Protest Dialectics

State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970-1979

Paul Chang

• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780804794305
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Soziologie

1970s South Korea is characterized by many as the "dark age for democracy." Most scholarship on South Korea's democracy movement and civil society has focused on the "student revolution" in 1960 and the large protest cycles in the 1980s which were followed by Korea's transition to democracy in 1987. But in his groundbreaking work of political and social history of 1970s South Korea, Paul Chang highlights the importance of understanding the emergence and evolution of the democracy movement in this oft-ignored decade.

Protest Dialectics journeys back to 1970s South Korea and provides readers with an in-depth understanding of the numerous events in the 1970s that laid the groundwork for the 1980s democracy movement and the formation of civil society today. Chang shows how the narrative of the 1970s as democracy's "dark age" obfuscates the important material and discursive developments that became the foundations for the movement in the 1980s which, in turn, paved the way for the institutionalization of civil society after transition in 1987. To correct for these oversights in the literature and to better understand the origins of South Korea's vibrant social movement sector this book presents a comprehensive analysis of the emergence and evolution of the democracy movement in the 1970s.

Part 1

MOVEMENT CONTEXT

1

THE MAKING OF THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE

Today, at this place, I clearly say to you all that this will be the last political speech where I ask you to vote for me as president.

Park Chung Hee, campaign promise, April 25, 1971

A recent flurry of scholarship has taken stock of Park Chung Hee and the “Park Chung Hee era” (Lee 2012; Kim and Vogel 2011; Kim and Sorensen 2011; Lee 2006). Contemporary evaluations of Park Chung Hee’s tenure as South Korea’s leader tend to focus on two main themes: economic development and dictatorship. Studies of development, for the most part, paint Park Chung Hee as orchestrator of the economic “miracle on the Han” (see among others, Lee 2006; Kim 2004), while scholarship on Korean politics identifies him as first in a line of military dictators who established a harsh autocracy that lasted until democratic transition in 1987 (Park 2011; Kim J. H. 2011).¹ Both emphases in the literature are critical to understanding the trajectory of South Korea’s modernization in the postliberation period, and it is fitting that Park’s legacy has motivated the application of new terms, including the apt “developmental dictator” (Lee 2006). This chapter sets the stage for the analysis of South Korea’s democracy movement by highlighting the transformation of Park’s government as repression became an increasingly essential feature of his ruling strategy.

There were in fact three distinct phases of Park Chung Hee’s rule. He first ruled South Korea under the banner of a military government, from 1961 to 1963, before transitioning to a period of “democratic interlude” or “soft authoritarianism,” when the legitimacy of his presidency was based on democratically held elections in 1963 and 1967 (Im 2011: 234). In the third phase, Park reverted back to formal authoritarianism after unilaterally promulgating dramatic constitutional revisions that suspended direct presidential elections and ensured his lifelong rule. After the promulgation of the Yusin Constitution in 1972, however, Park increasingly relied on repressive measures in direct response to the growing voices of dissent that challenged his leadership. Indeed, the core components of Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism “were continually evolving entities” (Kim B. K. 2011a: 4) that developed over the eighteen years of his rule. Understanding these transformations requires a temporal assessment of the historical events that culminated in the Yusin regime.

THE “DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE” (1963–1971)

In April 1960, the First Republic of South Korea came to an end when Syngman Rhee abdicated the presidency following the April 19, or “4.19,” student revolution. The subsequent government under Chang Myŏn and Yun Posŏn proved to be ephemeral, and on May 16, 1961, a “second-tier leader,” two-star Major General Park Chung Hee, successfully executed a coup d’état and established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (Kukka Chaegŏn Ch’oego Hoeŭi) in place of the government (Han 2011: 35).² Partly because Park Chung Hee’s coup restored order and stability at a time when the nation seemed to be plunging into social chaos amid growing political demonstrations, hyperinflation, and spikes in the crime rate (Kim 2004: 45), student activists and the greater part of society initially maintained a “wait and see” attitude. In addition, after a short deliberation about the advantages and disadvantages that Park Chung Hee represented to American interests in Korea and East Asia, “the United States accepted the coup as a fait accompli” and did not interfere with Park’s power grab (Kim and Baik 2011; see also Brazinsky 2007).

Park Chung Hee, for his part, attempted to garner public support by claiming that the “5.16 Military Administration”—marking the day of the coup—was merely a temporary government and promising to reinstitute democratic procedures in due time. Responding to the increasing demand from both the Korean people and the United States to follow through on his promise, Park Chung Hee announced the reestablishment of civilian rule by means of a presidential election scheduled for October 15, 1963. Park promptly retired from the military and ran successfully, thus becoming the president of South Korea’s Third Republic.³

At this early stage, it was still important for Park Chung Hee to build legitimacy for his government and win the support of the Korean people. Park was acutely aware of the powerful potential of student mobilization to facilitate social change, and he argued that his own “May Revolution” was a continuation of the 4.19 student revolution. In his inaugural address on December 17, 1963, Park Chung Hee presented a narrative that linked his May 1961 coup d’état with the 4.19 revolution:

