Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control

Interests, Conflicts, and Justice

Gary Bertsch, Howard Wiarda, William Keller, Harald Müller, Carmen Wunderlich

• Publisher: University of Georgia Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9780820344249
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 21st Century History
• Index: History

This volume comprehensively covers a range of issues related to dynamic norm change in the current major international arms control regimes related to nuclear, biological,and chemical weapons; small arms and light weapons; cluster munitions; and antipersonnel mines. Arms control policies of all of the key established and rising state actors are considered, as well as those of nonaligned countries, nongovernmental organizations, and international governing bodies.

Recent studies on multilateral arms control tend to focus mostly on "structure," by which opportunities and constraints for action are created. This volume pays equal attention to "agency," through which opportunities and constraints to produce change or maintain the status quo are handled. In addition-and in greater depth than in recent studies-the volume acknowledges the force of moral and ethical impulses (alongside such factors as political, legal, and technological change) in the evolution of arms control norms.

The volume begins with a look at the structure of regimes, at the conflicts residing in these structures, and at the dynamic processes in which these conflicts are worked out. The impact of extrinsic factors on norm dynamics is considered next, including technological change and shifts in attitudes and power structures. Essays on the role of agency in driving norm change conclude the volume, with a particular focus on norm entrepreneurship and the importance of acknowledging the competing justice claims surrounding norm-change efforts.

Contributors: Una Becker-Jakob, Alexis Below, Marco Fey, Giorgio Franceschini, Andrea Hellmann, Gregor Hofmann, Friederike Klinke, Daniel Müller, Harald Müller, Franziska Plümmer, Carsten Rauch, Judith Reuter, Elvira Rosert, Annette Schaper, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Tabea Seidler-Diekmann, Simone Wisotzki, Carmen Wunderlich.

CHAPTER ONE
Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics

Carmen Wunderlich

THIS CHAPTER ELABORATES our understanding of “norms,” introduces the concept of “norm dynamics,” and establishes the central role of norm contestedness/contestability for the dynamic evolution of norms and regimes. We deal with individual norms here, but even more so with regimes as “sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” (Krasner 1983, 2), because multilateral arms control norms are usually embedded in such regimes.

We are interested in understanding the process of how norms—and thus regimes—develop, that is, how they emerge, diffuse, become internalized, and, once established, become subject to change resulting in their strengthening, weakening, or even erosion. This is what is called norm dynamics.¹ We regard the evolution of norms as triggered by three driving forces: intraregime norm conflicts, exogenous factors, and—as a necessary condition—norm entrepreneurs who seize windows of opportunity that emanate from these factors and set out to alter the prevalent normative structure. As our focus is on states as norm entrepreneurs, drastic domestic changes within states are also regarded as inducing norm change as in the case of major political upheavals or revolutions.²

Thus we are trying to contribute to research on norms in three ways:

• Starting from the fundamental contestedness and ambiguity of norms (see Sandholtz 2007; Wiener 2008), we highlight the role of intraregime norm conflicts for the path regimes and single norms take once they are established. We thus transcend mainstream norm studies that tend to treat successful internalization as the end point of a norm’s career (see also Sandholtz and Stiles 2009; introduction to this volume).

• Recognizing the—frequently criticized (Elgström 2000; Sending 2002)—static-structuralist bias of constructivist research on norms, we place the emphasis on change as driven by agency, inquiring into the role of norm entrepreneurs not only in initiating norm establishment but also in norm maintenance and change.

• Noting the focus of mainstream (liberal-inspired) research on norms on supposedly “good” norms and amiable norm entrepreneurs, we also look at the possibility of (“oppositional”) norms promoted by not so liberal, radical norm entrepreneurs.

NORMS AND THE LOGICS OF ACTION

The social sciences generally approach norms via two paradigms: Whereas cognitivist approaches (constructivists and poststructuralists) focus on the normativity of norms as setting standards of appropriateness, rationalists treat norms as emerging from actors’ rational preference-based calculations (Axelrod 1986, 1097; Thomson 1994, 79–80). Both modes of access are linked to different logics of action³: the first one emphasizes that norms regulate actors’ behavior due to a logic of appropriateness, while the second one sees a logic of consequences at work. Embedded in rationalist theorizing, proponents of the latter logic constrain the role of norms to the instrumental implementation of exogenous interests: actors observe norms motivated by their utilitarian cost-benefit calculations when they perceive the benefits of compliance as outweighing the costs of norm adherence (Axelrod 1986). It is mainly to regulative norms that rationalist-institutionalist approaches refer; rationalist regime theory usually confines the term norms to “institutional device[s] to facilitate interaction” (Gehring 1994, 374; see also Keohane 1989).⁴ While treated as intervening variables in rationalist-institutionalist theory, norms are ostensibly rejected by realists: at best, norms are regarded as dependent variables that reflect the interests of the major powers (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 13). “Hegemonic norms” (Goertz and Diehl 1992, 640) are used by powerful actors to preserve their superiority. Rationalist approaches explain norm adherence by actors who do not benefit from the respective norms as resulting from material incentives (sanctions), coercion, or social pressure (loss of reputation). Hence, states abide by norms because it is in their interest to do so, or because they are forced into compliance (Krasner 1999).

