China Matters

Getting It Right for Australia

Bates Gill, Linda Jakobson

• Publisher: La Trobe University Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781925435542
• Topic: Économie
• Subtopic: Économie internationale

Australia and China face a new era, butare weready? Australia's prosperity and security are linked to China as never before. But what kind of a country is China becoming? Will its demand for Australian goods and services increase? Can the Communist Party continue to keep the middle class satisfied while cracking down on political freedoms? How will China use its economic and military might, especially if challenged by President Trump? China Matters is a concise overview of China today, and the implications for Australia. Written by Australia-based, internationally renowned China-watchers Bates Gill and Linda Jakobson, it examines the country's unique dynamism and contradictions. It delves into everything from business ties to the growing influence of the Chinese government in Australia. It is essential reading for anyone wanting to understand China's complexities and how Australia should respond to secure our future.'Cuts through the volatile mix of hype, hysteria and complacency surrounding the Middle Kingdom in Australia to sketch out a nuanced road map for dealing with Asia's rising super power.' —Richard McGregor'Australians must learn to live with China's power. This is simply the best all-round guide we have for how to do this.' —Hugh WhiteBates Gill is Professor of Asia-Pacific Strategic Studies at the Strategicand Defence StudiesCentre, Australian National University. He is an internationally recognised China expert with25years' experience as a scholar and policy adviser. Dr Gill has authored seven books and more than100 other China-related publications, including Rising Star and China: The Balance Sheet. Linda Jakobson is an award-winning, internationally recognised author of six books on China. A Mandarin speaker, she worked as a researcher and policy adviser in China for 22 years before moving to Sydney in 2011 to become East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute. In 2015 she founded China Matters, an Australian public policy initiative.A Finnish national she is a permanent resident of Australia.

1.

THE CHINA DREAM

Return of the Middle Kingdom

Dreaming of a better tomorrow

No one living in China during the mid-1980s could have dreamt the China of today. Most city folk dreamt of a slightly bigger apartment so that three generations would not have to share a one- or two-room home. Some also entertained the wish that their child, upon finishing school, would be assigned to a not-too-distant ‘work unit’, the Chinese term used for a state employer. Others fantasised about being sent abroad by their work unit, and in their wildest imaginings this once-in-a-lifetime trip would be to the United States. Whatever dreams a city resident had were dependent on decisions taken by Chinese government officials. Thirty years ago the Chinese state controlled most aspects of a person’s life, starting from where one resided and where one worked. You could not marry, have a child or even buy a train ticket without your superior’s written approval – an unbearable existence for anyone who did not get on with their boss.

Back in the mid-1980s ordinary people in the countryside could not imagine being allowed to settle in a city. Many if not most of them dreamt of the day when food would be plentiful and they could save enough money to build a solid house and pass their old age without too much hardship.

Thirty or so years ago any Chinese citizen dismissed the thought of owning a car – let alone a home, or holidaying overseas with the family – as fantasy; not to speak of the diversity of lifestyle choices, job opportunities, dazzling high-rise malls, consumer goods and leisure activities that so many urban Chinese today take for granted.

So when China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, in 2012 started promoting his signature China Dream slogan, some middle-aged Chinese who had grown up during the politically turbulent 1960s declared on internet chat sites: ‘We are already living the China Dream!’

The China Dream encapsulates an array of Xi’s ambitions. He wants to make China modern and successful. He wants to restore the ideological legitimacy and attractiveness of the Party, and he wants to boost the self-confidence of all Chinese, but especially CPC members. Grasping some of the motivations and undercurrents of Xi’s China Dream, as well as the dreams of ordinary Chinese, is vital for understanding China today.

Another important dimension is recognising the energy and determination with which hundreds of millions of Chinese have gone about fulfilling their own personal dreams. Since Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the People’s Republic’s second revolution, set the nation on a path of reform and opening in the late 1970s, people have taken advantage of the freedom of choice brought about by Deng’s actions in every conceivable way. Today they may start a company, change jobs, own an apartment (or several), buy airline tickets, educate their child at a private school or even overseas, find a partner using online dating services, and purchase food, consumer goods and just about any other service online. In 1978 the average annual per capita income was US$155; in 2016 it was US$8200.¹

The relentless desire to make tomorrow a better day still propels China forward. Evan Osnos, an award-winning American journalist who wrote about the years he lived in China (2005–2013), aptly titled his book Age of Ambition. He describes a shift in thinking among Chinese people from determinism to a fervent belief in the ability to alter one’s life, regardless of the circumstances. As one of the book’s characters notes: ‘Why should I be like everyone else, just because I was born to a poor family?’²

A high degree of ambition certainly is a characteristic Xi shares with Chinese people. But before comparing and contrasting the dreams of China’s leaders with those of its populace, it is useful to try to understand what Xi wants to achieve with his China Dream.

