990s, but in any case the reversal following September 11, 2001 was brutal and has been extended. Over a cycle of two political generations the international context for individual national experiments with democratization has clearly undergone huge swings, and these background conditions have powerfully affected the course of development of different processes of democratization.
The early regime changes (such as the Greek and Portuguese) were rare, and seen as precarious. But as the “third wave” gathered momentum in the 1980s, the perception grew that democratization had become easy and perhaps even unstoppable. This optimism crested with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc after 1989. During the 1990s impediments and uncertainties become more evident, as the most recent claimants for inclusion in the list of new democracies tended to lack many of what earlier theorists had regarded as the basic “prerequisites” for democratic stability (a minimum level of per capita income, literacy, urbanization, and a middle class, among others). From Albania to Zambia, the later “democratizers” presented a range of adverse characteristics that may help to explain why, as the “wave” has spread, the spectrum of processes has broadened and outcomes diverged. What initially appeared as a relatively small and coherent cluster of cases suitable for tight comparative analysis (Portugal, Spain, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and others) has become a sprawling, and perhaps unmanageable, crowd. Certainly the attempt to apply established categories and models to such recent instances of “regime change” as Afghanistan and Iraq involves extrapolation on a heroic scale.
Nevertheless, the comparative study of democratization processes has developed into one of the most flourishing growth industries in comparative politics, and on some important topics this has generated substantial advances in methods and understanding. One area of methodological advance is of particular interest and relevance to the theme of this chapter—comparative historical analysis.2 This macro, and potentially holistic, perspective helps us to view each democratization process as a long-term, multidimensional, and partially open-ended and perhaps even potentially reversible historical reality. It also facilitates theoretically informed comparison of analogous processes, undertaken with the principal aim of enhancing the understanding of each specific instance. From this perspective, the test of a good comparison might not be whether it uncovered a “law-like” regularity applying to a multitude of cases, still less to “predict” outcomes, or to prescribe “best practices.” Rather, it would be to identify themes and hypotheses that merit further inspection when “telling the story” of each particular democratization. Ideally, in addition, these themes might (if supported by detailed historical corroboration) generate tentative “middle range” generalizations applicable to suitably defined clusters of cases.
This is the approach guiding the rest of this chapter. The universe of democratizations subject to reassessment in what follows is all the attempted or achieved regime changes that began after April 1974 and before April 2003. Out of this large universe, the focus will be on a limited number of “telling” examples, cases where a historically grounded reconsideration uncovers hitherto underestimated indications of the importance of international variables and dimensions. This volume contains several such studies. In particular, the Portuguese regime change was reinterpreted as an episode of European decolonization, and the reorientation of mainland Portugal away from its maritime empire (seen as a counterweight to Spain’s dominance of the Iberian hinterland) and towards full integration in a democratic European Union (EU). Likewise, the democratization of Spain following the death of Franco was also reinterpreted, uncovering historical evidence to demonstrate that this supposedly archetypal instance of a domestically driven “pacted” transition was also strongly conditioned by hitherto neglected international components. Thus, subsequent democratizations in, say, Argentina, Poland, Taiwan or East Timor can no longer be classified as mere “exceptions” to the general rule that international dimensions of regime change are typically of no more than secondary significance, since this new research demonstrates their centrality in even the classic initial cases. Moreover, Washington’s recent ambition to bring democracy to the large world region it has recently constructed (the “Greater Middle East,” which extends from Pakistan to Morocco) underscores the continuing policy significance of comparative work on the international politics of democratization.
This overview chapter highlights three comparative and theoretical issues that have, in my opinion, so far received inadequate attention from the democrat-ization studies community. With the benefit of thirty years of hindsight, it would be illuminating to reassess prevailing interpretations of many key democratic transitions from an international politics perspective. More specifically, the chapter suggests the following three axes of comparative historical analysis: first, the increasing emphasis on the links between democracy and security, in contrast to an earlier perception of democratization as liberation; second, the associated possibility of a declining “counter-hegemonic potential” of democratization during the 1990s period of unipolarity and ascendant liberal internationalism although since September 11, 2001, the counter-hegemonic potential of free elections has reappeared with particularly destabilizing implications for some new democracies in the Middle East; third, the narrower issue of whether democratization alters a state’s foreign policy (and, if so, what parts of it, and how). The following three sections of this chapter outline an exploratory research agenda on these inter-related topics. It does not aspire to resolve the questions it raises (that requires more detailed historical analysis of key cases, as exemplified in other chapters of this volume), but only to stimulate further work. The final section of the chapter sketches some provisional suggestions and conclusions.

