Nuclear Terrorism

Brecht Volders, Tom Sauer, Brecht Volders, Tom Sauer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317395188
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Arms Control
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume aims to improve understanding of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear terrorism is perceived as one of the most immediate and extreme threats to global security today. While the international community has made important progress in securing fissile material, there are still important steps to be made with nearly 2, 000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material spread around the globe. The volume addresses this complex phenomenon through an interdisciplinary approach: legal, criminal, technical, diplomatic, cultural, economic, and political. Despite this cross-disciplinary approach, however, the chapters are all linked by the overarching aim of enhancing knowledge of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The volume aims to do this by investigating the different types of nuclear terrorism, and subsequently discussing the potential means to prevent these malicious acts. In addition, there is a discussion of the nuclear security regime, in general, and an important examination of both its strengths and weaknesses. In summary, the book aims to extend the societal and political debate about the threat of nuclear terrorism.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, nuclear governance, terrorism studies, international organizations, and security studies in general.

Part I Nuclear terrorism

Countering the threat

1 Introduction

Brecht Volders & Tom Sauer

DOI: 10.4324/9781315679778-1

Introduction

On December 11, 2014, Interpol reported on the arrest of seven suspected uranium smugglers by the Moldova police. Carrying out searches in the capital Chisinau and two other towns, the police and the General Prosecutor’s office seized 200 grams of uranium-238, 1 kg of mercury, and 1 kg of unidentified radioactive material. The estimated value of the matter is €1.6 million. The suspects are members of an organized criminal network with specialized knowledge of radioactive substances – believed to be pursuing to sell this material in Europe. It may potentially be used in the production of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) – “a conventional explosive with radioactive material” – and could cause massive disruption when obtained by terrorist organizations (Ferguson and Potter, 2005, p. 3; Interpol, 2014; CNS, 2015a). The 2014 CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database identified 325 such publicly reported incidents across 38 different countries in which nuclear or other radioactive material was lost, stolen, or otherwise outside of regulatory control in that year (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014, p. 3). Likewise, the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database contains a total of 2,477 confirmed incidents reported by participating states between 1993 and 2013 (IAEA fact sheet, 2014).

While no major act of nuclear terrorism actually took place, these regularly occurring events remind us about the nuclear terrorism threat to international security. Although the nexus between illicit trafficking and terrorism remains obscure, these events demonstrate that an organized and determined terrorist group could exploit weak security controls or careless human behavior (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014, p. 3). Terrorist organizations breaking the nuclear threshold could lead to unseen socio-economic, material, and psychological destruction and disruption. The public support for social and political institutions could erode. Alex Wellerstein – specialized in the history of nuclear weapons and secrecy – demonstrates this situation by enabling the simulation of a 10 Kt Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). The surface burst of such a high-end nuclear device in, for example, Brussels would directly cause over 34,000 fatalities and 84,000 injuries (Wellerstein, 2015).¹ In addition, Bunn et al. (2011) refer to the inadequate measures to protect civilians effectively and respond efficiently to the impact of nuclear terrorism. The impact of nuclear terrorism increases through ineffective consequence management. People will live in fear following a nuclear incident. Public support for social and political institutions will erode.

Such grave concerns undoubtedly justify the focus by experts, policy-makers and the wider public on the nuclear threat and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Yet, the exact scope and nature of the threat is inherently complex, thereby complicating any preventive efforts: nuclear terrorism can manifest itself in various ways, and may be achieved through multiple pathways. The required capabilities and conditions depend on the selected pathway. Moreover, the decision process to acquire any nuclear capability goes beyond the mere absolute value of nuclear attacks. Opportunity and willingness to go nuclear are related in a complex, subjective manner. These threat intricacies give rise to competing perspectives, threat assessments and corresponding counterterrorism policies. Yet, methodological problems exacerbate these appraisals even more. Terrorist organizations – especially when involved in a nuclear endeavor – are clandestine organizations. Stealth and secrecy complicate valid threat assessments.