While the China Dream alludes to a range of aspirations, it also has some clearly defined objectives. These are the Two Centenary Goals: to ‘comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society’, defined as doubling 2010 GDP and per capita income by 2021; and to ‘build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious’ by 2049. In 2021 the Party celebrates its hundredth birthday; 2049 marks a century since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

Raising the living standards of the Chinese people continues to be the primary focus of the Party under Xi. It is imperative for keeping stability in society and maintaining acceptance of CPC rule. Doubling the 2010 per capita income translates into an average annual income in China of US$9000 by 2021. In purchasing-power terms, that would put China at the same level as Mexico and Brazil.³ But because China is set to pass the goal of US$9000 before 2021, analysts predict China will by then be on par with Italy.⁴

However, because of the gigantic absolute numbers and mind-boggling disparities of everything related to China, comparisons with other countries rarely capture the whole picture. Per capita income in China is brought down by the 151 million Chinese who still live in extreme poverty (under US$1.90 per day), as well as the 360 million who live on less than US$3.10 per day.⁵ Only one-fifth of the population is regarded as wealthy or middle class, loosely defined as a person with a post-secondary education who owns a house and has sufficient disposable income for non-essential consumption and travel. But in absolute numbers that is 225 million households.⁶ McKinsey and Co estimates that by 2022, some 300 million urban households will be considered affluent, upper middle class or middle class.⁷

The goal of making China a middle-class society is based on Xi’s stated objective to make the private sector ‘the decisive factor’ in the Chinese economy.⁸ As will become evident in the following chapters, this is indeed an ambitious objective.

Xi appeals to cultural greatness

A major aim of Xi’s China Dream is to realise the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Just hours after becoming CPC General Secretary in November 2012, Xi said that the Party had ‘rallied and led the Chinese people in transforming the poor and backward Old China into an increasingly prosperous and powerful New China, thus opening a completely new horizon for the great renewal of the Chinese nation’.⁹ Two weeks later he led the country’s most powerful leaders through an exhibition called ‘The Road to Renewal’ at the National Museum of China and spoke specifically about the China Dream.

Xi sent a host of messages on that first day as China’s new leader. At a nationally televised meeting with the media he spoke unambiguous standard Mandarin, conspicuously avoiding often-incomprehensible Marxist political jargon. That in itself was noteworthy. Xi said he understood that ordinary people aspired to good jobs, better social security, better education for their kids and a better environment. He spoke of China being a great nation with a great people; of China’s 5000-year history and its great culture; and of the unusual hardship Chinese people had suffered in the past. He acknowledged the need to resolve the problems of corruption, alienation of CPC officials from the people, and bureaucratism.

There was no mistaking his message. China’s new leader wanted to be perceived as a man who has ordinary citizens’ interests at heart; who wishes all Chinese to feel pride about belonging to a great nation with a great culture; and who wants China to become strong and respected in the family of nations. In subsequent speeches and writings attributed to Xi, he has emphasised that the China Dream and the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation entail making China strong again in every conceivable way – economically, militarily, politically, culturally, scientifically, technologically – to make sure the Chinese people do not suffer the humiliations of the past.

Do these desires resonate with Chinese people? Absolutely. The China Dream reflects a historical yearning for wealth, power, respect and global standing. The China Dream fulfils a need to make up for lost time.

Chinese people are no different from any other people in their feelings of pride for their country. Chinese are especially proud of their 5000 years of civilisation, proud of the country’s name ‘Middle Kingdom’, reflecting the perception of China at the centre of the universe, and proud of the nation’s immense accomplishments over the past four decades of modernisation. Chinese wish for China to once again be a respected nation in the international community. For most Chinese that means China must be strong. The vast majority of Chinese agree with Xi’s vision – and that of the leaders before him – that China must strive to attain wealth, power and greatness.

Xi strikes a chord when he constantly speaks about China’s rich cultural heritage. Overseas Chinese, including Australian-Chinese, are proud of that heritage too. This can cause conflicting emotions in those who do not feel an attachment to the PRC or in those who abhor some of the policies of the PRC but still love their Chinese cultural heritage.

