The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
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The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

T.V. Paul

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The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

T.V. Paul

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About This Book

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the tradition of non-use, a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states—thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

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1

INTRODUCTION

IN AUGUST 2008, the world observed the sixty-third anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, history’s first and only instances of nuclear attack. Since 1945, the nuclear age has generated considerable debate on the utility, morality, and legitimacy of the acquisition, possession, control, and use of nuclear weapons. Buried in the global discourse on the nuclear dilemma is the fact that atomic weapons have not been used militarily by any nuclear state since 1945. While their non-use between nuclear states may largely be explained by the operation of mutual deterrence, it remains a puzzle as to why these weapons have not been used against nonnuclear opponents, who could not retaliate in kind. In some cases, nuclear weapon states (NWS) have lost the wars they fought against nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS). Occasionally, NWS have experienced the temptation to use their atomic arms, yet desisted from doing so. In other instances, nonnuclear states initiated crises or wars, anticipating non-use of atomic weapons by the defending nuclear state. In some other cases, NNWS continued fighting with NWS, and thereby imposed enormous costs on the latter in personnel and resources, even though the NWS had the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons and thus terminate the war expeditiously.
I argue that the unwillingness to use nuclear weapons can be partially attributed to an informal norm inherent in the tradition of non-use, which has gradually emerged since 1945. A tradition in this sense is a time-honored practice of non-use that has been followed by nuclear states since 1945 as an “accustomed obligation.”1 This tradition has largely been shaped by two dominant factors: first, an appreciation of the material character of the weapon concerned (i.e., the horrendous short- and long-term impact its use would create), beginning with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but more powerfully entrenched following the hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950s; second, the negative reputational effects its use would generate, especially in terms of projecting poor images, signaling wrong intentions, and setting bad precedents. The awareness among nuclear states that the unpredictability and enormity of nuclear weapons use actually reduced their utility for most strategic purposes involving nonnuclear states caused them to practice self-deterrence. Over time, the iterated non-use of nuclear weapons became self-perpetuating through the establishment of an informal norm: that is, later decisions to refrain from nuclear use were based, in part, on previous decisions to desist and a desire to continue the practice.
Tactical/strategic constraints also need to be examined in order to understand why nuclear arms have not been used since 1945. However, an explanation solely based on the tactical and strategic unsuitability of the weapon is unlikely to show us the larger picture of non-use for over sixty years as these considerations are context-dependent. The non-use of nuclear weapons under varying strategic/tactical circumstances suggests that other causal mechanisms might be operating more powerfully or alongside strategy and tactics in the choices of nuclear states. In other words, the story of non-use of nuclear arms is much larger than what a pure strategic/tactical account can offer. This book provides a larger discussion of the politics of nuclear non-use, not only in terms of the crisis decisions made by nuclear powers involving nonnuclear states but also from the perspectives of different states on the usability or non usability of nuclear weapons in world politics at large.
Although previous works on the subject locate the reasons for non-use largely in either rationalist/materialistic or in normative/ideational considerations, I argue that both sets of factors need to be examined in order to get a comprehensive and more accurate view of the phenomenon of non-use. In that sense, this book approaches the subject on the basis of analytical eclecticism that has been proposed by some social scientists.2 This approach also combines the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness as presented by James March and Johan Olsen. The reputational argument developed in Chapter 2 is based on a rational logic of consequences, while the normative argument inherent in the tradition of non-use relies on a logic of appropriateness. I argue that the reputational variables linked to the logic of consequences are the primary causal factors for understanding the continued non-use of nuclear weapons, but the logic of appropriateness in the form of a normative prohibition inherent in the tradition of non-use has intermingled with the former, especially as the nuclear age has advanced.3 First, reputation arbiters such as scientists, strategists, peace movements, and developing country leaders helped increase the reputational costs of nuclear use through compelling arguments using a logic of appropriateness as well as a logic of consequences. Second, the practice of non-use became reinforced through iteration over time, through mechanisms that included both the entrenchment of costs for using nuclear weapons (consequences) and the development of ideas about responsible state behavior (appropriateness).
This book approaches the subject from a puzzle-driven perspective as opposed to a purely paradigm-driven approach. While paradigms offer disciplinary coherence, allowing scholars to devote their energies to research programs that share common assumptions, premises, dominant variables, and units of analysis, they also limit the prospects for answering pressing policy issues or intellectual puzzles that do not have black-or-white answers. Further, when analysts attempt to pigeonhole explanations to fit one paradigm or another, they tend to leave out the nuances involved in the explanation for the phenomenon they study. The effort in this book is to offer a richer analysis and not to create a grand theory but an intermediate theory, in order to explain the puzzle of nuclear non-use.4
The tradition seems to have emerged due to the realizations that nuclear weapons are radically different from conventional weapons and that their use would show the user in an excessively bad light in international public opinion. However, beyond reputation, there exists a practical value of non-use to the NWS, especially for the United States and the Soviet Union. The reputation for non-use served the twin goals of U.S. international security policy during the Cold War, that is, preserving peace through mutual deterrence but at the same time preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had similar objectives vis-à-vis the West and the developing world. In this sense, this has been a partially “invented tradition” (a practice that is deliberately constructed) in order to impart legitimacy for the major powers’ monopoly over nuclear weapons.5 Moral, ethical, and legal factors are important to the extent that they enter into reputational considerations. Since it is not a formal, enforceable legal norm, but a practice followed by the nuclear states, I use the term informal norm to denote the normative restraint inherent in the tradition of non-use. Moreover, most nuclear states proclaim that they intend to use their weapons only under certain circumstances—for example, to deter or retaliate against challenges to the vital interests of their nation-state, including survival. In contrast, when it comes to the use of chemical or biological weapons, most of these states have made legal commitments, and tend to deny any deterrence or retaliatory intent. In that respect, the nuclear non-use norm is legally less enshrined than the norms against the use of chemical and biological weapons (although, ironically, these norms have been more widely violated). Therefore, until it becomes a full-fledged legal prohibition, the nuclear non-use norm will remain an informal norm rooted in a tradition.
In order to gain a broader understanding of the tradition of non-use, this book examines several interrelated questions. First, what have been the reasons for the unwillingness of nuclear weapons states, both new and old, to use their capability against nonnuclear adversaries in war? Second, what have been the calculations of nonnuclear states that confronted nuclear powers on the battlefield? Third, if nuclear use is constrained by reputational considerations, what are the implications for theories of deterrence and compellence, as well as for the political utility of these weapons as instruments of power? Fourth, does the existence of the unequal nuclear nonproliferation regime partially depend on the maintenance of this tradition? Specifically, what role did it play in the bargain between nuclear haves and have-nots, especially in the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its continued existence? Fifth, how resilient or fragile is this informal norm? Do new political and technological developments have the potential to unravel the restraining power of the tradition? If so, what precisely are these forces in the contemporary and emerging international system? Finally, does the preservation of the tradition of non-use serve any fundamental interests of the global community (involving both nuclear and nonnuclear states)? If yes, what are they?