The complex nuclear threat

Nuclear terrorism experts agree on three main types of nuclear terrorism. Yet, each type of threat can be achieved in various ways, and requires differing capabilities.² First, terrorist organizations could employ a RDD or Radiation Emission Device (RED) – a fixed radiological source that exposes potential victims to radiation (Ferguson and Potter, 2005, p. 259). These types of nuclear terrorism would likely cause the lowest scale of destruction. Yet, contamination of an area could lead to substantial economic damage, and the strong negative association with radiological substances could lead to widespread socio-economic and psychological disruption. Availability of radiological material – think about radiological sources at hospitals, nuclear facilities, and universities – and the less complex technical demands mean that this type of nuclear threat is the most likely option. Radiological material may be acquired by means of deliberate transfers, theft, insider assistance, and licensing fraud (Ferguson and Potter, 2005). In order to weaponize these radiological sources, however, terrorist organizations have to take into account the exact type and nature of the material. The nature of radiation and its half-life period define its impact and effectiveness (Medalia, 2011). Different financial, technical, physical, and organizational capabilities are required for each method of procurement.

Second, an attack and/or sabotage of any type of nuclear facility. Large amounts of radiation can be released by means of attacking operating nuclear power reactors, spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, or other nuclear facilities. Although not comparable to the impact of the detonation of a (crude) nuclear device, this could lead to enormous economic costs and grave social disruption. Various modes of attack are possible. Ferguson and Potter (2005) refer to airplane crashes, commando raids by land, air, or water, and cyber-terrorism. It is likely that terrorist organizations would try to obtain the help of an insider to set up the attack scheme. Technical skills are necessary to identify and select the relevant buildings and equipment. Substantial organizational skills are required to prepare, coordinate, and execute any of the modes of attack. For instance, if a terrorist group would be able to gain control over an aircraft, they would also need to be capable to identify the vital plant safety systems in order to target them.

Finally, the detonation of a nuclear device – either an intact nuclear device or a crude improvised nuclear device (IND). Although this is the most devastating type of nuclear terrorism, this option is the least likely to occur. An intact nuclear weapon may be acquired by gift, purchase, theft, or diversion. Terrorist organizations would need to defeat safeguards against unauthorized use, and take the nuclear device to its intended target.³ Depending on the external and insider support terrorist organizations receive, and the physical and technical protection of the weapons, terrorist organizations will require varying levels of financial resources, technical competence, material power, and organizational skills. For instance, seizure of a nuclear weapon without insider help requires more investment in training and arming a force that can defeat security measures. Insider help, on the other hand, would require considerable effort in identifying the relevant employees and achieving their cooperation/exploitation. If deterred by the scenario to detonate an intact nuclear device, terrorist organizations could instead strive for the construction of a crude IND. After acquiring sufficient fissile material – which parallels the ways to acquire an intact nuclear weapon – a terrorist organization would need to fabricate the nuclear device, and transport it to its intended target. The attainment of fissile material is considered to be less challenging than the attainment of an intact nuclear weapon due to the abundant amount of fissile material, and the inherent problems with track-keeping of fissile material. Yet, similar contingent conditions as with the obtainment of intact nuclear weapons are at play: varying levels of technical, financial, and organizational competences are needed to successfully complete such a project. For instance, depending on which type of material they can acquire, terrorist organizations would need to process it in a form that is usable in a nuclear device – thereby putting varying demands to the exact technical design of the weapon (Ferguson and Potter, 2005).

Besides the fact that there is no singular nuclear threat, there is no straightforward decision process for terrorist organizations contemplating one of these nuclear options. Ackerman (2006, p. 1) notices that: “One all too often comes across the unquestioned assumption that any terrorist capable of employing a nuclear weapon would automatically want to do so.” Destruction, economic damage, psychological impact, and prestige are often correctly cited as direct possible wins for terrorist organizations. Yet, terrorist organizations will consider other factors besides these direct wins as well. Their decision with respect to nuclear terrorism should be framed in an opportunity versus willingness framework. This subjective framework further complicates the exact scope and nature of the nuclear threat (see Chapter 2 by Volders).

