Contagion
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Contagion

Health, Fear, Sovereignty

Bruce Magnusson, Zahi Zalloua, Bruce Magnusson, Zahi Zalloua

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eBook - ePub

Contagion

Health, Fear, Sovereignty

Bruce Magnusson, Zahi Zalloua, Bruce Magnusson, Zahi Zalloua

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About This Book

Over many decades, "contagion" has been a metaphor of choice for everything from global terrorism, suicide bombings, poverty, immigration, global financial crises, human rights, fast food, obesity, divorce, and homosexuality. Essays examine the language of epidemiology used in the war on terror, the repressive effects of global disease surveillance, and films and novels that enact the perplexities of contagion in a global context. Fear of microbial disaster becomes a framework for larger questions about the nature and location of sovereignty and the related questions of contact and hygienic isolation, fear and invisibility, the hazards of sociability, the security of surveillance, and what a healthy security might mean. Utilizing the cross-disciplinary approach of global studies, contagion emerges as a vexed trope for globalization itself.

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1

RETHINKING THE WAR ON TERROR

New Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Management in the Post-9/11 World
Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian
The new strategic challenge facing the United States in the wake of September 11 is often compared with the great “generational” struggles of the twentieth century against Fascism and Communism. While the contest likely will be as prolonged and require a comparable mobilization of national and international resources if the United States is to prevail, the comparison should not be pushed too far. The struggle in which we now find ourselves is like neither World War II nor the Cold War, with their clearly defined combatants, “front lines,” and rules of engagement. The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks represent a transnational, highly dynamic, increasingly decentralized, religiously inspired movement propelled for the most part by a diverse collection of nonstate actors. They operate in some instances openly but more often clandestinely using unorthodox tactics and weapons. The challenge posed by what we define as “Islamist militancy” is fundamentally different, therefore, from traditional “state-centric” threats to international peace and security.
As such, Islamist militancy has more in common with other so-called new security challenges that transcend national borders and are driven by nonstate actors and processes. This does not mean that the traditional toolbox of national security responses is now irrelevant or renders obsolete the standard menu of conflict prevention and management techniques—on the contrary. But these techniques must be adapted and complemented with new approaches that acknowledge unconventional attributes of these new security challenges. In the case of Islamist militancy, the nature of the evolving challenge is still poorly understood. Thus, before describing an alternative, and what we believe to be a more effective strategy for responding to Islamist militancy than the approach currently favored in the global war on terror, this chapter lays out a different way of thinking about the new strategic challenge confronting the United States.
The New Strategic Challenge
Despite a plethora of studies and policy prescriptions since the September 11 attacks, we are still trying to grasp the nature of the new strategic challenge we face and how best to counter it. There is no better indication of this than the complete lack of consensus or common lexicon about what to call the threat. Is it “global terrorism,” “Islamic terrorism,” “al Qaeda and its affiliates,” “Sunni jihadists,” “Islamist radicals,” or “terrorist extremism”? This is not just a semantics issue; words and names have vital operational import. Without clarity on who, precisely, is our adversary, we are unlikely to ever develop a clear and comprehensive understanding of its objectives, strategy, and operational character. And without such a common understanding, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of an effective and sustainable response. Yet it is our assessment that there is neither a broadly accepted understanding of the challenge we face nor a comprehensive long-term strategy for countering it.
Our preference is to classify this broader challenge as “Islamist militancy.” Like the 9/11 Commission, we feel it important to use the modifier “Islamist,” a politico-religious movement within the Muslim world, rather than “Islamic,” the culture and religion of Islam.1 Unlike the 9/11 Commission, however, we prefer the simpler, less loaded term “militancy” to “terrorism.” Using the term “militants” to refer to those who either employ or espouse violent means in pursuit of political ends not only avoids the notoriously slippery definitional problems associated with terrorism but also serves to underscore the multidimensional and broad-based nature of the challenge, involving more actors than just those who actually carry out terrorist attacks.2 Indeed, Islamist militancy has three main constituent groups whose memberships are constantly evolving and overlap in significant ways.
