Ecological Economics for the Anthropocene

An Emerging Paradigm

Peter Brown, Peter Timmerman

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780231540421
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Ecology
• Index: Biological Sciences

Ecological Economics for the Anthropocene provides an urgently needed alternative to the long-dominant neoclassical economic paradigm of the free market, which has focused myopically—even fatally—on the boundless production and consumption of goods and services without heed to environmental consequences. The emerging paradigm for ecological economics championed in this new book recenters the field of economics on the fact of the Earth's limitations, requiring a total reconfiguration of the goals of the economy, how we understand the fundamentals of human prosperity, and, ultimately, how we assess humanity's place in the community of beings.

Each essay in this volume contributes to an emerging, revolutionary agenda based on the tenets of ecological economics and advances new conceptions of justice, liberty, and the meaning of an ethical life in the era of the Anthropocene. Essays highlight the need to create alternative signals to balance one-dimensional market-price measurements in judging the relationships between the economy and the Earth's life-support systems. In a lively exchange, the authors question whether such ideas as "ecosystem health" and the environmental data that support them are robust enough to inform policy. Essays explain what a taking-it-slow or no-growth approach to economics looks like and explore how to generate the cultural and political will to implement this agenda. This collection represents one of the most sophisticated and realistic strategies for neutralizing the threat of our current economic order, envisioning an Earth-embedded society committed to the commonwealth of life and the security and true prosperity of human society.

PART I

PROPOSED ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The first section of the book explores a reconsideration of the ethical foundations of ecological economics, beginning with a summary statement outlining what we consider to be the necessary basic elements of such foundations. It then proceeds through different articulations of the consequences of embracing these elements.

Summary Statement

We start from the belief that ecological economics has only begun to consider the radical implications of its original promise—that its journey is unfinished. Part of what is unfinished is the consideration of a new ethical foundation based on the insights of ecological economics, and this foundation cannot be laid without considering the implications of those insights. Among the reasons why the journey is unfinished are the following: (1) standard economics continues to mesmerize its possible critics; (2) there is appeal in tinkering around the edges of standard economics through various forms of what is usually referred to as “environmental economics”; and (3) it is immensely difficult to come to terms with the urgency and true dimensions of the planetary crisis—a difficulty shared with most people who have tried to face it.

The fundamental, original premise of ecological economics is to consider the human economy as embedded in and part of natural ecology—that is (among other things), the dynamics of the physical world—energy, matter, entropy, evolution, etc.—have been neglected by standard economics. Crucially, we now believe that this neglect imperils the present and future well-being of humanity and the other creatures with whom we share heritage and destiny. The extraordinary ethical shift that ecological economics needs to incorporate into its workings is that these physical demands have ethical implications; that is, ecological facts are values, and “is” has become “ought.” The German philosopher Hans Jonas made the fundamental point that there “ought” to be a continuation of “is,” otherwise there will no longer be any ethics or anything else; his “ontological imperative” therefore is that nothing should be done to threaten the continued flourishing of life on earth. These are ethical claims about the implications of certain qualities of the physical world.

Concerning the ethical foundations of ecological economics, we propose three interlocking postulates:

(1) Membership: Humans are members, not masters, of the community of life.

(2) Householding: The earth and the living systems on and in it should not be seen as merely “natural resources.” They are worthy of respect and care in their own right.

(3) Entropic Thrift: Low-entropy sources and sink capacities, the things that undergird life’s possibilities and flourishing, must be used with care and shared fairly. Ecological economics is inexorably and fundamentally about justice.

Taken together, these postulates can be understood—and should be lived—as foundational to an ethos of right relationship with life and the world. Versions of these postulates and their accompanying ethos can be found in indigenous and traditional economic systems, past and present, and we have much to learn from them.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

“The Ethics of Re-Embedding Economics in the Real: Case Studies,” by Peter Timmerman

Peter Timmerman’s chapter presents a series of case studies or examples of economic systems that operate according to nonstandard economic theory as a way of illuminating economic elements, practices, and concepts that do not “fit” the theory. These case studies were also chosen for a number of other reasons, of which the most important is to highlight the fact that standard economic theory is anomalous in human history. It is based on a very specific range of assumptions drawn from a very specific period in modern history—a historical artifact of a particular period of thought and time rather than a universal truth. The alternative cases sketched out in this chapter range from hunter-gatherer economic practices (the Nayaka of India) through complex sustainable agricultural systems (Bali) to Western economic approaches that were consigned to the so-called dustbin of history (Aristotelean, medieval, etc.). They highlight social, cultural, physical, and ethical factors in actual economic practices throughout history and in contemporary life that have been eliminated, downplayed, or too narrowly construed by standard theory. These alternatives provide resources for reconsidering and recasting economics within a more “embedded” ecological and ethical world.

