As global power shifts away from the West, democracy is under the spotlight. Many articles and books express pessimism about the future of Western, liberal democracy. They often suggest that Western-style democracy must give way to other forms of democracy. Many experts, politicians, and policymakers feel that if democracy is to prosper in the future, it must do so through non-Western templates. While citizens in all regions of the world want more open forms of governance, many think democracyâs current problems stem from its narrow, Western straitjacket.
Calls for non-Western democracy are not new. They have served as a background critique of the Westâs democracy-support policies since the end of the Cold War. Still, these calls have gained momentum in the past five years and are today at the forefront of debates about the type of politics that is likely to prevail in a post-Western world order. Western liberal democracy in North America and Europe is beset by problems and less able to stand as an unblemished beacon to the world. Meanwhile, the rest of the world is increasingly self-confident and keen to contribute ideas to twenty-first-century politics.
The plea for variation in democratic forms holds strong intuitive appeal. Many Western governments themselves express sympathy with the view that alternative routes to democracy need to be explored. As Western democracy-support strategies have struggled to gain traction, these governments have cast around for new ideas and come to agree that local ownership of such initiatives is important. Few involved in democracy and human rights support programs today question the need for customized policies that conform to âlocal valuesâ rather than Western templates. In fact, the latter are habitually damned as unsuited to non-Western countries ânot only by anti-Western strands of opinion but also by most practitioners and analysts engaged in democracy issues within the West itself. After all, who could possibly be against variety, when this is part of democracyâs very ethos?
It is common for participants in international meetings and conferences on democracy to excoriate the evils of Western or liberal democracy and to call passionately for non-Western democracy. âYou must stop imposing a Western form of democracy!â they cry. Or, âWe must be more supportive of local forms of democracy.â Such calls elicit approving applause. Speaking out in favor of non-Western democracy is one of the surest ways to win broad appreciation among democracy experts.
But just as assuredly, the conversation stops there, without anyone asking what is meant by non-Western democracy. Imprecision reigns. Do citizens in other parts of the world want a political order that is really different from the Western model? Is the call for non-Western democracy about maintaining tradition or fast-forwarding to a different type of political modernity? Talk of traditional forms of politics goes on as developing states rush toward modernization. Are these two things compatible? Is non-
Western democracy the same thing as a less liberal form of democracy?
Western democracy the same thing as a less liberal form of democracy?
The twenty-first century might see democracy not only spread but also become more varied. If successful, such divergence might help to head off a resurgence of authoritarianism. If misconceived, it could usher in the ills of illiberalism. How the quest for less Western-specific democracy turns out will be crucial for the new global order.
At a moment when liberal norms are challenged by rising powers, this question matters: If democracy is to fare well in the twenty-first century, must its global reach look less Western? And if so, what are the implications for Western foreign policies, especially initiatives that aim to foster democracy?
In Favor of Moderate Variation
In this book, I do four things. First, I outline where the calls for different models of democracy have come from and what lies behind them. Second, I point to problems with the concept of non-Western democracy. Third, I suggest alternative ways to think about democratic variation. And fourth, I explore how this analysis should inform the policies of organizations involved in international democracy support.
My overarching argument holds that the search for variety in democratic forms is valid. The need to revitalize democracy is essential. The increasingly prominent non-Western democracy discourse cannot be dismissed as an entirely disingenuous pretext for illiberal politics. However, when it comes to improving the quality of democracy worldwide, there are limits to the usefulness of the non-Western concept.
Although variation in democratic templates merits support, I question the assumption that there is a well-defined and wholesale dichotomy between Western and non-Western models of democracy. Variation can and should incorporate local elements of culture, authenticity, and historical tradition. But it is less clear that there exists a non-Western variety with structural features that deviate from the core, standard version of democracy. A more nuanced approach to democratic variety is warranted.
The advocates of non-Western democracy raise a straw man. These proponents contend that Western liberal democracy is of limited appeal in other regions of the world because it is hopelessly minimalisticâit does not deliver economic justice, protect community identities, or empower citizens. The advocates of non-Western democracy also accuse Western powers of supporting a narrow, rigid form of Western democracy internationally. Although the call for variation is justified, we must be cautious about such breezy assertions in order to have a more productive debateâand one that is less theoretical and more forward looking in its relevance to policymakers concerned with international democracy support.