Democracy as security, or as liberation

Every democratization process involves a change of political regime. Every regime change presupposes the demise of a prior regime. But, of course, an undemocratic regime can come to an end without being replaced by any equally coherent successor regime; and a change from an authoritarian regime may not result in democracy. Therefore every transition generates uncertainty, and raises the spectre of potential insecurity (both domestic and in relation to neighbours and allies of authoritarian incumbents). Every regime change also raises fears of betrayal, reversal or collapse. So those who struggle for democratic regime change are aiming to introduce a new political order in which old authoritarian practices are permanently ended, not just temporarily interrupted. In this sense they aim for “liberation” of their society from its repressive traditions and heritage. This dialogue between hope and fear, between liberation and security, is inherent in all democratizations.
Even when a regime change does culminate in the establishment of a durable democracy, it must nevertheless obey the logic of order that applies to the implantation of every effective political regime. Even democracy is a form of “domination,” in the sense that only certain patterns of political conduct can be tolerated. Others lie outside the range of what can be permitted by even the most liberal of constitutional orders. All beliefs and forms of peaceful expression may be allowed, but even then some more aggressive forms of behaviour will have to be prescribed, and even in the last analysis repressed. Those political actors who remain wedded to the promotion of outlawed behaviour will ultimately have to be sanctioned (always within the law, and subject to constitutional guarantees and due process, if the new regime is indeed to qualify as a fully fledged constitutional democracy). For example, those engaged in attempts to restore the previous authoritarian system in violation of the new rules will have to be restrained or ultimately punished. Similarly, those who welcome the breakdown of the old regime but refuse to accept constraints legitimately put in place to defend the new order will also have to be disciplined. 3
So the dialogue between freedom and security in democracy always requires the striking of a balance. Within a democratic framework, liberation cannot be confused with anarchy. But at the same time any incoming democratic regime will want to offer its newly enfranchised demos a menu of political and civic freedoms that were not previously available. This is the inherent “liberation” component of a democratic transition. Admittedly this terminology carries a baggage unacceptable to many contemporary liberals, who prefer to speak in terms of “building the rule of law” or “promoting the rights of citizenship.” But there is a cost to this substitute terminology. Correctly understood, “liberation” is an objective that people struggle for, rather than a target that is merely set for them from above.
Now let us put these theoretical reflections into some comparative historical perspective. Twenty years ago democratic transitions were infrequent, and their outcomes were uncertain. In a bipolar world the two dominant blocs generally promoted loyal protégés, and discouraged the security risks associated with democratic experimentation. Political democratization also raised anxieties about the stability of economic arrangements—as voters oscillated between left and right parties this might produce shifts between socialist and capitalist economic orientations. So democratization was plausibly viewed as an uncertain undertaking, one that would have to be internally driven, one that was potentially counter-hegemonic, and therefore a project most likely to succeed when domestic strategic interactions favoured agreement, and when external destabilizing pressures could be minimized. The relevant unit of analysis was therefore the individual state (or national political regime), and attention was focused on those states that possessed sufficient internal autonomy to screen out international intrusions.
