The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership
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The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership

Hiski Haukkala

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The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership

Hiski Haukkala

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About This Book

Why have the European Union and the Russian Federation encountered severe difficulties in developing their relationship? Why haven't the parties lived up to the initial promise and enthusiasm of the early 1990s?

Beginning with the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this book provides a practical answer to these questions whilst linking the issues to International Relations theorizing. Taking into account both the role of ideas and power, the book links the topic with three variants of mainstream theorizing: the English School, (neoliberal) institutionalism and constructivism. In the process a multi-causal framework that looks for points of convergence between different paradigms in the study of IR is developed.

Providing an overview, history and explanation of the problems of institutionalization in EU-Russia relations during the post-Cold War era, this book is vital reading for students and scholars of the EU and Russia, European studies, European security and Russian foreign policy. It will also be of major interest to scholars of International Relations theory.

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Publisher
Routledge
Year
2010
ISBN
9781135150129

1
Introduction

This is a study concerning the profound interrelationship between ideas, power and institutions in the field of international relations. 1 Their interaction is examined in three different fora: in the study of International Relations (IR), in the constitution of international society and in the actual institutionalized practices between the European Union and Russia. To be more specific, the book studies the problems of institutionalization in EU-Russia relations during the post-Cold War period, and how these processes have been affected by the differences in underlying worldviews and power that the actors bring to bear in their interaction.
Even a cursory glance at contemporary commentary concerning the relationship reveals that problems have indeed been rife (perhaps the most detailed account of the problems and tensions is Prozorov 2006:5–7; but see also Averre 2005a; Barysch 2005; Emerson 2006; Fischer 2007; Gutnik 2007; Medvedev 2006; and Zagorski 2007). The political dialogue is being conducted in an increasingly acrimonious manner. The parties also seem to be having serious problems agreeing on a concrete joint agenda that would move the relationship forward, as exemplified by the difficulties the two faced in even beginning the negotiations for a new agreement, a successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), in 2006–08. 2 Recently the focal point of conflicts has been the so-called common neighbourhood that lies between the partners, as exemplified by the Russo-Georgian conflict in August 2008 and the RussoUkrainian gas crisis at the beginning of 2009, which both resulted in major crises in EU-Russia relations as well. As early as 2001 a Russian scholar characterized the relationship as being in a ‘vicious circle’ (Leshukov 2001). More recently a western European analyst has gone so far as to condemn the partnership and its main institutional embodiment, the PCA, as failing in its main goal, namely the promotion of greater political freedom in Russia (Vahl 2006:62).
The increase in the number and severity of problems seems somewhat perplexing, however. This is especially so when one compares the current state of affairs with the enthusiastic and optimistic mood of the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when the EU and Russia were forging the present structures and institutions of cooperation. What has changed since June 1994, when the parties were able to agree on a PCA that spelled out a fairly ambitious agenda of cooperation and convergence? What accounts for the recurring and escalating problems in the EU-Russia relationship?
The problems of cooperation and institutionalization, and the conflicts that often precede or follow them, are central to the study of IR in both its empirical and its theoretical aspects. The usual point of departure in extant mainstream IR theorizing is that cooperation is always difficult and fragile, especially at the level of the anarchic international system (Stein 1990). This gives rise to the interesting question of why the EU and Russia seem to perceive the problems and the hard bargaining that relates to cooperation as being particularly problematic and not a natural part of arriving at mutually beneficial equilibria between the parties.
The question becomes even more curious when one considers the answers that the extant literature usually gives concerning the current state of affairs. Instead of pointing to clashing interests in line with the discussion above, it is often the essential incompatibility of wider value systems that is seen as residing behind the problems (this is the case as far as scholars and commentators both in the EU and in Russia are concerned: see Averre 2005a; Barysch 2005; Emerson et al. 2006; Kaveshnikov 2007; Lukyanov 2008; Lynch 2004; Medvedev 2006; Prozorov 2006; Romanova and Zaslavskaya 2004; Schuette 2004; and Spetschinsky 2007). The existence of such differences can be problematic, as the EU-Russia relationship is built on the assumption of an existing foundation of similar values and goals between the parties and on the expectation of the compatibility of their future endeavours in Europe. Moreover, and as will be discussed in these pages, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement implicitly reveals an understanding of the relationship as a process resulting in growing similarity between the parties. To be precise, the aim is not a gradual and mutual rapprochement between the EU and Russia, but a process whereby Russia is envisaged as the party that has to do all the adjusting and converging as the cooperation aims at facilitating the transition of Russia towards ‘European’ models of society and economy. In addition, and despite the fact that the PCA does not include the perspective of eventual EU membership for Russia, the actual means and, to a certain extent, also the ends of cooperation are very similar to that of the accession process: the EU is seeking to exercise political conditionality in order to ensure Russia’s increasing harmonization with its values, norms and standards (see Vahl 2001; Morozov 2008). As will be argued in what follows, the asymmetric nature of the relationship, together with unidirectional expectations concerning normative convergence, warrant our speaking about a post-sovereign international institution that is based on the Union’s explicit attempt at regional normative hegemony in Europe.
Despite the near-consensus in the extant commentary, it is important to point out that this contention has, in fact, hardly ever been subjected to serious theoretical or empirical scrutiny. 3 This is a shortcoming that the present study seeks to rectify. Instead of taking the value differences at face value, the proposition is turned into a hypothesis that will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. In essence, the work at hand seeks to develop a conceptual framework and its empirical application through which the hypothesis of divergent worldviews can be put to the test, and to see whether the question—Why, despite the initial promise and enthusiasm, has the actual process of EU-Russia interaction proved to be so problematic and failed to meet the parties’ expectations?—can be answered. This is done by linking the issue with previous debates concerning international institutionalization, especially within the (neoliberal) institutionalist research programme. 4 In this respect, it is the nature of interaction between the EU and Russia within a certain institutionalized context that is of primary interest here.
The hypothesis merits studying for three reasons. First, it is of theoretical relevance, as it reveals an important facet concerning international institutionalization that has thus far been under-theorized (see what follows for more on this). Second, and equally importantly, it serves a practical purpose by shedding light on an important policy question that seems to be equally perplexing and frustrating for both the EU and Russia. Finally, the work also has a future-oriented face to it, as it is assumed that the nature of understandings concerning the issues at stake shapes and limits the extent to which the parties can engage in deeper cooperation in the future. Therefore, the results can be used in understanding what the chances of a continued rapprochement between the EU and Russia are and where its eventual limits lie: is it mere cooperation or does it have the potential to evolve into gradual integration as well?