There are two somewhat different debates in play. One is about the idea of non-Western alternatives to Western liberal democracy. The other is about variations in democracy more broadly. These two debates unfold in parallel but are often conflated. It is vital, however, to understand that they have quite different implications. The former often leads to advocacy for political features or practices that stand directly at odds with the core democratic standards that exist in the West. The latter is more about searching for ways to improve democracy in a more general senseâacross non-Western and Western regions.
The book explores both debates, but it leans toward the latter as the more vital ground. Non-Western countries might legitimately develop democracy differently from the West, but many of todayâs challenges outside the West are similar to those within it. The book unpacks specific areas in which non-Western countries might introduce legitimate and innovative variations to forms of democratic accountability. But the book also drives home the point that calls for non-Western democracy are frequently inspired by concerns that animate the reimagining of politics in North America and Europe as much as they do in non-Western countries. If the West tends to misunderstand othersâ perspectives on democracy, others tend equally to caricature Western democracy.
Some readers will feel the book goes too far in the direction of advocating democratic variation. Others will feel it restricts itself too much to a core liberal-democratic framework. In expectation of slings and arrows from both sides, I appeal for flexibility. Debates on democratic regenerationâand better international support for democracyâare currently hampered. On one side, there are those who are overly defensive of a singular and somewhat beleaguered Western template. On the other side, there are those who let their broad antipathy to the West distort clear thinking on how demands for core universal values can be better met.
I believe that democratic variation must flow from exploratory openness. There are undoubtedly lines to be drawn in order to preserve core democratic principles; concepts such as âtraditional justiceâ might hide deeply undemocratic dynamics. The notion of âauthenticityâ can be taken too far; listening to non-Western perspectives is not axiomatically a route to uncontested truths in other societies. However, the West does need to cooperate with non-Western reformers in genuinely exploring promising means for ensuring that democracy gains local legitimacy. This represents an extremely difficult and delicate balance to strike, but it is a puzzle that must urgently be addressed.
The Bookâs Structure
The book is organized into eight chapters. The next one, chapter 2, offers an account of how the focus on different models of democracy has intensified in recent years. It highlights how leaders, politicians, and diplomats both inside and outside the West now talk about the concept of non-
Western democracy. And it explains why they do so.
Western democracy. And it explains why they do so.
Chapter 3 examines the debates over regional models of democracy. It looks at the state of current arguments in favor of distinctive Middle Eastern, Latin American, African, and Asian forms of democracy. The longevity of calls for regionally specific models of democracy suggests there is real weight to this localized focus. At the same time, analysts and politicians struggle to define with precision what such regional models should look like. And although some of the calls for Arab, Latin American, African, or Asian democracy are rooted in genuine impulses for democratic variation, some are espousals of soft authoritarianism.
Chapter 4 examines the reasons why arguments for a distinctive concept of non-Western democracy are not fully convincing. A lack of clarity characterizes calls for non-Western democracy. They fail to articulate the distinctive elements that would constitute a non-Western template of democratic politics. And the calls aim at quite different objectives. Some critiques object to Western democracy per se; others suggest that democracyâs institutional forms need more modest tweaking to fit national specificities. And in other cases, the calls are for different sets of policies that do not in fact seem to entail a different model of democracy. It is the outcomes of neoliberal economic or social policiesâmore than the institutional structures of Western politicsâthat many critics object to.
Chapter 5 moves the analysis toward a broader set of debates about democratic variation, summarizing important ideas for improving democratic quality that have taken shape in recent years. These ideas are not framed explicitly in terms of non-Western democracy; many are just as concerned with the state of Western democracy as they are with the developing world. Yet these ideas offer ways of usefully thinking about variety in different types of democracy. This chapter lays the analytical foundations for connecting the rather vague calls for non-Western democracy with a more concrete and targeted exploration of democratic variation.
Chapter 6 identifies legitimate elements of distinctiveness in democratic forms and practices. Non-Western preferences may be meaningfully different, even if they are not extensive enough to constitute entirely distinctive models. It is possible and important to distinguish between the benign and the bogus in calls for non-Western democracy. While it is right to be alert for authoritarian tendencies hiding within some calls for non-Western templates, there are potentially helpful variations from what is normally thought of as Western democracy. This chapter draws out the issues where the advocates of democratic variation are on solid ground.