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There are, first, the transnational jihadist groups that have a global agenda (principally al Qaeda and its affiliates); second, the nationalist insurgent groups that have essentially a local agenda (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and some of the Kashmiri groups); and, third, the miscellaneous organizations and networks that directly and indirectly support these militant groups. Distinctions among these groups are difficult to discern. Indeed, more and more new organizations and groups are emerging that share common traits and have overlapping agendas. Figure 1.1 provides a general snapshot of the principal actors in 2006. The diagram is not meant to be exhaustive and is merely illustrative of the phenomenon and its key constituent elements.
Islamist militancy does not represent a conventional national security threat—that much is clear and generally understood. Neither does it represent a conventional terrorist threat, which typically has a distinctive—often singular—identity with reasonably clear political goals, organizational structure, and area of operations. Conventional counterterrorist responses, with their emphasis on apprehending an organization's leaders and rolling up networks or cells of activists and supporters through improved intelligence gathering and sharing, are therefore usually effective. Although such methods remain just as necessary to any campaign against Islamist militancy, it is also becoming clear that they will not be sufficient. The growing trend, exhibited in attacks such as those in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005), for example, toward the emergence of localized, self-organizing militant groups acting largely independently of higher operational direction underscores the limits of conventional counterterrorism responses.
Not surprisingly, an increasing number of experts now advocate drawing on the strategies and tactics of unconventional, or “irregular,” warfare to meet the challenge.3 The threat is portrayed as a global insurgency that requires a commensurate global counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. There is some logic to this view, as elements of the challenge reflect characteristics of a classic insurgency. Certainly, al Qaeda's stated goals of expelling “Jews and crusaders” from the Muslim world and cleansing it of apostate regimes—all with the objective of reestablishing a purified caliphate—can be viewed as an insurgency of sorts. The recognition that success ultimately hinges on winning “hearts and minds” in the Muslim world is also a critically important attribute of a counterinsurgency response.
Yet just as classic counterterrorism measures have their limits, so a strictly counterinsurgency approach has its shortcomings and even liabilities. Describing the phenomenon as a global insurgency dangerously exaggerates the threat by assuming a degree of organization and unity among its various actors that currently does not exist. The COIN approach also risks conflating many kinds of Islamist struggles and perversely even serving to legitimize them. Unless suitably adapted, the standard COIN framework with its simplistic distinctions between “enemies,” “friends,” and “uncommitted” could make matters worse, especially if military or “kinetic” responses come to dominate.
With these concerns in mind, we propose an alternative strategy for countering Islamist militancy that views the challenge as one would a global public health threat or epidemic. The conceptual leap required by this approach is not as far as it first appears. Social scientists increasingly have looked to epidemiology in order to understand a variety of social contagions, and, here, Islamist militancy is no different. Specifically, our approach draws on the scientific principles and practices of epidemiology as well as insights from a growing body of research on “social contagion phenomena” such as fashions, fads, rumors, civil violence, and revolutionary ideas.4 Moreover, many commentators and even U.S. officials have employed disease metaphors to describe the challenge of Islamist militancy.5 Thus, references to terrorism being a “virus” or to al Qaeda “mutating” or “metastasizing” are common. Similarly, the image of madrassas and mosques being “incubators” of a “virulent ideology” is frequently invoked. Such metaphors have a visceral appeal in that they help convey a dangerous and, moreover, darkly insidious threat. For some, the disease metaphor also sets—implicitly, at least—a more realistic goal for what can be practically achieved in attempting to eliminate this scourge. Just as very few diseases have been completely eradicated, so the likelihood that terrorism or political violence will be rendered extinct is remote. The best that can be hoped for is that it will become a manageable, low-probability, albeit sometimes deadly, nuisance much like many other social ills.
Beyond its metaphorical appeal, an epidemiological and public health approach offers more practical attractions, three of which stand out.
» First, epidemiologists observe rigorous standards of inquiry and analysis in order to understand the derivation, dynamics, and propagation of a specific disease. In particular, they seek clarity on the origins and geographical and social contours of an outbreak: where the disease is concentrated, how it is transmitted, who is most at risk or “susceptible” to infection, and why some portions of society may be less susceptible or, for all intents and purposes, immune. Applying the same methodological approach to mapping and understanding Islamist militancy can yield immediately useful guidance on where and how to counter it.
» Second, epidemiologists recognize that diseases neither arise nor spread in a vacuum. They emerge and evolve as a result of a complex dynamic interactive process between people, pathogens, and the environment in which they live. Indeed, the epidemiological concept of “cause” is rarely if ever singular or linear but is more akin to a “web” of direct and indirect factors that play a lesser or greater role in differing circumstances. To make sense of this complexity, epidemiologists typically employ a standard analytical device that deconstructs the key constituent elements of a disease. This model helps not only in understanding the phenomenon in its entirety but also in anticipating how it might evolve in the future. The same systemic conception of disease can be adapted to understand the constituent elements of Islamist militancy and their evolution.