“Ethics for Economics in the Anthropocene,” by Peter G. Brown

Peter Brown argues that ecological economics has profound ethical implications. He points out that ethical systems typically have at least five features, although they can be weighted and may function extremely differently. These features are: a foundation or justification, postulates, structured principles or rules, virtues, and a guiding metaphor or ethos. First, to work toward an appropriate foundation, he grounds his argument in an affirmation of human life; however, he places the understanding of what life is in broader contexts (e.g., what it means to be a person). Then, as already outlined, Brown wishes us to accept the three interlocking postulates of membership, householding, and entropic thrift. Following on from these and moving forward to proposed principles or rules, Brown notes that ecological economics has an implicit structure of concern. These are matters of scale or size of the economy relative to the earth’s capacities, fair distribution of these capacities, and efficiency in allocation. Brown argues that each of these, although valid, has stronger ethical implications for the unfinished journey of ecological economics than has hitherto been explored. For example, although “efficiency” is a core concept in ecological economics, it remains constricted by the neoclassical conception. Once scale and distribution concerns have been met, a more complex and highly modified version of the neoclassical conception of efficiency comes into play. Brown further argues that in an enriched ethical perspective, notions like “virtue” become important as part of the emerging ethos of ecological economics. We require such virtues as courage, epistemological humility, and a sense of (and quest for) atonement for what has already been wrought by our carelessness and attempts at domination. Ultimately, however, we cannot take our first ethical step upon presumed ideas about what we ought to do. Rather, it must emerge from an empirical understanding of our place in a broader community of life.

“Justice Claims Underpinning Ecological Economics,” by Richard Janda and Richard Lehun

Richard Janda and Richard Lehun link the insights drawn from the previous two chapters by contrasting the constellation of justice claims recognized in the existing market economy with those that would be recognized in an ecological economy. The existing market economy has “flattened” possible conceptions of justice so as to include only the sum of individual preferences. Thus, it excludes any claims upon us from the world or from outside of ourselves, which can be called metaphysical claims. Absent an accounting for metaphysical claims, there is no exogenous principle that might serve to correct or adjust the outcomes of our preferences. Metaphysical justice claims, characteristic of premodern societies, were displaced and repressed by the Enlightenment project in the name of emancipation. Emancipation now confronts an impasse it created. Rather than the free will willing itself to be free, to use Hegel’s formula, the free will that is not other-regarding wills its own destruction in appropriating and depleting all life-support capacity. Ecological economics cannot maintain a justice conception that relies on a self-regarding calculus of utility functions. Rather, it must begin to model the interaction of self-regarding and other-regarding justice conceptions as it plots a trajectory toward fair and reproducible shares of Earth’s life-support capacity. Thus, it will expand its conception of the household and of its members and will shift attention to rendering justice with entropic thrift for present and future generations.

An ecological economy would thus not only be an economy of taking “resources” but also an economy of safeguarding the prospects of life into the future. This has practical, substantive implications. The governance of economic actors would have to be redesigned to ensure that they are accountable for producing environmental and social benefits, not only to produce return for shareholders. Economic transactions would have to be restructured so as to send both a price signal reflecting private utility and a social score reflecting the burden of the transaction on public goods. The tax regime would have to be reconceived so as to channel the resources of the gift economy into the environmental and social goods that are now depleted through collective action. Also, the basic policy framework for the deployment of economic instruments—cost-benefit analysis—would have to be replaced by a full life-cycle accounting scheme to ensure the mitigation of any effects of a project or activity that tend toward transgressing planetary boundaries. Nonetheless, any new justice model will entail new sets of unrecognized and unanticipated justice claims. Ecological economics should already begin to model the inadequacy of its emerging justice conception, particularly in its application to existing norms.