TABOO OR TRADITION?

Many analysts explain the non-use of nuclear weapons by referring to a “taboo” that arose against their use.6 Others refer to the practice of non-use as a “tradition.” The terms are often used interchangeably, although they have different meanings. The presence of a taboo-like prohibition against nuclear use has been noted by important scholars and policy makers such as Thomas Schelling, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara. Former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially used the term taboo to describe the unwritten prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons. On October 7, 1953, Dulles was reported to have said: “Somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons.”7 Dulles was in favor of developing usable nuclear weapons to obtain the key battlefield military objectives of the United States in Korea. George Ball presented a stringent prohibition when he contended that the revulsion against nuclear use “has enveloped nuclear weapons in a rigid taboo,” and that the nation that first broke it “would suffer universal condemnation.”8
While scholars such as Bernard Brodie saw no purpose in nuclear weapons other than deterrence, Thomas Schelling popularized the concept of a “tradition of non-use” in his writings in the 1960s. In his words, what makes atomic weapons different is a powerful tradition for their non-use, “a jointly recognized expectation that they may not be used in spite of declarations of readiness to use them, even in spite of tactical advantages in their use.”9 A tradition in this respect is based on a habit or disposition that prevents the use of nuclear weapons as a serious option for consideration by decision makers.10 Schelling argues that the main reason for the non-use of nuclear weapons is the perception that they are unique and that once introduced into combat they could not be “contained, restrained, confined, or limited.”11 Although prolonged conventional war can also cause somewhat similar levels of casualties, the difference is in the perception of the impact.12 The swiftness with which widespread destruction can take place and the lingering aftereffects in the form of radiation hazards are the distinguishing marks of nuclear weapon use vis-à-vis attacks relying on conventional weapons.