To this end, the chapter advocates a guiding principle of âliberalism plus.â This idea is meant to suggest that democratic variation should be pursued through innovations that add to the core template of liberal democracy rather than subtract from it. Liberalism plus categorically does not mean simply more of the same kind of politics that already exists in Western countries. Rather, it is meant to convey the need to look seriously at non-Western ideas that give greater meaning to political liberalismâs core spirit of tolerance, pluralism, and popular accountability over the powerful.
The chapter lays out five axes for thinking about democratic variation: individual rights, economic justice, communitarian identity, new forms of civic action and representation, and legal pluralism. Variation along these axes offers genuine potential for positive innovation to democracy. I do not argue that regimes generally defined as ânot democraticâ but that attend in some positive ways to these areas should be categorized as âdemocratic.â Rather, I seek to identify variation in the ways in which democratic quality might genuinely be improved.
Chapter 7 explores implications for international democracy-support policies. Western donors have begun to address the issue of democratic variation more than is generally realized. Moreover, rising non-Western democracies are themselves beginning to support democracy beyond their borders and making use of new types of democratic variation as they do so. I argue that all democracy supporters need to develop their policies further in this direction. They need to match their initiatives to the suggested five axes of democratic variation. These axes should not be seen as the building blocks of non-Western democracy support, but rather as issues that democracy supporters should explore as they develop and implement their programs and initiatives.
Chapter 8 concludes the book by exploring the broader significance of the non-Western democracy debate. Essential to the renewal of global democracy will be finding the right kind and degree of political variation. It will also be necessary if international democracy-support policies are to retain any integrity and legitimacy. The quest for democratic variation springs from the extremely fluid and indeterminate trends that shape todayâs global politics. And it is a search whose outcome will have an increasingly strong bearing on democracyâs future prospects.
A Note on Concepts
As noted earlier, the book is framed as an exploration of the debates over non-Western democracy. Many readers may feel that this non-Western lens requires a firm definitional justification. Some will be skeptical about the âWesternâ and ânon-Westernâ terminology. However, the exploration is posed in these terms becauseâas will become apparentâthis is how so many political actors and analysts today frame the debate. This makes it necessary to explore the question of whether there are varieties of democracy that are non-Western. My argument is explicitly that no such clear-cut definitions of Western and non-Western democracy exist. To adhere to fixed definitions of these terms would be subversive of the bookâs rationale.
Another distinction is made between democratic values and democratic institutions. Some Western observers insist that people outside the West support the same basic democratic principles as those in the West but that non-Westerners want these principles expressed through different institutional forms and practices. This book argues that this ânorms versus institutionsâ division is indeed helpful, but it does not fully capture the way we should think about democratic variation. When politicians and diplomats claim that people everywhere subscribe to the same core democratic values but simply want these guaranteed through different institutional configurations, they are partly rightâbut they also oversimplify the nature of global political debates. Aspects of non-Western calls for variation are about values, not institutional forms. There are genuine and necessary debates to be had about how democratic values should now be defined. In some ways the situation has been inverted: many countries today contest some core norms, while accepting most of the basic Western institutional template.
Differentiating between the definitions of âWesternâ and âliberalâ democracy is trickier. Although these terms tend to be used interchangeably, a theme running through the book is that there is a complex relationship between the notions of âWestern democracyâ and âliberal democracy.â A lot of what follows revolves around debates over the concepts of liberalism and illiberalism. Table 1.1. gives a breakdown of the main varieties of democracy that analysts have traditionally identified. Liberal democracy is defined as the combination of open political competition and the protection of individual rights. Illiberal democracy is where some degree of political competition exists, but individual rights are constricted or not fully protected. One of the most important questions to answer is whether calls for non-Western democracy are in essence calls for illiberal democracy. This has become one of todayâs most sensitive questions both analytically and politically. Many trends point toward rising illiberalismâunderstood as opposition to the notion of largely unfettered individual rights.
At least some variations of what is most commonly advocated as non-Western democracy are, in essence, democracy with abridged liberal rights. But the Western-versus-non-Western democracy debate is not synonymous with the liberal-versus-illiberal democracy debate. Many of the calls for non-Western democracy do amount to forms of illiberal democracy. But some non-Western variations do not necessarily attack the protection of individual rights. This is where a more positive attitude toward democratic variation is desirable. Although some non-Western proposals...