In this work the question of potentially divergent value systems between the EU and Russia is framed in terms of the indigenous worldviews that the two possess. Following Goldstein and Keohane (1993b: 8), by worldviews I mean collective conceptions of possibility that are embedded in the symbolism of culture and deeply affect modes of particular thought and discourse. It is well known also in IR theory that different worldviews in effect lead people to perceive the world and the issues at stake differently (Jervis 1976; Little 1988:39). If the problems in EU-Russia relations do indeed spring from those differences, then it prompts one to ask whether the parties perceive the normative foundation of the EU-Russia institution differently. By normative foundation I mean a set of understandings concerning norms and rules that pertain to the scope, the nature of objects of contention, the relationship with sovereignty, and the logic of interaction in a given international institution. In short, I am interested in studying to what extent the EU and Russia have departed from and been able to develop common understandings concerning the nature of their institutionalized interaction. Therefore, the main research question of the work can be reformulated using institutionalist vocabulary as follows: can the differences in the degree of commonality concerning the normative foundation of the EU-Russia institution be used in explaining the recurring difficulties in the EU-Russia relationship?
But in order to probe the question in a useful way, a substantial amount of theoretical work is required. In the following, Robert O.Keohane’s (1989) notion of commonality is taken as the theoretical starting point. The task is not entirely straightforward and it will entail grappling with the key concepts that the institutionalist research programme, especially in its mainstream American variant, has put forward. One may ask, why link the question of EU-Russia interaction with institutionalism, which may be construed as being past its prime to a certain extent? One should, however, note that in IR there is something cyclical in theoretical debates, where ‘theories keep re-appearing and debate between them is continuous’ (Church 1996:9, quoted in Chryssochoou 2001: 10.) Accordingly, the work at hand seeks to reinvigorate some of the issues and debates by bringing them into a new and previously unexplored context in the belief that some aspects of institutionalism still have untapped theoretical potential; there is still some mileage left in the endeavour.
This is especially the case when it comes to the role of commonality in explaining problems of international institutionalization. Interestingly, Keohane has not pursued the issue any further (and nor has any other institutionalist, for that matter). As will be argued in Chapter 3, this has been largely due to the strict rationality assumptions of institutionalism that have made the commonality variable largely empty and uninteresting. This is so because although institutionalists were themselves among the first to acknowledge the power of ideas in international cooperation, they have approached the concept in a somewhat problematic manner (one of the earliest accounts of the role of ideas in international institutionalization is Goldstein and Keohane 1993a). As Carlsnaes (2002: 344) has commented, institutionalists treat ideas in a rather oxymoronic way, denying the constitutive nature of ideas and treating them instead as mere ‘ideational variables’ that have a certain (minimal) role in the rational calculus of utility-maximizing actors. This work, however, challenges the strictly rationalistic accounts of actors and the role of ideas and treats the role of values and norms, in shorthand ideas, in the EU-Russia relationship in a way that is, in certain respects, closer to the one put forward by constructivists. 5 However, it is important to note that the relationship between institutionalism and constructivism does not have to be seen in entirely antagonistic terms. Accepting certain constructivist insights does not necessarily have to entail a drastic break with the premises of institutionalism, as the study of institutions itself can be seen as having two facets, ‘rationalistic’ and ‘reflective’, which both have their own merits (Keohane 1989:161). Therefore, in order to probe commonality in a meaningful way we must discuss, and relax, institutionalism’s strict rationality assumptions by embracing the notion of contextual rationality, which allows us to take into account the subjective elements in preference formation. With this move, we have the manoeuvrability to raise the question of possible diverging worldviews and to bring the role of commonality to the fore.
But studying differences in thinking between the EU and Russia in a static manner will not suffice. It is important to approach the subject as a process with a dynamism of its own. The task in hand is therefore twofold. First, we must develop a way to assess the salience of possible differences in the underlying worldviews. In order to be able to do that, we must turn our attention to actual institutionalized practices between the European Union and Russia. This calls for multi-causal modelling based on retroductive reasoning. In addition to ideas, we must also take into account the role of power and the wider constitution of international society in framing the EU-Russia relationship. Here we run into the second main theoretical aim of the present study: pondering the possibilities and limits of theoretical bridge-building between rationalist and constructivist strands of theorizing in the study of IR.
The work emerges from a sort of theoretical middle ground between structuralism and methodological individualism, rationalism and constructivism. In order to facilitate this task, the theoretical framework that will be developed in Chapters 2 and 3 draws largely on different strands of mainstream IR theory: the English School, and institutionalism with a pinch of social constructivism, especially in the forms of thin constructivism and the so-called new institutionalism (for useful overviews of the key tenets of new institutionalism, see Immergut 1998 and Peters 2005). The main interlocutors in the chapters that follow are Hedley Bull (the English School), Robert O.Keohane (institutionalism) and Alexander Wendt (thin constructivism) (the main works in this respect have been Bull 1977/1995, Keohane 1989 and Wendt 1999).
Admittedly, this is an eclectic approach to conceptualization. It is, however, in line with earlier works on international regimes that have rested ‘on a rejection of grand theory in favour of a pragmatic, issue-specific theoretical eclecticism’ (Donnelly 1986:641). That said, one must also acknowledge that such eclecticism is not without its dangers, the biggest of which is the possibility of unconsciously combining theories with contradictory ontologies, epistemologies and explanatory assumptions (Arts 2000:535). This need not, however, be an insurmountable problem. As will be argued in Chapter 2, by consciously respecting the idea of conceptual path dependence, the limits of individual theories can be transcended and theoretical pluralism can be safely embraced (see also Legro 2005).
Second, and based on the first step of establishing the possible existence and actual salience of value differences, we have to try to find out whether there has been a change concerning the central elements of the normative basis of the EU-Russia relationship: is the Russian worldview converging towards the EU ideas and worldview, as the PCA would lead us to expect, or could the opposite be taking place? Indeed, some scholars have argued that in the realm of security policy there has already been a substantive change in Russian ‘strategic culture’ when compared to the Soviet times. During the 1990s the Frunzean ‘cult of the offensive’ was replaced with a paradigm of defensive realism—one that is more compatible with western traits of thinking (Heikka 2000). The aim of this book is to find out whether there has been a commensurate change in Russian stances on the wider normative basis of the EU-Russia relationship, but also vice versa, as in order to get a complete picture of the problematic it is equally important to discern how the EU’s readings have evolved over time.