Social Taboos

While it is possible that some elements of a taboo-like prohibition might exist, the tradition of non-use does not contain a strict prohibitionary norm. Let us explore what a taboo means in order to assess whether the literal use of the term is justified in this instance. The term taboo is derived from the Polynesian word tabu or tapu which means “prohibition.” In its sociological aspects, it refers to “a system of prohibitions observed as customs.”13 A taboo arises from the fear of something “mystically dangerous,” and generally its authority is based on custom. As Webster states: “The authority of a taboo is unmatched by that of any other prohibition. There is no reflection on it, no reasoning about it, no discussion of it. A taboo amounts simply to an imperative thou-shalt-not in the presence of the danger apprehended.”14 Taboo denotes the prohibitions arising from the mysterious attributes of a person, thing, or place, or a transitory condition. To Freud, it connotes attributes such as “sacred,” “consecrated,” “above the ordinary,” “dangerous,” “forbidden,” “unclean,” and “uncanny.”15 It thus refers to a social prohibition on a human activity considered as forbidden or sacred.
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a taboo is a “prohibition of an action or the use of an object based on ritualistic distinctions of them either as being sacred and consecrated or as being dangerous, unclean, and accursed.” Taboos “include prohibitions on fishing or picking fruits at certain seasons; food taboos that restrict the diet of pregnant women; prohibitions on talking to or touching chiefs or members of other high social classes; taboos on walking or traveling in certain areas, such as forests; and various taboos that function during important life events such as birth, marriage, and death.”16 Assumptions of danger and fear of repercussions of the particular act committed characterize most social taboos. For some social taboos, the anticipated repercussions could be in the form of disease or death or an incalculable trauma to the victim, the violator, and his or her associates, while for others, it could be shame, embarrassment, and social isolation.17 For some social taboos, the violator is stigmatized as “eccentric” and “abnormal,” although the level of punishment and redemption could vary from one social taboo to another.18
In modern societies, there are a number of well-established social taboos in evidence. They include restrictions on diets, sexual activities, and exposure of particular body parts. Two of the most significant ones are the taboos against incest and cannibalism.19 These two acts are not only forbidden by law, but people rarely discuss them in regular conversations. In other words, ordinarily people do not wish to talk about them, and when they hear that transgressions have occurred, reactions are usually those of horror and disgust; the transgressor is characterized as a “psychopath” who is in need of urgent psychiatric intervention. People in general observe these and other social taboos not simply because of the legal prohibitions against them, but because of the socially accepted understanding of their prohibition. Taboos are also powerful instruments of social order, although some of them may not have a clear rational basis.

Why Is Nuclear Non-Use a Tradition?

As discussed above, the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons has been characterized as equivalent to a taboo, although many scholars and practitioners use the term taboo in a figurative and a loose sense, as an unwritten and uncodified prohibitionary norm against nuclear use. The term is also used to the extent that both social and nuclear taboos are based on the fear of consequences of a given course of action. Similarly, both may be reinforced by legal and nonlegal restraints and considerations as well. Thus, like social taboos, the nuclear taboo is likely to have been influenced by a number of considerations—moral and legal norms and rational calculations in particular. The nuclear taboo might have arisen as a response to a realization of the danger or the unforeseeable consequences of a nuclear war. The mysterious attributes of the weapon might have played a role in the creation and persistence of the taboo. States George Quester: “The very notion of a ‘taboo’ involves a ban on human behavior that is not subjected continuously to a rational balancing of costs and benefits, but that settles in, through wide-spread social acceptance, as an axiomatic redefinition of what constitutes legitimate behavior.”20
But the differences between well-entrenched social taboos and the nuclear taboo are many. Most social taboos are punishable acts—punishable either by the community (through customs) or the state (through law), each expecting observance by its members. The legal and moral opprobria are so strong that transgressors of powerful social taboos, if caught, would be punished seriously, and their fundamental rights could be curtailed drastically. This is also the case with many social taboos practiced in tribal societies. Some such societies imposed the death penalty on transgressors of deeply held taboos.
In contrast, the prohibition against nuclear use is not as absolute as in the case of many social taboos. International law does not explicitly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, especially if it is in retribution or in t...

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