Invoking a logic of appropriateness instead, constructivists attribute to norms explanatory power for actors’ behavior as they influence both the formation and change of actors’ preferences and identities. By describing common understandings of appropriate behavior and providing corresponding rules, norms enable orientation in a complex social environment: they serve as “rules of the road” (Kratochwil 1989, 24), coordinating behavior and facilitating cooperation in constellations of conflicting interests. Beyond regulative effects, constructivists attribute to norms a constitutive function. As the “cement of society” (Elster 1989), they not only constrain the actors’ scope of action but constitute their identities and interests in the first place (March and Olsen 1998, 951–52). Norm adherence results not from external sanctions or coercion but from a feeling of obligation and “oughtness” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891)—actors follow normative prescriptions because their identity tells them to do so. Empirical evidence supports the constructivist proposition that norms are more than the corollary of rationalist calculations (e.g., Klotz 1995; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996a; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).⁵ We support the constructivist approach and also adopt the conventional definition of norms as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996b, 5; see also Klotz 1995, 14; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891).

FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NORMS

Constructivist research on norms basically focuses on three distinguishing features (see, e.g., Finnemore 1996, 22–23; Florini 1996, 364): First, norms provide standards of appropriateness for actors with a common, shared identity—that is, they have an intersubjective character. Second, norms generate regular patterns of behavior for actors with a shared identity. And, third, they contain a “prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of ‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; emphasis added). In terms of more detailed characteristics, conceptual frictions abound. While some authors see morality as inherent to norms (e.g., Nadelmann 1990; Price 2008), others identify mere functional norms in addition to moral ones (e.g., Bull 1977, 53; Elster 1989, 89–90). In our understanding (see also the introduction to this volume), norms inevitably carry ethical content, albeit with varying intensity depending on the type of norm (social, legal, moral; see Deitelhoff 2006), as even mere functional norms are tied to a higher normative order, and supporting or defying a norm thus carries a positive or negative ethical value because each non-observance might imply defying the prevailing order per se. Another contested attribute relates to the relationship between norms and interests. At times, following a logic of appropriateness might indeed conflict with pursuing one’s own interests. As argued in the introduction to this volume, however, even self-interest has an underlying normative underpinning, and thus, in reality, norms and interests stand in a dialectical relationship to each other: norms express institutionalized interests, whereas, conversely, interests are defined by norms (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54; Müller 2004). Norms vary widely with regard to the distinctiveness of their prescriptions or their scope (local, national, regional, societal, etc.) as well as the degree of importance attached to them. Norms placed high in the hierarchy of a normative system may be usefully distinguished from ordinary norms as metanorms (Kelsen 1967; Fastenrath 1993; Frost 1996) lending validity to all other norms; one example is justice (see the introduction to this volume).⁶ The exact meaning of and the rules emanating from metanorms are a matter of interpretation and thus subject to contestation, as is true for all norms (Wiener 2008; Sandholtz and Stiles 2009).

The contestedness of both the meaning and relative importance of single norms within a norm system have so far been insufficiently acknowledged by norm research. We address this lacuna by focusing on the dynamic interplay of single norms and regimes as systems of norms, paying tribute not only to competing norms and continuing negotiation and interpretation processes about their meaning but also to consequences that emanate from complex normative systems and their perception by actors. Norms not only provide public goods, but they also distribute benefits, costs, and participation opportunities, thereby rendering norm creating and maintaining processes justice-laden (Gehring 1994, 366) and power-laden endeavors (Epstein 2012; Towns 2012; Widmaier and Park 2012).