Intermingled with understandable pride and patriotism is a legacy of victimhood. Every PRC citizen under the age of seventy was taught – and taught again – at school that Chinese people suffered horribly at the hands of outsiders – especially Japan and Western powers – during the ‘century of humiliation’, approximately from the 1840s to the 1940s, which indeed they did. They are taught that, had it not been for the Party, the Chinese people would not have ‘stood up’ in 1949 and hundreds of millions of people would not have been lifted out of poverty and hundreds of millions more would not have moved into the ranks of the middle class. This too is a reasonable statement, though it is first and foremost the Chinese people who deserve credit for these achievements. The ‘celebration of national insecurity’, as William Callahan of the London School of Economics has called the ongoing emphasis on national humiliation, is a prominent feature of children’s education.¹⁰

But, importantly, the narrative continues through adulthood. New books, articles, television programs, theatre, operas, theme parks and museum exhibitions today still send subtle or less subtle messages about the need to be vigilant so that the century of humiliation is never repeated. To quote Zheng Wang of Seton Hall University, the century of humiliation is a ‘lasting trauma seared into the national conscious [sic]’.¹¹ One is constantly reminded that China was subjugated by outsiders because it was weak, and the Party is to be thanked for making China strong again.

Humiliation can also be a driver of energy, according to China scholars Orville Schell and John Delury. In their book Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century, they write: ‘Through a strange alchemy, based on an old Confucian idea that humiliation stimulates effort, the shame that stemmed from humiliation and defeat generated a steely determination to become strong again.’¹²

Whether a stimulant or a depressant, the elaborate layers of humiliation and shame that are part of the national psyche in China today create troubling undercurrents. Humiliation and shame inhibit the formation of a neutral view of other countries. During any one day, a Chinese person listening to the radio might hear a senior official point out that China seeks peaceful relations with other countries, based on mutual trust and mutual respect – and China expects others to adhere to this principle as well. From another official the listener will hear a reference to the century of humiliation, implicitly warning that foreigners can never be trusted because they might push China down again. Some officials go so far as to say that is precisely what the United States, Japan, and other Westerners are generally trying to do.

The ongoing public education that keeps alive the lessons of the century of humiliation is not unique to Xi’s leadership. With each new CPC general secretary, the messaging has become more sophisticated to appeal to new generations of Chinese in a connected and globalised world.

The explicit goal of the ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ is not novel to Xi Jinping either. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), considered by people on both the mainland and Taiwan as the father of modern China, spoke of the need for rejuvenation. So did twenty-first-century reform leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Even use of the word ‘dream’ was not coined by Xi. Chinese writers had incorporated the word into various arguments over the past decade during fierce internal debates about how to make China strong and wealthy. New terms were adopted in the 1990s to replace old Marxist-Leninist maxims which became less important as a justification for CPC policies. This was especially so after the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders relied less on ideology and more on national pride. This changed in the months following Xi’s ascent to power. Xi is intent on reinvigorating the Party. He has tried hard to reinforce the importance of ideology alongside national pride.

Xi’s appeal to ideology is likely to be an uphill battle. It is not at all certain that CPC members, let alone ordinary Chinese citizens, are ready to return to the days when policies were justified by ideological reasoning. The appeal to patriotism is complex too because the CPC equates love for one’s country with love for the Party. Whether Chinese people actually embrace this notion is also questionable.

The Party intentionally stokes nationalist sentiment to reinforce the message of the Party’s indispensability. As Xi Jinping has made clear, the goals of rejuvenating the nation, keeping China unified and avoiding anything akin to the century of humiliation must (and can only) happen under the leadership of the Party.

The era of submissiveness is over

Xi’s rise to power and promotion of the China Dream have been accompanied by a ferocious expression of nationalist views in officially sanctioned media outlets. At the turn of the twenty-first century, hardcore nationalists who were anti-Western were still considered relatively marginalised and were only allowed to rant and rage online. Today they are mainstream voices in the public sphere.

There are numerous reasons for this, including competition among television, radio, online and print media outlets as a consequence of the rise of social media, and, unmistakably, the merging of top-down state nationalism and bottom-up popular nationalism under the metaphorical umbrella of Xi’s China Dream. Here state nationalism means the interests of the Communist state to ensure loyalty of the citizenry. The leadership uses nationalism to bolster the population’s faith in the Party’s ability to guide the nation through an era of rapid and turbulent transformation.¹³ Popular nationalism is expressed in emotional outbursts at perceived slights to China and the Chinese people.

What has further changed since Xi’s ascent to power in late 2012 is his emphasis on the need for China – while upholding stability – to forcefully defend its rights and interests when dealing with outsiders. During his predecessor’s ten years in power, maintaining stability was the overriding objective. ‘Upholding stability’ was code for avoiding risks, especially in the international arena, to ensure domestic political stability and economic growth. China needed to continue to modernise and accumulate power. Of slightly lesser importance was defending sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under Xi these two goals appear in official texts in reverse order: first comes defending sovereignty a...