This panorama has now been transformed. Whereas in Cold War conditions the struggle for democracy often prioritized national liberation and downplayed the issue of security, in the post-Cold War world the balance of emphasis has swung in the other direction. There is currently one main source of political orientation (Washington) instead of two rival centres. During the 1990s, under Washington’s influence, democratization was more commonly viewed as the norm, rather than the exception (outside the Islamic world). Unsatisfactory outcomes are most often presented as temporary setbacks to a predetermined course. There has been an explosion of international political and economic incentives for states to qualify as “democracies,” and these external reinforcements are widely expected to “lock in” democratization processes in most or all properly administered states. Where such expectations are clearly being frustrated, the leaders of international opinion reach for such labels as “rogue states,” or “collapsed” or “failed” states, thereby paving the way for encroach-ments on state sovereignty. There has been a proliferation of so-called “humanitarian interventions” that are supposed to end when transitional administrations construct new democratic regimes. This radical shift in the outlook of international actors reflects the end of the bipolar conflict and the discredit of socialist economic models. More recently, it has been reinforced by a perception that Western-led security interests are best served by managing the risks of controlled democratization.
In the 1990s an academic consensus argued that democracies do not go to war with one another, and therefore that democratization is a means to abolish war. This justified democracy promotion as a policy that was both virtuous and cost-effective (on the “all good things go together” principle). But with the passage of time this automatic linking of democracy with security has been seen to be simple-minded. The emphasis has therefore shifted to more intrusive forms of Western intervention that may promote security in troubled regions without necessarily cherishing democratic values, although official discourse still assumes the promotion of pro-Western security through controlled withdrawal, supposedly leaving new democratic regimes in place after the intervention ends. Although this is mainly a Western (above all US-led) approach to democratization it has been taken up by the United Nations, and so has acquired the status of a new international orthodoxy.
This was not the way democratization was viewed in the early, Cold War, stage of the “third wave.” At that time, given its confrontation with the Soviet Union, the West embraced quite a few clearly undemocratic regimes, and disavowed many of their typically democratic opponents as either willing or naive agents of Soviet imperialism. In response, emerging democratic coalitions in Southern Europe and Latin America tended to view authoritarian rule and the violation of human rights as a tolerated expression of Western security interests. In consequence, when opposition forces argued for democratization and the return of the military to barracks, they tended to associate regime change with a certain degree of “liberation” from the straitjacket of repressive anti-communism. More concretely, democracy might require the legalization of an outlawed Communist Party, and a return of exiles, and even a reassessment of the role of military bases and external security alliances (which could only be renewed subject to popular democratic endorsement). In the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe, the association of democratization with “liberation” was even more direct and indeed stark. Since a transition from communist rule would mean escaping Soviet control, it almost inherently involved “national liberation.”
Since the end of the Cold War this logic has faded. Now that the richest, most powerful and most secure nations of the world are so predominantly rated as democracies, it has become possible to forge agreements between leading states in the international system, extending “democratic conditionality” to a widening range of regional and functional arenas. The intention was to press the remaining (mostly poor, weak, and insecure) nations to conform to standards set by these leading nations (not themselves necessarily subject to much external scrutiny). So during the 1990s, the idea that international organizations should attach a higher priority to democracy promotion than in the past became increasingly fashionable, at least in the West. This probably also reflected the increased proportion of member states in most such organizations that are now, at least formally, classified as “democracies,” and that gain international prestige and even benefits from such a status. It also reflects the fact that some international organizations include commitments to democracy (or, failing that, at least to some basic universal values concerning human rights and respect for international law) among their goals. Increasingly, they even make democracy a requirement for membership. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, if not before, Western liberal thinkers have tended to downgrade the claims of “national sovereignty” and “non-intervention,” and to extend the scope attributed to shared international norms as arbitrators of the conduct of nations.
For a mixture of these reasons the international community has over the past decade or so become increasingly committed to democracy promotion, and these practices are becoming more institutionalized and perhaps more effective. Even before the end of the Cold War, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) had begun coming round to a more positive view of the possibilities for promoting both political reform and regional conflict resolution through the UN system (the 1988 Namibia Agreement provided an early indication of this new trend).
Since the end of the Cold War the UNSC has been much freer to authorize “humanitarian interventions,” which start with the determination (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) that there is a threat to international security justifying the temporary suspension of state sovereignty until the fault has been corrected. International interventionism is therefore conceived as no more than an interlude to be accompanied by a variety of measures, including the convocation of a competitive election, prior to the withdrawal of UN or other internationally mandated forces. The key point to note here is that democracy promotio...

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