TAKING STOCK: THE RESEARCH ON NORM DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The last two decades have witnessed the evolution of a constructivist-inspired research program on norm dynamics in International Relations (IR) that proceeded in two waves (Cortell and Davis 2000, 66; Hoffmann 2010).⁷ The next section summarizes the main characteristics of both phases, putting emphasis on “critical” approaches that emerged in the course of second-wave norm studies and to which we also subscribe.⁸

From Demonstrating Effectiveness to Accounting for Norm Diffusion

During the early stages in the 1990s, norm studies were mainly occupied with defining boundaries vis-à-vis rationalist approaches by empirically demonstrating “that norms matter” (Checkel 1997, 473). Norms were conceptualized as independent variables, affecting actors’ preferences and identities by establishing intersubjective standards of appropriateness (Klotz 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of norms, a huge body of empirical studies emerged covering the full spectrum of international relations from security policy (Katzenstein 1996a; Price 1997; Tannenwald 1999) to human rights (Sikkink 1993; Klotz 1995; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), foreign aid (Lumsdaine 1993), and environmental policy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A major objective of these initial studies was to trace the process of norm diffusion through socialization processes, as a result of which a given norm spreads from one community to actors outside this community (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Checkel 2001). The mechanisms identified largely converged with those at work in norm emergence processes—that is, the transformation from ideas to norms—and include coercion, persuasion, learning, and emulation processes.

First-wave norm studies, for pragmatic reasons, treated norms as stable and constant phenomena and were thus stuck to a structuralist perspective, leaving only marginal space for the mutually constitutive effect of agency on norm dynamics. The impact of norms was conceptualized as a one-way street, simplifying the complex process of norm dynamics to “the structuring power of norms and their influence on state behavior in world politics” (Wiener 2009, 179) leading to progressive evolution. Feedback loops and the possibility of norm decay were dynamic aspects left out of mainstream research. By “freezing” (Hoffmann 2010, 5413) norms, early constructivist norm studies failed to provide comprehensive accounts of norm emergence and norm change in particular (Sending 2002). Subsequent studies thus shifted the focus to understanding norms as products of strategic social construction (Widmaier and Park 2012) and highlighted the role of agency in norm diffusion processes. Agency-based explanations emphasized the role of “norm entrepreneurs” who use ideational as well as material resources for their norm-initiating or norm-promoting activities (e.g., Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Nadelmann 1990; Haas 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896–901; Risse 2000; Payne 2001; Müller 2004). Still, however, these accounts predominantly adhered to a linear, unidirectional understanding of norm diffusion and conceptualized norm entrepreneurs as norm transmitters, leaving out the interactive aspect of norm dynamics.

A prominent example is the norm life cycle model according to which norms go through a three-stage process—a “patterned ‘life cycle’” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 888)—that develops from norm emergence to norm cascade and finally to norm internalization. Norm entrepreneurs are identified as the driving force for the emergence of new norms as they mobilize other actors to adopt a “norm candidate” framed as the solution to a salient problem. As soon as the (new) norm is accepted by a “critical mass” of actors, the “tipping point” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901) is reached, and a “norm cascade” starts.⁹ As the socialization process wears on, and more and more states acknowledge the validity of the emerging norm, the norm assumes a “taken-for-granted quality” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895) and is no longer challenged.

In a similar vein, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) elaborated a “spiral model” that highlighted the interplay between the domestic and transnational/international spheres in bringing about norm compliance. The authors suggest that norm diffusion processes are mainly initiated by nonstate transnational networks putting pressure on norm-violating governments through naming and shaming strategies. Faced with public attention, the target state will at first deny the accusations but ultimately enter a phase of tactical concessions by cautiously incorporating “norm talk” into the domestic discourse. Over time the norm-violating state may find itself rhetorically entrapped in its own (norm-abiding) rhetoric (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 25–28). In a final stage, the norm is internalized through processes of national implementation and institutionalization.¹⁰

In contrast, evolutionary models of norm diffusion take a structural approach instead. Florini (1996) draws an analogy between processes of norm development and Darwinian evolution, claiming that norms and genes share three characteristics¹¹: both are instructive to their hosts, are transmitted from one individual to another through biological (genes) and cultural (norms) inheritance, and are in constant competition with their peers, which renders them subject to natural selection. Norms emerge through reproduction processes as a result of which some norms prevail while others decline. As causes of success she suggests initial norm prominence, being promoted by norm entrepreneurs, fitting the existing norm pool, conducive attributes of the norm itself (legitimacy, coherence, and consistency), and favorable environmental conditions. She distinguishes between a vertical reproduction mechanism that is the persistence of a norm over generations and horizontal reproduction through emulation of successful behavior of others. Because genetic evolution is a process in which intentions play no role, while norm dynamics involve a variety of intention-driven actors, applying a Darwinist analogy does not strike us as germane to our field and is thus not given consideration in this study.

Norm Contestation and Norm Change

During the last decade, scholars have begun to develop detaile...