Our fiery democratic convictions overthrew dictatorship in the April Revolution. This was succeeded by the May Revolution, which rejected corruption and injustice, restored the national spirit, and made possible the construction of the new republic which comes into existence today. Our unavoidable historical task in this decade, as initiated in the course of the April and May Revolutions, is the modernization of the fatherland in all fields—political, economic, social and culture. . . . On this meaningful occasion, I therefore propose a great reform movement to materialize our national ideals as demonstrated by the April 19 and May 16 Revolutions. . . . (Park 1970: 286)

Ignoring students who insisted that “the 4.19 and 5.16 Revolutions cannot coexist,”⁴ Park Chung Hee was able, as he began his first term, to establish social stability and restore some faith in a democratic Korea. The reinstitution of the democratic process, evidenced in the 1963 presidential election, contributed to the feeling that Park would uphold the democratic system. This feeling was also engendered by several speeches Park gave in the 1960s on the importance of further consolidating democracy in Korea. On May 27, 1965, for example, upon returning from a visit to the United States, he exhorted the Korean people to become better democratic citizens:

The flower of democracy does not bloom, if there is no attempt to realize it. Before one preaches democracy, one should first be a good democratic citizen. We Koreans should recognize again what democracy is and discipline ourselves to be democratic citizens. Without this effort, democracy and the construction of democratic society is impossible and the flower of democracy will not bloom. (Park 1970: 315)

At the start of his first term, then, hope remained that Park Chung Hee’s presidency would be the kind of democratic government that had been promised to the Korean people in 1948. But within a few years this hope, along with invocations of the 4.19 student revolution, would dissipate, when Park Chung Hee pushed through controversial policies that reignited large protests. The commitment to send South Korean troops to participate in the Vietnam War and the unpopular decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan were driven by the two central concerns of Park Chung Hee’s government: national security and economic development.

Participation in the Vietnam War and the Normalization of Relations with Japan

It is important to situate Park Chung Hee’s decision to deploy South Korean troops to Vietnam in the larger context of the international Cold War. Although the role that the United States played in the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and in the Korean War (1950–1953) reflected the importance of South Korea to America’s East Asian foreign policy, U.S. commitment to its small ally was at times doubted by the South Korean leadership. This was especially true in the period leading up to the Korean War, when top American political leaders debated the extent to which they would go to protect South Korea in the case of a communist incursion. Most notably, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson reiterated in January 1950 America’s commitment to protecting Japan while leaving South Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter.⁵ When this scenario was made known, it triggered a “deeply ingrained fear of abandonment” in South Korea (Lee M. Y. 2011: 404). Although America’s subsequent involvement in the Korean War reassured South Koreans that the United States was indeed committed to protecting its ally, Korean political and military leaders never forgot the shocking possibility of Dean Acheson’s initial proposal.

In the 1960s, America’s involvement in the Vietnam War led to the redistribution of its military resources in the Asia-Pacific region, and plans were put in place to dispatch a significant number of U.S. troops from South Korea to Vietnam. Fears that the reduction in U.S. troops would compromise South Korea’s national security were compounded by a significant decline in U.S. military aid to Korea, “from an annual average of $232 million during the 1956–1961 period to $154 million for the 1962–1965 period” (Lee M. Y. 2011: 405). Eager for America to maintain its commitment to South Korean security, Park Chung Hee informed President John F. Kennedy during their summit meeting in Washington, D.C., in 1961 of his willingness to dispatch Korean soldiers to Vietnam (Lee M. Y. 2011: 409). A formal request for Korean participation in the Vietnam War was made by President Lyndon B. Johnson a few years later, on May 1, 1964, and by the following September, Park Chung Hee had sent nearly two thousand noncombat troops to Vietnam (Kim J. H. 2011: 173).

Within a year, South Korea sent combat troops as well, and at peak deployment there were fifty thousand Korean soldiers in Vietnam, making South Korea the country “with the second-largest number of military troops after the United States” (Lee M. Y. 2011: 404). From 1964 to 1973, some three hundred thousand Korean soldiers participated in the Vietnam War (Cumings 1997: 321). In return, from 1965 to 1972, the United States rewarded South Korea with roughly a billion dollars in financial support, as well as with assurances that it would not reduce the number of American military troops stationed in South Korea (Lee M. Y. 2011: 425; Cumings 1997: 321).

The “extraordinary” rewards (Katsiaficas 2012: 142) that South Korea would reap from its participation in the Vietnam War did not, however, preclude significant opposition from institutional politicians when Park Chung Hee submitted to the National Assembly the bill for dispatch of combat troops. When it came time to vote, legislators from the opposition parties boycotted the session, but Park’s Democratic Republican Party (DRP; Minju Konghwadang) occupied enough seats in the National Assembly to pass the bill anyway. Park’s complete disregard for minority party members and his unwillingness to engage in dialogue and debate were early signs that he would not entertain challenges to his policies. This authoritarian tendency became more evident when Park initiated the process of reestablishing diplomatic relations with Japan. Both the bill for the dispatch of troops and the bill for normalization of relations with Japan were presented to the National Assembly on July 14, 1965. The latter bill was more controversial than the dispatch bill, and a majority of opposition party members resigned their parliamentary positions en masse in protest of Park’s efforts to normalize relations with Japan.