Existing works on the topic

Serious works both on the EU’s Russia policy and on Russia’s EU policy have been relatively few and far between. The lack of extensive monographs dedicated to the topic(s) is evident. 6 The lack of theoretically inclined accounts is also notable. Almost the sole exception in this respect is the work of Prozorov (2006). 7 Despite sharing a similar focus—trying to explain the recurring problems between the parties—the present work takes issue with certain key theoretical choices in Prozorov’s approach (for a more detailed discussion of Prozorov’s work, see Haukkala 2008a). Perhaps the most problematic element in Prozorov’s work lies in his exclusive use of mono-causal discourses to explain problems between the EU and Russia, a move that is clearly inadequate in enabling us to grasp the multifaceted nature of the problems. 8 This is true in two respects in particular. First, by concentrating on static discourses, Prozorov risks overlooking the possible ongoing changes in the actual institutionalized practices between the parties. He also sidelines other, largely material, structures of the world that might have a strong bearing on the issues at stake. In this study an alternative and more multi-causal framework is proposed.
The works that have been in good supply have mainly been descriptive and have concentrated on individual policy areas, such as the PCA (Hillion 1998; Timmermann 1996), the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (Haukkala and Medvedev 2001; Maresceau 2004; Moshes 2003), the Northern Dimension policy (Aalto et al. 2008; Ojanen 2001; Vahl 2001), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Forsberg 2004; Marsh 2008; Webber 2001) or the Four Common Spaces (Barysch 2006; Emerson et al. 2005; Van Elsuwege 2008). The works that have sought a broader perspective have, however, usually been short pamphlets aimed at providing decision-makers with certain policy recommendations (Barysch 2004; Braithwaite 2000; Emerson 2001; Gowan 2000; Leonard and Popescu 2007). The exception is Lynch’s Russia Faces Europe (2003), which, although otherwise being a sound scholarly work, omits a theoretical treatment of the issue. Therefore, there is a clear need for a theoretically driven work that would elaborate a framework suitable for the examination of the EU-Russia relationship.
By contrast, during the 1990s both the ‘European’ and Russian foreign policies individually generated major scholarly interest. This has been visible in a vast, ...

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