CHAPTER ONE

The Ethics of Re-Embedding Economics in the Real: Case Studies

PETER TIMMERMAN

A picture held us captive.

—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

Americans are not addicted to oil, Americans are addicted to freedom—the freedom to move freely and independently where and when we want.

—Neoconservative former Virginia governor George Allen, 2008

The good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the wicked man orders the whole in relation to himself. The latter makes himself the centre of all things, the former measures his radius and keeps to the circumference. Then he is oriented to the common centre, which is God, and in relation to all the concentric circles, which are the creatures.

—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a series of case studies or examples of economic systems that operate according to nonstandard economic theory as a way of illuminating economic practices and concepts that do not “fit” standard theory. These case studies were chosen for this book to help explore themes in ecological economics, but their most important function is to underscore the fact that standard economic theory is anomalous in human history. It is based on a specific range of assumptions drawn from a specific period in modern history—a historical artifact of a particular period of thought and time rather than a universal truth. Claims to universal theoretical purity are a recurring feature of various historical periods and movements and were never more attractive, perhaps, than to nineteenth-century Western societies, faced with the emergence of physics and mathematics as world-defining powers.

If we intend to replace standard economic theory, it is important to understand why this theory has been so seductive and so powerful for so long. Central to the appeal of standard or mainstream economics has been its ideal quality: it describes a modeled world that enables, among other things, mathematizable descriptions of its operations once one adopts its basic assumptions. It is immensely powerful in its operations, providing for most people the most readily available model of a self-organizing system that appears to work out its complexities all by itself (the infamous “invisible hand”). It encapsulates and appears to explain a wide variety of human experience, from ordinary transactions in daily life to global movements of goods, services, finances, etc. It also embodies a plausible if debased model of social interaction. As a kind of bonus, it also has ethical and political implications; for instance, it refuses to make moral judgments about what people wish to spend their money on, and it is severe on external interference with transactions. Furthermore, and perhaps most prominently, it has until recently been associated with the rise of liberal democracies, capitalism, and “progress” generally. The elision of “freedom” with “free, frictionless motion” underpins the godlike power of the market that punishes and rewards from a passionless, apolitical standpoint—and claims to being universal and apolitical (markets, nature) are among the most powerful political moves there are.

The difficulty with ideal models, of course, is their relationship to reality, which is full of particulars and details and is messier and more “abundant” (Feyerabend 1999) than any model. This is not to dispute the value of models and modeling. However, the further an ideal model strays from reality, the less heuristic it becomes if the understanding of reality is the object (the neoconservative economist Milton Friedman [1953] famously disagreed with this). Also, as will be discussed shortly, there is a difference between ideal models in physical systems and ideal models in social systems (although many people confuse the two for good and bad reasons). In the case of standard economics, a variety of challenges have been made over the years, to which theoreticians have responded with various forms of improving, tinkering, or simply saving face. These challenges have included concerns over basic elements of the model, including the assumptions of perfect information, the rationality of the actors, the mysterious origins of the “desires” of the actors, the misappropriation of physical analogies, and so on. In recent years, the number of challenges has increased to the point where—to the unfriendly observer—economics is in a Ptolemaic state; that is, it is attempting to protect an outdated vision of an earth-circling cosmos through the endless addition of epicycle after epicycle so as to save the foundational explanation of increasingly awkward phenomena.

Part of the contention of ecological economics is that it has brought forward the one element in the current theoretical economic system that cannot be persuaded or ultimately coerced into its fortress walls: the physical realm. As noted already, there are differences between models of physical systems and social systems, and one clear difference is that physical systems are unpersuadable by rhetoric: gravity operates, whatever one may think or complain about it; by contrast, people can be persuaded to believe in a seductive model of a social system and then proceed to try and alter their world accordingly. The great danger of standard economic theory is not that it models the way people act; rather, it takes elements of how people might act and then does what it can to prove that that is how they do in fact act—or if they do not act in that way, they are somehow in the wrong or misguided as to the true nature of what they are doing “deep down.” As this theory increasingly pervades the social world, more and more people become convinced by it—and in some cases benefit mightily from it; thus, people’s behavior, and the social and cultural worlds that support it, alters accordingly. People proceed to see the world through the lens of th...