The motivation to reestablish relations with Japan was predicated on similar anxieties that prompted South Korea’s entry into the Vietnam War. Because “his rule coincided with a sharp decline in annual U.S. economic aid” (Lee M. Y. 2011: 407), Park Chung Hee needed alternative sources of capital to fuel his economic programs. Although the successful normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 secured “$800 million in grants and preferential loans as reparations for Japanese colonial wrongdoings” (Lee M. Y. 2011: 425), this sparked the first large wave of protests since Park Chung Hee took power in 1961. Park was accused by various segments of Korean society, including opposition party members, intellectuals, and students, of selling out the country by conceding to a “humiliating agreement” (kuryokchŏk in hyŏpchŏng) with Japan.⁶ Beginning in March 1964, students nationwide staged protests that were the largest since the April 1960 revolution. Park responded to this “explosion of student protests” (Kim B. K. 2011a: 25) by declaring martial law on June 3, 1964, and deploying military personnel to the cities to violently put down student demonstrations.⁷ Park’s disregard for the legislative process when pushing through the troop dispatch bill, and his use of the military to quell student protesters during the Japan normalization process, unequivocally confirmed his authoritarian tendencies and his willingness to apply violent repression strategies to oppositional forces. The crackdown on student protests in 1964 and 1965 set precedence for state-society relations in the years to come as Park Chung Hee moved the country increasingly toward a formal authoritarian state.

Toward Formal Authoritarianism

Having successfully put down the demonstrations against normalization with Japan and secured Japanese and U.S. foreign capital commitments to support his economic programs, Park Chung Hee finished his first presidential term. Bolstered by the significant economic growth that his policies created, Park beat past president Yun Posŏn in the 1967 presidential election, winning just over 51 percent of the popular vote. He began his second term in July 1967, intent on continuing and expanding the economic programs he deemed necessary to modernize South Korea. Park was keenly aware of the two-term limitation for presidents that the existing constitution imposed and, unwilling to relinquish power, he orchestrated a constitutional amendment in 1969 that would allow for a third term. The proposed amendment was met with fierce opposition from minority party members in the legislature. Realizing that Park Chung Hee’s DRP had the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the amendment, opposition party members staged a sit-in rally in the plenary session hall of the National Assembly. Choosing to sidestep the challenge rather than face it, members of the DRP met on September 14, 1969, “at 2:27 AM in an annex building to pass its bill” (Kim B. K. 2011b: 156). The meeting took all of six minutes. The constitutional amendment allowing Park Chung Hee to run for president in 1971 was finalized after a national referendum conducted in October 1969 showed that 65.1 percent of the Korean people approved of the amendment (Kim B. K. 2011b: 156).

Park Chung Hee’s manipulation of the constitution to prolong his rule further confirmed suspicions that his promise to foster democracy in South Korea was just rhetoric. For many observers, the push for extra-constitutional extension of the presidency was becoming all too familiar and some noted the similarities between Park’s 1969 power play and Syngman Rhee’s rule. Writing in the period after the 1969 amendment and before the 1971 presidential election, David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, who in the mid-1960s had been in Korea acting as economic advisors to Park’s government, warned that “the unwillingness of the president to step aside at the end of his second term, which repeats the pattern of Syngman Rhee, raises the possibility that he will try to remain in office indefinitely” (1971: vi). The students and citizens who maintained a “wait and see” attitude when Park assumed control in 1961 now saw his true will to power. Students again led the charge and organized large protests demanding that Park step down as president. In the fall of 1969, student protesters and the police squared off in what were often violent exchanges, and it wasn’t until Park closed down thirty-eight universities on September 10, 1969, that social order on university campuses was restored (Kim B. K. 2011b: 156). In addition to forcefully repressing student criticisms, Park Chung Hee justified the constitutional amendment by arguing that a third term was necessary for the continuation of economic progress.

Repression and justifications aside, Park insisted that if he was democratically elected again in 1971, it would be his last term, because he would relinquish power at the end of the third term. This was indeed a salient campaign promise, made in a speech given on April 25, 1971, just two days before the election:

It is said that “if we vote for President Park again, he will make an authoritarian system and President Park will be president until he dies.” Today, at this place, I clearly say to you all that this will be the last political speech where I ask you to vote for me as president. (Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe 2006)

Belying Park Chung Hee’s campaign promise to relinquish power at the end of the third term, scholars argue that before the presidential election in 1971 he already had concrete plans in place to prolong his rule indefinitely. In his thorough analysis of the three-year period from the constitutional amendment in 1969 to the election in 1971, Hyug Baeg Im (2011) has shown that Park Chung Hee consolidated his power within the DRP by demoting and purging second-tier leaders who might have entertained hopes of succeeding him at the end of his second term. In what amounted to a dizzying array of political moves, Park imperiously “cleared the road towards his lifelong presidency” by “undermining the power bases of all major ...