The Dark Side of European Integration

Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe

Alina Polyakova

• Publisher: Ibidem Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9783838267968
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Radicalism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Across Europe, radical right-wing parties are winning increasing electoral support. The Dark Side of European Integration argues that this rising nationalism and the mobilization of the radical right are the consequences of European economic integration. The European economic project has produced a cultural backlash in the form of nationalist radical right ideologies. This assessment relies on a detailed analysis of the electoral rise of radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. Contrary to popular belief, economic performance and immigration rates are not the only factors that determine the far right's success. There are other political and social factors that explain why in post-socialist Eastern European countries such parties had historically been weaker than their potential, which they have now started to fulfill increasingly. Using in-depth interviews with radical right activists in Ukraine, Alina Polyakova also explores how radical right mobilization works on the ground through social networks, allowing new insights into how social movements and political parties interact.

Chapter One
Introduction

It remained only to decide the political shape of the new order that must now replace the unrecoverable past.

—Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.

—The Schuman Declaration

Ravaged by years of war, mid-twentieth century Europe was a disaster in every meaning of the word. World War II had effectively bankrupted the major European economies. Countless cities in the East and West lay wasted, and the sheer magnitude of human loss—over 60 million killed—left the European continent devastated and its remaining population exhausted. In 1945, an observer standing on the rubble of Berlin, Warsaw, or any other post-war city, would find it difficult to predict what the future could hold. With the past effectively annihilated, a new Europe was bound to take shape, but the type of economic, political, and social order that would arise from those ashes by the end of the twentieth century remained unimaginable in 1945.

If our casual observer were transported from the wasteland of immediate postwar Europe to the Europe of 2014, the economic prosperity of the once ruined central European cities such as Berlin or Warsaw would immediately have shocked her. And if she spent more time there, she would discover even more surprising and once unimaginable changes: our observer, for example, could board a train from Berlin to Rome without ever being asked to show her passport. Passing through Austria and Switzerland, she would not need to be concerned whether she was holding the appropriate documents, and upon arrival in Rome, she could use the same currency she had elsewhere throughout the continent. If she decided to look for a job in Italy, she could start immediately, without needing to obtain a work permit. If she were a well-educated professional, she would find others like her who considered themselves Europeans, just as much or even more so than Germans or Italians. Finally, she would be quite surprised to learn that the Soviet Union, which, in her time, controlled all lands up to the German border, and even half of Berlin, no longer existed, and that most of the once socialist Eastern Bloc republics now constituted a twenty-seven country union, replete with its own supra-national political institutions. The rhetorical device of the postwar observer only goes so far, but it does illustrate the dramatic micro and macro changes that have taken place in Europe in the last seventy years.

Many of these changes—such as the Schengen zone agreement allowing for the free movement of individuals between countries and the common currency of the Euro—have made contemporary Europe feel more like a single country than a collection of once antagonistic nation-states. The European Union, which began as a limited coal and mining partnership, now stretches from Lisbon to Romania. The Balkan states and Turkey are now candidate countries, and, further east, countries such as Ukraine are waiting to sign association agreements. Step-by-step, Europe has become ever more economically and politically interdependent; meanwhile, EU member states have prospered tremendously in the process. Among the EU’s most important achievements has been the maintenance of long-term peace on the continent. In recognition of this success, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Committee 2012). From our 2014 vantage, another world war on Europe’s soil is practically unthinkable.

But economic and political interdependence was never the sole goal of European integration to the architects of the EU project. Enshrining the notion of European social solidarity, representatives from France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg gathered in 1950 to sign the Schuman Declaration, which laid the groundwork for what would become the European Union. Although economic and political interdependence alone would have been enough to prevent future wars, in the devastating aftermath of World War II, the vision of a new Europe emphasized cultural integration. The Schuman Declaration envisioned an economic and political institutional framework that would eventually engender a cultural and social solidarity throughout Europe. As Jean Monnet, who along with Schuman is known as one of the founders of the European Union, famously declared in 1952, “We are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men.” As Monnet’s vision suggests, New Europe was to be a social union of European citizens grounded in the common historical and philosophical heritage of Enlightenment ideals. It was to be the beacon of democracy and tolerance. And Europe’s common currency, the Euro, was to be more than a medium of exchange: it was to mark a uniquely European identity.[1]

In many ways, the European Union has lived up to this ideal of supra-national solidarity: compared to fifty or even twenty years ago, more Europeans speak foreign languages, spend significant time outside their country, and identify as Europeans (Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). While these trends do provide some evidence for increasing cultural integration, scholars examining European identity agree that no overarching sense of “Europeanness” has emerged (Fligstein et al. 2012). For every individual that identifies solely as European, there are ten times as many who see themselves in strictly national terms. Residents of Europe continue to identify primarily as German, Italian, or Romanian. In fact, many see the EU as an elitist project, imposed from the top on an unwilling population.

This charge of elitism may stem from the fact that the average European rarely interacts with any of the major EU institutions, such as the European Parliament. Yet, EU politics have become increasingly influential in national politics (Risse 2010). Rather than embracing this influence, many individuals—especially those who do not see themselves as benefitting from the EU project—feel not only disconnected from the EU, but also resentful of its interference in what were once solely national issues. The 2008 economic crisis intensified these sentiments, as national governments—without control over their national currency—were left helpless to abate the crisis. Further, the EU’s highly unpopular austerity policies, pushed through in already hard-hit countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy, have confirmed the sentiment that EU policies benefit European elites at the expense of the majority. Unevenness—between countries and individuals—thus characterizes New Europe more so than cultural unity.

The Dark Side of Europe

As Europe, through the EU, has moved toward greater supra-national integration, another side of European identity and politics has emerged. If our time traveler from the immediate postwar period remained in modern day Europe, she would notice that in some of Western Europe’s most prosperous economies, such as those in Austria, France, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, voters support radical right parties in shockingly high numbers. Such political parties advocate for everything that the European Union claims it does not: intolerance toward “non-European” immigrants, stricter border controls, exclusionary social redistribution policies, and, most importantly, preservation of national tradition and culture. At the core of the radical right’s ideology is nationalism in its ethnic form (Hainsworth 2008), which “condense[s] the idea of nation into an image of collective homogeneity” (Minkenberg 2002:337). Once considered ephemeral phenomena, radical right parties have become a mainstay in the very countries that are supposed to lead Europe toward the fulfillment of enlightenment ideals. The persistence of these parties and the continued salience of national identities signal that, behind Europe’s many exalted achievements, lies a dark side.

This book is about that dark side of Europe. Specifically, I examine how nationalism, as a radical political movement, manifests in contemporary Europe as support for radical right political parties and as a process of political mobilization.[2] Each of the chapters focuses on an aspect of nationalism. The paradox uniting all the chapters is the seeming contradiction between Europe’s EU project of cultural integration and the continued salience and perseverance of nationalism as an ideology, a category of belonging, and a political project.

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