» Third, just as epidemiologists view disease as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, so public health officials have come to recognize that success in controlling and rolling back an epidemic typically results from a carefully orchestrated, systematic, prioritized, multipronged effort to address each of its constituent elements. At the same time, however, it is also recognized that significant progress or major advances can sometimes be precipitated by relatively minor interventions—or “tipping points.”6 Again, there are lessons and insights to be learned here for orchestrating a global counterterrorism campaign.
Before turning to what such a campaign to defeat Islamist militancy might look like were it to follow a public health or counter-epidemic approach, it is necessary to understand how epidemiologists typically try to understand disease and how this can help us understand the challenge we face.
The Epidemic Model
As indicated, epidemiologists employ a standard approach, or model, to study epidemics that deconstructs an outbreak into four key components, recognizing that they are all dynamically interconnected, as shown in Figure 1.2.7
In simple terms, the agent is the pathogen (e.g., a virus or bacterium) that causes disease. The host is the person infected with the disease (the “infective”), while the environment is composed of a variety of external factors that affect both agent and host. At the center of the triad are the vectors, the key pathways, or conduits, that help propagate the disease.
Islamist militancy is clearly not a disease in a comparably clinical fashion. Whereas those who fall victim to disease are typically passive and unwitting receptors of the pathogen, Islamist militants to a lesser or greater extent willingly decide to play an active role of some kind. Yet their actions are clearly driven by a core set of ideas and beliefs—an ideology—that has an “infectious” appeal. In this and other respects, Islamist militancy can be seen as having epidemic-like qualities. It, too, therefore, can be deconstructed using the classic epidemic model, as shown in Figure 1.3.
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Thus, with the model so applied, the agent is Islamist militant ideology. Specifically, two primary strains can be identified: (1) a transnational SalafĂŹst/jihadist ideology as espoused by al Qaeda8 and (2) a nationalist/insurgent Islamist militant ideology as espoused by groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and some of the militant Kashmiri groups. Each ideological strain is characterized by a specific set of underlying assumptions, motivations, and goals.
The host is the group or person “infected” by the agent. More specifically, the host is a group or individual who becomes to a lesser or greater extent an adherent of militant Islamist ideology. As defined, Islamist militants are those who employ or espouse the use of violence in pursuit of political goals.
The environment comprises key factors specific to the Muslim world that promote exposure to Islamist militancy—conflict, political repression, economic stagnation, and social alienation being the leading influences. Vectors in this case are a variety of known conduits that are used to propagate the ideology and associated action agendas, such as mosques, prisons, madrassas, the Internet, satellite television, and diasporic networks.
It is important to understand that the epidemic model of Islamist militancy acknowledges that the vast majority of Muslims find the core elements of Islamist militant ideology both aberrant and abhorrent. In this respect, they are effectively “immune” to its appeal. However, some unknown, yet critical, proportion of the population is clearly “susceptible” to not only becoming an adherent of the ideology but being actively motivated by it.
Several policy-relevant benefits accrue from conceiving of Islamist militancy in this fashion. First, it captures the key elements of the challenge in a systemic manner rather than in the disaggregated, unconnected way that so often bedevils analysis and understanding. Second, it is a dynamic model that acknowledges that the phenomenon is not static but constantly evolving with the emergence of new strains, new hosts, new vectors, and changing environmental conditions. Third, it provides insights into how Islamist militancy may evolve in the future.
However, unlike with an outbreak of disease, in which those infected typically (though not always) are motivated to report their condition to seek treatment, the size and spread of Islamist militancy are clearly more difficult to assess. A combination of indicators (e.g., the number of attacks conducted or thwarted and militants killed or incarcerated, the influence of jihadist Web sites, the dissemination of training materials) suggests that the phenomenon is expanding as well as mutating in the ways indicated earlier. Surveys within the Muslim world, of people's attitudes toward the United States and the West more generally, would also suggest that the pool of “susceptibles”—those at risk of becoming Islamist militants—is large and expanding in certain countries. Figure 1.4 depicts the overall growth of Islamist militancy.
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The Counter-epidemic Approach
Faced with the outbreak of an infectious disease,...

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