An essential step in any nuclear project would be the terrorist organization’s decision to pursue a nuclear attack. On the one hand, this decision is based on the willingness and eagerness of the terrorist organization to carry out this type of assault. Going beyond direct wins and simple motivations, it is necessary to take into account a terrorist organization’s deliberate strategy to advance its end: how well does nuclear terrorism fit with the organization’s ideology, goals, and corresponding strategic and organizational objectives? Separatist terrorist organizations, for instance, are generally perceived to be less inclined to detonate a crude nuclear device. The latter would entail negative consequences to their constituency support while damaging the contested territory. On the other hand, terrorist organizations must also decide on how they allocate their time and resources to achieve these strategic and organizational objectives. Which opportunities are available to terrorist organizations to acquire a nuclear capacity? How much resources should they invest in order to achieve their goal? This refers to the broad environment in which terrorist organizations operate, and the financial, technical, material, and organizational resources at their availability.

The opportunity and willingness dimensions are closely related and have clear ramifications for each other. Building on criminological insights, such as the routine activity theory, the rational choice perspective and the crime pattern theory,⁴ criminal behavior is to a large extent dependent on “the circumstances surrounding the convergence in time and place of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable defenders” (Wilcox et al., 2003, p. 2). Terrorist organizations will also act upon the available opportunities in their environment (Eleftheriadoua, 2014, p. 411; Crenshaw, 1987). The terrorist organization calculates the costs and benefits of specific acts of terrorism based on both the given opportunity (and corresponding costs), and the eagerness to carry out that specific act. Both dimensions should be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of terrorist organizations going nuclear. Three questions are essential: What is the benefit or value to be gained? What are the costs of an attempt and/or its failure? And what are the consequences of inaction, and the probability of success (Crenshaw, 1987, p. 14)?

The variety of nuclear terrorism’s scenarios – with the associated contingent requirements – and the subjective decision process to opt for one of these scenarios enormously complicates the scope and nature of the nuclear threat.

The complex nuclear threat assessment

A complex nuclear threat naturally leads to challenging nuclear threat assessments. Yet, the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations – and their potential nuclear projects – further amplifies the intricacy of these threat assessments. As Malik (1999, p. 115) argued: “a fundamental difficulty which faces those who make threat assessments is that the past is the basis for their prediction in the future. The less their assessment is founded upon past experience or upon reliable information, the less conviction is it likely to carry.” Empirical evidence of nuclear terrorism is often limited to proxy evidence and/or analyses of Aum Shinrikyo’s and Al Qaeda’s nuclear program or the Chechen rebels. These methodological problems complicate valid threat assessments.

Terrorist organizations rely on stealth and secrecy to cope with governmental counterterrorism efforts (Shapiro, 2013). This is of particular importance to any type of nuclear project. The gravity of this endeavor will urge the terrorist organization to pay additional attention to its hidden character. The details of many incidents and cases are often sketchy and ambiguous (Parachini, 2003). This complicates the valid assessment of terrorist organizations’ nuclear capabilities and intentions. Moreover, the academic world needs to cope with even more barriers when discussing this phenomenon: Zenko (2006, p. 187) correctly acknowledges the fact that “nuclear terrorism lies at the nexus of three arenas that the U.S. government treats with supreme secrecy – intelligence, nuclear weapons, and terrorism.” Governmental assessments and rhetoric might be consciously framed in order to benefit underlying political motives. Their messages serve varying functions and may be directed toward different audiences. Besides the obvious implications to the malleable public opinion on nuclear terrorism, this level of secrecy further complicates academic efforts with respect to nuclear terrorism.

The inherent complex nuclear threat, and methodological problems in assessing the scope and nature of the threat, lead to enormous complexity and uncertainty in current public, academic, and professional debates about nuclear terrorism.

Conflicting intuitions

Considering the complexity of nuclear terrorism, we fundamentally have to deal with what Bernard Brodie would call “conflicting intuitions.” As he has argued in relation to state nuclear strategy and deterrence, “there is no doubt that some people’s intuitions are better than others, but the superiority of the former, though sometimes definable and explicable, may be difficult to prove” (Brodie, 1978, p. 83). A similar claim can be made with respect to the complex nuclear terrorism threat and its prevention. The key questions and discussions of this debate are inherently entangled by high levels of uncertainty. The sensational perspectives related to nucl...